in the Interest of C.R., A.R., and I.R., Children ( 2019 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-19-00009-CV
________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF C.R., A.R., AND I.R., CHILDREN
On Appeal from County Court at Law Number 1
Randall County, Texas
Trial Court No. 6985-L1; Honorable Jack M. Graham, Presiding
April 16, 2019
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellants, E.R. and R.R., appeal the trial court’s order terminating their parental
rights to their children, C.R., A.R., and I.R.1 The children’s mother, E.R., presents three
issues questioning the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the two
statutory grounds for termination as well as the trial court’s best interest finding. By
separate brief, the children’s father, R.R., presents two issues challenging the legal and
1
To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we refer to them by their initials. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West Supp. 2018). See also TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
factual sufficiency of the evidence to support termination under the two statutory
grounds.2 We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The parents and their children have been involved with the Texas Department of
Family and Protective Services since 2007. In 2010, the parents and the Department
entered into an Agreed Final Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship
involving C.R. The children’s ages range from ten to fourteen with C.R. being the oldest
of the three.3 C.R. has long-term special needs. He takes psychotropic medications that
require monitoring and has anger and behavioral issues. A.R. also has anger issues and
impulsiveness that is controlled with medication, and I.R. has dyslexia and psychiatric
issues.
In May 2017, the family was involved in a family-based service case in which the
court ordered them to participate in various services. Months later, in September, an
allegation that I.R. went to school hungry and wearing a coat with urine on it resulted in
an intake report. Those allegations, coupled with the Department’s concern that the
parents were abusing drugs, resulted in removal of the children.4 The family-based
service plan developed in two separate cases: one case to modify the prior 2010 order
involving C.R., which included the possibility of termination of parental rights and a
2 In the Table of Contents of his brief, R.R. only challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence;
however, in the body of the brief, he challenges both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support the grounds for termination. Thus, we will review the evidence under both standards.
3 E.R. and R.R. have a fourth child who is younger than the three that are the subject of this appeal.
The fourth child lives with E.R.’s brother in California.
4At the final hearing, the Department’s witness acknowledged that allegations of the children being
hungry and the parents abusing drugs may not have been justifications for removal.
2
second case which was initiated as a pleading in intervention regarding the two younger
children, by which the Department also sought termination as an alternative.5
The trial court appointed the Department as temporary managing conservator of
all three children in October 2017. The trial court’s temporary orders included a paragraph
notifying each parent of certain actions required of them in order to obtain the return of
their children and admonished them that full compliance was required. In May 2018, the
Department determined that reunification goals were unsuccessful and proceeded with
termination of parental rights. The Department’s supervisor explained that once the goal
shifted from reunification to termination, the Department focused on participation by the
parents in their services and other circumstances as a condition precedent to again
considering reunification.
At the time of the final hearing in November 2018, the children were placed as
follows: C.R. was placed in a residential treatment center in Houston, A.R. in a group
home in Dallas,6 and I.R. with a foster family in Dallas.7 Of the several caseworkers the
family had throughout the proceedings, none testified at the final hearing. Instead, the
sole witness for the Department was one of its supervisors. E.R. and R.R. testified on
their own behalf. At the conclusion of the testimony, the attorney ad litem for the children
recommended termination of parental rights and the trial court took the case under
advisement.
5 On the Department’s motion, the two cases were later consolidated.
6 Earlier in the case, A.R. was in a group home in San Antonio.
7 I.R. lived in four foster homes and was moved to Dallas when her most recent foster parents
retired.
3
Subsequently, the trial court signed an order terminating E.R. and R.R.’s parental
rights for constructively abandoning their children, who had been in the Department’s care
for not less than six months, after the Department had made reasonable efforts to return
the children, the parents had not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with
the children, and they had not demonstrated the ability to provide a safe environment.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(N) (West Supp. 2018). The trial court also found
that both parents had failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically
established the actions necessary for them to obtain the return of their children who had
been in the Department’s care for not less than nine months as a result of the children’s
removal for abuse or neglect. § 161.001(b)(1)(O) (West Supp. 2018). The trial court
further found that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests. §
161.001(b)(2) (West Supp. 2018). The court then ordered termination of the parental
rights of both parents. Both parents seek to overturn that termination order.
