in Re Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                              ACCEPTED
    FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
    HOUSTON, TEXAS
    1/2/2015 4:28:10 PM
    CHRISTOPHER PRINE
    CLERK
    01-15-00003-CV
    NO. ___________________
    FILED IN
    1st COURT OF APPEALS
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS                    HOUSTON, TEXAS
    FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF           TEXAS
    1/2/2015 4:28:10 PM
    AT HOUSTON                       CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
    Clerk
    IN RE ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
    Original Proceeding from 434th Judicial District
    Of Fort Bend County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 14-DCV-215228
    RELATOR ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
    PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
    Ronald J. Restrepo
    Texas State Bar No. 16791300
    rrestrepo@drhrlaw.com
    Sarah J. Allen
    Texas State Bar No. 24064810
    sallen@drhrlaw.com
    Alexandra Ledyard
    Texas State Bar No. 24087903
    aledyard@drhrlaw.com
    440 Louisiana Street, Suite 2300
    Houston, Texas 77002
    DOYLE, RESTREPO, HARVIN & ROBBINS, L.L.P.
    (713) 228-5100 (telephone)
    (713) 228-6138 (facsimile)
    Attorneys for Relator Allstate
    Fire and Casualty Insurance
    Company
    ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
    Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(a), the following is a
    complete list of all parties, and the names and addresses of all trial and appellate
    counsel:
    Relator:
    Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company
    Trial Counsel for Relator:
    John M. Causey
    State Bar No.0419100
    Hope & Causey
    100 I-45 North, Ste. 600
    Conroe, Texas 77301
    (936) 441-4673 (telephone)
    (936) 441-4674 (telecopier)
    Appellate Counsel for Relator:
    Ronald J. Restrepo
    Sarah J. Allen
    Alexandra Ledyard
    DOYLE, RESTREPO, HARVIN & ROBBINS, L.L.P.
    440 Louisiana, Suite 2300
    Houston, Texas 77002
    (713) 228-5100 (telephone)
    (713) 228-6138 (facsimile)
    i
    Respondents: *
    The Honorable Judge James H. Shoemake
    Judge of the 434th Judicial District of Fort Bend County, Texas
    301 Jackson Street
    Richmond, Texas 77469
    (281) 633-7653 (telephone)
    The Honorable Judge John Hawkins
    Associate Judge of the 434th Judicial District of Fort Bend County, Texas
    301 Jackson Street
    Richmond, Texas 77469
    (281) 341-4457 (telephone)
    Real Parties in Interest:
    Charlene T. Howard and William D. Howard
    Trial Counsel for Real Party in Interest:
    Mario Martinez
    Law Offices of Mario A. Martinez
    23123 Cinco Ranch Blvd., # 208
    Katy, TX 77494
    (281) 665-7924 (telephone)
    (281) 665-7929 (telecopier)
    *
    Relator includes both Judge James H. Shoemake and Judge John Hawkins as Respondents
    because both signed the Order at issue in this mandamus proceeding. (See MR 44–45.)
    ii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ...........................................................................i
    TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ iii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...............................................................................................v
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................ vii
    STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................. viii
    ISSUE PRESENTED.......................................................................................................ix
    STATEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................................................1
    ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................2
    I.       Standard of Review ............................................................................... 2
    II.      Mandamus relief is warranted in this case. ........................................... 2
    A.        The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to
    abate discovery on Plaintiffs’ extra-contractual and bad
    faith claims because these claims do not accrue, and
    would therefore be moot, unless and until Plaintiffs
    first succeed on their breach of contract claim. .......................... 3
    1.       Because Plaintiffs have not obtained a judgment
    establishing the liability and underinsured status
    of Mr. Carr, the other driver, Allstate has no
    contractual duty to pay UIM benefits. .............................. 3
    2.       Allowing discovery on Plaintiffs’ extra-
    contractual claims before a determination on
    Plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claims is an abuse
    of discretion. ..................................................................... 5
    B.        Allstate has no clear and adequate remedy by appeal
    because it will lose substantial rights by being required
    to conduct discovery on claims that may be rendered
    moot...........................................................................................10
    iii
    PRAYER .....................................................................................................................11
    CERTIFICATES OF COMPLIANCE.................................................................................13
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..........................................................................................14
    APPENDIX
    October 23, 2014 Order Allowing Discovery on Plaintiffs’
    Extra-Contractual Claims ........................................................................Tab A
    In re United Fire Lloyds, 
    327 S.W.3d 250
    (Tex. App.—San Antonio
    2010, orig. proceeding). .............................................................. Tab B
    In re Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    439 S.W.3d 422
                    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). ......................... Tab C
    In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-14-00068-CV,
    
    2014 WL 5285850
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    Oct. 16, 2014, no pet. h.) . ..........................................................Tab D
    iv
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases                                                                                                Page(s)
    Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co.,
    
    216 S.W.3d 809
    (Tex. 2006). ......................................................................3–4
    Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London,
    
    327 S.W.3d 118
    (Tex. 2010). .......................................................................... 4
    Henson v. State Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.,
    
    17 S.W.3d 652
    (Tex. 2000). ............................................................................ 3
    In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co.,
    No. 01-14-00068-cv, 
    2014 WL 5285850
           (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 16, 2014, no pet. h.) . ............ 4, 9–10, 11
    In re Am. Nat’l County Mut. Ins. Co.,
    
    384 S.W.3d 429
    (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, orig. proceeding). ....................11
    In re Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co.,
    
    439 S.W.3d 422
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ..... 4–7, 9–11
    In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
    
    148 S.W.3d 124
    (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). ..................................2–3, 11
    In re United Fire Lloyds,
    
    327 S.W.3d 250
    (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010,
    orig. proceeding). ................................................................... viii, 2, 7–8, 9, 11
    Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boyd,
    
    177 S.W.3d 919
    (Tex. 2005). .......................................................................... 5
    U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard,
    
    847 S.W.2d 668
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). ................. 3
    Weir v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.,
    
    622 F. Supp. 2d 483
    (S.D. Tex. 2009).........................................................5–6
    v
    Womack v. Berry,
    
    291 S.W.2d 677
    (Tex. 1956). .......................................................................... 7
    Statutes                                                                                                     Page(s)
    TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.221.................................................................................... viii
    Rules                                                                                                        Page(s)
    TEX. R. APP. P. 52. ................................................................................................. viii
    vi
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Nature of the          This original proceeding arises from a lawsuit filed by
    underlying case:       Real Parties in Interest Charlene T. Howard and
    William D. Howard (“Plaintiffs”) against Relator
    Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company
    (“Allstate”), among others. (MR 1–14). Plaintiffs seek
    the recovery of underinsured motorist benefits under an
    automobile policy issued by Allstate to Plaintiffs, as
    well as damages for Allstate’s asserted bad faith and
    statutory violations related to the handling of Plaintiffs’
    claims. (MR 3–6).
    Respondents:           The Honorable John Hawkins, Associate Judge of the
    434th Judicial District of Fort Bend County, Texas, and
    The Honorable James Shoemake, Judge of the 434th
    Judicial District of Fort Bend County, Texas
    Respondents’ actions   Plaintiffs filed suit in the underlying case alleging that
    from which relief      Allstate breached the underinsured motorist provisions
    sought:                of its policy to Plaintiffs when Allstate denied full
    payment of their claim and, in doing so, committed bad
    faith and violated various statutory provisions. (MR 7–
    10). Allstate moved to sever and abate the bad faith and
    extra-contractual claims until the preliminary issue of
    coverage is resolved. (MR 22–31). The trial court
    granted Allstate’s motion except that it allowed
    discovery on Plaintiffs’ extra-contractual claims to
    continue. (MR 44–46).
    Order at issue:        The trial court’s October 23, 2014 order allowing
    discovery on Plaintiffs’ extra-contractual and bad faith
    claims (MR 44–46; see also App. at Tab A).
    vii
    STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
    This Court possesses jurisdiction to grant mandamus relief from the trial
    court’s order allowing discovery on Plaintiffs’ bad faith and extra-contractual claims
    before the preliminary issue of coverage is resolved because it constitutes a clear
    abuse of discretion that impacts Allstate’s right to avoid the cost and expense of
    preparing to defend claims that may be rendered moot for which no adequate remedy
    exists by ordinary appeal. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.221; TEX. R. APP. P. 52; In re
    Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    439 S.W.3d 422
    , 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (holding that insurer had no adequate remedy by appeal where
    trial court’s order allowing discovery on extra-contractual claims in an uninsured
    motorist lawsuit would cause insurer to “lose substantial rights by being required to
    prepare for claims that may be rendered moot and never even accrue”); In re United
    Fire Lloyds, 
    327 S.W.3d 250
    , 256 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, orig. proceeding)
    (holding that insurer did not have adequate remedy by appeal where it would “lose
    substantial rights by being required to prepare for claims that may be rendered moot
    and may have not even yet accrued”).
    viii
    ISSUES PRESENTED
    1.     Whether the trial court’s refusal to abate discovery on Plaintiffs’ bad
    faith and extra-contractual claims until the preliminary issue of coverage is resolved
    is an abuse of discretion that warrants mandamus relief because Plaintiffs’ extra-
    contractual and bad faith claims do not accrue, and would therefore be moot, unless
    and until Plaintiffs first succeed on their breach of contract claim.
    2.     Whether Allstate has an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal where
    Allstate will lose substantial rights by being required to conduct discovery on claims
    that may be rendered moot.
    ix
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    On or about August 11, 2011, Real Parties in Interest Charlene T. Howard and
    William D. Howard (“Plaintiffs”) were involved in an automobile accident with
    another vehicle driven by James Alexander Carr. 1 As a result of that accident,
    Plaintiffs submitted claims to Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company
    (“Allstate”) for underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage. 2 After evaluating the
    claims, Allstate made an offer to settle the Plaintiffs’ claims, 3 however, the Plaintiffs
    did not accept. 4
    On or about June 5, 2014, Plaintiffs filed suit in the underlying case seeking
    a declaration of coverage and the recovery of UIM benefits under an automobile
    policy issued by Allstate to Plaintiffs (the “Policy”), as well as damages for
    Allstate’s asserted bad faith and statutory violations related to the offering of those
    benefits. 5 On August 11, 1014, Allstate filed a motion to sever and abate the
    Plaintiffs’ extra-contractual and bad faith claims pending trial on the contractual
    claim (the “Motion”).6 Plaintiffs responded to the Motion on October 5, 2014, 7 and
    1
    MR 3, ¶ 11.
    2
    
    Id. at ¶
    14.
    3
    See MR 22–23, Ex. 1.
    4
    See 
    id., Ex. 2–3;
    see also MR 5.
    5
    MR 1–14.
    6
    MR 22–31.
    7
    MR 35–39.
    1
    the trial court signed an order on October 23, 2014 conditionally granting the Motion
    save and except discovery. 8
    ARGUMENT
    I.    Standard of Review
    Mandamus will issue to correct a clear abuse of discretion for which the
    relator has no adequate remedy at law. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
    148 S.W.3d 124
    , 135–36 (Tex. 2004, orig. proceeding). A trial court has no discretion in
    determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts, and a clear failure by
    the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly constitutes an abuse of discretion.
    In re United Fire Lloyds, 
    327 S.W.3d 250
    , 253 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, orig.
    proceeding). Mandamus relief is justified when parties stand to lose substantial
    rights. 
    Id. Mandamus relief
    is also appropriate to “spare private parties and the
    public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly
    conducted proceedings.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of 
    Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136
    .
    II.   Mandamus relief is warranted in this case.
    Mandamus relief is warranted in this case because the record establishes that
    (A) the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to abate discovery on
    Plaintiffs’ extra-contractual and bad faith claims until the preliminary issue of
    8
    MR 44–46.
    2
    coverage is resolved, and (B) Allstate has no clear and adequate remedy at law. See
    
    id. at 135–36.
    A.     The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to abate
    discovery on Plaintiffs’ extra-contractual and bad faith claims
    because these claims do not accrue, and would therefore be moot,
    unless and until Plaintiffs first succeed on their breach of contract
    claim.
    1.    Because Plaintiffs have not obtained a judgment establishing
    the liability and underinsured status of Mr. Carr, the other
    driver, Allstate has no contractual duty to pay UIM benefits.
    Underinsured motorist claims and bad faith claims are by their very nature
    independent, and Texas courts have recognized them as “separate and distinct causes
    of action which might each constitute a complete lawsuit within itself.” See U.S.
    Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 
    847 S.W.2d 668
    , 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993,
    orig. proceeding). In the context of underinsured motorist claims, “the [UIM]
    insurer is under no contractual duty to pay benefits until the insured obtains a
    judgment establishing the liability and underinsured status of the other motorist.”
    Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 
    216 S.W.3d 809
    , 818 (Tex. 2006) (citing
    Henson v. State Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 
    17 S.W.3d 652
    , 653–54 (Tex. 2000)).
    In Brainard, the Texas Supreme Court explained the unique nature of a UIM case as
    follows:
    The UIM contract is unique because, according to its
    terms, benefits are conditioned upon the insured’s legal
    entitlement to receive damages from a third party. Unlike
    many first-party insurance contracts, in which the policy
    3
    alone dictates coverage, UIM insurance utilizes tort law to
    determine coverage. Consequently, the insurer’s
    contractual obligation to pay benefits does not arise until
    liability and damages are determined.
    
