Sebastian Yamas v. State ( 2005 )

Opinion issued December 22, 2005

    In The  

Court of Appeals  

For The  

First District of Texas  

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  NO. 01-05-00200-CR

__________

SEBASTIAN YAMAS, Appellant  

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee  

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On Appeal from the 184th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 460136  

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MEMORANDUM OPINION  

          Appellant, Sebastian Yamas, pleaded nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child, without an agreed punishment recommendation from the State. The trial court deferred adjudication of appellant’s guilt and placed him on community supervision for ten years. The State subsequently filed a motion to adjudicate appellant’s guilt based on allegations that appellant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision by failing to participate in an approved sexual offender treatment program. Appellant consented to the entry of a “stipulation of evidence,” admitting that an adjudication of his guilt had been deferred, he had been placed on community supervision for ten years, and he had violated the terms and conditions of community supervision by failing to participate in sex offender counseling. Appellant and the State entered a plea bargain agreement whereby the State recommended appellant’s punishment be assessed at confinement for six years in exchange for appellant’s above stipulation. The trial court admonished appellant, and, based on appellant’s plea, adjudicated appellant guilty and sentenced him to confinement for six years.

          Appellant’s appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating that, based on her review of the record, appellant’s pleas of no contest and true were freely and voluntarily entered, that appellant was properly admonished, and that there was no indication in the record that appellant’s counsel acted ineffectively.

          Appellant proceeds pro se, contending that he “never admitted guilt on this case” and that he “was lied to” by the lawyer representing him in the trial court. He asserts that his lawyer did not tell him that he had “signed for probation until three days after [he] was released” and that the forms he was signing were “for his release.” Appellant states that his lawyer did not inform him of “having signed for probation until [appellant] went [to his lawyer’s office] to pay him the balance of his fee.” Finally, appellant contends that, in reviewing his file, he noticed that his lawyer had filed a motion to receive funds to hire an interpreter, that there was “never an interpreter present” during their conversations, and that this “represents a sole monetary interest on [the lawyer’s] behalf and not a total interest on [appellant’s] well being or [appellant’s] best interest.” Based on the above contentions, appellant requested that his case “be reopened” so that he “may properly be tried.”

          Appellant’s brief may be fairly interpreted to present two issues, the first concerning the voluntariness of his plea and the second concerning the effectiveness of his counsel in the deferred adjudication proceedings.

          However, in this direct appeal, appellant may not now raise issues relating to his original deferred adjudication proceeding. A defendant placed on deferred adjudication may raise issues relating to the original plea proceeding only in appeals taken when deferred adjudication is first imposed. Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). This includes complaints about the voluntariness of the prior plea of guilty or nolo contendere and complaints of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Guillory v. State, 99 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d).

          Thus, we lack jurisdiction over appellant’s appeal.  

Conclusion

          We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  

                                                                        Terry Jennings

                                                                        Justice

Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Jennings, and Higley.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).