Vernon Wolter, Nickie Wilson & Marie Cooper v. Monte S. Donaldson, Coastal Banc SSB, and James F. Murphy ( 2003 )

  In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas  

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NO. 01-02-00426-CV

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VERNON WOLTER, NICKIE WILSON, AND MARIE COOPER,

Appellants

v.

MONTE S. DONALDSON, COASTAL BANC SSB, AND JAMES F. MURPHY, Appellees

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On Appeal from the 125th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2000-50367

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

           Vernon Wolter, Nickie Wilson, and Marie Cooper, appellants, sued Monte S. Donaldson, Coastal Banc SSB, and James F. Murphy, appellees, alleging that the disclosure of appellants’ financial information gave rise to an invasion of privacy claim. The trial court granted appellees’ no-evidence motions for summary judgment. Appellants’ sole point of error claims that Coastal Banc invaded their privacy by releasing appellants’ bank account information to appellees, Murphy and Donaldson. We affirm.

Background

           This case involves a writ of garnishment filed by Monte Donaldson to satisfy a judgment in the amount of $3,136.57 against Vernon Wolter and John WorldPeace for sanctions stemming from a real property dispute. Coastal Bank was served with the writ on June 11, 1999. Due to a series of challenges mounted by Wolter and WorldPeace, Coastal placed the funds into the court’s registry. The funds were ultimately released to Donaldson.

           The specific information used for the writ and challenged on appeal reads as follows: “Mr. Wolter has an account at Coastal Banc being account 350228383 in his name. Also, Mr. Wolter is a signatory on account number 350228391 in the name of Nickie Wilson at Coastal Banc and is also a signatory on an account in the name of Marie Cooper.” In placing the money into the registry of the court, Coastal only took money from Wolter’s account, number 350228383, and not from the other accounts mentioned in the writ.

Discussion

Standard of Review

           Under rule 166a(i), a party is entitled to summary judgment if, after adequate time for discovery, there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Thus, a no-evidence summary judgment is similar to a directed verdict. Flameout Design & Fabrication, Inc. v. Pennzoil Caspian Corp., 994 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). The motion for summary judgment may not be general, but must state the elements on which there is no evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant produces more than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Macias v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). The party with the burden of proof at trial has the same burden of proof in the summary judgment proceeding. Galveston Newspapers, Inc. v. Norris, 981 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). In reviewing a summary judgment, we must indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolve any doubts in its favor. Flameout Design, 994 S.W.2d at 834.  

           Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion for no-evidence summary judgment. To succeed in an action for invasion of privacy, the plaintiffs must show: (1) an intentional intrusion, (2) physically or otherwise, upon the solitude, seclusion, or private affairs of another, (3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. See Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993).

           Appellees’ no-evidence motion asserted that there was no evidence of an intentional intrusion and no evidence that legal action in furtherance of the writ of garnishment would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

           Appellants’ response to appellees’ no-evidence motion stated that “someone at Coastal Banc had to research the private Coastal Banc records of Wolter, Wilson and Cooper not through Wolter’s account number but through other records at Coastal Banc which tied Wolter to Wilson and Cooper.” Appellants asserted that appellees did not provide testimony stating that the information on the signature cards was public information, and, if in fact such information was public, where it could be found. Attached to appellants’ response were affidavits of Wolter and Wilson. Wolter denied that the account number on his check was placed there by him and claims it was not on the check. Wilson stated that there are “no other names on my printed checks and no way for anyone to know who was a signatory on my account other than by checking my records at Coastal Banc.”

           Appellants allege that, if the information on the signature cards is not public information, then someone at Coastal Banc gave the information to Murphy or his alleged contractor. Appellants further contend that the mystery of how exactly appellees obtained appellants’ bank account information raises a fact issue. Appellants believe the only way appellees could have obtained the bank account information was through Coastal, therefore they are liable. However, appellants’ beliefs are merely speculations and do not amount to a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to an intentional intrusion by appellees. In light of our decision, we need not address appellants’ argument alleging that a cause of action for invasion of privacy exists under these facts. We overrule appellant’s sole point of error.

Conclusion

           We affirm the trial court’s judgment granting appellees’ no-evidence motion for summary judgment.

                                                                             Sam Nuchia

                                                                             Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Nuchia and Hanks.