in the Interest of B.C., P.C., Jr., and A.C. ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
04-14-00744-CV
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
2/26/2015 4:27:51 PM
KEITH HOTTLE
CLERK
No. 04-14-00744-CV
FILED IN
In the 4th COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
Fourth Court of Appeals District of Texas 02/26/2015 4:27:51 PM
KEITH E. HOTTLE
San Antonio, Texas Clerk
In the interest of
B.C., ET AL.,
minor children.
PAUL C.,
Appellant
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES,
Appellee
On appeal from the 131st Judicial District Court
Bexar County Texas
Trial Cause No. 2013-PA-01143
BRIEF FOR THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF
FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES
NICHOLAS “NICO” LAHOOD
Criminal District Attorney
NATHAN E. MOREY
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 24074756
Criminal District Attorney’s Office
Oral Argument Waived Bexar County, Texas
101 West Nueva Street, Suite 370
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Voice: (210) 335-2414
Fax: (210) 335-2436
Email: nathan.morey@bexar.org
Attorneys for the TDFPS
In re B.C., No. 04-14-00744-CV – TDFPS Brief
IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.2(a)(1)(A), the State
supplements the following individual(s) to the list of parties and counsel:
Nathan E. Morey
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
and Counsel on Appeal for the TDFPS
State Bar No. 24074756
Criminal District Attorney’s Office
Bexar County, Texas
101 West Nueva, Suite 370
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Voice: (210) 335-2414
Fax: (210) 335-2436
Email: nathan.morey@bexar.org
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ....................................................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...............................................................................................v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...........................................................................................1
ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................................................................2
STATEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................................................3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ....................................................................................5
First Point of Error: The evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s order
terminating parental rights pursuant to
subsections 161.001(1)(B) and (C). ...........................5
State’s Response: The evidence was legally and factually
sufficient because the trial court could draw a
reasonable inference that Appellant voluntarily
abandoned the children based on the shear
amount of time Appellant was out of the
picture. Furthermore, the law does not require
Appellant to affirmatively express an intent
not to return; the absence of an expression is
sufficient by itself according to the statute. ...............5
Second Point of Error: The evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s order
terminating parental rights pursuant to
subsection 161.001(1)(O). .........................................5
State’s Response: The evidence was legally and factually
sufficient because the children were removed
from both the parents pursuant to Chapter 262
on May 22, 2013. Additionally, the only
reason Mary had possession of the children
when they were physically seized was because
Raquel had subjected them to neglect some
years earlier. ...............................................................5
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ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................6
Standard of Review ............................................................................................6
Applicable Law: Family Code, subsections 161.001(1)(B), (C), & (O)............6
Application of the Law to the Present Record ...................................................7
PRAYER .....................................................................................................................11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..........................................................................................12
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................................12
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Statutes:
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(1)(B) ................................................................. 1, 6, 8
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(1)(C) ......................................................................1, 7
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(1)(O)................................................................. 1, 7, 9
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(2) ...............................................................................1
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.206(a) ...............................................................................6
TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.104 ..............................................................................3, 10
TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.201 ..................................................................................10
TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.205 ..................................................................................10
Cases:
In re C.H.,
89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002) .................................................................................6
In re D.R.J.,
395 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) ...............................11
In re J.F.C.,
96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) ...........................................................................6, 8
In re R.M.,
180 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) ..............................7, 8
Rules:
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(B)...............................................................................12
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3) ......................................................................................12
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.5(b) ........................................................................................12
TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b)...........................................................................................1
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1)(A) ............................................................................... ii
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In re B.C., No. 04-14-00744-CV – TDFPS Brief
TO THE HONORABLE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS:
Now comes the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services,
hereinafter referred to as “Department,” by and through Nicholas “Nico” LaHood,
criminal district attorney of Bexar County, Texas, and the undersigned assistant
criminal district attorney, with the filing of the following brief:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The trial court signed and entered an order terminating the parental rights of
Paul C., hereinafter referred to as Appellant (C.R. at 268–76). The trial court
found that termination was in the children’s best interest and that Appellant had
voluntarily left the in the possession of another without expressing an intent to
return and without providing for the adequate support of the child, and that
Appellant had failed to complete her court ordered service plan (C.R. at 271–73).