    Brainard, 216 S.W.3d at 818
    . As a result, Plaintiffs must succeed on their breach of
    contract claim before any extra-contractual claims could even accrue.
    To succeed on their breach of contract claim, Plaintiffs must first establish
    that UIM coverage for their injuries existed at the time of the accident. See Gilbert
    Tex. Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 
    327 S.W.3d 118
    , 124 (Tex.
    2010) (“Initially, the insured has the burden of establishing coverage under the terms
    of the policy.”); In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-14-00068-CV, 
    2014 WL 5285850
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 16, 2014, no pet. h.) (providing
    that in order “[t]o prevail on these [extra-contractual] claims, the [plaintiffs] must
    first establish that Allstate is liable under the insurance contract”).
    If they meet this initial burden, Plaintiffs must then establish that the other
    driver, Mr. Carr, negligently caused the accident and was underinsured. In re
    Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    439 S.W.3d 422
    , 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 2014, no pet.). “Neither requesting UIM benefits nor filing suit against the
    insurer triggers a contractual duty to pay.” 
    Id. Accordingly, unless
    and until
    Plaintiffs obtain a judgment not only establishing that the Policy provided UIM
    coverage, but also establishing the liability and underinsured status of Mr. Carr,
    Allstate has no contractual obligation to pay UIM benefits to Plaintiffs.
    4
    2.    Allowing discovery on Plaintiffs’ extra-contractual claims
    before a determination on Plaintiffs’ breach of contract
    claims is an abuse of discretion.
    Absent proof of a valid contract claim, Allstate should not be required to
    provide discovery related to Plaintiffs’ extra-contractual and bad faith claims
    because it is irrelevant, overly broad, and prejudicial. See In 
    Progressive, 439 S.W.3d at 427
    (finding severance and abatement of extra-contractual claims was
    necessary to avoid prejudice because document requests relating to extra-contractual
    claim were irrelevant to breach of contract claim and far broader than car accident
    claim that must first be resolved). As already stated, in order to prevail on their
    extra-contractual and bad faith claims, Plaintiffs must first demonstrate that Allstate
    was contractually obligated to pay their UIM claim. See Progressive County Mut.
    Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 
    177 S.W.3d 919
    , 922 (Tex. 2005) (recognizing bad faith claims are
    generally negated by a lack of coverage under the insurance policy). Thus, unless
    Plaintiffs can establish that Allstate breached the Policy by denying full payment of
    Plaintiffs’ UIM claims, Allstate cannot be liable on Plaintiffs’ extra-contractual and
    bad faith claims based on that denial, and all the time, effort, money, and judicial
    resources spent conducting discovery on those claims will have been for naught. See
    Weir v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 
    622 F. Supp. 2d 483
    , 486 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (Harmon,
    J.) (“If there is no contractual duty to pay, [the insurer] cannot be in ‘bad faith,’ under
    common law or statute, for not paying. [The insurer] cannot be guilty of not
    5
    performing a proper investigation of his UIM claim because it is the trial of the UIM
    claim, at which it will be determined who was at fault and the amount of damages,
    that constitutes the investigation.”). It is for this reason that several courts of appeals,
    including recent opinions from this Court, require the severance and abatement of
    extra-contractual claims, including discovery on such claims, in UIM coverage cases
    like this one.
    In a recent opinion, this Court specifically addressed the prejudice involved
    in allowing discovery on extra-contractual claims to continue prior to a
    determination on an uninsured motorist breach of contract claim.                See In re
    Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    439 S.W.3d 422
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2014, no pet.); see also App. at Tab C. In Progressive, an insured filed suit for
    uninsured motorist benefits under her insurance policy, as well as damages for bad
    faith and statutory violations related to the denial of those benefits. 
    Id. at 422.
    The
    insured served the carrier with a number of discovery requests, including all
    documents related to lawsuits and claims against the carrier regarding the denial of
    uninsured/underinsured motorist claims for over ten years. 
    Id. at 427.
    In response to the insurer’s motion to sever the breach of contract claim from
    the extra-contractual claims, the trial court judge signed an order abating the motion
    to sever, allowing discovery to move forward on all claims, and deferring the other
    issues covered by the motion until the pretrial hearing. 
    Id. at 424.
    In concluding
    6
    that severance and abatement of the extra-contractual claims was required in order
    to avoid prejudice on behalf of the insurer, this Court held that the aforementioned
    discovery requests sought documents “irrelevant to the breach-of-contract claim, and
    the introduction of Progressive’s claims handling history in unrelated accidents at
    the trial of [Plaintiff’s] breach-of-contract claim would be manifestly unjust.” 
    Id. at 427.
    (citing Womack v. Berry, 
    291 S.W.2d 677
    , 682–83 (Tex. 1956)). The Court
    went on:
    The trial court’s abatement of any decision on severance
    until the eve of trial requires the parties to engage in
    discovery on the extra-contractual claims and prepare
    for a trial on these claims, even though extra-contractual
    liability could only accrue if Progressive is found liable
    on the contract. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to
    postpone severance, unless writ is granted, will require
    Progressive to expend resources answering discovery that
    is far broader than the car accident claim that must be
    resolved.
    
    Id. at 427
    (emphases added). Similarly, the trial court’s order—made the subject of
    this mandamus—allowing discovery on Plaintiffs’ extra-contractual claims to go
    forward subjects Allstate to irrelevant, overly broad, and prejudicial discovery.
    Other recent opinions confirm that the trial court’s refusal to abate discovery
    on Plaintiffs’ extra-contractual claims is an abuse of discretion. In In re United Fire
    Lloyds, the insured filed suit for UIM benefits under his employer’s insurance policy
    as well as damages for bad faith and statutory violations related to the denial of those
    benefits. 
    327 S.W.3d 250
    , 252 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, orig. proceeding);
    7
    see also App. at Tab B. After the insurer moved to sever and abate the extra-
    contractual and bad faith claims, the insured filed a motion to bifurcate these claims
    as an alternative to severance and abatement, arguing, like Plaintiffs argue here,9 that
    “a severance would be judicially wasteful” and “prejudice him.” 
    Id. at 253.
    In
    reviewing the trial court’s decision to bifurcate, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
    discussed the unique nature of a UIM claim in that a UIM insurer “has no contractual
    duty to pay benefits until the insured obtains a judgment establishing the liability
    and underinsured status of the other motorist.” 
    Id. at 255.
    “As a result,” the court
    continued, “a determination of [the insured’s] UIM claim may negate his bad faith
    claims.” 
    Id. at 256.
    Thus, the court held, the trial court had abused its discretion
    when it refused to sever and abate the insured’s extra-contractual and bad faith
    claims because an insurer should not be required to prepare to litigate claims that
    could be rendered moot by a determination on the UIM claim:
    [W]e are constrained by the clear holding in Brainard, and
    hold that [the insurer] is under no contractual duty to pay
    UIM benefits until [the insured] establishes the liability
    and underinsured status of the other motorist. Therefore,
    [the insurer] should not be required to put forth the
    effort and expense of conducting discovery, preparing
    for trial, and conducting voir dire on bad faith claims that
    could be rendered moot by the portion of the trial relating
    to UIM benefits. To require such would not do justice,
    avoid prejudice, and further convenience. Under these
    circumstances, we conclude the trial court abused its
    9
    See MR 38.
    8
    discretion in bifurcating the case instead of severing and
    abating the UIM claim from the bad faith claims.
    
    Id. (internal citations
    omitted) (emphases added).
    Similarly, this Court reached the same result in In re Allstate County Mutual
    Ins. Co., No. 01-14-00068-CV, 
    2014 WL 5285850
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    Oct. 16, 2014, no pet. h.); see also App. at Tab D. In that case, the insureds filed
    suit for UIM benefits under their insurance policy, as well as damages for bad faith
    and statutory violations related to the denial of those benefits. 
    Id. at *2.
    The insurer
    moved to sever and abate the extra-contractual and bad faith claims from the
    underlying coverage claim. In reviewing the trial court’s denial of the insurer’s
    motion, the Court held that the severance of the settlement claims was mandatory.
    
    Id. at *3.
    In doing so, the Court explained that the plaintiffs’ settlement claims
    would be negated by a determination that they lacked
    coverage under the insurance contract, requiring Allstate
    to prepare for and litigate the . . . claims, which may have
    not yet accrued and may be rendered moot by the breach
    of contract claim, would not do justice, avoid prejudice, or
    further convenience.
    
    Id. at *5
    (citing In re Progressive County Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 439 S.W.3d at 426
    –28). The
    Court went on to provide that “allowing the [insureds] to conduct broad discovery
    into Allstate’s claims handling history regarding unrelated accidents and then
    allowing the introduction of such information at the trial of the [their] breach of
    9
    contract claim would be manifestly unjust.” 
    Id. at *5
    (citing In re Progressive
    County Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 439 S.W.3d at 426
    –27) (emphasis added).
    As in Progressive, Allstate, and United Fire, the trial court’s order denying
    abatement of discovery on extra-contractual claims is an abuse of discretion because
    it does “not do justice, avoid prejudice, or further convenience.” See In re Allstate
    County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    2014 WL 5285850
    , at *5. Here, Allstate made an offer of
    settlement on Plaintiffs’ claims for UIM benefits, which was not accepted.10 Thus,
    consistent with Brainard and its progeny, unless and until Plaintiffs obtain a
    judgment establishing UIM coverage, as well as the liability and underinsured status
    of Mr. Carr, Allstate has no contractual obligation to pay UIM benefits. Without an
    existing obligation to pay, Allstate should not be required to put forth the effort and
    expense of conducting discovery on Plaintiffs’ bad faith and extra-contractual claims
    because these claims have not yet accrued and could be rendered moot by the failure
    of Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim. Allowing Plaintiffs to conduct discovery on
    their bad faith and extra-contractual claims will require Allstate “to expend resources
    answering discovery that is far broader than the car accident claim that must be
    resolved.” See In re Progressive County Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 439 S.W.3d at 427
    . Thus,
    the trial court’s refusal to abate discovery on these claims was an abuse of discretion
    10
    See MR 22–23, Ex. 1–3; see also MR 5.
    10
    warranting mandamus relief. See In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    2014 WL 5285850
    , at *5; In re Prudential Ins. Co. of 
    Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135
    –36.
    B.     Allstate has no clear and adequate remedy by appeal because it will
    lose substantial rights by being required to conduct discovery on
    claims that may be rendered moot.
    Allstate has a substantial right not to be required to put forth the expense of
    conducting discovery on bad faith and extra-contractual claims that do not accrue,
    and would therefore be moot, unless and until Plaintiffs first succeed on their breach
    of contract claim. See, e.g., In re Progressive County Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 439 S.W.3d at 428
    (citing In re United Fire 
    Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d at 256
    ). If discovery on Plaintiffs’
    extra-contractual claims is permitted to advance, Allstate will be required to conduct
    discovery “on claims that may have not yet accrued and that could be rendered moot
    by . . . the trial relating to breach of contract for underinsured motorist benefits.” See
    In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    2014 WL 5285850
    , at *6 (citing In re
    
    Progressive, 439 S.W.3d at 427
    –28); see also In re Am. Nat’l County Mut. Ins. Co.,
    
