John Andrew Garcia v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                       ACCEPTED
    01-14-00649-CR
    FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
    HOUSTON, TEXAS
    1/15/2015 1:32:05 PM
    CHRISTOPHER PRINE
    CLERK
    No 01-14-00649-CR
    FILED IN
    IN THE              1st COURT OF APPEALS
    HOUSTON, TEXAS
    COURT OF APPEALS              1/15/2015 1:32:05 PM
    CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
    FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT                   Clerk
    HOUSTON, TEXAS
    JOHN ANDREW GARCIA,
    Appellant
    V.
    STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    ON APPEAL IN CAUSE NO. 73555
    412TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
    HONORABLE W. EDWIN DENMAN, JUDGE PRESIDING
    BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT
    KEITH G. ALLEN
    Law Offices of Keith G. Allen, PLLC
    2360 CR 94, Suite 106
    Pearland, TX 77584
    Telephone: 832-230-0075
    Fax: 832-413-5896
    Bar No. 01043550
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                         Oral Argument Is Requested
    DATE: January 15, 2015
    1
    No 01-14-00649-CR
    IN THE
    412TH DISTRICT COURT                      §        COURT OF APPEALS
    OF                                        §        FIRST DISTRICT
    BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS                    §        HOUSTON, TEXAS
    JOHN ANDREW GARCIA,
    Appellant
    V.
    STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT
    TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
    JOHN ANDREW GARCIA, the defendant in Cause No. 73555 in the 412TH
    Judicial District Court of Brazoria County, Texas, respectfully submits this brief
    and respectfully shows the court the following:
    2
    SUBJECT INDEX
    Parties to the Case ……………………………………...………………………… 4
    Index of Authorities ……….…………..…………………..……………………… 5
    Statement of the Case ……………………..…….………….. …………………… 7
    Statement of Facts …………………………..………….………………………… 7
    Summary of the Argument ………………………………..…………………….. 13
    Appellant’s Point of Error One …………………..……………………………… 13
    There was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
    Argument ............................................................................................................... 13
    Appellant’s Point of Error Two …………………..……………………………… 19
    Appellant did not receive effective assistance of counsel at the trial court level.
    Argument ............................................................................................................... 20
    Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 23
    Prayer …………………………………………..……………………………...… 23
    Certificate of Compliance ………………………..……………………………… 24
    Certificate of Service ……………………………..……………………………... 24
    3
    PARTIES TO THE CASE
    APPELLANT:               JOHN ANDREW GARCIA
    Attorney for Appellant at Trial:
    Name:        Bill Leathers
    Address:     608 N. Front St.
    Angleton, TX 77515
    Telephone: 979-848-1700
    Attorney for Appellant on Appeal:
    Name:        Keith G. Allen
    Address:     Law Offices of Keith G. Allen, PLLC
    2360 CR 94, Suite 106
    Pearland, TX 77584
    Telephone: 832-230-0075
    Fax: 832-413-5896
    APPELLEE:                STATE OF TEXAS
    Attorneys for the State at Trial:
    Name:         Chase Clayton and Kurt Sistrunk
    Assistant Criminal District Attorney
    Address:      Brazoria County Courthouse
    111 E. Locust, Room 408A
    Angleton, TX 77515
    Telephone: 979-864-1230
    Fax: 979-864-1525
    Attorney for the State on Appeal:
    Name:         Jeri Yenne
    Brazoria County Criminal District Attorney
    Address:      Brazoria County Courthouse
    111 E. Locust, Room 408A
    Angleton, TX 77515
    Telephone: 979-864-1230
    Fax: 979-864-1525
    4
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases
    Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) ……………...……..….. 15
    Brown v. State, 
    212 S.W.3d 851
    (Tex.App.-Houston[1st Dist.] 2007),
    pet. ref’d, cert. denied, 
    552 U.S. 1151
    (2008) …………………..……. 16,17
    Charleston v. State, 
    33 S.W.3d 96
    (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d) ….…. 16
    Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
    446 U.S. 335
    (1980) ……………………..………………….. 20
    Edwards v. State, 
    10 S.W.3d 699
    (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999),
    pet. dism’d, improvidently granted 
    67 S.W.3d 228
    (Tex.Crim.App.2002) .. 17
    Ex parte Felton, 