See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(1)(B), (C) & (O); id. at § 161.001(2). Appellant
timely filed a notice of appeal (C.R. at 283). See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b).
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ISSUES PRESENTED
First Issue: Is the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support
termination pursuant to Texas Family Code section 161.001(1)(B)
or (C)?
Second Issue: Is the evidence legally or factually sufficient to support termination
pursuant to Texas Family Code section 161.001(1)(O)?
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
According to the affidavit that accompanied the original petition,
Appellant’s wife, Raquel C., left B.C., P.C., and A.C. alone for several hours in
September 2008 (C.R. at 15).1 The children were placed with their maternal aunt,
Mary Paredez and her boyfriend, Enrique Villanueva (C.R. at 16). Mary was
appointed managing conservator of the three children in November 2009 (C.R. at
16). In May 2013, the Department responded to Mary’s and Enrique’s home
because allegedly B.C. had been sexually abused by Mary’s biological son (C.R. at
14–15, 16–17). According to the allegations, Mary and Enrique were forcing B.C.
to dig a hole in the back yard because they blamed her for prompting their son to
commit suicide (C.R. at 14). B.C. was immediately removed by a Department
caseworker (C.R. at 22). See TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.104. The Department filed a
petition to terminate parental rights and the remaining children were removed
(C.R. at 1–13, 43–53).
After a hearing, the trial court entered temporary orders against both parents
and Mary (C.R. at 43). The order named Appellant as temporary possessory
conservator subject to court limitations (C.R. at 45–46). The Department was
named as temporary managing conservator (C.R. at 45). Mary, Enrique, Raquel,
1
According to an unsworn CASA report, Appellant was incarcerated for impersonating a
police officer when the children were initially removed from Raquel in 2008 (C.R. at 150).
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In re B.C., No. 04-14-00744-CV – TDFPS Brief
and Appellant were all subsequently assigned family service plans (C.R. at 47, 75
[Mary & Enrique], 93 [Raquel], 117 [Appellant]).
Appellant did not attend the termination trial (R.R. at 4). During trial, the
Department’s caseworker testified that Appellant and Raquel had very little contact
with the children from the initial removal in 2008 through the commencement of
the present case in 2013 (R.R. at 9, 21). The parents did not take advantage of
court ordered visitation or provide any support for the children (R.R. at 9).
Appellant told his caseworker that he did not visit the kids (R.R. at 23). Neither
parent completed the court-ordered family service plan, although Appellant did
complete his parenting class and initiated his therapy sessions (R.R. at 10, 38).
According to the caseworker, Appellant has not expressed an intent to return to his
children (R.R. at 37). The caseworker believes that all three kids would like
Appellant’s rights terminated (R.R. at 13, 19).
Enrique testified that he and Mary would like to adopt P.C. and A.C. (C.R.
at 42). Enrique said that Appellant has tried to contact the kids, but without
“proper authorization” by the court (C.R. at 42). A.C. and P.C. would like to be
adopted by Mary and Enrique and would like to have their last name changed to
Villanueva (C.R. at 42).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First Point of Error: The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support the trial court’s order terminating parental rights
pursuant to subsections 161.001(1)(B) and (C).
State’s Response: The evidence was legally and factually sufficient because
the trial court could draw a reasonable inference that
Appellant voluntarily abandoned the children based on
the shear amount of time Appellant was out of the
picture. Furthermore, the law does not require Appellant
to affirmatively express an intent not to return; the
absence of an expression is sufficient by itself according
to the statute.
Second Point of Error: The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support the trial court’s order terminating parental rights
pursuant to subsection 161.001(1)(O).
