Regina Sophus v. Houston Police Department Homicide Division and New Hope Housing ( 2015 )

Opinion issued February 19, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-00021-CV
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REGINA SOPHUS, Appellant
V.
HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT HOMICIDE DIVISION
AND NEW HOPE HOUSING, Appellees
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1036595
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Regina Sophus sued New Hope Housing 1 and the Houston Police
Department (“HPD”) Homicide Division, alleging that she was harassed by
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Sophus sued “New Hope Apartments,” but the proper party name is New Hope
Housing.
neighbors and that HPD police officers were unresponsive to her complaints. The
HPD Homicide Division moved to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
91a on the ground that it lacked capacity to be sued, and the trial court granted the
motion. New Hope Housing moved for summary judgment on the ground that
Sophus’s petition did not state a claim against it, and the trial court granted the
motion. We affirm.
Background
Sophus’s petition recounted various allegations of harassment by neighbors
while living in a variety of apartments in the Houston area. Sophus alleged that
she made police reports, and at one point during this time, requested an update
regarding her reports from an officer in the HPD Homicide Division. According to
her petition, that officer told her that the neighbors reported that she was “crazy”
and that the neighbors were “using” her for “doing a job.”
Sophus alleged that, after experiencing these issues, she signed a year-long
lease agreement with New Hope Housing in October 2012. She alleged that after
moving into New Hope, her neighbors there also harassed her and broke into her
apartment. She reported these complaints to HPD and alleged that her complaints
were never resolved.
The HPD Homicide Division moved to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 91a on the ground that it lacked capacity to be sued. It argued that
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it was created by ordinance and is a subdivision of HPD, which is in turn a
subdivision of the City of Houston, and therefore it could not be sued separately
and apart from the City. In the alternative, the HPD Homicide Division argued
that even if it were a proper party, Sophus pleaded no cause of action against it for
which governmental immunity is waived. The trial court granted the plea and
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
New Hope Housing moved for summary judgment, arguing that Sophus’s
petition was too vague to put New Hope on notice of how to defend the suit. New
Hope also argued that the pleading affirmatively demonstrated that no cause of
action existed against New Hope, and was therefore subject to dismissal. The trial
court granted the motion for summary judgment.
Discussion
Litigants appearing on their own behalf must comply with all applicable
laws and rules of procedure, and they are held to the same standards as licensed
attorneys. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex.
1978); Kanow v. Brownshadel, 691 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1985, no writ). A pro se litigant must properly present her case on appeal,
and we may not make allowances or apply different standards for litigants
appearing without the advice of counsel. See Morris v. Am. Home Mortg. Serv.,
Inc., 360 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). The Rules
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of Appellate Procedure require appellate briefs to contain clear and concise
arguments with appropriate citations to the record and supporting authorities. TEX.
R. APP. P. 38.1(i). As always, however, we construe briefs liberally; substantial
compliance with the rules is sufficient. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9.
In Sophus’s appellate brief, she reiterates some of the factual allegations
contained in her filings with the trial court and makes new allegations regarding
additional alleged harassment. She does not present any legal argument that the
case should not have been dismissed or that summary judgment should not have
been granted. Nor does her brief comport with the requirements of Rule 38.1,
which requires an appellant to state the issues presented and make a clear and
concise argument for her contentions with appropriate citations to legal authorities
and the record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f) & (i). The brief contains no citations to
the record or to cases.
With respect to the HPD Homicide Division, Sophus does not present any
argument that the case should not have been dismissed because the HPD Homicide
Division lacked capacity to be sued, or that she pleaded a cause of action for which
governmental immunity is waived. By failing to raise any legal issue related to the
dismissal of the case against the Homicide Division, Sophus has waived any
argument pertaining to this potential issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.
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With respect to New Hope, Sophus does not present any legal argument
challenging the summary judgment. A party appealing a motion for summary
judgment must either assert (1) separate points of error attacking each of the
independent grounds alleged in the motion, or (2) a general point of error attacking
the summary judgment as a whole. Zapata v. ACF Indus., Inc., 43 S.W.3d 584,
586 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Because Sophus did neither,
we must affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of New Hope. See id.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court. All pending motions are
dismissed as moot.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.
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