Gerald Wayne Springer v. Janice Marie Lingle ( 2002 )

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                                                             11th Court of Appeals

                                                                  Eastland, Texas

                                                                        Opinion

Gerald Wayne Springer

Appellant

Vs.                   No. 11-01-00303-CV -- Appeal from Erath County

Janice Marie Lingle

Appellee

This appeal arises from a dispute between a brother and sister regarding their father=s ranch. Appellant, Gerald Wayne Springer, and Appellee, Janice Marie Lingle, are the only children of Marsh Springer, deceased.   Marsh Springer owned a ranch in Comanche County made up of three tracts which totaled approximately 805 acres combined. The three tracts consisted of: (1) a 505-acre tract referred to as the Resley Creek or Dueese Place; (2) a 160-acre tract referred to as the Home Place; and (3) a 140-acre tract referred to as the Cude Place. Marsh Springer died on March 3, 1997, and his will was admitted to probate in Erath County on June 1, 1998.^[1]   His last will and testament devised his ranch located in Comanche County to appellee.^[2]

Appellant asserts that he is the owner of the 505-acre tract by virtue of Marsh Springer=s parol gift of the land to him in 1993.^[3] Appellant testified that he took exclusive possession of the 505-acre tract in 1993 and made valuable improvements thereon as a result of the conveyance. The improvements consisted of clearing trees, cleaning up debris, building fences and roads, and sprigging coastal bermudagrass. He ran cattle on the 505-acre tract and grew wheat and oats on the tract for his cattle to consume. Appellant testified that he kept all of the money generated from his cattle operation on the tract as well as the money received for leasing the property for hunting.

Appellant also testified about improvements he made to the Home Place and the Cude Place. These improvements consisted of making repairs to his father=s house, building fences and pens, building roads, adding amendments to the soil, and running a water line to the Cude Place. Appellant testified that he made improvements at a cost of approximately $199,000 to all three tracts.^[4] He estimated that half of this figure was expended on the improvements to the Home Place and Cude Place. Appellant alternatively sought an equitable lien to recover the enhanced value of the three tracts as a result of the improvements in the event he did not receive title to the 505-acre tract.

Appellant=s claims were tried before the court. The trial court denied appellant=s claim of ownership to the 505-acre tract. The trial court also denied his claim for a recovery as a result of the improvements which had been made to the three tracts. The trial court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in this regard:

The money spent and services provided by [appellant] related to the real estate subject of this suit was provided to benefit [appellant=s] farming and ranching operations and for the natural affection that a son has for his father.

[Appellant] did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Marsh Springer and [appellant] entered into an oral contract to convey the Cude Place and [the 505-acre tract] in exchange for money and services.

[Appellant] did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to reimbursements for improvements or enhanced value to the property subject of this suit because his efforts benefitted his personal enterprises or was a result of natural affection for his father.

Appellant brings two issues on appeal. In his first issue, he attacks the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence regarding the trial court=s denial of his ownership claim to the 505-acre tract.   His second issue attacks the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence regarding the trial court=s refusal to impose an equitable lien for improvements. We affirm.

As set forth below, appellant=s claims are in the nature of equitable relief.   With respect to a claim for equitable relief, the fact finder is responsible for resolving the disputed, material facts connected to the claim. See Casa El Sol-Acapulco v. Fontenot, 919 S.W.2d 709, 715 (Tex.App. B Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ dism=d by agr.). After the fact issues have been resolved, the decision to grant or deny equitable relief is a question of law for the court to decide. See Crown Construction Company, Inc. v. Huddleston, 961 S.W.2d 552, 558 (Tex.App. B San Antonio 1997, no pet=n). The trial court=s granting or denying of equitable relief is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review on appeal. Crown Construction Company, Inc. v. Huddleston, supra at 558; Mathews v. First Citizens Bank, 374 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex.Civ.App. B Dallas 1963, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

Appellant=s issues attack the trial court=s resolution of the factual findings. When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse fact finding on an issue on which he has the burden of proof, he must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow Chemical Company v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex.2001); Sterner v. Marathon Oil Company, 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989). In order to determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we must review all of the evidence and determine whether the challenged finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.1986); In re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.1951).