    384 S.W.3d 429
    , 439 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, orig. proceeding) (holding that
    insurer did not have adequate remedy by appeal where it would “lose substantial
    rights . . . by being required to prepare and try claims that may be rendered moot”).
    Accordingly, the Court should conclude that Allstate has no adequate remedy by
    appeal, and mandamus relief is warranted. 
    Id. (citing In
    re Progressive County Mut.
    Ins. 
    Co., 439 S.W.3d at 427
    –28).
    11
    PRAYER
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Relator Allstate Fire and
    Casualty Insurance Company respectfully prays that this Court direct the trial court
    to amend its October 23, 2014 order to abate discovery on Plaintiffs’ extra-
    contractual and bad faith claims until there has been a full and final resolution of
    Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims. Allstate also prays and for such other and
    further relief to which Allstate may be entitled.
    Respectfully submitted,
    DOYLE, RESTREPO, HARVIN & ROBBINS, L.L.P.
    By: ________________________________
    Ronald J. Restrepo
    Texas State Bar No. 16791300
    rrestrepo@drhrlaw.com
    Sarah J. Allen
    Texas State Bar No. 24064810
    sallen@drhrlaw.com
    Alexandra Ledyard
    Texas State Bar No. 24087903
    aledyard@drhrlaw.com
    440 Louisiana Street, Suite 2300
    Houston, Texas 77002
    (713) 228-5100 (telephone)
    (713) 228-6138 (facsimile)
    Attorneys for Relator Allstate
    Fire and Casualty Insurance Company
    12
    CERTIFICATION
    I hereby certify that I have reviewed Relator Allstate Fire and Casualty
    Insurance Company’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus and conclude that every
    factual statement in this petition is supported by competent evidence included in the
    appendix or record.
    ____________________________________
    Sarah J. Allen
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    Relying on the word count function in the word processing software used to
    produce this document, I hereby certify that this petition (excluding the caption,
    identity of parties and counsel, table of contents, index of authorities, statement of
    the case, statement of jurisdiction, statement of issues presented, signature,
    certificate of service, certification, certification of compliance, and appendix)
    contains 2,815 words. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i).
    ____________________________________
    Sarah J. Allen
    13
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    As required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.3 and 9.5(b), (d), (e),
    I certify that I have served this document and the corresponding mandamus record
    by electronic service or certified mail, return receipt requested, on all parties as listed
    below on January 2, 2015 as follows:
    The Honorable Judge James H. Shoemake
    434th Judicial District of Fort Bend County, Texas
    301 Jackson Street
    Richmond, Texas 77469
    The Honorable Judge John Hawkins
    434th Judicial District of Fort Bend County, Texas
    301 Jackson Street
    Richmond, Texas 77469
    Mario Martinez
    Law Offices of Mario A. Martinez
    23123 Cinco Ranch Blvd., # 208
    Katy, Texas 77494
    Attorney for the Real Parties in Interest
    Charlene Howard and William Howard
    John M. Causey
    Hope & Causey
    100 I-45 North, Ste. 600
    Conroe, Texas 77301
    Trial Counsel for Relator
    Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company
    ____________________________________
    Sarah J. Allen
    14
    TAB A
    ·'     1'-DCV-215228
    OTDN
    ; Olher Dlspotitlon/Non-Fiml
    . 32699'8
    FILED
    AUG 1 l .2Q1~ ri
    I~I I~llllllllHllllll~llll~                          NO. 14-0CV-215228
    AT
    ``~!{)~
    v{.`` V· ~I'
    1
    Cte~ Olllrlct Co'-Jrt. Fer1°'1rnd Ct., TX
    CHARLENE T. HOW ARD                          AND         §     IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
    WILLIAM D. HOWARD                                        §
    §
    VS.                                                      §     FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS
    §
    ALLSTATE FIRE & CASUALTY                                 §
    INSURANCE COMPANY AND LISA                               §    434TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    GRAVES
    ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
    MOTION TO SEVER AND ABATE
    On this day came on for consideration Defendants' Motion to Sever and Abate. The Court,
    having considered the motion, the prevailing case law, and the response thereto, is of the opinion that
    said motion is meritorious. The Court, therefore
    ORDERS that all of the        Plaintiff.~ ·   claims for extra-contractual violations, including those of
    the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices /\ct, violations of the fnsurance Code, violntions of Chapter 37
    & 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, gross neglect and breach of the duty of good
    faith and fair dealing, arc hereby severed from the above captioned lawsuit and shall be re-designated
    as CAUSE NO.               f'f:pc\J 2J£'.)m~i1 ii¥ Q1 S??B,· IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF FORT ·
    BEND COUNTY, TEX A S 434TJ/ JUDICIAL DfTRJCT;
    AC~o
    is further ORDERED that !he"'following documents shall be placed in CAUSE NO.
    [l
    ,t.\   ~r;r:::v- ~s2-z. 327 S.W.3d 250 
    (2010)
    Nature and Extent of Discretionary Power
    