    815 S.W.2d 733
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) ….………………….... 20
    Gomez v. State, 
    685 S.W.2d 333
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1985) …..…………..……..…. 16
    Gross v. State, 
    380 S.W.3d 181
    , 188 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012) …………..….….…. 19
    Hernandez v. State, 
    726 S.W.2d 53
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) …………….……… 21
    Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 15 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) …………………..….. 19
    In the Matter of S.B., 
    117 S.W.3d 443
    (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) .…. 15
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    (1979) ……….…………………………... 14,15
    Johnson v. State, 
    169 S.W.3d 223
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2005),
    cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 1181
    (2006) ……………………...…………...…... 20
    McMann v. Richardson, 
    397 U.S. 759
    (1970) …………………..….…..….……. 20
    Morales v. State, 
    633 S.W.2d 866
    (Tex.Crim.App.1982) ……………………….. 16
    5
    Muniz v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 238
    (Tex.Crim.App.1993),
    cert. denied, 
    510 U.S. 837
    (1993) ……………………………….………. 15
    Powell v. Alabama, 
    287 U.S. 45
    (1932) ………………….……………...…...…. 20
    Robinson v. State, 
    16 S.W.3d 808
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) ………..…..………… 20
    Sanders v. State, 
    119 S.W.3d 818
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) ……………..……….... 15
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984) ………………..…..….….…. 20,21
    Tucker v. State, 
    274 S.W.3d 688
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) ……….……..…………. 16
    Constitutions
    U.S Const. Amends. VI and XIV ……………………………………..…..….… 20
    Tex. Const. art. I, sec 10 ………………………………..…..………...............… 20
    Statutes and Rules
    Tex. Penal Code sec. 22.01(Vernon 2011) ………………………..….……..….. 15
    Tex. Penal Code sec. 22.02 (Vernon 2011) …………………….……………..... 16
    Tex. Penal Code sec. 1.07(a)(17) (Vernon 2011) ……………..….….………..…16
    6
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Appellant, John Garcia, was charged by indictment with Aggravated Assault
    alleged to have occurred on or about June 19, 2013, by intentionally, knowingly, or
    recklessly causing bodily injury to Rene Arredondo with a deadly weapon, namely
    a wrench or a hard metal object. (CR1 at 5). On July 30, 2014, a jury found the
    defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault as alleged in the indictment and the next
    day sentenced him to 10 years confinement in the penitentiary. (CR1 at 23&31).
    Notice of Appeal and a Motion for New Trial were then filed by trial counsel on
    July 31, 2014. (CR1 at 32&33). Appellant’s Motion for New Trial was later denied
    by the trial court after a hearing on September 15, 2014. (CR1 at 53).
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The state’s first witness at trial was Rene Arredondo. (RR3 at 21). Rene
    testified that he and his brother, Dion Trevino, were taking a gas tank out of a truck
    to sell for scrape when Tim approached them asking for the twenty-five dollars that
    Rene owed him. Rene told Tim that he would have the money as soon as he
    scraped the truck. (RR3 at 24). Rene owed Tim money for helping him build a
    fence. (RR3 at 23). Tim then left but came back later. (RR3 at 25). According to
    Rene, the defendant, who is also known as John-o or Chano, also came over. (RR3
    at 26,38,46). The defendant and Rene’s brother, Dion, then got into an argument.
    (RR3 at 26). The defendant then left and went to his house. (RR3 at 26&27). The
    7
    defendant then came back outside and he and Dion began arguing again after Rene
    and Dion went over the defendant’s house. (RR3 at 27). It was loud and more
    people started to show up including Rene’s wife. (RR3 at 28&30). Rene said he
    turned to leave to continue working on the truck and was “hit with some object in
    the face.” (RR3 at 33). He said that he was hit on the right side of the face and did
    not see it coming. (RR3 at 34). However, he later said that he was hit in the front of
    his mouth or “between the side and the front.” (RR3 at 68 & 70). Rene said that it
    was a hard piece of metal that hit him even though he admitted that he never saw
    the object that hit him. (RR3 at 35,42&59). Rene also testified that he thought that
    it was the defendant who hit him because the defendant was standing behind him.
