Facility Insurance Corporation v. Kevin Loyd Gibbs ( 2009 )


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  • Opinion filed October 8, 2009
    In The
    Eleventh Court of Appeals
    ___________
    No. 11-09-00005-CV
    __________
    FACILITY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellant
    V.
    KEVIN LOYD GIBBS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 35th District Court
    Brown County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. CV0604153
    OPINION
    This is an interlocutory appeal in a workers’ compensation suit. Kevin Loyd Gibbs suffered an
    injury while in the course and scope of his employment, and the Texas Department of Insurance, Division
    of Workers’ Compensation, found that he was entitled to lifetime income benefits. Facility Insurance
    Corporation filed suit to appeal this determination. Gibbs challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear
    new evidence, and the trial court found that its jurisdiction was limited to Gibbs’s entitlement to lifetime
    income benefits through the date of the contested case hearing. We affirm.
    I. Background Facts
    Gibbs injured his lower back in 1993 and has undergone multiple back surgeries for this injury.
    Gibbs was ultimately diagnosed with failed back syndrome, and his treating physician opined that Gibbs’s
    lower extremities did not possess substantial utility because he was unable to control his legs and that
    Gibbs would be unable to get and keep employment requiring the use of his legs. The Division found that
    as of November 29, 2005, Gibbs was entitled to lifetime income benefits based on the total and permanent
    loss of use of both feet.
    Facility appealed this determination and gave notice that it would call a vocational rehabilitation
    counselor and an orthopedic surgeon to offer opinions on Gibbs’s employability and medical condition
    that were developed after the administrative process. Gibbs contended that the trial court lacked
    jurisdiction to consider any evidence of his condition after November 29, 2005. The trial court agreed and
    held that no new evidence concerning Gibbs’s condition after November 29 was admissible. The trial
    court also found that an interlocutory appeal was appropriate pursuant to TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE
    ANN . § 51.014(d) (Vernon 2008), and it entered an agreed order authorizing an interlocutory appeal.
    II. Issues
    Facility challenges the trial court’s ruling with a single issue, contending that new evidence
    generated after November 29, 2005, but concerning Gibbs’s condition, is admissible.
    III. Discussion
    The heart of this appeal is whether Facility can introduce evidence of Gibbs’s current condition.
    Facility argues that, if Gibbs is not disabled today, then the hearing officer’s decision that he was
    permanently disabled on November 29 is necessarily in error. Gibbs responds that his current condition
    is not in issue and that, if Facility desires to seek relief based upon new medical evidence, it must first
    present that evidence to the Division. We cannot directly address this issue by deciding whether specific
    testimony or evidence would, if offered, be admissible because to do so would constitute an advisory
    opinion. See Speer v. Presbyterian Children’s Home and Serv. Agency, 
    847 S.W.2d 227
    , 229 (Tex. 1993)
    (courts have no jurisdiction to render advisory opinions). We will, therefore, restrict ourselves to the trial
    court’s jurisdictional ruling.
    In Tex. Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp. v. Jackson, 
    225 S.W.3d 734
    , 736 (Tex.
    App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.), we held that the Workers’ Compensation Act imposes a three-step
    administrative process as a predicate to seeking judicial review, that each step is contingent upon
    completion of the prior proceeding, and that each step is limited to the scope of the prior proceeding.
    Consequently, we found that the trial court lacked the authority to consider issues beyond those originally
    presented to the hearing officer at the Contested Case Hearing. 
    Id. 2 The
    issue presented to the hearing officer in this case was whether Gibbs was entitled to lifetime
    income benefits as of November 29, 2005, based on the total and permanent loss of use of both feet. The
    trial court’s jurisdiction is limited to that same issue. But the Act does not limit the trial court’s
    jurisdiction to consideration of the evidence presented to the hearing officer. The trial court has
    jurisdiction to consider new evidence – even if it was created after November 29, so long as it is relevant
    to Gibbs’s disability on November 29. For example, if Gibbs underwent an MRI on December 1 and a
    doctor testified that the results of the MRI would have been the same if conducted on November 29, then
    the court would have jurisdiction to consider this evidence. But if the new evidence instead establishes
    Gibbs’s condition on some subsequent date, then the court lacks jurisdiction because the proffering party
    has not yet exhausted its administrative remedies. See 
    id. at 737
    (whether claimant was entitled to
    benefits at trial is a related but separate question from whether he was entitled to benefits as of the date
    of the contested case hearing); see also DWC Appeals Panel Decision, APD, No. 020432-s, April 10,
    2002, 
    2002 WL 971079
    (Division has jurisdiction to determine continued entitlement to lifetime income
    benefits).
    The trial court correctly found that its jurisdiction was limited to Gibbs’s entitlement to lifetime
    income benefits as of November 29, 2005, and Facility’s issue is overruled. We express no opinion on
    the findings of fact or conclusions of law in the trial court’s agreed order authorizing an interlocutory
    appeal or on whether Facility’s new evidence is admissible.
    IV. Holding
    The trial court’s partial summary judgment order is affirmed.
    RICK STRANGE
    JUSTICE
    October 8, 2009
    Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
    McCall, J., and Strange, J.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-09-00005-CV

Filed Date: 10/8/2009

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/10/2015