    327 S.W.3d 250
                                          Mandamus
    Court of Appeals of Texas,                                  Matters of discretion
    San Antonio.                                       A trial court has no discretion in determining
    what the law is or applying the law to the facts,
    In re UNITED FIRE LLOYDS.                                  and a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or
    apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse
    No. 04–10–00094–CV.            |    July 14, 2010.
    of discretion for mandamus purposes.
    Synopsis
    Cases that cite this headnote
    Background: Employee who had been involved in
    motor vehicle accident with other motorist filed suit
    against employer's automobile insurer, asserting claim for         [3]   Mandamus
    underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits, as well as bad faith                  Matters of discretion
    claims. Insurer filed motion to sever and abate UIM claim                To satisfy the clear abuse of discretion standard
    from bad faith claims. Employee filed motion for a bifurcated            for issuance of a writ of mandamus, the relator
    trial. The 49th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Jose               must show that the trial court could reasonably
    A. Lopez, J., denied insurer's motion and granted employee's             have reached only one decision.
    motion. Insurer filed petition for writ of mandamus.
    Cases that cite this headnote
    Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Rebecca Simmons, J., held          [4]   Mandamus
    that:                                                                       Remedy at Law
    Appellate court will not issue a writ of
    [1] trial court was required to sever and abate UIM claim from           mandamus if there is a clear and adequate
    bad faith claims, and                                                    remedy at law.
    [2] insurer had no adequate remedy by appeal with respect to             Cases that cite this headnote
    trial court's abuse of discretion in denying its motion to sever
    and abate.                                                         [5]   Mandamus
    Nature and existence of rights to be
    protected or enforced
    Writ conditionally granted.
    Since mandamus is intended as an extraordinary
    remedy, such interference is justified only when
    parties stand to lose their substantial rights.
    West Headnotes (14)
    Cases that cite this headnote
    [1]     Mandamus
    Remedy at Law                                          [6]   Action
    Severance of actions
    Mandamus
    Nature of acts to be commanded                               Action
    Nature and subject matter of actions in
    Mandamus will issue only to correct a clear
    general
    abuse of discretion for which the relator has no
    adequate remedy at law.                                         Trial court was required to sever and abate
    claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits
    1 Cases that cite this headnote                                 brought by employee involved in motor vehicle
    accident with other motorist against employer's
    automobile insurer from employee's bad faith
    [2]     Appeal and Error
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                             1
    In re United Fire Lloyds, 
    327 S.W.3d 250
    (2010)
    claims against insurer, as insurer was under
    no contractual duty to pay UIM benefits               [10]   Insurance
    until employee established the liability and                      Prerequisites for Claim of Breach or Bad
    underinsured status of the other motorist, and,              Faith
    thus, insurer should not be required to put forth            Insurance
    the effort and expense of conducting discovery,                  Bad faith in general
    preparing for a trial, and conducting voir dire on           Contractual claims based on an insurance policy
    bad faith claims that could be rendered moot by              and bad faith claims against an insurer are
    the portion of the trial relating to UIM benefits,           by their nature independent, but, in most
    in that to require such would not do justice, avoid          circumstances, an insured may not prevail on a
    prejudice, and further convenience.                          bad faith claim without first showing that the
    insurer breached the contract.
    6 Cases that cite this headnote
    2 Cases that cite this headnote
    [7]    Action
    Severance of actions                             [11]   Insurance
    Trial                                                            Necessity of Tort Liability
    Separate Trials in Same Cause                           In a case in which underinsured motorist
    Severance and bifurcation are distinct trial                 (UIM) benefits are sought from an automobile
    procedures; a “severance” divides the lawsuit                insurer, the UIM insurer is obligated to
    into two or more separate and independent                    pay damages which the insured is legally
    causes, but the “bifurcation” of a trial leaves the          entitled to recover from the underinsured
    lawsuit intact but enables the court to hear and             motorist. V.A.T.S. Insurance Code, art. 5.06–
    determine one or more issues without trying all              1(5) (Repealed).
    controverted issues at the same time.
    2 Cases that cite this headnote
    3 Cases that cite this headnote
    [12]   Insurance
    [8]    Action                                                           Necessity of Tort Liability
    Severance of actions                                    Insurance
    Claims are properly severable if: (1) the                        Underinsurance; exhausted coverage
    controversy involves more than one cause of                  Insurance
    action, (2) the severed claim is one that would be                Determination of Tort Liability; Actions
    the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently             and Settlements
    asserted, and (3) the severed claim is not so
    An underinsured motorist (UIM) insurer is
    interwoven with the remaining action that they
    under no contractual duty to pay benefits until
    involve the same facts and issues.
    the insured obtains a judgment establishing
    Cases that cite this headnote                                the liability and underinsured status of the
    other motorist; neither requesting UIM benefits
    nor filing suit against the insurer triggers a
    [9]    Action                                                       contractual duty to pay.
    Severance of actions
    The controlling reasons for a severance of claims            2 Cases that cite this headnote
    are to do justice, avoid prejudice, and further
    convenience.                                          [13]   Insurance
    Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist
    2 Cases that cite this headnote
    Coverage
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                     2
    In re United Fire Lloyds, 
    327 S.W.3d 250
    (2010)
    Insurance
    Necessity of Tort Liability
    OPINION
    Insurance
    Claims and Settlement Practices                  Opinion by: REBECCA SIMMONS, Justice.
    For an insured to recover for underinsured
    On February 8, 2010, relator United Fire Lloyds filed a
    motorist (UIM) benefits under an automobile
    petition for writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the trial
    insurance policy, he must prove not only that
    court to (1) vacate the October 7, 2009 Order Granting
    the purported underinsured motorist negligently
    Plaintiff's Motion for a Bifurcated Trial, (2) vacate the
    caused the accident that resulted in the covered
    October 13, 2009 Order Denying Defendant United Fire
    damages, but also that all applicable policy
    Lloyd's Motion to Sever and Abate Plaintiff's Extra–
    provisions have been satisfied.
    Contractual Claims, and (3) grant United Fire's Motion to
    1 Cases that cite this headnote                      Sever and Abate Plaintiff's Extra–Contractual Claims. We
    conditionally grant mandamus relief.
    [14]   Mandamus
    Modification or vacation of judgment or
    order                                                                     BACKGROUND
    Employer's automobile insurer, against which         The underlying suit arose from a motor vehicle accident
    employee had brought claim for underinsured          involving Juan Garcia and Ramon Valverde. Garcia filed
    motorist (UIM) benefits as well as bad faith         suit against United Fire for underinsured motorist (“UIM”)
    claims, had no adequate remedy by appeal with        benefits under his employer's insurance policy. The original
    respect to trial court's abuse of discretion in      petition only alleged a claim for UIM benefits, but
    denying its motion to sever and abate UIM claim      subsequently filed petitions added extra-contractual (bad
    from bad faith claims, and, thus, mandamus
    faith) claims. The Fourth *253 Amended Petition 2 alleged
    relief was appropriate, as if mandamus was not
    the following bad faith claims in violation of the Texas
    granted, insurer stood to lose substantial rights
    Insurance Code: (1) failing to commence an investigation of
    by being required to prepare for claims that might
    Garcia's claim and failing to request from the claimant all
    be rendered moot and might have not even yet
    items, statements, and forms in order to properly evaluate
    accrued.
    Garcia's claim in violation of section 542.055; and (2)
    3 Cases that cite this headnote                      engaging in unfair settlement practices in violation of section
    541.060. 3
    United Fire contends it made a settlement offer in the amount
    1                  of $100,000 during mediation. However, no settlement
    *252 Original Mandamus Proceeding.
    agreement was ever reached. Later, United Fire filed a motion
    Attorneys and Law Firms                                      to sever and abate Garcia's UIM claim from the bad faith
    claims. As the basis for the motion, United Fire asserted
    Clay E. Coalson, Donnell, Abernethy & Kieschnick,            a severance was necessary because the introduction of the
    Corpus Christi, TX, Jose L. Gamez, Donnell, Abernethy &      settlement offer, the policy limits, and the facts concerning
    Kieschnick, Edinburg, TX, for Appellant.                     United Fire's handling of the claim, as they relate to the
    bad faith claims, would prejudice United Fire in the trial
    Ronald A. Ramos, Nadine Nieto, Law Offices of Ronald
    of the UIM claim, and would confuse, complicate, and
    A. Ramos, P.C., Adam Poncio, Poncio Law Offices, P.C.,
    considerably lengthen the trial. Garcia then filed a motion
    San Antonio, TX, Bryan W. Jones, Texas Mutual Insurance
    for a bifurcated trial as an alternative to the severance and
    Company, Austin, TX, for Appellee.
    abatement. As authority for his motion, Garcia relied on
    Sitting: KAREN ANGELINI, Justice, REBECCA                    this court's opinion in In re Travelers Lloyds of Tex. Ins.
    SIMMONS, Justice, MARIALYN BARNARD, Justice.                 Co., in which we concluded the trial court did not abuse
    its discretion in bifurcating over severing the contractual
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                        3
    In re United Fire Lloyds, 
    327 S.W.3d 250
    (2010)
    claims from the bad faith claims. See 
    273 S.W.3d 368
    , 373–         controverted issues at the same time. 
    Id. Claims are
    properly
    75 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, orig. proceeding). Garcia           severable if (1) the controversy involves more than one cause
    contended a severance would be judicially wasteful, would          of action, (2) the severed claim is one that would be the
    unduly prejudice him, and the disposition of the trial on the      proper subject of a lawsuit if independently asserted, and (3)
    UIM claim would not eliminate the trial on the bad faith           the severed claim is not so interwoven with the remaining
    claims. In response to the motion for a bifurcated trial, United   action that they involve the same facts and issues. Guar. Fed.
    Fire asserted that a UIM claim is different from other types of    Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 
    793 S.W.2d 652
    , 658
    contractual insurance claims because there is no contractual       (Tex.1990). “The controlling reasons for a severance are to
    duty to pay benefits until the insured obtains a judgment          do justice, avoid prejudice, and further convenience.” 
    Id. establishing liability
    and the underinsured status of the other
    motorist. Therefore, United Fire claimed no bad faith claims        [10] Contractual claims based on an insurance policy and
    had yet accrued, and the trial on the UIM claim would control      bad faith claims are by their nature independent. Akin, 927
    the outcome of the bad faith claims. After a hearing, the trial    S.W.2d at 629. “But, in most circumstances, an insured may
    court granted Garcia's motion for a bifurcated trial and denied    not prevail on a bad faith claim without first showing that the
    United Fire Lloyd's motion to sever and abate. This petition       insurer breached the contract.” 
    Id. In Akin,
    the Texas Supreme
    for writ of mandamus ensued.                                       Court concluded that a severance may be necessary in some
    bad faith cases. 
    Id. at 630.
    For instance, when evidence is
    admissible only with regard to the bad faith claim and would
    prejudice the insurer to such an extent that a fair trial on the
    ANALYSIS
    contract claim would become unlikely. 
    Id. I. Standard
    of Review
    [1]    [2]    [3]     [4]     [5]   [6] Mandamus will issue onlyFollowing Akin, numerous intermediate courts of appeals
    to correct a clear abuse of discretion for which the relator     have considered whether it is an abuse of discretion for
    has no adequate remedy at law. In re Prudential Ins. Co.         a trial court to refuse to order a severance of contractual
    of Am., 
    148 S.W.3d 124
    , 135 (Tex.2004) (orig. proceeding);       claims from bad faith claims when a settlement offer has
    Walker v. Packer, 
    827 S.W.2d 833
    , 839–40 (Tex.1992) (orig.       been made. See, e.g., In re Miller, 
    202 S.W.3d 922
    , 925–
    proceeding). “A trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining   26 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied] );
    what the law is or applying the law to the facts,” and “a clear  In re Allstate Tex. Lloyds, No. 14–05–00762–CV, 2005 WL
    failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly 2277134, at * 4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist] Sept. 2, 2005,
    will constitute an abuse of discretion” *254 Walker, 827         orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Allstate Indem. Co., 05–
    S.W.2d at 840. “To satisfy the clear abuse of discretion         03–01496–CV, 
    2003 WL 22456345
    , at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas
    standard, the relator must show ‘that the trial court could      Oct. 30, 2003, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Trinity
    reasonably have reached only one decision.’ ” Liberty Nat'l      Universal Ins. Co., 
    64 S.W.3d 463
    , 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo
    Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 
    927 S.W.2d 627
    , 630 (Tex.1996)            2001, orig. proceeding [mand. denied] ). Eventually, parties
    (quoting 
    Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840
    ). However, this court         began seeking bifurcation of the contractual claims from the
    will not issue a writ of mandamus if there is a clear and        bad faith claims as an alternative to severance. See In re
    adequate remedy at law. See 
    Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840
    .           
    Travelers, 273 S.W.3d at 373
    –75; In re Allstate Tex. Lloyds,
    Since mandamus is intended as an extraordinary remedy, such      
    202 S.W.3d 895
    , 900 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, orig.
    interference is justified only when parties stand to lose their  proceeding [mand. denied] ) (concluding plaintiffs failed
    substantial rights. 
    Id. at 842.
                                     to meet their burden that they would be prejudiced by
    the bifurcation of contractual claims under a homeowner's
    insurance policy and bad faith claims instead of severing and
    II. Severance or Bifurcation?                                    abating the claims). But we are only aware of a few cases
    [7]    [8]    [9] Severance and bifurcation are distinct trial in the context of a UIM claim that have considered whether
    procedures. Hall v. City of Austin, 
    450 S.W.2d 836
    , 837–38       severance and abatement is necessary over bifurcation. See
    (Tex.1970). A severance divides the lawsuit into two or more     In re Allstate Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., No. 02–07–00141–
    separate and independent causes. 
    Id. However, the
    bifurcation    CV, 
    2007 WL 1574964
    , at *1 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth May
    of a trial leaves the lawsuit intact but enables the court to    30, 2007, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding it was an
    hear and determine one or more issues without trying all         abuse of discretion to bifurcate *255 instead of severing
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                            4
    In re United Fire Lloyds, 
    327 S.W.3d 250
    (2010)
    and abating the UIM claim from the bad faith claims); In           severing and abating because it is disputed whether there is
    re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    209 S.W.3d 742
    , 746–47           a covered loss. United Fire argues it should not be required
    (Tex.App.-Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding) (concluding it was         to prepare for a trial on bad faith claims when it has no
    an abuse of discretion to bifurcate instead of severing the UIM    contractual duty to pay the UIM claim until Garcia obtains
    claim from the bad faith claims). However, these cases fail to     a judgment establishing the underinsured motorist's liability
    discuss the necessity of severance and abatement rather than       and underinsured status.
    bifurcation in the context of a UIM claim.
    Garcia responds that it is not disputed that he has a covered
    [11] [12] In a UIM case, “[t]he UIM insurer is obligated loss and the bad faith claims will not be mooted by a trial
    to pay damages which the insured is ‘legally entitled to      on the UIM claim; therefore, this court should hold the
    recover’ from the underinsured motorist.” Brainard v. Trinity trial court did not abuse its discretion in bifurcating the
    Universal Ins. Co., 
    216 S.W.3d 809
    , 818 (Tex.2006) (citing    trial rather than severing and abating. 5 Garcia relies *256
    TEX. INS.CODE art. 5.06–1(5)). In Brainard, the Texas         primarily on In re Travelers to support his argument. See
    Supreme Court expounded on the uniqueness of a UIM 
    case 273 S.W.3d at 373
    –75. However, we do not find In re
    as follows:                                                   Travelers controlling because it was not a UIM case. 
    Id. In re
    Travelers involved a suit filed by homeowners against
    The UIM contract is unique because,
    their homeowners' insurance carrier for breach of contract
    according to its terms, benefits are
    and bad faith for mishandling their claim. 
    Id. at 370.
    This
    conditioned upon the insured's legal
    court concluded that “[b]ecause the trial of the [plaintiffs']
    entitlement to receive damages from
    extra-contractual claims is unaffected by the outcome of
    a third party. Unlike many first-
    their contractual claim, a single bifurcated trial preceded by
    party insurance contracts, in which the
    unified discovery and pretrial proceedings promotes judicial
    policy alone dictates coverage, UIM
    economy better than severance and abatement.” 
    Id. at 374.
                insurance utilizes tort law to determine
    As a result, this court determined the trial court did not abuse
    coverage. Consequently, the insurer's
    its discretion in bifurcating the case because “[u]nder these
    contractual obligation to pay benefits
    circumstances, the primary justification for abatement of the
    does not arise until liability and
    extra-contractual claims—avoiding the effort and expense of
    damages are determined.
    conducting discovery on claims that may be rendered moot
    See 
    Brainard, 216 S.W.3d at 818
    (citing Henson v. S. Farm          in a previous trial—is non-existent because the disposition
    of the contractual claim will not moot the extra-contractual
    Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 
    17 S.W.3d 652
    , 654 (Tex.2000)). 4
    claims.” 
    Id. Therefore, “the
    UIM insurer is under no contractual duty to
    pay benefits until the insured obtains a judgment establishing
    This court's determination that bifurcation is an appropriate
    the liability and underinsured status of the other motorist....
    alternative to severance is not applicable to the present case
    Neither requesting UIM benefits nor filing suit against the
    because a UIM claim that involves a dispute as to whether
    insurer triggers a contractual duty to pay.” 
    Id. there is
    a covered loss is distinguishable from a homeowners'
    insurance claim where the existence of a covered loss is not
    [13] Therefore, in order for Garcia to recover under his
    disputed. Unlike the situation presented in In re Travelers,
    UIM claim, he must prove not only that the purported
    United Fire disputes whether Garcia has a covered loss. As
    underinsured motorist negligently caused the accident that
    a result, a determination of Garcia's UIM claim may negate
    resulted in the covered damages, but also that all applicable
    his bad faith claims. See Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co. v.
    policy provisions have been satisfied. See Allstate Ins. Co.
    Boyd, 
    177 S.W.3d 919
    , 922 (Tex.2005) (recognizing bad faith
    v. Bonner, 
    51 S.W.3d 289
    , 291–92 (Tex.2001); Wellisch v.
    claims are generally negated by a lack of coverage under the
    United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 
    75 S.W.3d 53
    , 57 (Tex.App.-San
    insurance policy); 
    Akin, 927 S.W.2d at 630
    –31 (recognizing
    Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding that because an insurer is
    that judgment for the insurer on the coverage claim prohibits
    not obligated to pay UIM benefits until the insured becomes
    recovery premised only on the bad faith denial of a claim,
    legally entitled to those benefits, an insurer has the right to
    but does not necessarily bar all claims for bad faith); In re
    withhold payment of UIM benefits until the insured's legal
    
    Miller, 202 S.W.3d at 925
    (concluding that bad faith claims
    entitlement is established). As a result, United Fire contends
    are negated by a lack of coverage under the insurance policy).
    the trial court abused its discretion in bifurcating rather than
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                              5
    In re United Fire Lloyds, 
    327 S.W.3d 250
    (2010)
    order. Typically in a mandamus situation, a party preserves
    its complaint by requesting an order and the trial court
    As a result of the foregoing, we are constrained by the clear
    either grants or *257 does not grant the request to enter
    holding in Brainard, and hold that United Fire is under no
    an order. See Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 
    798 S.W.2d 550
    ,
    contractual duty to pay UIM benefits until Garcia establishes
    556 (Tex.1990). It is unclear what Garcia contends United
    the liability and underinsured status of the other motorist.
    Fire waived since United Fire's complaint is that the trial
    See 
    Brainard, 216 S.W.3d at 818
    . Therefore, United Fire
    court improperly granted a bifurcated trial over severing and
    should not be required to put forth the effort and expense of
    abating the UIM claim from the bad faith claims. United Fire
    conducting discovery, preparing for a trial, and conducting
    does not appear to complain about the form or contents of
    voir dire on bad faith claims that could be rendered moot
    the bifurcation order. Therefore, we do not find United Fire
    by the portion of the trial relating to UIM benefits. To
    waived any complaints.
    require such would not do justice, avoid prejudice, and further
    convenience. See Guar. Fed. Sav. 
    Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 658
    .
    Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial court abused
    its discretion in bifurcating the case instead of severing and                                       CONCLUSION
    abating the UIM claim from the bad faith claims.
    We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in granting
    [14] We further conclude United Fire does not have an                     Juan Garcia's motion for a bifurcated trial and denying
    adequate remedy by appeal because if mandamus is not                       United Fire's motion to sever and abate. Accordingly,
    granted it stands to lose substantial rights by being required             we conditionally grant the writ of mandamus. The trial
    to prepare for claims that may be rendered moot and may                    court is ordered to (1) vacate the October 7, 2009 Order
    have not even yet accrued. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard,              Granting Plaintiff's Motion for a Bifurcated Trial, (2) vacate
    