APPLICABLE LAW
The Texas Family Code permits a court to terminate the relationship between a
parent and a child if the Department establishes one or more acts or omissions
enumerated under section 161.001(b)(1) of the Code and that termination of that
relationship is in the best interest of the child. See § 161.001(b)(1), (2); Holley v. Adams,
544 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976). The burden of proof is by clear and convincing
evidence. § 161.206(a) (West 2014). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” § 101.007 (West
2014).
4
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional
magnitude. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed.
2d 599 (1982). See also Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Consequently,
termination proceedings are strictly construed in favor of the parent. In the Interest of
E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 563 (Tex. 2012). Parental rights, however, are not absolute, and
it is essential that the emotional and physical interests of a child not be sacrificed merely
to preserve those rights. In the Interest of C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). The Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution and section 161.001 of the Texas
Family Code require application of the heightened standard of clear and convincing
evidence in cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. See In the Interest
of E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012); In the Interest of J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263
(Tex. 2002).
In a legal sufficiency challenge, we credit evidence that supports the verdict if
reasonable jurors could have done so and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable
jurors could not have done so. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112-13 (Tex. 2014).
However, the reviewing court should not disregard undisputed facts that do not support
the verdict to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 113. In
cases requiring clear and convincing evidence, even evidence that does more than raise
surmise and suspicion will not suffice unless that evidence is capable of producing a firm
belief or conviction that the allegation is true. Id. If, after conducting a legal sufficiency
review, a court determines that no reasonable fact finder could form a firm belief or
conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, then the evidence is legally
insufficient. Id. (citing In the Interest of J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).
5
In a factual sufficiency review, a court of appeals must give due consideration to
evidence that the fact finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In
the Interest of J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (citing In the Interest of C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25).
We must determine whether the evidence is such that a fact finder could reasonably form
a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department’s allegations. In the Interest
of J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We consider whether disputed evidence is such that a
reasonable fact finder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its
finding. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact finder
could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact finder could not
reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually
insufficient. Id.
The clear and convincing standard does not mean that the evidence must negate
all reasonable doubt or that the evidence must be uncontroverted. In the Interest of T.N.,
180 S.W.3d 376, 382 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.). The reviewing court must
recall that the trier of fact has the authority to weigh the evidence, draw reasonable
inferences therefrom, and choose between conflicting inferences. Id. Also, the trier of
fact, as opposed to the reviewing body, enjoys the right to resolve credibility issues and
conflicts within the evidence. Id. It may freely choose to believe all, part, or none of the
testimony espoused by any particular witness. Id. at 382-83 (citing In the Interest of
R.D.S., 902 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ)).
A termination order will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient on any statutory
ground relied on by the trial court. In the Interest of K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied). Although evidence presented may be relevant to both
6
the statutory grounds for termination and best interest finding, each element must be
established separately and proof of one element does not relieve the burden of proving
the other. See In the Interest of C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.
SECTION 161.001(b)(1)(N)
Parental rights may be terminated under subparagraph N if the trial court finds that
(1) a parent has constructively abandoned a child who has been in the permanent or
temporary conservatorship of the Department for not less than six months, (2) reasonable
efforts have been made to return the child, (3) the parent has not regularly visited or
maintained significant contact with the child, and (4) the parent has demonstrated an
inability to provide the child with a safe environment. See In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 88-
89 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). If there is insufficient evidence of
any of the four elements, termination under subparagraph N fails. In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d
625, 633 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).
ANALYSIS
By issue one of their respective briefs, E.R. and R.R. challenge the legal and
factual sufficiency of the evidence to support termination under subparagraph N. The
Department, however, offers no argument in response on this ground and relies solely on
subparagraph O as the statutory ground supporting termination. Because only one
statutory ground is required to support termination, we will evaluate the parties’
arguments presented in issue two of their respective briefs pertaining to the legal and
factual sufficiency of the evidence to support termination under subparagraph O. In light
of our ultimate conclusion, consideration of E.R.’s and R.R.’s first issues challenging
termination under subparagraph N is pretermitted. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
7
SECTION 161.001(b)(1)(O)
Parental rights may be terminated under subparagraph O if the Department
establishes that a parent:
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically
established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the
child who had been in the permanent or temporary managing
conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not
less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent
under Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect of the child.
(Emphasis added). See § 161.001(b)(1)(O). See also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 278-79.