The statute of frauds precludes an oral conveyance of real property. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. ' 26.01 (Vernon 2002). However, Texas courts have recognized various conditions of an oral conveyance which Arelieves it from the operation of the statute of frauds, or, as more accurately stated, renders the contract enforcible in equity notwithstanding the statute.@ Hooks v. Bridgewater, 229 S.W. 1114, 1116 (Tex.1921). The Texas Supreme Court enumerated three requirements to relieve a parol conveyance of land from the operation of the statute of frauds in Hooks: (1) payment of consideration, whether in money or in services; (2) possession by the transferee; and (3) making by the transferee of permanent and valuable improvements upon the land with the consent of the transferor. Hooks v. Bridgewater, supra at 1116. The three requirements identified in Hooks have been modified to apply to situations involving a parol gift of realty: (1) a gift in praesenti; (2) possession under the gift by the donee with the donor=s consent; and (3) permanent and valuable improvements made on the property by the donee with the donor=s knowledge or consent or, without improvements, the existence of such facts as would make it a fraud upon the donee not to enforce the gift. See Thompson v. Dart, 746 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Tex.App. B San Antonio 1988, no writ); Grimsley v. Grimsley, 632 S.W.2d 174, 178 (Tex.App. B Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).

To be a gift in praesenti, the donor must, at the time he makes it, intend an immediate divestiture of the rights of ownership out of himself and a consequent immediate vesting of such rights in the donee. Thompson v. Dart, supra at 825. Three elements are necessary to establish the existence of a gift: (1) intent to make a gift; (2) delivery of the property; and (3) acceptance of the property. See Hayes v. Rinehart, 65 S.W.3d 286, 289 (Tex.App. B Eastland 2001, no pet=n). The intent of the donor is the principal issue in determining whether a gift has been made, and the person claiming a gift must prove the gift by clear and convincing evidence. Hayes v. Rinehart, supra at 289.

Appellant=s testimony was the only evidence offered regarding the purported oral conveyance of the 505-acre tract to him. The trial court=s resolution of this fact issue obviously hinged on its assessment of appellant=s credibility.    The fact finder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.   McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.1986). The evidence does not conclusively establish Marsh Springer=s agreement to convey the 505-acre tract to appellant either by gift or contractual conveyance. Furthermore, evidence supporting the trial court=s ruling was adduced at trial. With respect to the issue of appellant=s possession of the 505-acre tract, appellant testified that his father continued to possess a key to the tract after the purported conveyance.   The testimony also revealed that his father paid for a portion of the fencing materials used on the 505-acre tract. Finally, appellant testified that he spoke with his father about preparing a new will which Awould have left this property@ to appellant but that his father did not want to change his will. Appellant=s first issue is overruled.

We next consider the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the denial of appellant=s claim for improvements. One who improves real estate under the erroneous but good faith belief that he owns the land is entitled to recover from the true owner the cost of the improvements to the extent they have enhanced the value of the property. Whelan v. Killingsworth, 537 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex.Civ.App. B Texarkana 1976, no writ). For one to qualify as a good faith improver under this equitable rule of Abetterments,@ he must show that he believed he was the true owner of the land and that he had reasonable grounds for that belief.   Miller v. Gasaway, 514 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex.Civ.App. B Texarkana 1974, no writ).    The trial court did not make any findings regarding appellant=s status as a good faith improver.   With respect to the 505-acre tract, appellant seeks a recovery for improvements made since 1990 even though he asserted that the conveyance did not occur until 1993.   Appellant never claimed ownership of the Home Place and Cude Place. To the contrary, he testified that he made improvements to the Home Place and Cude Place based on his expectancy of receiving them in the future. There was no evidence that appellant=s father agreed to reimburse him for the improvements. As noted by the trial court, the improvements facilitated the agricultural operations which appellant conducted on the three tracts. Consequently, the trial court=s determination that appellant was not entitled to compensation for the improvements is supported by the evidence. See Mayberry v. Campbell, 356 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.Civ.App. B Amarillo 1962, writ ref=d n.r.e.). Appellant=s second issue is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

W. G. ARNOT, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

August 29, 2002

Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.3(b).

Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and

Wright, J., and McCall, J.

     ^[1]The parties litigated this action in Erath County as an ancillary proceeding to the probate of Marsh Springer=s estate.

     ^[2]Marsh Springer devised his interest in a ranch located in Scurry County to appellant. The record reflects that this bequest consisted of a one-half interest in approximately 1,700 acres. Appellant and appellee had previously inherited a one-quarter interest each in the Scurry County ranch from their mother=s estate.

     ^[3]Appellant predominantly refers to the conveyance as a gift in the appellate record. There are instances in the record wherein appellant refers to the conveyance as a matter of contractual agreement. The distinction between a gift versus a contractual conveyance is not material to the outcome of the case.

     ^[4]Appellant attributed $132,600 of the $199,000 figure for his individual labor in making the improvements.