    847 S.W.2d 668
    , 675 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993,                    the October 13, 2009 Order Denying Defendant United
    orig. proceeding); In re Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 64 S.W.3d             Fire Lloyd's Motion to Sever and Abate Plaintiff's Extra–
    463, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding [mand.                  Contractual Claims, and (3) grant United Fire's Motion to
    denied] ).                                                                 Sever and Abate Plaintiff's Extra–Contractual Claims. The
    writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply within
    Finally, we address Garcia's contention that United Fire                   fourteen days.
    waived any complaint as to the wording or form of the
    Footnotes
    1      This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2008–CVE000521–D1, Juan Garcia, Plaintiff, Texas Mutual Insurance Co., As Subrogee
    of Juan Garcia, Intervenor v. United Fire Lloyds, pending in the 49th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas, the Honorable
    Jose A. Lopez presiding.
    2      The live petition is the Fifth Amended Petition. However, it was filed after the trial court granted the motion to bifurcate. In considering
    whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying United Fire's motion to sever and abate, we limit our review to the record that
    was before the trial court at the time the “decision was made.” In re Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 
    975 S.W.2d 601
    , 605 (Tex.1998).
    3      Specifically, Garcia contends United Fire engaged in unfair settlement practices by: (1) failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate
    a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of Garcia's claim after liability had become reasonably clear, (2) refusing, failing or
    unreasonably delaying a settlement offer on the basis that other coverage may be available, and (3) delaying or refusing settlement
    of a claim solely because there is other insurance of a different kind available to satisfy part of the loss.
    4      We acknowledge Brainard involved a different issue than the case at hand: a determination as to when presentment of a contract
    claim was made in order to determine whether a party was entitled to attorney's fees in accordance with Chapter 38 of the Texas
    Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 
    Id. 5 We
    note that in Garcia's Sur–Reply he provides, “The truth of the matter is the primary claims will be decided and then, if warranted,
    extra-contracial [sic] claims will be determined in the bifurcated portion of the trial.” However, later Garcia again contends that the
    extra-contractual claims will not be rendered moot by judgment in the first phase of the trial due to bifurcation.
    End of Document                                                       © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                                             6
    TAB C
    In re Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    439 S.W.3d 422
    (2014)
    Cases that cite this headnote
    
    439 S.W.3d 422
                    Court of Appeals of Texas,
    Houston (1st Dist.).                            [3]   Mandamus
    Matters of discretion
    In re PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL                                  Because a trial court has no discretion in
    INSURANCE COMPANY, Relator.                                  determining what the law is, the trial court
    abuses its discretion, thus supporting claim for
    No. 01–14–00199–CV.           |   June 12, 2014.                 mandamus relief, if it clearly fails to analyze or
    apply the law correctly.
    Synopsis
    Background: Insured brought action against uninsured                    Cases that cite this headnote
    motorist (UM) carrier to recover for breach of contract, breach
    of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and statutory
    violations. The 215th District Court, Harris County, Elaine H.    [4]   Mandamus
    Palmer, J., denied carrier's motion to sever and abate extra-              Remedy by Appeal or Writ of Error
    contractual claims. Carrier petitioned for writ of mandamus.            In determining whether appeal is an adequate
    remedy, Court of Appeals considers whether the
    benefits outweigh the detriments of mandamus
    review.
    [Holding:] The Court of Appeals, Harvey Brown, J., held that
    severance of extra-contractual claims from breach of contract           Cases that cite this headnote
    claim was required.
    [5]   Action
    Writ conditionally granted.                                                  Severance of actions
    The trial court has broad discretion in
    the severance of causes of action. Vernon's
    West Headnotes (9)                                                     Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41.
    Cases that cite this headnote
    [1]    Mandamus
    Remedy by Appeal or Writ of Error                      [6]   Action
    Mandamus                                                             Severance of actions
    Matters of discretion                                        The trial court has a duty to order severance
    Court of Appeals may issue a writ of mandamus                   of causes of action when all of the facts and
    to correct a trial court's clear abuse of discretion            circumstances of the case unquestionably require
    or violation of duty imposed by law when no                     a separate trial to prevent manifest injustice,
    adequate remedy by appeal exists.                               there is no fact or circumstance supporting or
    tending to support a contrary conclusion, and the
    Cases that cite this headnote                                   legal rights of the parties will not be prejudiced
    thereby. Vernon's Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc.,
    [2]    Mandamus                                                        Rule 41.
    Matters of discretion
    1 Cases that cite this headnote
    A clear abuse of discretion occurs supporting
    mandamus relief when the trial court's decision
    is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it amounts          [7]   Action
    to clear error.                                                      Severance of actions
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                           1
    In re Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    439 S.W.3d 422
    (2014)
    Claims are properly severable if: (1) the
    controversy involves more than one cause of          Attorneys and Law Firms
    action; (2) the severed claim is one that would be
    *424 Mark R. Lapidus, Megan L. Knudsen, Lapidus
    the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently
    Knudsen, PC, Houston, TX, for Relator.
    asserted; and (3) the severed claim is not so
    interwoven with the remaining action that it         Timothy R. Hightower, Alexandra Muthcler, Houston, TX,
    involves the same facts and issues. Vernon's         for Real Party in Interest.
    Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41.
    Panel consists of Justices KEYES, BLAND and BROWN.
    Cases that cite this headnote
    OPINION
    [8]    Action
    Severance of actions                            HARVEY BROWN, Justice.
    Severance of insured's extra-contractual claims
    Relator, Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company
    from breach of contract claim was required in
    seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to
    order to avoid prejudice and prevent manifest
    (1) vacate its order denying Progressive's motion to sever
    injustice to uninsured motorist (UM) carrier
    extra-contractual claims asserted against it and (2) enter an
    from need to expend resources answering
    order abating those extra-contractual claims until the breach-
    discovery far broader than the car accident
    of-contract claim brought by Alma Guia, the real party in
    claim; documents related to lawsuits and claims
    interest, has been resolved. We conditionally grant the writ.
    against carrier regarding the denial of UM and
    underinsured motorist (UIM) claims for over
    ten years were irrelevant to contract claim, and
    introducing carrier's claims handling history in                             Background
    unrelated accidents at trial of breach-of-contract
    Following an automobile collision with an uninsured
    claim would be manifestly unjust. Vernon's
    Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41.                  motorist's vehicle, Guia sued her insurer, Progressive. 1
    While investigation into the claim was ongoing, Guia sued
    1 Cases that cite this headnote                      Progressive for breach of the uninsured motorist provisions in
    her policy, violations of Chapter 542 of the Texas Insurance
    [9]    Mandamus                                             Code, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer
    Modification or vacation of judgment or         Protection Act, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair
    order                                                dealing. Guia served Progressive with a number of discovery
    requests, some of which would not be relevant to the breach-
    Mandamus
    of-contract claim. Progressive filed a motion to sever the
    Proceedings in civil actions in general
    breach of contract claim for uninsured motorist coverage from
    Appeal was not adequate remedy for trial court's     the extra-contractual claims. The trial court judge signed an
    improper refusal to sever and abate insured's        order abating the motion to sever, allowing discovery to move
    extra-contractual claims from breach of contract     forward on all claims, and deferring the other issues covered
    claim against uninsured motorist (UM) carrier,       by the motion until the pretrial hearing. Progressive filed a
    and, thus, writ of mandamus would be granted if      writ seeking to compel severance and abatement.
    trial court failed to comply. Vernon's Ann.Texas
    Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41.
    1 Cases that cite this headnote                                          Standard of Review
    [1] [2] [3] [4] We may issue a writ of mandamus to
    correct a trial court's clear abuse of discretion or violation
    of duty imposed by law when no adequate remedy by
    appeal exists. See Walker v. Packer, 
    827 S.W.2d 833
    , 839
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                       2
    In re Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    439 S.W.3d 422
    (2014)
    (Tex.1992) (orig. proceeding). A clear abuse of discretion      In Liberty National Fire Insurance Co. v. Akin, the Texas
    occurs when the trial court's decision is so arbitrary and      Supreme Court considered whether severance was required
    unreasonable that it amounts to clear error. See 
    id. (quoting in
    a case involving breach of contract and extra-contractual
    Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 
    700 S.W.2d 916
    ,             claims against an insurer under a homeowner's policy. 927
    917 (Tex.1985)). Because a trial court has no discretion        S.W.2d 627 (Tex.1996). In refusing to grant mandamus relief,
    in determining what the law is, the trial court abuses its      the Court rejected “an inflexible rule that would deny the
    discretion if it clearly fails to analyze or apply the law      trial court all discretion and ... require severance in every
    correctly. See 
    id. at 840.
    “In determining whether appeal       case [involving bad-faith insurance claims], regardless of the
    is an adequate remedy, [we] consider whether the benefits       likelihood of prejudice.” 
    Id. at 630.
    Ultimately, the Court
    outweigh the detriments of mandamus review.” In re BP           concluded that the contractual and extra-contractual claims
    Prods. N. Am., Inc., 
    244 S.W.3d 840
    , 845 (Tex.2008) (orig.      in that case were interwoven, with most evidence admissible
    proceeding).                                                    on both claims, and that any prejudicial effect could be
    ameliorated by appropriate limiting instructions. See 
    id. The [5]
        [6] The trial court has “broad” discretion in the Court went on to
    severance of causes of action. Morgan v. Compugraphic
    Corp., 
    675 S.W.2d 729
    , 734 (Tex.1984); Black v. Smith, 956                   Several Texas appellate courts have
    S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, orig.                     found severance may nevertheless
    proceeding). However, that discretion is not unlimited. See                  be necessary in some bad faith
    U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 
    847 S.W.2d 668
    , 671 (Tex.App.-                cases. A trial court will undoubtedly
    Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding). The trial court                 confront instances in which evidence
    has a duty to order severance when *425 “all of the facts and                admissible only on the bad faith claim
    circumstances of the case unquestionably require a separate                  would prejudice the insurer to such an
    trial to prevent manifest injustice, and there is no fact or                 extent that a fair trial on the contract
    circumstance supporting or tending to support a contrary                     claim would become unlikely. One
    conclusion, and the legal rights of the parties will not be                  example would be when the insurer
    prejudiced thereby.” Womack v. Berry, 
    156 Tex. 44
    , 291                       has made a settlement offer on the
    S.W.2d 677, 682–83 (Tex.1956) (orig. proceeding).                            disputed contract claim. As we have
    noted, some courts have concluded
    that the insurer would be unfairly
    prejudiced by having to defend the
    Severance of Contractual and                                 contract claim at the same time and
    Extra–Contractual Claims                                   before the same jury that would
    consider evidence that the insurer had
    [7] Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 41 governs severance of
    offered to settle the entire dispute.
    claims. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 41. The rule provides, in part,
    While we concur with these decisions,
    that “[a]ctions which have been improperly joined may be
    we hasten to add that evidence of this
    severed ... on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
    sort simply does not exist in this case.
    party may be severed and proceeded with separately.” 
    Id. The In
    the absence of a settlement offer
    predominant reasons for a severance are to do justice, avoid
    on the entire contract claim, or other
    prejudice, and promote convenience. F.F.P. Op. Partners,
    compelling circumstances, severance
    L.P. v. Duenez, 
    237 S.W.3d 680
    , 693 (Tex.2007). Claims are
    is not required.
    properly severable if: (1) the controversy involves more than
    one cause of action; (2) the severed claim is one that would be 
    Id. (internal citations
    omitted); see also In re Miller, 202
    the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently asserted; and  S.W.3d 922, 925–26 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding
    (3) the severed claim is not so interwoven with the remaining   [mand. denied] ); In re Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 64 S.W.3d
    action that it involves the same facts and issues. Guar. Fed.   463, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding [mand.
    Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 
    793 S.W.2d 652
    , 658       denied] ). Thus, in Liberty National, the Court opined a
    (Tex.1990). Only the third element is in dispute here.          settlement offer by an insurer may create a situation where
    severance of an insured's contract claim is 
    required. 927 S.W.2d at 630
    (Tex.1996).
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                         3
    In re Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    439 S.W.3d 422
    (2014)
    the liability and underinsured status
    There is no evidence in the record that Progressive made a                    of the other motorist. Therefore, [the
    settlement offer to *426 Guia. However, Liberty National                      insurer] should not be required to
    does not limit severance to cases where such an offer has been                put forth the effort and expense of
    made, instead holding that “other compelling circumstances”                   conducting discovery, preparing for
    may also require severance. 
    Id. In the
    case before us,                        a trial, and conducting voir dire
    Progressive argues that “other compelling circumstances”                      on bad faith claims that could be
    should include the effort and cost associated with conducting                 rendered moot by the portion of
    discovery on extra-contractual claims that have not yet                       the trial relating to [underinsured
    accrued because the insured's breach-of-contract claim has                    motorist] benefits. To require such
    not yet been decided.                                                         would not do justice, avoid prejudice,
    and further convenience. Under
    Several courts of appeals have considered the issues of                       these circumstances, we conclude
    severance and abatement in the context of uninsured motorist                  the trial court abused its discretion
    or underinsured motorist insurance coverage; these courts                     in bifurcating the case instead of
    have concluded that, when uninsured motorist claims are                       severing and abating the [underinsured
    involved, severance of the extra-contractual claims was                       motorist] claim from the bad faith
    required. See In re Am. Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 384 S.W.3d                 claims.
    429 (Tex.App.-Austin 2012, orig. proceeding) (concluding
    trial court abused discretion by denying insurer's motion for    In re United Fire 
    Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d at 256
    . 2
    severance and abatement of extra-contractual claims where
    settlement offer was made on underinsured motorist claim);        *427 [8] In this case, to prevail on her extra-contractual
    In re Reynolds, 
    369 S.W.3d 638
    , 650–55 (Tex.App.-Tyler           claims against Progressive, Guia must demonstrate that
    2012, orig. proceeding) (holding severance of underinsured       Progressive was contractually obligated to pay her uninsured
    motorist claim was required to prevent prejudice); In re         motorist claim. To do this, Guia must first prove that she had
    United Fire Lloyds, 
    327 S.W.3d 250
    , 257 (Tex.App.-San            uninsured motorist coverage, that the other driver negligently
    Antonio 2010, orig. proceeding) (finding abuse of discretion     caused the accident and was uninsured, and the amount of her
    in granting motion for bifurcation of trial rather than          damages. See In re 
    Reynolds, 369 S.W.3d at 652
    . It appears
    severance and abatement of extra-contractual claims); see        that the first issue is not in dispute. Therefore, Guia's breach-
    also In re Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 13–             of-contract claim will essentially involve the issues in a
    12–00700–CV, 
    2013 WL 398866
    (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi             typical car wreck: the comparative negligence of Guia and the
    January 30, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding          other driver and Guia's damages. The bad faith claim here is
    that severance and abatement of extra-contractual claims         more complicated. In her most recent petition, she alleges that
    is required in many instances when insured asserts claim         Progressive breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing,
    to uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits); In re           violated the insurance code by failing to timely pay the
    Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 07–11–00396–CV,            claim, and further alleges Progressive's conduct was knowing
    