    (RR3 at 37). However, Rene admitted that he did not see who hit him and he never
    saw anything in the defendant’s hand. (RR3 at 37-38,59,60). In addition, Rene
    stated that he did not have a disagreement with the defendant that day and before
    he was hit, the defendant never made any threatening moves toward him. (RR3 at
    63-64). Rene testified that his injuries consisted of a fractured jaw and loose teeth,
    but that he did not actually lose any teeth. (RR3 at 45). No medical records were
    offered at trial. (RR3 at 75). Rene also testified that he is a convicted felon who has
    been to prison, that he has a felony pending, and his prior convictions include
    burglary, theft, and drugs. (RR3 at 43-44). Rene also testified that the defendant
    told him that he would shoot him if he testified against him. (RR3 at 55).
    8
    The state’s next witness was Rene’s wife, Jaclyn Sambrano. (RR3 at 76).
    She testified that Rene and Dion had been working on a truck. (RR3 a 79). She
    later heard arguing from across the street between Rene, Dion, Tim and the
    Defendant. (RR3 at 79). So, she then went across the street to the defendant’s place
    to where they were arguing. (RR3 at 81). When she went across the street, the
    defendant was standing on his stairway. (RR3 at 82). According to Jaclyn, things
    seemed to be ending until Coco arrived. (RR3 at 83). At that point, things heated
    up again because Coco wanted to fight Dion. (RR3 at 83-84). Coco and Dion
    approached each other to fight, but then things calmed down again. (RR3 at 85).
    She, Rene, and Dion then began to walk home when she heard a hit and then saw
    her husband lying in the grass. (RR3 at 86). Jaclyn did not see who hit Rene, nor
    did she see what was used to hit Rene. (RR3 at 88&98). She did see the defendant
    standing there when she turned around, but she did not see anything in his hand.
    (RR3 at 88). She did admit that Rene could have been hit with a fist. (RR3 at 100).
    After Rene got hit, Dion and Tim started fighting. (RR3 at 91).
    James Edwards, a police officer with the Alvin Police Department, was the
    next witness to testify. (RR3 at 103). On June 19, 2013, he responded to a
    disturbance involving multiple subjects. (RR3 at 104-105). He was directed by his
    sergeant to collect a wrench that was found on the ground. (RR3 at 106-107). The
    wrench he collected was admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 4. (RR3 at 108).
    9
    He did testify that the wrench was capable of causing serious bodily injury. (RR3
    at 108-109). However, he never saw anyone holding the wrench. (RR3 at 112).
    Roger Breaux, the property and evidence technician for Alvin Police
    Department, also testified. (RR3 at 115). He tested the wrench and did not find any
    blood on the wrench. (RR3 at 119). He did not test the wrench for fingerprints.
    (RR3 at 120).
    The state’s next witness was Shannon Foley, another police officer with the
    Alvin Police Department. (RR3 at 121). She testified that she was dispatched to a
    fight in progress on June 19, 2013. (RR3 at 122). She also testified, over objection,
    that Rene told her that Chano had hit him with a pipe. (RR3 at 124). Even though,
    Rene had previously testified under oath that he never saw who or what hit him.
    (RR3 at 59-60). Several photos were admitted including a photo of the defendant’s
    hand showing bruising or discoloration across his knuckles. (RR3 at 131-135). She
    also testified that the wrench was never checked for DNA. (RR3 at 145).
    After the state rested, the defense moved for a directed verdict which was
    denied by the trial court. (RR3 at 149-150). The defense then called Timothy
    McKeel as a witness. (RR3 at 151). On June 19, 2013, he was involved in an
    altercation with Dion. (RR3 at 152-153). He also saw Rene push the defendant
    with both hands in an aggressive manner. (RR3 at 153). He then saw the defendant
    hit Rene on the face with a closed fist. (RR3 at 154). Rene then fell and rolled.