State’s Response: The evidence was legally and factually sufficient because
the children were removed from both the parents
pursuant to Chapter 262 on May 22, 2013. Additionally,
the only reason Mary had possession of the children
when they were physically seized was because Raquel
had subjected them to neglect some years earlier.
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ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
An order terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.206(a). Evidence is legally and
factually sufficient on appeal if “a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or
conviction about the truth of the matter on which the State bears the burden of
proof.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17,
25 (Tex. 2002). A legal sufficiency review requires the appellate court to review
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s order giving appropriate
deference to the factfinder’s conclusions. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Factual
sufficiency review requires the appellate court to consider whether “disputed
evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction
about the truth of the State’s allegations.” Id. (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25).
Applicable Law: Family Code, subsections 161.001(1)(B), (C), & (O)
“The court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the parent has: (B) voluntarily left
the child alone or in the possession of another not the parent without expressing an
intent to return, without providing for the adequate support of the child, and
remained away for a period of at least three months.” TEX. FAM. CODE §
161.001(1)(B). Similarly, “[t]he court may order termination of the parent-child
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relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the parent
has: (C) voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of another without
providing adequate support of the child and remained away for a period of at least
six months.” Id. at § 161.001(1)(C).
A court may also order termination if “the parent has: (O) failed to comply
with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions
necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been in the
permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family
and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s
removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child.”
Id. at § 161.001(1)(O).
Application of the Law to the Present Record
The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support
termination under subsections 161.001(1)(B) and (C).
Appellant does not dispute that Appellant voluntarily left the children in the
possession of another (Appellant’s Brief at 8). Instead, Appellant argues that the
evidence is insufficient because the record fails to show that Appellant “made an
affirmative expression of his intent not to return” (Appellant’s Brief at 9). For this
proposition, Appellant relies on In re R.M., 180 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2005, no pet.). R.M. does not support this proposition. To the contrary,
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the Texarkana Court of Appeals found that the Department failed to prove the
parent’s failure to provide adequate support because the parent consented to a
custodial arrangement where the children were adequately cared for. Id. at 877–
78. The clear statutory terms of subsection 161.001(1)(B) indicate that an
affirmative expression is not required because the statute states: “… without
expressing an intent to return.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(1)(B). The present
record shows that Appellant did not express an intent to return (R.R. at 38).
Appellant also argues that the evidence is insufficient because Appellant did
not need to personally support the children; he only needed to make, or consent to,
adequate arrangements for support (Appellant’s Brief at 9–10). Here, the record
does not show that Appellant facilitated or consented to any arrangement
whatsoever between him and Mary and Enrique. The record shows that Appellant
simply left—for quite a long time. Accordingly, the trial court’s findings pursuant
to subsections 161.001(1)(B) and 161.001(1)(C) should be affirmed. See J.F.C.,
96 S.W.3d at 266 (“In a factual sufficiency review, as we explained in In re C.H., a
court of appeals must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could
reasonably have found to be clear and convincing.”).
The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support
termination under subsection 161.001(1)(O).
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In this ground, Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient
because the children were not physically seized from either his or Raquel’s custody
in May 2013 and that neither parent was directly responsible for the abuse or
neglect (Appellant’s Brief at 12–13). A reading of subsection 161.001(1)(O)
indicates that neither of these scenarios are required. The elements of subsection
161.001(1)(O) can be broken down as follows: “[1] fail[ure] to comply with the
provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for
the parent to obtain the return of the child [2] who has been in the permanent or
temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective
Services [3] for not less than nine months [4] as a result of the child’s removal
from the parent under Chapter 262 [5] for the abuse or neglect of the child.” TEX.
FAM. CODE § 161.001(1)(O) (alterations added). Appellant does not dispute that
the Department satisfied the first, second, third, or fifth element; he disputes that
the children were not removed from a parent under Chapter 262.