The Supreme Court has broadened the “abuse or neglect” elements to include risks or
threats from the environment in which the child is placed. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d
239, 248 (Tex. 2013). Although potentially relevant to the best interest issue, termination
under subparagraph O does not allow for consideration of excuses for noncompliance
with a court order nor does it consider “substantial compliance” to be the same as
completion. See In the Interest of I.G., 383 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012,
no pet.); In the Interest of M.C.G., 329 S.W.3d 674, 675-76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).
ANALYSIS
Paragraph twelve of the trial court’s temporary orders for each parent include the
following language:
THE COURT FINDS AND HEREBY NOTIFIES THE PARENTS THAT
EACH OF THE ACTIONS REQUIRED OF THEM BELOW ARE
NECESSARY TO OBTAIN THE RETURN OF THE CHILD[REN], AND
FAILURE TO FULLY COMPLY WITH THESE ORDERS MAY RESULT IN
THE RESTRICITON OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS.
8
The next few paragraphs specifically order the parents to comply with “Psychological or
Psychiatric Evaluation,” “Counseling,” “Parenting Classes,” and “Drug and Alcohol
Assessments and Testing.” Finally, paragraph seventeen of the temporary orders
requires “Compliance with Service Plan.” Under that paragraph, each parent is ordered
to “comply with each requirement set out in the Department’s original, or any amended,
service plan during the pendency of this suit.”
Relying on In the Interest of B.L.R.P., 269 S.W.3d 707, 710-11 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2008, no pet.), and In the Interest of C.C., Nos. 07-15-00185-CV, 07-15-00220-
CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10137, at *10 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 29, 2015, no pet.),
the parents argue that the language in the orders referenced above is inadequate to
support termination. The temporary order at issue in In the Interest of C.C. provided as
follows:
[The parent] is ORDERED, pursuant to § 263.106 Texas Family Code, to
comply with each requirement set out in the Department’s original, or any
amended, service plan during the pendency of this suit.
As the parents point out, this court found that such language created a fluid order
subjecting a parent to amendments to an existing family service plan that could be added
at a future date by someone other than a judicial officer. In the Interest of C.C., 2015 Tex.
App. LEXIS 10137, at *10.8 This court held that the Legislature could not have intended
We observe that the trial court’s Status Hearing Orders, Initial Permanency Hearing Orders, and
8
Permanency Hearing Orders all contain the following fluid language:
IT IS ORDERED that, except as specifically modified by this order or any subsequent order,
the plan of service for the parents, previously filed with the Court and incorporated herein
by reference as if the same were copied verbatim in this order, is APPROVED and made
an ORDER of the Court.
(Emphasis added).
9
such language to be a “court order specifically establish[ing] the actions necessary for the
parent to obtain the return of the child.” Id. Today this court goes a step further to
describe such fluid language imposing a potential future non-judicial obligation as being
akin to an adhesion contract. An adhesion contract is defined in Texas as a contract in
which one party has absolutely no bargaining power or ability to change the contract
terms. In re Media Arts Grp., Inc., 116 S.W.3d 900, 911 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2003, orig. proceeding). Because such fluid language would not likely pass constitutional
muster, parental rights, being of constitutional magnitude, should not be subject to
termination under subparagraph O where the obligation to comply is one added by the
Department and not specifically ordered by the court.
The Department, relying on In the Interest of K.F., 402 S.W.3d 497, 504-05 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied), urges that because the appellate record
contains the family service plans and court orders that incorporates those plans by
reference, E.R. and R.R.’s arguments have no merit. The parent in In the Interest of K.F.
argued that an existing order in a clerk’s record constituted no evidence because it was
not admitted at trial and the trial court did not expressly take judicial notice of its prior
orders. Id. at 504. The court of appeals presumed that the trial court took judicial notice
of an order in the clerk’s record, without a request to do so having been made and without
any announcement by the trial court that it had done so, and found that order was
sufficient to comply with the court-order requirement of subparagraph O. Id.The Department argues that even though the service plan and temporary orders
were not introduced into evidence in the underlying case, “they were included in the
clerk’s record, constituting sufficient evidence under subsection (O).” This court has not
10
held, and does not now hold, that temporary orders must be introduced into evidence to
be enforceable. What is required under subparagraph O is the existence of a specific
written order, signed and issued by the court, in the appellate record, specifying the task
a parent must complete in order to obtain the return of a child. § 160.001(b)(1)(O); In the
Interest of B.L.R.P., 269 S.W.3d at 710. Here, the Department argues that the evidence
is sufficient to establish that the parents were ordered to perform specific tasks.