    10
    (RR3 at 154). He did not see any other involvement between the two, nor did he
    see a wrench, a pipe, or any type of weapon in the defendant’s hand. (RR3 at 154-
    155).
    The defendant, John Garcia, did not testify at the first stage of his trial, but
    he did testify at the punishment phase. (RR5 at 64). At punishment, John denied
    assaulting Rene with a weapon. (RR5 at 73).
    The appellant also testified during his Motion for a New Trial. (RR7 at 4).
    He testified that he had been informed by his trial counsel of his right to testify at
    the guilt/innocence phase of his trial; however, he was advised not to testify and
    was denied the opportunity to testify. (RR7 at 6-7). The appellant testified as
    follows:
    Q. “So he told you, you had a right to testify and advised you not to
    testify. Is that correct?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. Did he give you an opportunity to testify?
    A. No, sir.
    Q. Was the decision to testify or not to testify, was that decision made
    by you or made by your attorney?
    A. It was made by my attorney, sir.
    11
    Q. And if you had it your way, you would have testified in your own
    defense?
    A. Yes, sir, I sure would have.
    Q. Did you disagree then with your attorney's decision for you not to
    testify?
    A. Yes, sir, I did.
    Q. Did your attorney tell you why he didn't want you to testify?
    A. He never gave me a specific answer. He just said that he didn't
    think it was best that I testified.” (RR7 at 6-7).
    If given the opportunity to testify at the first stage of his trial, he would have
    told the jury that a weapon was never used. (RR7 at 7). Appellant believes that if
    he had been given the opportunity to testify at the first phase of his trial, the
    outcome of the trial would have been different. (RR7 at 8).
    Appellant’s trial counsel, Bill Leathers, also testified during the Motion for
    New Trial. (RR7 at 16). He advised the appellant not to testify based on his prior
    criminal history. (RR7 at 19). Trial counsel’s memory was unclear about the
    conversation regarding whether or not appellant wanted to testify. (RR7 at 16-20).
    However, he recalled that appellant did not insist on testifying. (R7 at 19-20).
    After the hearing, the trial court made the following ruling:
    12
    “Looking at the docket sheet, it appears Mr. McKeel did testify on
    July 29th of this year; and as I recall his testimony, Mr. Clayton, you
    did correctly outline the major points of what he testified to. So I do
    not feel that this rises to ineffective assistance. I don't think it would
    have caused a different outcome, even if what Mr. Garcia says is
    correct. So I'll deny the motion for new trial.” (RR7 at 22).
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    There was insufficient evidence produced at trial to prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that a wrench or hard metal object was used to strike Rene
    Arredondo and therefore, no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant
    guilty of aggravated assault as alleged in the indictment.
    In addition, the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel by not
    being allowed to make his own decision as to whether or not to testify and by
    being deprived of his right to testify in his own defense at the guilt/innocence
    phase of his trial.
    APPELLANT'S POINT OF ERROR ONE
    There was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
    ARGUMENT
    In this case, appellant was charged by indictment in paragraph one with
    Aggravated Assault by intentionally or knowingly or recklessly causing bodily
    13
    injury to Rene Arredondo and using or exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely, a
    wrench, which in the manner of its use or intended use was capable of causing
    death or serious bodily injury by striking the said Rene Arredondo about the facial
    area; and in paragraph two with Aggravated Assault by intentionally or knowingly
    or recklessly causing bodily injury to Rene Arredondo and using or exhibiting a
    deadly weapon, namely, a hard metal object, which in the manner of its use or
    intended use was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury by striking Rene
    Arredondo about the facial area. (CR1 at 5). The indictment did not allege that the
    appellant caused “serious bodily injury” or that the object used was “unknown to
    the grand jury.” Therefore, a jury could have only convicted the appellant of
    aggravated assault if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant
    caused bodily injury to Rene Arredondo by striking him with a deadly weapon,
    specifically, a “wrench” or “hard metal object.” In this case, it is not disputed that
    Rene Arredondo suffered bodily injury by being struck on the face. Additionally,
    since there was no testimony that a weapon was “exhibited,” since no one saw a
    weapon, the only question is whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that
    a deadly weapon was “used,” specifically, whether Rene Arredondo was struck
    with a “wrench” or “hard metal object.”