In the present case, all the children were removed from both parents on May
22, 2013 when the trial court signed an order pursuant to section 262.205 (C.R. at
43). It is true that B.C. was “removed” from Mary’s actual custody pursuant to
section 262.104, as stated by the trial court’s May 10, 2013 order (C.R. at 27).
However, a reading of subsection 161.001(1)(O) indicates that it is triggered by
any removal under Chapter 262. See id. at § 161.001(1)(O) (“… as a result of the
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In re B.C., No. 04-14-00744-CV – TDFPS Brief
child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the
child.” (emphasis added)). The Department’s actions of taking possession of B.C.
from Mary qualified as a “removal under Chapter 262”—specifically, section
262.104. See id. at 262.104(a) (“… an authorized representative of the Department
of Family and Protective Services, a law enforcement officer, or a juvenile
probation officer may take possession of a child without a court order under the
following conditions …”). Likewise, the trial court’s May 22, 2013 order was a
“removal under Chapter 262”—specifically, section 262.205—because it deprived
both parents of possessory rights to all three children (C.R. at 43–53). See id. at §
262.205(b) (“After the hearing, the court may grant the request to remove the child
from the parent, managing conservator, possessory conservator, guardian,
caretaker, or custodian entitled to possession of the child if the court finds …”).2
Furthermore, the record indicates—and Appellant does not dispute this on
appeal—that the children were only with Mary because of Raquel’s neglect some
years earlier (R.R. at 21; C.R. at 15–16). In any event, the plain language of
subsection 161.001(1)(O) does not limit the term “removal” to any particular
section or subchapter within Chapter 262. Because Appellant’s possessory rights
2
It appears from the record that B.C. was removed on May 8, 2013 pursuant to section
262.104. The Department’s initial affidavit states that “an exigent removal was performed”
(C.R. at 15). The amended affidavit indicates that P.C. and A.C. were left with Mary (C.R. at
22). Accordingly, the hearing on May 22, 2013 appears to have been conducted pursuant to
section 262.201 as to B.C., and pursuant to section 262.205 as to P.C. and A.C. (C.R. at 29, 43).
Whether the trial court removes the children under section 262.201 or section 262.205 is
inconsequential to a determination under subsection 262.001(1)(O).
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were limited by court order pursuant to Chapter 262, the children were “removed”
from him under the law and the trial court’s finding under subsection
161.001(1)(O) should be affirmed. See, e.g., In re D.R.J., 395 S.W.3d 316, 319–20
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) (finding sufficient evidence to support a
finding that D.R.J. was properly removed from grandmother’s house due to abuse
by mother’s sibling).
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellee Department prays
the Court overrule Appellant’s points of error and affirm the trial court’s Order of
Termination.
Respectfully submitted,
NICHOLAS “NICO” LAHOOD
Criminal District Attorney
Bexar County, Texas
/s/ Nathan E. Morey
NATHAN E. MOREY
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 24074756
101 West Nueva Street, Suite 370
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Voice: (210) 335-2414
Fax: (210) 335-2436
Email: nathan.morey@bexar.org
Attorneys for the State of Texas
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nathan E. Morey, hereby certify that, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.5(b), a true and correct copy of the above and forgoing brief was
emailed to James Peplinski on Thursday, February 26, 2016.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I, Nathan E. Morey, certify that, pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B) and 9.4(i)(3), the above response contains 2,928 words
according to the “word count” feature of Microsoft Office.
/s/ Nathan E. Morey
NATHAN E. MOREY
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 24074756
101 West Nueva, Suite 370
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Voice: (210) 335-2414
Fax: (210) 335-2436
Email: nathan.morey@bexar.org
Attorney for the State of Texas
cc: JAMES B. PEPLINSKI
Attorney at Law
State Bar No. 24010294
15751 Knollbranch
San Antonio, Texas 78247
Voice: (210) 416-1129
Fax: (210) 829-5432
Email: jpeplinski@satx.rr.com
Attorney for Appellant
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