Theresa Fay Jerry v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company and Robert Valdespino as Trustee ( 2016 )


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  •                                Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-15-00663-CV
    Theresa Fay JERRY,
    Appellant
    v.
    DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY,
    Appellee
    From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2014-CI-05864
    Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
    Sitting:          Karen Angelini, Justice
    Marialyn Barnard, Justice
    Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: September 21, 2016
    AFFIRMED
    In the underlying lawsuit, Theresa Fay Jerry asserted various claims against Deutsche Bank
    National Trust Company arising out of a non-judicial foreclosure of Jerry’s home. Jerry appeals
    the trial court’s order granting Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the
    trial court’s order.
    BACKGROUND
    In 2006, Jerry obtained a loan to purchase a home and executed a note secured by a deed
    of trust. After Deutsche Bank foreclosed on the property in February of 2014, Jerry filed the
    04-15-00663-CV
    underlying lawsuit asserting various claims against Deutsche Bank which were premised on
    Deutsche Bank not being the owner and holder of the note. 1 Jerry alleged the assignment of the
    note and deed of trust to Deutsche Bank was void because a signature on the assignment was a
    forgery. In the alternative, Jerry alleged a breach of contract claim, asserting if Deutsche Bank
    was the holder of the note, it failed to properly credit her for payments.
    A year and a half after Jerry filed the lawsuit, Deutsche Bank filed a traditional and no-
    evidence motion for summary judgment, asserting there was no evidence Deutsche Bank was not
    the owner or holder of the note and no evidence it breached any contract. Jerry did not file a
    response to the motion. After a hearing, the trial court signed an order granting Deutsche Bank’s
    motion. Jerry appeals.
    INADEQUACY OF BRIEFING
    “The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require adequate briefing.” ERI Consulting
    Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 
    318 S.W.3d 867
    , 880 (Tex. 2010). “Specifically, Rule 38.1(i) requires
    that an appellant’s brief contain clear and concise arguments, ‘with appropriate citations to
    authorities and to the record.’” In re Estate of Valdez, 
    406 S.W.3d 228
    , 235 (Tex. App.—San
    Antonio 2013, pet. denied) (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)). “Failure to satisfy this requirement
    waives the issue on appeal.” 
    Id. Although we
    construe pro se briefs liberally, “pro se litigants still must comply with all
    applicable procedural rules.” Nevarez v. Inv. Retrievers, Inc., 
    324 S.W.3d 238
    , 239 (Tex. App.—
    El Paso 2010, no pet.). “An appellate court has no duty — or even right — to perform an
    independent review of the record and applicable law to determine whether there was error.”
    1
    The claims Jerry alleged based on this premise included a declaratory judgment claim, claims alleging violations of
    the Texas Business and Commerce Code, action to quiet title, and claims alleging violations of Chapter 12 of the
    Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
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    04-15-00663-CV
    Valadez v. Avitia, 
    238 S.W.3d 843
    , 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.). “Were we to do so,
    even on behalf of a pro se appellant, we would be abandoning our role as neutral adjudicators and
    become an advocate for that party.” 
    Id. Jerry’s initial
    brief raises six issues; however, the brief contains no citations to the record
    or to relevant authority. The only challenge Jerry makes to the summary judgment is the assertion
    that the attorney she hired should have filed a response with supporting evidence. Jerry also
    includes an affidavit of detailed facts concerning the mortgage. The affidavit, however, was not
    properly presented to the trial court as summary judgment evidence.
    After Deutsche Bank filed its brief, Jerry filed a “First Amended Brief and Reply Brief of
    Appellant,” and this court granted Jerry’s request that the brief be “taken as supplementation and
    under consideration as such in conjunction with the original brief.” This brief also contains no
    citations to the record. 2 The bulk of the discussion in this brief is under a section of the brief
    entitled, “Statements Regarding Oral Argument.” This discussion does not, however, relate to any
    specific issues raised in the brief. Liberally construing the brief, Jerry raises the following two
    identifiable issues: (1) “homeowners may bring a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure on the
    basis that the assignment of debt is invalid;” and (2) a “party’s lack of authority is a proper basis
    on which the foreclosing homeowner may challenge a foreclosure.” However, each of these issues
    refers to a wrongful foreclosure claim, and Jerry did not assert a claim for wrongful foreclosure in
    her pleadings.
    2
    It is unclear if certain statements in the brief refer to documents Jerry attached to her “Original Appeal of Motion to
    Summary Judgment” which was construed as a notice of appeal. The only evidence a trial court may consider in
    ruling on a motion for summary judgment, however, is evidence referred to or incorporated in the motion, the response,
    or a reply. See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Pham, 
    449 S.W.3d 230
    , 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
    no pet.); Sipes v. Petry & Stewart, 
    812 S.W.2d 428
    , 430 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ).
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    04-15-00663-CV
    Liberally construing Jerry’s briefs, we hold the only issue properly presented in the briefs
    is whether the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment because Deutsche Bank was
    without authority to foreclose on Jerry’s home. Any other issues raised in the briefs are waived.
    In re Estate of 
    Valdez, 406 S.W.3d at 235
    ; 
    Nevarez, 324 S.W.3d at 239
    .
    NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    With regard to Jerry’s assertion that Deutsche Bank was without authority to foreclose on
    her home, one of the grounds asserted by Deutsche Bank in its no-evidence motion for summary
    judgment was that no evidence existed that it was not the owner or holder of the note. In order to
    defeat summary judgment, Jerry was required to present summary judgment evidence raising a
    fact issue with regard to Deutsche Bank’s status as the owner or holder of the note. Jerry’s mere
    allegation in her pleadings and in her briefs that the assignment to Deutsche Bank was void because
    of a forged signature is not summary judgment evidence. See Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. & Loan
    Ass’n, 
    462 S.W.2d 540
    , 543 (Tex. 1971); Estate of Jobe v. Perry, 
    428 S.W.3d 888
    , 902 n.16 (Tex.
    App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.); 
    Sipes, 812 S.W.2d at 430
    ; see also Myer v. Cuevas, 
    119 S.W.2d 830
    , 836 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (appellate court must determine appeal based
    on appellate record and cannot consider documents attached as exhibits or appendices to briefs)
    (quoting Mitchison v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    803 S.W.2d 769
    , 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 1991, writ denied)). Because Jerry did not produce any summary judgment evidence raising
    a genuine issue of material fact regarding Deutsche Bank’s status as the owner and holder of the
    note, the trial court was required to grant Deutsche Bank’s no-evidence motion for summary
    judgment as to the claims premised on Deutsche Bank’s lack of authority. 3 See TEX. R. CIV. P.
    166a(i); Sudan v. Sudan, 
    199 S.W.3d 291
    , 292 (Tex. 2006).
    3
    With regard to Jerry’s breach of contract claim which she alleged as an alternative claim, Deutsche Bank’s no-
    evidence motion for summary judgment asserted no evidence existed of any breach. Because Jerry did not produce
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    04-15-00663-CV
    CONCLUSION
    The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
    any evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to any breach, the trial court also was required to grant Deutsche
    Bank’s motion as to that claim. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).
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