    The Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard of review that applies
    in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a
    14
    criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 911 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010). The standard is
    whether after considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    verdict, was a jury rationally justified in finding the Appellant guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt. 
    Id. at 899.
    Therefore, when determining the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support a conviction, the appellate court must view the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the verdict and determine if any rational trier of fact could
    have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); Sanders v. State, 
    119 S.W.3d 818
    ,
    820 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). In conducting the review, the appellate court does not
    engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence, but
    ensures that the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 238
    ,
    246 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 
    510 U.S. 837
    (1993). The relevant
    question is not whether there was any evidence to support a conviction, but
    whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact to find
    someone guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In the Matter of S.B., 
    117 S.W.3d 443
    ,
    445 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2003, no pet.), citing Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    ,
    318–19 (1979).
    A person commits Aggravated Assault if the person commits an assault as
    defined by Texas Penal Code section 22.01 and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon
    15
    during the commission of the assault. Tex. Penal Code sec. 22.02(a)(2) (Vernon
    2011). A person commits an assault under Texas Penal Code section 22.01(a)(1) if
    the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.
    A deadly weapon is defined as a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made or
    adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or anything that
    in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious
    bodily injury. Tex. Penal Code sec. 1.07(a)(17) (Vernon 2011) .
    A “wrench” is not per se a deadly weapon, so the state is required to prove
    that, in the manner of its use or intended use, it was capable of causing death or
    serious bodily injury. Charleston v. State, 
    33 S.W.3d 96
    , 99 (Tex.App.-Texarkana
    2000, pet. ref’d). The same argument can be made for any similar “hard metal
    object.”
    The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “even without expert testimony
    or a description of the weapon, the injuries suffered by the victim can by
    themselves be a sufficient basis for inferring that a deadly weapon was used.”
    Tucker v. State, 
    274 S.W.3d 688
    , 692 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008), citing Morales v.
    State, 
    633 S.W.2d 866
    , 868–69 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). However, “when the state
    alleges unnecessary matters that are descriptive of the essential elements of the
    crime, the state must prove the descriptive matters as alleged. Brown v. State, 
    212 S.W.3d 851
    , 860 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d), cert. denied, 552
    
    16 U.S. 1151
    (2008), citing Gomez v. State, 
    685 S.W.2d 333
    , 336 (Tex.Crim.App.
    1985). Therefore, when the state alleges in an indictment that a particular object
    was used by a defendant as a deadly weapon, it is required to prove the use of that
    particular weapon beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brown at 860, citing Edwards v.
    State, 
    10 S.W.3d 699
    , 701 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999), pet. dism’d,
    improvidently granted 
    67 S.W.3d 228
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
    In this case, Appellant was found guilty by a jury of aggravated assault as
    charged in the indictment which alleged a deadly weapon, namely, a wrench or a
    hard metal object. (CR1 at 23&5). However, there was insufficient evidence to
    support that finding. The only three witnesses to testify at the guilt/innocence stage
    of the trial that were present during the alleged assault were Rene Arredondo,
    Jaclyn Sambrano and Timothy McKeel.
    Rene Arredondo testified that he thought that it was the defendant who hit
    him because the defendant was standing behind him. (RR3 at 37). However, Rene
    admitted that he did not see who hit him and he never saw anything in the
    defendant’s hand. (RR3 at 59,60,37-38). In addition, Rene stated that he did not
    have a disagreement with the defendant that day and before he was hit, the
    defendant never made any threatening moves toward him. (RR3 at 63-64).
    Jaclyn Sambrano, Rene’s wife, testified that she heard a hit and then saw her
    husband lying in the grass. (RR3 at 86). She did not see who hit Rene, nor did she
    17
    see what was used to hit Rene. (RR3 at 98). She did admit that Rene could have
    been hit with a fist. (RR3 at 100).
    Timothy McKeel testified that he saw Rene push the defendant with both
    hands in an aggressive manner. (RR3 at 153). He then saw the defendant hit Rene
    on the face with a closed fist. (RR3 at 154). He did not see a wrench, a pipe, or any
    type of weapon in the defendant’s hand. (RR3 at 154-155).
