Claus, Jason Glenn v. State ( 2003 )

Opinion issued on November 20, 2003

  In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

---

NO. 01-02-01269-CR

---

JASON GLENN CLAUS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

---

On Appeal from the 338th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 883,934

---

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellant, Jason Glenn Claus, was charged with aggravated robbery. After appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery, the trial court deferred adjudication of appellant’s guilt, placed him on community supervision for 10 years, and assessed a $1,000.00 fine. The State subsequently filed a motion to adjudicate appellant’s guilt for violations of the terms and conditions of his community supervision. Appellant entered a plea of true to the State’s motion and was sentenced to eight years’ confinement. Appellant now complains that his guilty plea was void and, thus, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment against him. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

          On August 2, 2001, appellant was charged with aggravated robbery. On August 10, 2001, appellant appeared in person before the court, and the following transpired: (1) appellant waived his right to be prosecuted by indictment; (2) appellant waived his right to have a court reporter record his plea; (3) appellant entered a plea of “guilty” to aggravated robbery;(4) appellant moved for community supervision; (5) appellant waived his right to appeal; and (6) the trial court deferred adjudication of appellant’s guilt, placed him on community supervision for 10 years, and assessed a $1,000 fine. Apparently, six of the documents generated during appellant’s court appearance on August 10, 2001were mistakenly date-stamped “July 10, 2001.”

          In 2002, the State filed a motion to adjudicate appellant’s guilt. Appellant entered a plea of true to the community supervision violations alleged in the State’s motion. Appellant was sentenced to eight years’ confinement. Appellant waived his right to appeal and no permission to appeal was granted. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se notice of appeal, and counsel was appointed. DISCUSSION

          In his sole point of error, appellant argues that his conviction is void because the charging instrument was inadequate, and, thus, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment against him. Specifically, appellant suggests the record shows that the charging instrument was executed prior to the date of the offense, rendering his guilty plea and, consequently, the judgment against him, void.

          A defendant may normally not appeal issues relating to the original plea proceeding in an appeal, such as this one, from an order adjudicating guilt. See Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). An exception arises when the original plea proceeding is void. See Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 667-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). A void judgment is a “nullity” and can be attacked at anytime. Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 668. Here, appellant’s claim appears to fall within the recognized exception to the general rule allowing an appeal when the original proceeding is void. See id.

          Only in rare situations, usually due to lack of jurisdiction, will a judgment be void. Jordan, 54 S.W.3d at 785; cf. also Ex parte McCain, 67 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“void” convictions are those in which trial court lacked jurisdiction over person or subject matter or in which judge lacked qualification to act in any manner). A judgment of conviction for a crime is void when (1) the document purporting to be a charging instrument (i.e. indictment, information, or complaint) does not satisfy the constitutional requisites of a charging instrument, so that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the defendant; (2) the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the offense charged; (3) the record reflects that there is no evidence to support the conviction; or (4) an indigent defendant is required to face criminal trial proceedings without appointed counsel, when such has not been waived. Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 668. For a judgment to be void, however, the record must leave no question about the existence of the fundamental defect. Id. at 668-69.

          Under Texas law, a charging instrument must convey sufficient notice to allow the accused to prepare his defense; specifically, it must allege all facts and circumstances necessary to establish the material elements of the offense. Galliford v. State, 101 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d.); State v Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.03 (Vernon 1989). A charging instrument tracking the language of the statute will, as a general rule, satisfy constitutional and statutory notice requirements. Galliford, 101 S.W.3d at 606. Here, both the complaint and the information state:

in Harris County, Texas, Jason Glenn Claus, hereinafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about August 1, 2001, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing theft of property owned by Brian Brothers and with intent to obtain and maintain control of the property, intentionally and knowingly threaten and place Brian Brothers in fear of imminent bodily injury and death, and the Defendant did then and there use and exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm.

Both documents track the language of the criminal statute, thus satisfying constitutional and statutory notice requirements. See Galliford, 101 S.W.3d at 605; Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.03 (Vernon 1989) (elements of aggravated robbery offense). Because the complaint and the information satisfy the constitutional requisites of a charging instrument, the trial court had jurisdiction over appellant, and, thus, the judgment of conviction is not void. See Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 668-69.

          Furthermore, careful review of the record exposes the fallacy of appellant’s argument. Although the record shows that appellant’s judicial confession, plea papers, and waiver of indictment were incorrectly date-stamped, these documents were executed as a part of the plea proceedings, and are not a part of the charging instrument. No defect exists in either the information or the complaint. Put simply, no factual basis exists for appellant’s claim.   

          We overrule appellant’s sole point of error.

CONCLUSION

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                             Sherry Radack

                                                             Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Taft and Keyes.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).