    2011 WL 4916303
    , (Tex.App.-Amarillo Oct. 17, 2011,               and intentional in violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices
    orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (denying mandamus because           Act. In discovery, Guia seeks production of all documents
    complaint was not preserved, but agreeing that abatement of      related to lawsuits and claims against Progressive regarding
    extra-contractual claims is required in most instances when      the denial of uninsured/underinsured motorist claims for over
    an insured asserts claim to uninsured motorist benefits).        ten years. Examples of these requests include:
    The San Antonio Court of Appeals explained its                     Request 3. Produce all documents of any type as to claims
    determination that mandamus relief was proper to compel            asserted against Progressive during period from January
    severance and abatement of an underinsured motorist claim          1, 2001, up to and including present day as a result of
    from related bad faith claims as follows:                          nonpayment of uninsured/underinsured motorist claims in
    Texas regardless of whether a lawsuit was filed and/or
    [The insurer] is under no contractual                  liability was denied.
    duty to pay [underinsured motorist]
    benefits until [the insured] establishes
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                            4
    In re Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    439 S.W.3d 422
    (2014)
    
    Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839
    . The Corpus Christi Court of
    Request 4. Produce all documents of any type as to
    Appeals in In re United Fire Lloyds concluded the insurer
    all lawsuits filed against Progressive during period from
    did not have an adequate remedy by appeal because, if a
    January 1, 2001, up to and including present day, as a result
    writ of mandamus were not granted, the insurer stood to lose
    of nonpayment of uninsured/underinsured motorist claims
    substantial rights by being required to prepare for claims that
    in Texas regardless of whether liability was denied.
    might be rendered moot and never even accrue. In re Fire
    ...                                                                  
    Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d at 256
    (citing U.S. Fire Ins. 
    Co., 847 S.W.2d at 675
    ; In re Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 64 S.W.3d
    Request 16. A copy of each and every policy, manual,                 at 468).
    protocol, instruction booklet or similar writing concerning
    procedures for the investigation and handling of uninsured/          The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals agreed. See In re Old
    underinsured motorist claim which was in effect at the time          Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    2013 WL 398866
    . Likewise,
    Plaintiff made her claims in this case, and for the seven            other appellate courts have also found these claims do not
    years preceding Progressive's denial of Plaintiff's claim.           have an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Am. Nat'l Cnty.
    Mut. Ins. Co., 
    384 S.W.3d 429
    , 439; In re Reynolds, 369
    These requested documents are irrelevant to the breach-of-
    S.W.3d at 658; In re United Fire 
    Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d at 256
    .
    contract claim, and the introduction of Progressive's claims
    handling history in unrelated accidents at the trial of Guia's
    breach-of-contract claim would be manifestly unjust. See
    Womack v. 
    Berry, 291 S.W.2d at 682
    –83 (Tex.1956) (orig.                                             Conclusion
    proceeding).
    Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Guia's
    extra-contractual claims against Progressive are severable,
    The trial court's abatement of any decision on severance until
    the facts and circumstances of the case require a severance to
    the eve of trial requires the parties to engage in discovery
    prevent manifest injustice, and the legal rights of the parties
    on the extra-contractual claims and prepare for a trial on
    will not be prejudiced thereby. See Womack, 291 S.W.2d
    these claims, even though extra-contractual liability could
    at 683. The trial court, therefore, abused its discretion in
    only accrue if Progressive is found liable on the contract. See
    refusing to sever and abate the uninsured motorist claims
    In re United Fire 
    Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d at 256
    . Accordingly,
    from the bad faith claims pending the determination of
    the trial court's decision to postpone severance, unless writ
    Progressive's liability for the uninsured motorist damages
    is granted, will require Progressive to expend resources
    under the policy. See In re Am. Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 384
    answering discovery that is far broader than the car accident
    S.W.3d 429; In re 
    Reynolds, 369 S.W.3d at 650
    –55; In re
    claim that must be resolved.
    United Fire 
    Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d at 257
    ; see also In re Old Am.
    Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    2013 WL 398866
    ; In re Farmers
    Consistent with In re Reynolds and In re United Fire Lloyds,
    Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 
    2011 WL 4916303
    .
    we conclude that severance of insured's extra-contractual
    claims is required in this instance to avoid prejudice.
    We conditionally grant Progressive's writ of mandamus and
    order the trial court to vacate the February 11, 2014 Order,
    grant Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company's
    Adequate Remedy by Appeal                               Motion to Sever, and abate the extra-contractual claims. We
    are confident that the trial court will promptly comply, and
    [9] A writ of mandamus will issue only if there is no
    our writ will issue only if it does not.
    adequate remedy available by direct appeal. See *428
    Footnotes
    1         The underlying case is Alma Guia v. Jessica Nicole Estes, Relinda Estes, Progressive Insurance Company and Progressive County
    Mutual Insurance Company; No. 2012–57535, in the 215th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Elaine H. Palmer
    presiding.
    2         The court relied on the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning in Brainard v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co., 
    216 S.W.3d 809
    (Tex.2006),
    but acknowledged that Brainard concerned timing of presentment of contract claim to determine whether party was entitled to
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                                    5
    In re Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 
    439 S.W.3d 422
    (2014)
    attorney's fees under Chapter 38 of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, rather than severance and abatement in the context
    of uninsured motorist claim. See In re United Fire Lloyds, 
    327 S.W.3d 250
    , 257 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2010, orig. proceeding)
    (discussing 
    Brainard, 216 S.W.3d at 818
    ).
    End of Document                                                 © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                                6
    TAB D
    In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., --- S.W.3d ---- (2014)
    
    2014 WL 5285850
    involves the same facts and issues. Vernon's
    Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41.
    
    2014 WL 5285850
           Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.              Cases that cite this headnote
    NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
    RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE                           [2]   Action
    PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED,                                    Severance of Actions
    IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.                             Controlling reasons to allow a severance
    are to avoid prejudice, do justice, and
    Court of Appeals of Texas,
    promote convenience. Vernon's Ann.Texas
    Houston (1st Dist.).
    Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41.
    In re ALLSTATE COUNTY MUTUAL
    Cases that cite this headnote
    INSURANCE COMPANY, Relator.
    No. 01–14–00068–CV.           |   Oct. 16, 2014.      [3]   Action
    Severance of Actions
    Synopsis
    Trial court has a duty to order severance when
    Background: Insured brought action against underinsured
    all of the facts and circumstances of the case
    motorist (UIM) carrier to recover for breach of contract,
    unquestionably require a separate trial to prevent
    breach of duty of good faith in settlement, and
    manifest injustice, and there is no fact or
    misrepresentation of insurance policy. The 240th District
    circumstance supporting or tending to support a
    Court, Fort Bend County, Pedro Ruiz, J., denied carrier's
    contrary conclusion, and the legal rights of the
    motion to sever and abate extra-contractual claims. Carrier
    parties will not be prejudiced thereby. Vernon's
    petitioned for writ of mandamus.
    Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41.
    Cases that cite this headnote
    Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Sherry Radack, C.J., held
    that:                                                           [4]   Insurance
    Settlement Duties; Bad Faith
    [1] severance of settlement claims was required, but
    An insurer generally cannot be liable for failing
    to settle or investigate a claim that it has no
    [2] severance of misrepresentation claims was not required.
    contractual duty to pay.
    Cases that cite this headnote
    Writ granted in part.
    [5]   Insurance
    Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist
    West Headnotes (8)
    Coverage
    Insurance
    [1]       Action                                                         Necessity of Tort Liability
    Severance of Actions                                  Insurance
    Claims are properly severable if: (1) the                      Underinsurance; Exhausted Coverage
    controversy involves more than one cause of                In the context of underinsured motorist
    action; (2) the severed claim is one that would be         coverage, an insurer is under no contractual
    the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently           duty to pay underinsured motorist benefits
    asserted; and (3) the severed claim is not so              until the insured proves that the insured
    interwoven with the remaining action that it               has underinsured motorist coverage, that the
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                       1
    In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., --- S.W.3d ---- (2014)
    
    2014 WL 5285850
    underinsured motorist negligently caused the                    promote convenience and judicial economy.
    accident that resulted in the covered damages,                  Vernon's Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41.
    the amount of the insured's damages, and that
    the underinsured motorist's insurance coverage is               Cases that cite this headnote
    deficient.
    Cases that cite this headnote
    Attorneys and Law Firms
    [6]    Insurance
    Ronald J. Restrepo, Nicole S. Bakare, N. Kimberly Hoesl,
    Duty to Settle or Pay
    Doyle, Restrepo, Harvin & Robbins, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for
    Insurance                                              Appellant.
    Investigations and Inspections
    An insured generally must first establish that the     David L. Miller, Diane F. Burgess, Miller, Scamardi &
    insurer is liable on the contract before the insured   Carrabba, P.C., Houston, TX, for Appellee.
    can recover on extra-contractual causes of action
    Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices
    against an insurer for failing to promptly pay,
    JENNINGS and KEYES.
    failing to settle, or failing to investigate an
    underinsured motorist insurance claim.
    OPINION
    Cases that cite this headnote
    SHERRY RADACK, Chief Justice.
    [7]    Action                                                  *1 Relator, Allstate County Mutual Insurance Company,
    Severance of Actions                              seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to (1)
    Severance of insured's settlement claims from          vacate its December 10, 2013 order denying Allstate's motion
    breach of contract claim was required in order         to sever and abate extra-contractual and bad faith claims
    to avoid prejudice and prevent manifest injustice      asserted against it and (2) enter an order severing and abating
    to underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier from            those extra-contractual and bad faith claims until the breach
    need to expend resources answering discovery           of contract claim brought by the real parties in interest,
    far broader than car accident claim; allowing          Raymond Briers, Jr. and Stacy Briers (collectively, Briers),
    insureds to conduct broad discovery into carrier's     individually and as representatives of the estate of Grant
    claims handling history regarding unrelated            Briers, has been resolved. 1 We partially grant relief.
    accidents and then allowing introduction of such
    information at trial of breach of contract claim
    would be manifestly unjust. Vernon's Ann.Texas
    Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41.                                                      Background
    Cases that cite this headnote                          The Briers' minor son, Grant, was riding in a vehicle driven
    and owned by DaYonajja Williams when the vehicle was
    involved in a single-vehicle automobile collision. Grant died
    [8]    Action                                                 as a result of the automobile accident. Following Grant's
    Severance of Actions                              death, the Briers filed a claim for underinsured motorist
    Trial court acted within its discretion when it        benefits with Allstate, pursuant to a business auto policy
    denied underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier's           issued by Allstate to Raymond Briers Jr.'s employer, T &
    motion to sever insureds' misrepresentation            R Pipeline Services, Inc. Allstate denied the Briers' claim,
    claims from breach of contract claim;                  stating that neither Raymond nor Grant was an “insured”
    misrepresentation claims were asserted as              under the policy and therefore they were not covered for an
    alternative causes of action to the breach of          underinsured motorist claim.
    contract claim, and, therefore, requiring carrier
    to litigate the claims at the same time would
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                         2
    In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., --- S.W.3d ---- (2014)
    