    With regard to testimony concerning the use of a “wrench” during the
    commission of the assault, a wrench was found on the ground and collected by
    Alvin Police Officer James Edwards. (RR3 at 106-107). However, no blood was
    found on the wrench and it was never tested for fingerprints or DNA. (RR3 at
    119,120&145). In addition, no one testified that they ever saw the appellant
    holding the wrench; no one testified that Rene Arredondo was struck by the
    wrench; and no one testified that Rene’s injuries were caused by the wrench. The
    state even conceded the lack of evidence concerning the use of the wrench during
    its closing argument by stating: “We can't tell you and no one has suggested to you
    that State's Exhibit 4 was the weapon that was used to inflict the injuries on Mr.
    Arredondo.” (RR4 at 19-20).
    With regard to the use of a “hard metal object,” Rene did testify that he
    believed that it was a hard piece of metal that hit him even though he admitted that
    he never saw the object that hit him. (RR3 at 35,42&59). There was also testimony
    18
    admitted, over objection, by Alvin Police Officer Shannon Foley that Rene told her
    that he was hit with a pipe. (RR3 at 124). Even though, Rene had previously
    testified under oath that he never saw who or what hit him. (RR3 at 59-60). Rene
    could have easily been hit with a fist, a rock, a brick, or a hard wooden object such
    as a bat. Rene’s testimony concerning the use of a hard piece of metal is no more
    than mere speculation on his part. “Juries are permitted to draw reasonable
    inferences from the evidence, but they are not permitted to draw conclusions based
    on speculation.” Gross v. State, 
    380 S.W.3d 181
    , 188 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012), citing
    Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 15 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). “Speculation is the mere
    theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of the facts and evidence
    presented.” 
    Id. “A conclusion
    that is reached by speculation may not seem
    completely unreasonable, but it is not sufficiently based upon facts or evidence to
    support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id. Therefore, no
    rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable
    doubt that a wrench or hard metal object was used to strike Rene Arredondo. The
    state did not need to specifically allege a wrench or a hard metal object in the
    indictment, but since they did, they are bound to prove it.
    APPELLANT'S POINT OF ERROR TWO
    Appellant did not receive effective assistance of counsel at the trial court level.
    19
    ARGUMENT
    In this case, appellant was denied effective representation of counsel by not
    being given the opportunity to make his own decision not to testify and by being
    deprived of his right to testify at trial. Therefore, the trial court should have granted
    appellants motion for a new trial based upon those grounds.
    A Defendant in a criminal trial has the right to effective assistance of
    counsel. U.S Const. Amends. VI and XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, sec 10; Powell v.
    Alabama, 
    287 U.S. 45
    , 66 (1932). Trial counsel must act within the range of
    competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. McMann v. Richardson, 
    397 U.S. 759
    , 771 (1970). The same standards apply in evaluating the representation of
    retained and appointed counsel. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
    446 U.S. 335
    , 344 (1980). The
    effectiveness of counsel is ordinarily gauged by the totality of the representation,
    but even a single error can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Ex parte
    Felton, 
    815 S.W.2d 733
    , 736 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). In addition, a defendant in a
    criminal trial does not need to object at trial to counsel’s ineffective representation
    to preserve the issue for appeal. Robinson v. State, 
    16 S.W.3d 808
    , 813
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).
    At trial, defense counsel shoulders the primary responsibility of informing
    the defendant of his right to testify and that the ultimate decision of whether to
    testify or not belongs to the defendant. Johnson v. State, 
    169 S.W.3d 223
    , 235
    20
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2005), cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 1181
    (2006). Therefore, because
    imparting that information is defense counsel’s responsibility, Strickland provides
    the appropriate framework for addressing an allegation that the defendant’s right to
    testify was denied by defense counsel. 
    Id. Under Strickland,
    in order to have a conviction reversed on appeal, an
    appellant must show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
    deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant by depriving him of a
    fair trial with reliable results. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984).
    The appellate court must judge trial counsel’s conduct based upon the particular
    facts of each case. 