Sufficiency of the evidence to support the existence of a court order is not the issue.
Either a court order specifying the tasks a parent must complete exists or it does not.
Either it is signed and contained in the record or it is not. A sufficiency-of-the-evidence
review is never directed to the existence of a court order. Instead, it is directed to whether
a fact finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the
Department’s allegations that a parent failed to complete the required tasks itemized in
an order of the court.
In the case before us, written orders do exist. The fluid language contained in
paragraph seventeen of the temporary orders notwithstanding, those orders do contain
specific orders requiring each parent to comply with “Psychological or Psychiatric
Evaluation,” “Counseling,” “Parenting Classes,” and “Drug and Alcohol Assessments and
Testing.” It should be noted, however, that the orders do not require the parents to
perform certain tasks specified only in the family service plans, to wit: (1) maintain a
source of legal income adequate to support the family for a minimum of six months, (2)
maintain visitation and contact with the children as requested by their placements, (3)
maintain a safe and stable home, (4) maintain contact with the Department, and (5) attend
11
and complete life-skills classes to learn money management and home management.9
Because these five tasks were not specified in any court order, they cannot be used
against the parents to terminate their rights under subparagraph O.
The Department maintains that there is “undisputed evidence” that the parents
“were court-ordered to complete services” and the filing of family service plans with the
court was sufficient to supply the court-order requirement of subparagraph O. We
disagree. A court order that orders parental compliance with a then non-existent family
service plan is not an order specifically establishing the actions necessary for the parent
to obtain return of the child. Furthermore, a family service plan signed by the parents
alone does not satisfy the court-order requirement of the statute until it has been
specifically incorporated into a subsequently signed court order. See In the Interest of
B.L.R.P., 269 S.W.3d at 709. Until the Legislature specifies otherwise, this court will
continue to require a court order that specifically establishes the actions necessary for
the parent to obtain the return of the child.
Although we agree with E.R. and R.R. that the fluid language in the court’s orders
is insufficient to satisfy the court-order requirement of subparagraph O as to certain
requirements, we do find that other tasks contained in the family service plans were also
itemized in the court’s temporary orders, to wit: psychological or psychiatric evaluation,
counseling, parenting classes, and drug and alcohol assessments and testing. Regarding
those tasks, the Department supervisor testified that E.R. did complete her psychological
evaluation and counseling sessions but did not complete parenting classes. Likewise,
9 The Department supervisor offered testimony that the parents failed to maintain stable housing
and employment and did not maintain contact with the children or with the Department as required by the
family service plans. As those tasks were not specifically included in the court’s temporary orders, we do
no address them in our analysis under subparagraph O.
12
R.R. completed his psychological testing and counseling sessions, but he did not
complete parenting classes. Also, E.R. failed to show for a court-ordered drug screen on
April 2, 2018, and she tested positive for methamphetamine on July 10 and July 31, 2018.
R.R. also tested positive for methamphetamine on July 31, 2018. While the parents did
later voluntarily request additional drug screening, the supervisor explained that testing
is intended to be random in order to avoid any attempt to detox before testing.
During their testimonies, both parents admitted they failed to perform certain tasks
but offered excuses for having failed to complete their services. They attributed their
positive results for methamphetamine to relatives who had lived with them for a short
time. Explanations were also offered for missing parenting classes—E.R. testified she
was given the address to a vacant building and through an Internet search, she found the
correct location but was told she had to go through her caseworker before starting
classes. She testified she contacted her caseworker and never heard anything.10 While
a fact finder does have broad discretion, the current state of the law does not tolerate
excuses for noncompliance and accepts nothing short of “completion” of services to avoid
termination under subparagraph O. See In the Interest of I.G., 383 S.W.3d at 771. Here,
as the trier of fact, the trial court resolved credibility issues and conflicts in the evidence
against E.R. and R.R. We find the trial court was presented with clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to support a finding that E.R. and R.R. failed to fully comply with
itemized tasks contained within a court order required to obtain the return of their children.
As such, E.R. and R.R.’s second issues are overruled.
10 E.R. and R.R. had several caseworkers and a temporary caseworker throughout the
proceedings. Eventually, the Department supervisor who was the only witness at the final hearing was
assigned to the case.
