Gustavo Cuello v. State ( 2004 )

                                                                                    NO. 12-03-00392-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

GUSTAVO CUELLO,                                        §                 APPEAL FROM THE 114TH

APPELLANT

V.                                                                         §                 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE                                                        §                 SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Gustavo Cuello appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Appellant raises one issue on appeal. We affirm.

Background

            Appellant was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child. While out on bail, Appellant fled the country, but was later returned to the United States by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to face the charges against him. Appellant pleaded guilty. The trial court sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for fifty years. Pursuant to the trial court’s timely pass for plea option, Appellant elected not to accept the trial court’s sentence, but rather sought to have a jury determine his sentence.

            Following a trial on punishment, the jury recommended that Appellant be sentenced to imprisonment for life. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly. This appeal followed.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

            In his sole issue, Appellant contends that the life sentence imposed on him constituted cruel and unusual punishment under both the Texas and United States Constitutions. Initially, we note that Appellant made no objection to the trial court raising the issue of cruel and unusual punishment and has, therefore, waived such an issue with respect to any alleged violation of his rights under the Texas Constitution. See Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. However, even absent waiver, we conclude that Appellant’s sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

            The legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties. See Davis v. State, 905 S.W.2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d); see also Simmons v. State, 944 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d). Courts have repeatedly held that punishment which falls within the limits prescribed by a valid statute is not excessive, cruel, or unusual. See Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664. In the case at hand, Appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, a first degree felony. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.021 (Vernon Supp. 2004). The punishment range for such an offense is between five and ninety-nine years, or life. Id.; see also Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.32(a) (Vernon 2003). Here, the punishment assessed by the trial court falls well within the range set forth by the legislature. Id. Therefore, the punishment is not prohibited as cruel, unusual, or excessive per se.

            Nonetheless, Appellant urges the court to perform the three-part test originally set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). Under this test, the proportionality of a sentence is evaluated by considering (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. The application of the Solem test has been modified by Texas courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin, to require a threshold determination that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime before addressing the remaining elements. See, e.g., McGruder, 954 F.2d at 316; see also Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 845-46 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1999, no pet.).

            In determining whether Appellant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate, we are guided by the holding in Rummel v. Estell, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980). In Rummel, the Supreme Court addressed the proportionality claim of an appellant who had received a mandatory life sentence under a prior version of the Texas habitual offender statute for a conviction for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. Id., 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1135. The life sentence was imposed because the appellant also had two prior felony convictions - one for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth of goods or services and the other for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id., 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1134-35. After both recognizing the legislative prerogative to classify offenses as felonies and considering the purpose of the habitual offender statute, the court determined that the appellant’s mandatory life sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 445 U.S. at 285, 100 S. Ct. at 1145.

            In the case at hand, the offense committed by Appellant - aggravated sexual assault - was far more serious than the offenses committed by the appellant in Rummel, while Appellant’s life sentence is no more severe than the life sentence upheld by the Supreme Court in Rummel. Thus, it follows that if the sentence in Rummel was not unconstitutionally disproportionate, then neither is the sentence assessed against Appellant in the case at hand. Therefore, since we do not find the threshold test to be satisfied, we need not apply the remaining elements of the Solem test. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.   

Conclusion

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                                                    DIANE DEVASTO

                                                                                                                 Justice

Opinion delivered July 30, 2004.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and DeVasto, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)