    2014 WL 5285850
    The Briers then filed suit against Allstate, seeking a            to clear error. See 
    id. (quoting Johnson
    v. Fourth Court of
    declaratory judgment stating that the Briers were covered by      Appeals, 
    700 S.W.2d 916
    , 917 (Tex.1985)). Because a trial
    the policy and alleging, in a paragraph styled “Breach of         court has no discretion in determining what the law is, the trial
    Contract,” that Allstate breached the underinsured motorist       court abuses its discretion if it clearly fails to analyze or apply
    provisions of the insurance contract. The Briers also asserted    the law correctly. See 
    id. at 840.
    “To satisfy the clear abuse of
    the following extra-contractual causes of action: (1) that        discretion standard, the relator must show ‘that the trial court
    Allstate acted in bad faith by failing to settle or make a good   could reasonably have reached only one decision.’”Liberty
    faith attempt to settle the claim, which the Briers styled as     Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 
    927 S.W.2d 627
    , 630 (Tex.1996)
    “Bad Faith”; (2) that Allstate engaged in unfair settlement       (orig. proceeding) (quoting 
    Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840
    ).
    practices by failing to make a good faith settlement offer,
    in violation of Texas Insurance Code section 541.060(a)           “In determining whether appeal is an adequate remedy, [we]
    (2), styled as “Unfair Settlement Practices”; and (3) that        consider whether the benefits outweigh the detriments of
    Allstate failed to properly investigate, evaluate, and pay        mandamus review.”In re BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 244 S.W.3d
    the Briers' claim, in violation of Texas Insurance Code           840, 845 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding). We also consider
    section 541.060(a)(7), styled as “Failure to Promptly Pay         “whether mandamus will spare litigants and the public ‘the
    Claims” (collectively, “settlement claims”).                      time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal
    of improperly conducted proceedings.’”In re Team Rocket,
    The Briers further alleged, in the event the trial court          L.P., 
    256 S.W.3d 257
    , 262 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding)
    determined that they were not covered by the underinsured         (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
    148 S.W.3d 124
    ,
    motorist provisions in the policy, the following alternative      136 (Tex.2004) (orig. proceeding)).
    causes of action: (1) that Allstate, Insurance Network of
    Texas, Eddie Croix Insurance Agency, Inc., and Randy Croix
    made material misrepresentations of fact and of law and failed
    Severance of Extra–Contractual and Bad Faith Claims
    to disclose a matter required to be disclosed, in violation of
    Texas Insurance Code section 541.061(3), (4), and (5), which       [1] [2] Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 41 governs severance
    they styled as “Misrepresentation of the Insurance Policy”;       of claims. SeeTEX.R. CIV. P. 41. The rule provides, in
    and (2) that Allstate, Insurance Network of Texas, Eddie          part, that “[a]ny claim against a party may be severed and
    Croix Insurance Agency, Inc., and Randy Croix violated the        proceeded with separately.”
    Id. Claims are
    properly severable
    Deceptive Trade Practices Act by representing that the Briers     if: (1) the controversy involves more than one cause of action;
    were covered under the policy, when they were not, styled as      (2) the severed claim is one that would be the proper subject
    “Violations of the DTPA” (collectively, “misrepresentation        of a lawsuit if independently asserted; and (3) the severed
    claims”).                                                         claim is not so interwoven with the remaining action that it
    involves the same facts and issues. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v.
    *2 Allstate filed a motion to sever the extra-contractual        Horseshoe Operating Co., 
    793 S.W.2d 652
    , 658 (Tex.1990).
    claims from the breach of contract claim and abate those          The controlling reasons to allow a severance are to avoid
    claims until the preliminary issue of coverage could be           prejudice, do justice, and promote convenience. F.F.P. Op.
    decided. The trial court denied the motion. Allstate filed this   Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 
    237 S.W.3d 680
    , 693 (Tex.2007).
    petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel severance
    and abatement.                                                     [3] The trial court has “broad” discretion in the severance
    of causes of action. Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 
    675 S.W.2d 729
    , 734 (Tex.1984); Black v. Smith, 
    956 S.W.2d 72
    ,
    Standard of Review                            75 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, orig. proceeding).
    However, that discretion is not unlimited. See U.S. Fire Ins.
    We may issue a writ of mandamus to correct a trial court's        Co. v. Millard, 
    847 S.W.2d 668
    , 671 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st
    clear abuse of discretion or violation of a duty imposed by       Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding). The trial court has a duty to
    law when no adequate remedy by appeal exists. See Walker v.       order severance when “all of the facts and circumstances of
    Packer, 
    827 S.W.2d 833
    , 839 (Tex.1992) (orig. proceeding).        the case unquestionably require a separate trial to prevent
    A clear abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's         manifest injustice, and there is no fact or circumstance
    decision is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it amounts         supporting or tending to support a contrary conclusion, and
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                                3
    In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., --- S.W.3d ---- (2014)
    
    2014 WL 5285850
    the legal rights of the parties will not be prejudiced thereby     Because the settlement claims asserted solely against Allstate
    ....” Womack v. Berry, 
    156 Tex. 44
    , 
    291 S.W.2d 677
    , 683            differ from the misrepresentation claims asserted against
    (1956) (orig. proceeding).                                         Allstate, Insurance Network of Texas, Eddie Croix Insurance
    Agency, Inc., and Randy Croix, we will consider the
    *3 In the context of insurance cases, a “breach of an             settlement claims separately from the misrepresentation
    insurance contract claim is separate and distinct from bad         claims.
    faith, Insurance Code or DTPA causes of action. Uninsured
    motorist claims and bad faith claims have been recognized
    as separate and distinct causes of action which might              Severance of the Settlement Claims Is Mandatory
    each constitute a complete lawsuit within itself.”Millard,         In their settlement claims, the Briers allege that Allstate 
    acted 847 S.W.2d at 672
    (internal citations omitted); see Akin,          in bad faith by failing to settle their contractual claim, 
    that 927 S.W.2d at 629
    ; In re Am. Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Ins.                 Allstate failed to make a good faith settlement offer, and that
    Co., 
    384 S.W.3d 429
    , 433 (Tex.App.-Austin 2012, orig.              Allstate failed to properly investigate their contractual claim.
    proceeding); In re United Fire Lloyds, 
    327 S.W.3d 250
    ,
    254 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2010, orig. proceeding). “But,            *4 [4] [5] [6] An insurer generally cannot be liable for
    in most circumstances, an insured may not prevail on a bad         failing to settle or investigate a claim that it has no contractual
    faith claim without first showing that the insurer breached        duty to pay. See Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 177
    the contract.” 
    Akin, 927 S.W.2d at 629
    ; see also In re             S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex.2005); 
    Akin, 927 S.W.2d at 629
    (“But,
    Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 
    439 S.W.3d 422
    , 426–              in most circumstances, an insured may not prevail on a bad
    27 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding)           faith claim without first showing that the insurer breached
    (stating that “extra-contractual liability could only accrue if    the contract.”); In re Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2013
    [insurer] is found liable on the contract”); In re Old Am.         WL 398866, at *4; In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
    Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 13–12–00700–CV, 
    2013 WL 395
    S.W.3d at 237–38; In re Am. Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co.,
    398866, at *4 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Jan. 30, 2013, 
    orig. 384 S.W.3d at 437
    –38; In re United Fire Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d
    proceeding) (“[T]o prevail on their extra-contractual claims       at 256; In re Miller, 
    202 S.W.3d 922
    , 925 (Tex.App.-Tyler
    against Old American, plaintiffs must first demonstrate that       2006, orig. proceeding); 
    Millard, 847 S.W.2d at 673
    . In the
    Old American was contractually obligated to pay their              context of underinsured motorist coverage, an insurer is under
    uninsured motorist claim.”); In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.      no contractual duty to pay underinsured motorist benefits
    Co., 
    395 S.W.3d 229
    , 238 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2012, orig.             until the insured proves that the insured has underinsured
    proceeding) (quoting Smith v. Allstate Ins., No. H–03–0651,        motorist coverage, that the underinsured motorist negligently
    
    2007 WL 677992
    , at *5 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 27, 2007)) (“Texas            caused the accident that resulted in the covered damages, the
    insurance law generally conditions recovery for bad faith          amount of the insured's damages, and that the underinsured
    and extracontractual claims on a recovery for breach of the        motorist's insurance coverage is deficient. See Brainard v.
    insurance contract itself”). And, in insurance cases involving     Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 
    216 S.W.3d 809
    , 818 (Tex.2006);
    bad faith claims, the Texas Supreme Court has recognized           In re Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    2013 WL 398866
    ,
    that severance may be necessary if the “insurer has made a         at *4; In re United Fire 
    Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d at 255
    . Thus,
    settlement offer on the disputed contract claim” or if there are   an insured generally must first establish that the insurer is
    “other compelling circumstances.” 
    Akin, 927 S.W.2d at 630
    .         liable on the contract before the insured can recover on extra-
    contractual causes of action against an insurer for failing
    There is no evidence in the record that Allstate made a            to promptly pay, failing to settle, or failing to investigate
    settlement offer to the Briers. Nevertheless, Allstate argues      an underinsured motorist insurance claim. See Akin, 927
    that there are “other compelling circumstances” requiring          S.W.2d at 629; In re Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 439
    severance of the extra-contractual claims in this case, namely,    S.W.3d at 426–27; In re Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
    the time, effort, costs, and judicial resources associated with    
    2013 WL 398866
    , at *4; In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
    litigating and preparing for trial on extra-contractual claims     
    Co., 395 S.W.3d at 238
    (quoting Smith, 
    2007 WL 677992
    ,
    that have not yet accrued because the Briers have not yet          at *5); see also In re Am. Nat'lCnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 384
    established a contractual right to recovery on the breach of       S.W.3d at 437–38 (holding that “any duty by an insurer to its
    contract claim.                                                    insured, common-law or statutory, necessarily arises from the
    contractual relationship between the parties,” and that insurer
    has no duty to settle claim that it is not contractually obligated
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                              4
    In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., --- S.W.3d ---- (2014)
    
    2014 WL 5285850
    to pay, insurer cannot be liable on bad faith claims arising          398866, at *4; In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 395
    from failure to investigate claim that it has no duty to pay, and     S.W.3d at 237–39; In re Am. Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 384
    insurer cannot be liable for insurance code violations related        S.W.3d at 437–39; In re United Fire Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d at
    to delays in making offer on claims it has no duty to pay).           256; 
    Millard, 847 S.W.2d at 673
    . Further, allowing the Briers
    As a result, “Texas case law establishes that severance and           to conduct broad discovery into Allstate's claims handling
    abatement of extra-contractual claims is required in many             history regarding unrelated accidents and then allowing the
    instances in which an insured asserts a claim to uninsured or         introduction of such information at the trial of the Briers'
    underinsured motorist benefits.”In re Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire         breach of contract claim would be manifestly unjust. 3 See In
    Ins. Co., 
    2013 WL 398866
    , at *4; see also In re Progressive           re Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 439 S.W.3d at 426
    –27;
    Cnty. Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 439 S.W.3d at 426
    –28; In re Am. Nat'l            In re Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    2013 WL 398866
    ,
    Cnty. Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 384 S.W.3d at 438
    –39; In re United Fire          at *4. Finally, severance of the Briers' settlement claims
    
    Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d at 255
    –56.                                         from the breach of contract claim would not prejudice the
    parties' rights. Accordingly, we conclude that severance of the
    [7] In this case, the Briers allege that Allstate failed to settle   settlement claims was required. See 
    Boyd, 177 S.W.3d at 922
    ;
    their claim, failed to make a good faith settlement offer to          
    Womack, 291 S.W.2d at 683
    ; In re Progressive Cnty. Mut.
    them, and failed to properly investigate, evaluate, and pay           Ins. 
    Co., 439 S.W.3d at 426
    –28; In re Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire
    their claim. To prevail on these claims, the Briers must first        Ins. Co., 
    2013 WL 398866
    , at *4; In re State Farm Mut. Auto.
    establish that Allstate is liable under the insurance contract 2      Ins. 
    Co., 395 S.W.3d at 237
    –39; In re Am. Nat'l Cnty. Mut.
    by proving: (1) they were covered by the insurance policy             Ins. 
    Co., 384 S.W.3d at 437
    –39; In re United Fire Lloyds, 327
    Allstate issued to T & R Pipeline; (2) Williams negligently           S.W.3d at 256; 
    Millard, 847 S.W.2d at 673
    .
    caused the automobile collision that resulted in Grant's death;
    (3) the amount of their damages; and (4) Williams was either
    uninsured or underinsured. See In re Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire          Severance of the Misrepresentation Claims Is Not
    Ins. Co., 
    2013 WL 398866
    , at *4; In re State Farm Mut. Auto.          Mandatory
    Ins. 
    Co., 395 S.W.3d at 237
    –38. There is no evidence in the            [8] The Briers alleged the misrepresentation claims as
    record showing that the Briers have established that Allstate         alternatives to their breach of contract claim. Unlike the
    is liable under the insurance contract. As a result, the Briers'      settlement claims, the misrepresentation claims do not allege
    settlement claims would be negated by a determination in the          that Allstate failed to act in good faith to comply with
    breach of contract claim that Allstate is not liable. See Boyd,       duties imposed by the insurance contract, but instead 
    allege 177 S.W.3d at 922
    ; In re Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co.,             that the Briers are entitled to damages even if they 
    are 439 S.W.3d at 426
    –27 (stating that “extra-contractual liability       not covered by the insurance contract. In these claims, the
    could only accrue if [insurer] is found liable on the contract”);     Briers alleged that Allstate, Insurance Network of Texas,
    In re Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    2013 WL 398866
    ,               Eddie Croix Insurance Agency, Inc., and Randy Croix made
    at *4 (“[T]o prevail on their extra-contractual claims against        material misrepresentations and misstatements of law related
    Old American, plaintiffs must first demonstrate that Old              to the insurance policy issued by Allstate to T & R Pipeline
    American was contractually obligated to pay their uninsured           that the Briers relied on to their detriment. SeeTEX. BUS.
    motorist claim.”); In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 395          & COMM.CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5), (b)(12) (West 2011);
    S.W.3d at 239; In re Am. Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 384               TEX. INS.CODE ANN. §§ 541.061, 541.151 (West 2009);
    S.W.3d at 438; In re United Fire 
    Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d at 256
    ;           Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Coats, 
    885 S.W.2d 96
    , 97–100
    
    Millard, 847 S.W.2d at 675
    .                                           (Tex.1994); Brown & Brown of Tex., Inc. v. Omni Metals,
    Inc., 
    317 S.W.3d 361
    , 381 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
    *5 Because the Briers' settlement claims would be negated            2010, pet. denied).
    by a determination that they lacked coverage under the
    insurance contract, requiring Allstate to prepare for and             The Briers sued Insurance Network of Texas, Eddie Croix
    litigate the settlement claims, which may have not yet accrued        Insurance Agency, Inc., and Randy Croix as agents of Allstate
    and may be rendered moot by the breach of contract claim,             and allege that the insurance policy at issue was sold by
    would not do justice, avoid prejudice, or further convenience.        Randy Croix, as an agent for Allstate. Therefore, if Allstate is
    See In re Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d at              liable for the allegations in the misrepresentation claims, the
    426–28; In re Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2013 WL               liability would be based on Randy Croix's actions as Allstate's
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                                5
    In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., --- S.W.3d ---- (2014)
    
    2014 WL 5285850
    agent. See, e.g., 
    Coats, 885 S.W.2d at 98
    (“An insurance           Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court acted within its
    company is generally liable for any misconduct by an agent         discretion when it denied Allstate's motion to sever insofar as
    that is within the actual or apparent scope of the agent's         Allstate requested severance of the misrepresentation claims
    authority.”); Omni Metals, 
    Inc., 317 S.W.3d at 377
    –78, 381.        from the breach of contract claim. See Duenez, 237 S.W.3d
    In its motion requesting severance, Allstate sought severance      at 693; 
    Morgan, 675 S.W.2d at 734
    ; Womack, 291 S.W.2d at
    of the misrepresentation claims alleged against Allstate from      683.
    the Briers' breach of contract claim. But the record before the
    Court reflects neither that the other defendants filed a similar
    motion nor that Allstate sought severance of the Briers' claims
    Adequate Remedy by Appeal
    asserted against it from the claims asserted against the other
    defendants. As a result, the Briers' misrepresentation claims      If the Briers' settlement claims are tried with the breach of
    against Allstate involve the same facts and issues as, and         contract claim, the trial court and the parties will be required
    are interwoven with, the misrepresentation claims against          to conduct discovery, prepare for trial, and conduct voir dire
    Insurance Network of Texas, Eddie Croix Insurance Agency,          on claims that may have not yet accrued and that could be
    Inc., and Randy Croix, which claims would remain pending           rendered moot by the portion of the trial relating to breach
    in the underlying lawsuit regardless of any severance of           of contract for underinsured motorist benefits. See In re
    these claims against Allstate. See Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793       Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 439 S.W.3d at 427
    –28; In
    S.W.2d at 658.                                                     re Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    2013 WL 398866
    , at
    *4; In re Am. Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 384 S.W.3d at 439
    ;
    *6 Further, the misrepresentation claims are not bad              
    Millard, 847 S.W.2d at 675
    –76. Accordingly, we conclude
    faith claims, are not dependent upon a determination               that Allstate has no adequate remedy by appeal. See In re
    that Allstate has a contractual duty to pay underinsured           Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 439 S.W.3d at 427
    –28; In re
    motorist benefits to the Briers, and will not be rendered          Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    2013 WL 398866
    , at *4;
    moot if Allstate prevails on the breach of contract claim.         In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
    Co., 395 S.W.3d at 239
    ; In
    SeeTEX. BUS. & COMM.CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5), (b)                   re Am. Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 384 S.W.3d at 439
    ; In re
    (12); TEX. INS.CODE ANN. § 541.061(3), (4), (5). The               United Fire 
    Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d at 256
    ; Millard, 847 S.W.2d
    misrepresentation claims, like promissory estoppel claims,         at 675–76.
    are asserted as alternative causes of action to the breach
    of contract claim, alleging that Allstate, Insurance Network
    of Texas, Eddie Croix Insurance Agency, Inc., and Randy
    Croix are liable for the Briers' damages even if the Briers                                 Conclusion
    are not covered by the insurance policy. CompareTEX.               Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the
    BUS. & COMM.CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5), (b)(12); TEX.                 Briers' settlement claims are severable from the breach of
    INS.CODE ANN. §§ 541.061(3), (4), (5), 541.151, with               contract claim, the facts and circumstances of the case require
    Miller v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 
    229 S.W.3d 358
    , 378–              a severance to prevent manifest injustice, and the legal rights
    79 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)(stating            of the parties will not be prejudiced thereby. See Womack,
    elements of promissory estoppel claim). Therefore, 
    unlike 291 S.W.2d at 683
    . The trial court, therefore, abused its
    the Briers' settlement claims, requiring Allstate to litigate      discretion in refusing to sever the Briers' settlement claims
    the misrepresentation claims at the same time as the breach        from the breach of contract claim and abate the settlement
    of contract claim would promote convenience and judicial           claims pending the determination of Allstate's liability for
    economy.                                                           the breach of contract claim. See In re Am. Nat'l Cnty. Mut.
    Ins. 
    Co., 384 S.W.3d at 439
    ; In re Reynolds, 369 S.W.3d
    Finally, Allstate has not offered evidence to demonstrate how      638, 650–55 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2012, orig. proceeding); In re
    it will be prejudiced if it has to prepare for and litigate the    United Fire 
    Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d at 257
    ; see also In re Old Am.
    misrepresentation claims in conjunction with the breach of         Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    2013 WL 398866
    , at *4–5.
    contract claim. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 
    865 S.W.2d 189
    , 194 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, orig. proceeding).          *7 We further conclude, however, that the facts and
    circumstances of the case do not require severance of the
    Briers' misrepresentation claims from their breach of contract
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                             6
    In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., --- S.W.3d ---- (2014)
    
    2014 WL 5285850
    Nevertheless, because the trial court did not abuse its
    claim and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion
    discretion when it determined that the “Misrepresentation of
    in determining that the misrepresentation claims should be
    the Insurance Policy” claim and the “Violations of the DTPA”
    tried with the breach of contract claim.
    claim should remain pending with the breach of contract
    claim, we deny Allstate's petition for writ of mandamus
    Accordingly, we conditionally grant Allstate's petition for
    insofar as it requests an order compelling the trial court
    writ of mandamus in part and order the trial court to (1)
    to sever and abate the Briers' “Misrepresentation of the
    vacate the portion of the December 10, 2013 order that
    Insurance Policy” and “Violations of the DTPA” causes of
    denies severance and abatement of the “Bad Faith,” “Unfair
    action.
    Settlement Practices,” and “Failure to Promptly Pay Claims”
    causes of action, (2) grant Allstate's motion to sever as to
    We are confident that the trial court will promptly comply,
    those causes of action, and (3) abate those causes of action
    and our writ will issue only if it does not.
    until the Briers' breach of contract claim is resolved.
    Footnotes
    1      The underlying case is Raymond Briers, Jr. and Stacy Briers, Individually, and as Representatives of the Estate of Grant Briers,
    Deceased v. Allstate County Mutual Insurance Company, Insurance Network of Texas, Ed die Croix Insurance Agency, Inc., and
    Randy S. Croix, cause number 12–DCV–198995, pending in the 240th District Court of Fort Bend County, Texas, the Hon. Pedro
    Ruiz presiding.
    2      The Supreme Court has “left open the possibility that an insurer's denial of a claim it was not obliged to pay might nevertheless be in
    bad faith if its conduct was extreme and produced damages unrelated to and independent of the policy claim.”Progressive Cnty. Mut.
    Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 
    177 S.W.3d 919
    , 922 (Tex.2005). The Briers have not, however, alleged that Allstate engaged in any “extreme”
    conduct that “produced damages unrelated to and independent of the policy claim.”Id.; see In re Am. Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 
    384 S.W.3d 429
    , 438 (Tex.App.-Austin 2012, orig. proceeding). The Briers allege only that Allstate improperly denied their claim and
    failed to fairly investigate their claim. See 
    Boyd, 177 S.W.3d at 922
    ; In re Am. Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 384 S.W.3d at 438
    .
    3      In discovery, the Briers seek production of all documents related to lawsuits and claims against Allstate regarding the denial of claims
    under business automobile policies. Examples of these requests include:
    Request No. 33: Please produce all documents, communications or other tangible items evidencing the denial of any claim or
    attempt to deny a claim by ALLSTATE under any Business Automobile policy, from 2000—present, for a claim asserted by
    one insured based on another insured's status.
    Request No. 42: Please produce your claims denial journal and any related documents for the past 10 years, relating to the denial
    of any claim asserted pursuant to an ALLSTATE Business Automobile policy in Texas.
    End of Document                                                     © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
    © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.                                                         7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-15-00003-CV

Filed Date: 1/2/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/28/2016

Authorities (29)

Wellisch v. United Services Automobile Ass'n , 75 S.W.3d 53 ( 2002 )

Brainard v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co. , 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 271 ( 2006 )

Henson v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. , 43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 622 ( 2000 )

Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp. , 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 501 ( 1984 )

F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez , 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 764 ( 2007 )

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hunter , 865 S.W.2d 189 ( 1993 )

Weir v. Twin City Fire Insurance , 622 F. Supp. 2d 483 ( 2009 )

Celtic Life Insurance Co. v. Coats , 885 S.W.2d 96 ( 1994 )

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Bonner , 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 736 ( 2001 )

Black v. Smith , 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 881 ( 1997 )

In Re Allstate Texas Lloyds , 202 S.W.3d 895 ( 2006 )

In Re Miller , 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 8492 ( 2006 )

Hall v. City of Austin , 13 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 163 ( 1970 )

Guaranty Federal Savings Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co. , 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 465 ( 1990 )

Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany , 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 56 ( 1990 )

United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Millard , 847 S.W.2d 668 ( 1993 )

Liberty National Fire Insurance Co. v. Akin , 927 S.W.2d 627 ( 1996 )

In Re Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. , 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1197 ( 1998 )

In Re Trinity Universal Insurance Co. , 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 7341 ( 2001 )

Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's ... , 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 367 ( 2010 )

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