Murphy, Danny Royce v. State ( 2003 )

Opinion issued November 13, 2003

      In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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  NO. 01-02-00793-CR

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DANNY ROYCE MURPHY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 213135

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellant, Danny Royce Murphy, was found guilty by a jury of the misdemeanor offense of displaying a counterfeit insurance document. The trial court suspended punishment of 180 days’ confinement and a fine of $500, and placed appellant on community supervision for six months. In four points of error, appellant asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case and that he was deprived of the due process of law.

           Counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that the appeal is frivolous and wholly without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and detailing why there are no arguable grounds for error to be advanced. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Moore v. State, 845 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d). Appellant has filed a brief on his own behalf.

BACKGROUND

          During a traffic stop, appellant gave Officer Winstead an insurance card from Puget Sound Agricultural Association [Puget Sound], which is not authorized to conduct business within the State of Texas. It is questionable whether Puget Sound exists at all.

          Appellant asserts in his pro se brief that the trial court failed to gain jurisdiction over the case, that the Code of Criminal Procedure only applies to corporations rather than human beings, that appellant was deprived of due course of law through an improper charging of a misdemeanor, and that the evidence presented was legally insufficient to prove that he knew that the document was counterfeit.

DISCUSSION

Jurisdiction

Constitutional Requirement for Information

          Appellant asserts that the trial court failed to gain jurisdiction over his case because the case was based on an information brought forth by an assistant district attorney. Appellant contends that the state constitution allows the commencement of a prosecution by an information in a constitutional county court only when it is filed by the county attorney and that otherwise, the constitutionally proscribed procedure is that a misdemeanor can only be charged by an indictment returned by a grand jury to the district court and then transferred to the inferior court which has jurisdiction.

          Article 5, section 21 of the Texas Constitution specifies the roles of county attorneys and district attorneys. Tex. Const. Art. III, § 2. If a county is within a judicial district in which there is a district attorney, the state constitution’s mandate that a county attorney represent the state in all cases in the district and inferior courts in their respective counties has no application. Ex parte Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 23 S.W.3d 596, 600-01 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d). We overrule appellant’s first point of error.

Naming Conventions

          In his second point of error, appellant avers that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not define the meaning of “person” in a way that corresponds to an individual as opposed to a corporation, and thus he can not be prosecuted. In his brief, appellant acknowledges that there is “no relevant appellate authority for this point of error.” He is correct. There is none. We overrule appellant’s second point of error.

Due Course of Law

          Appellant’s third point of error is that the trial court, by allowing appellant’s prosecution to proceed despite the alleged mistake of allowing the proceedings to commence via information, deprived him of the due course of law. As we have found that the trial court properly allowed the case to proceed via information, we overrule appellant’s third point of error.

Legal Sufficiency

          Appellant’s fourth point of error is that the evidence presented was legally insufficient to convict as the State offered no proof that appellant knew that the document was counterfeit. In reviewing the evidence on legal sufficiency grounds, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the witnesses’ testimony. Penegraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

          In the present case, Officer Winstead testified regarding appellant’s actions and statements at the time that appellant was pulled over. The officer stated that the appellant asked why he had to display proof of liability insurance and showed the proof of insurance after asking whether the information he gave would be admissible in a court of law. Officer Winstead also stated that appellant discussed why he did not believe he had to have the registration or other indicia required by state law. A rational juror could interpret this as some evidence that appellant was concerned about the validity of his insurance and find that appellant acted in a “knowing” manner. We overrule appellant’s fourth point of error.

Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw

          Appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief concluding that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Stephens v. State, 35 S.W.3d 770, 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).   

CONCLUSION

          We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and appellant’s brief. We find no reversible error in the record and agree that the appeal is wholly frivolous.

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

                                                             Sam Nuchia

                                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Hedges, Nuchia, and Higley.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).