Jose Silverio Lugo v. State ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                     WITHDRAWN 4-28-10
    REISSUED 4-28-10
    IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-09-00170-CR
    JOSE SILVERIO LUGO,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    From the 278th District Court
    Walker County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 24229
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Jose Silverio Lugo appeals from a conviction for violating a protective order
    pursuant to Texas Penal Code Section 25.07. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 25.07 (Vernon
    2003). The trial court assessed punishment at confinement for eight (8) years in the
    Texas Department of Criminal Justice – Institutional Division.           See 
    id. (g). Lugo
    complains that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the cause because
    the indictment as alleged failed to state a felony offense, and, in the alternative, that his
    sentence is illegal because he was convicted of a misdemeanor offense and sentenced to
    felony punishment. Because we hold that complaints about the indictment must be
    raised prior to the empanelling of the jury and the sentence is not illegal, we affirm the
    judgment of the trial court.
    In his first issue, Lugo complains that the district court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction over this cause because the indictment did not allege a felony offense, but
    merely a misdemeanor offense. Lugo did not object to the indictment prior to trial. In
    1985, Section 1.14(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to require that all
    defects in indictments, whether of form or substance, must be objected to prior to
    empanelling the jury in order to preserve the objection for appeal. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
    PROC. ANN. § 1.14(b) (Vernon 2005). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that
    this extends to matters of subject matter jurisdiction in instances such as this, where it is
    evident from the face of the indictment that the State intended to charge him with a
    felony offense. See Kirkpatrick v. State, 
    279 S.W.3d 324
    , 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing
    Teal v. 
    State, 230 S.W.3d at 182
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Further, Lugo’s application for
    probation filed with the trial court indicates his understanding that he was on trial for a
    third degree felony.      We find that Lugo waived any complaint regarding the
    defectiveness of the indictment by failing to bring his objection to the attention of the
    trial court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 1.14(b) (Vernon 2005); see also 
    Kirkpatrick, 279 S.W.3d at 329
    . Lugo’s first issue is overruled.
    In his second issue, Lugo argues that his sentence is void because it imposes
    felony punishment for a misdemeanor conviction. See Ex parte McIver, 
    586 S.W.2d 851
    ,
    854 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (holding that when statute authorized jury to
    recommend probation as to a period of confinement and impose a fine, a sentence that
    did the opposite by assessing confinement and recommending probation of a fine was
    Lugo v. State                                                                          Page 2
    deemed void). Lugo was sentenced to eight (8) years imprisonment which is within the
    range of punishment for a third degree felony offense. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.34
    (Vernon 2003).
    While this issue is not jurisdictional, it does turn on the same question as issue
    number one--whether the indictment alleged a felony or a misdemeanor. Thus, the
    same reasoning would apply here and would produce the same result; that the
    indictment did intend to allege a felony. Further, Lugo did not raise any alleged charge
    error in this appeal complaining of any language Lugo contends is erroneous, he makes
    no contention that the evidence is legally or factually insufficient, nor does he assert
    that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The punishment assessed was in
    agreement with the crime charged by the indictment that had not been objected to
    before trial, that being a third degree felony violation of a protective order. See Holley v.
    State, 
    167 S.W.3d 546
    , 548-49 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
    Therefore, the punishment assessed was within the range of punishment for a third
    degree felony, which is two to ten years’ confinement in the Texas Department of
    Criminal Justice and a fine not to exceed $10,000.00. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.34
    (Vernon 2003). We overrule Lugo’s second issue.
    Conclusion
    We find that any complaint regarding Lugo’s indictment was required to be
    raised to the trial court prior to the empanelling of the jury and that the sentence
    imposed was not illegal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    TOM GRAY
    Chief Justice
    Lugo v. State                                                                          Page 3
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Reyna, and
    Justice Davis
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed December 30, 2009
    Do not publish
    [CR25]
    Lugo v. State                                   Page 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-09-00170-CR

Filed Date: 12/30/2009

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/10/2015