13
BEST INTEREST
By her third issue, E.R. contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
to support the trial court’s best interest finding.11 Again, we disagree.
The Department was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of E.R.’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. § 161.001(b)(2);
In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 116. There is a strong presumption that the best interest of
a child will be served by preserving the parent-child relationship. In the Interest of R.R.,
209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). Prompt and permanent placement of a child in a safe
environment is also presumed to be in the child’s best interest. See § 263.307(a) (West
Supp. 2018). Section 263.307(b) of the Family Code provides a non-exhaustive list of
factors to consider in determining whether a given parent is willing and able to provide
the child in question with a safe environment.
To assist courts in making a best interest evaluation, the Supreme Court has set
out certain non-exclusive factors to consider when determining the best interest of a child.
See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72. Those factors include (1) the desires of the child; (2)
the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and
physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individual
seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the individual to promote the best
interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by the individual or by the agency seeking
custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of
the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one;
and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. The absence of evidence
11 R.R. does not challenge the trial court’s best interest finding.
14
of one or more of these factors does not preclude a fact finder from reasonably forming a
strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re C.H., 89
S.W.3d at 27.
Evidence that supports one or more statutory grounds for termination may also
constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child's best interest. See In the
Interest of C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. See also In the Interest of E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239 at
249-50. The best interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective
factors, and the totality of the evidence as well as direct evidence. See In re N.R.T., 338
S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). Additionally, a child’s need for
permanence through the establishment of a “stable, permanent home” has been
recognized as the paramount consideration in determining best interest. See In the
Interest of K.C., 219 S.W.3d 924, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.).
ANALYSIS
The family in this case has a history with the Department that spans more than a
decade. There was no evidence on the desires of any of the children. All three children
have behavioral issues and are on psychotropic medication that requires close
monitoring. C.R. has long-term special needs, A.R. has anger issues, and I.R. has
learning disabilities. The children reside in different cities in Texas. Due to geographical
issues, months had passed since the parents had visitation with their children. Contact
by phone was sporadic given the nature of the children’s placements and the requirement
that visits be supervised.
The parents made one trip to visit A.R. Before I.R. was moved from Amarillo to
Dallas, the parents had face-to-face visitation with her; however, after the parents missed
15
numerous visits, the Department cancelled all future visits due to concerns that I.R.
became distressed when her parents failed to show. The parents attempted to visit C.R.
once but were turned away when the facility was unable to provide a staff member to
supervise the visit. According to the parents, they made numerous attempts to contact
C.R. The supervisor, however, testified that C.R. had reported difficulties when he
attempted to reach his parents by phone.12
The evidence showed that E.R. and R.R. had lived in several homes and
numerous motels during the pendency of the suit. When R.R. was financially able to pay
rent and a security deposit, he was able to acquire a one-year lease for a three-bedroom
apartment. He was due to sign the lease within days of the final hearing.
E.R. testified that she was an unemployed, stay-at-home mother but had filled out
numerous employment applications. R.R. testified he had been employed by the same
company for two years. The children were receiving assistance from Medicaid and the
family was on food stamps. E.R. testified that if food stamps were insufficient, she relied
on local food pantries to provide for the children.
The Department was concerned with E.R.’s history of methamphetamine use.
R.R. also tested positive for methamphetamine. Both parents denied abusing substances
and testified the positive tests results were from associating with relatives who used
methamphetamines.
The Department was seeking permanence for the children. A.R. and I.R. have
lived in California with E.R.’s brother. I.R. has lived in a total of four foster homes in
12 Although a prior hearsay objection to C.R.’s comments was sustained, the same testimony came
in later without objection.
16
Texas. E.R. testified that she was agreeable to having A.R. placed with her brother in
California, who was already raising the youngest sibling. E.R. also testified that she had
a sister in Amarillo who could care for I.R. Unfortunately, she had no relatives who could
take C.R.
Considering the extended history with the Department and concerns about E.R.’s
use of methamphetamines, the Department supervisor and the attorney ad litem for the
children recommended that termination of E.R. and R.R.’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interests. Based on a totality of the evidence and the fact finder’s right to
resolve credibility issues and conflicts within the evidence, we conclude the evidence is
both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest finding. E.R.’s
third issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of E.R. and R.R. is affirmed.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
Quinn, C.J., concurring.
17