    Id. at 690.
    The appellant must show that trial counsel’s
    representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
    Id. at 688.
    In
    determining ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must identify acts or
    omissions by trial counsel that were not the results of reasonable professional
    judgment and were outside the range of professionally competent assistance. 
    Id. at 690.
    Ultimately, the appellant must show a reasonable probability that, but for
    counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
    different. 
    Id. at 694.
    Reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
    the confidence in the outcome. 
    Id. The standards
    announced in Strickland also
    apply to criminal cases in Texas. See Hernandez v. State, 
    726 S.W.2d 53
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1986).
    21
    In this case, at the motion for new trial, appellant testified he was informed
    by his trial counsel of his right to testify at the guilt/innocence phase of his trial.
    (RR7 at 6). However, he was advised by his attorney not to testify and was never
    given the opportunity to testify. (RR7 at 6). The decision not to testify was made
    by his defense counsel and not by the appellant. (RR7 at 6). The appellant testified
    that if he had it his way, he would have testified and that he disagreed with his
    attorney’s decision for him not to testify. (RR7 at 6-7). If given the opportunity to
    testify at the first stage of the trial, the appellant would have told the jury that a
    weapon was never used. (RR7 at 7). Therefore, appellant believes that if he had
    been given the opportunity to testify in the first stage of the trial, the outcome
    would have been different. (RR7 at 8). At the hearing on the motion for a new trial,
    the trial court found that the appellant was not denied effective assistance of
    counsel because it would not have changed the outcome of the trial. (RR7 at 22).
    However, under the circumstances of this case, there was a reasonable probability
    that the result of the trial would have been different if the appellant had been
    allowed to testify.
    A defendant’s testimony can have a powerful impact on the jury. In this
    case, the appellant would have told the jury that he did not use a weapon to strike
    Rene Arredondo. Due to the lack of evidence concerning what was used to strike
    Rene Arredondo, the defendant’s testimony would have been crucial to the jury
    22
    reaching a different decision in this matter. Neither Rene Arredondo nor his wife,
    Jaclyn Sambrano, saw who or what hit Rene. Rene also testified that he did not
    have a disagreement with the defendant that day and before he was hit, the
    defendant never made any threatening moves toward him. (RR3 at 63-64). Timothy
    McKeel testified that he saw the defendant hit Rene on the face with a closed fist
    and that he did not see a wrench, a pipe, or any type of weapon in the defendant’s
    hand. (RR3 at 154-155). However, it is apparent from the jury’s verdict that
    Timothy McKeel’s testimony alone was insufficient to produce a different result.
    Therefore, the defendant’s testimony would have been critical in influencing the
    jury to reach a different decision.
    CONCLUSION
    In conclusion, there was insufficient evidence produced at trial to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that a wrench or hard metal object was used to strike
    Rene Arredondo. Therefore, no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant
    guilty of aggravated assault as alleged in the indictment. In addition, the defendant
    was denied effective assistance of counsel by not being allowed to make his own
    decision as to whether or not to testify and by being deprived of his right to testify
    in his own defense at the guilt/innocence phase of his trial.
    PRAYER
    WHEREFORE, Appellant prays that appellant’s points of error be sustained
    23
    and the judgment of conviction be reversed.
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/ Keith G. Allen
    Keith G. Allen
    Attorney for Appellant
    Law Offices of Keith G. Allen, PLLC
    2360 CR 94, Suite 106
    Pearland, TX 77584
    Telephone: 832-230-0075
    Fax: 832-413-5896
    Keith@KGAllenLaw.com
    Bar No. 01043550
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I hereby certify pursuant to TRAP 9.4(i) that the preceding document
    contains 5059 words as determined by the word count of the computer program
    used to prepare this document.
    /s/ Keith G. Allen
    Keith G. Allen
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    This is to certify that on January 15, 2015 a true and correct copy of the
    above and foregoing document was served on Jeri Yenne, Brazoria County District
    Attorney, 111 E. Locust #408A, Angleton, Texas 77515 pursuant to TRAP 9.5.
    /s/ Keith G. Allen
    Keith G. Allen
    24