Kenneth R. Stamps v. State ( 2006 )


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  • Opinion issued on June 8, 2006  








       






      In The  

    Court of Appeals

    For The  

    First District of Texas





    NO. 01-04-01136-CR





    KENNETH R. STAMPS, Appellant


    V.


    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee





    On Appeal from the 262nd District Court

    Harris County, Texas

    Trial Court Cause No. 990558





    MEMORANDUM OPINION


              A jury found appellant, Kenneth R. Stamps, guilty of the offense of possession of a controlled substance in an amount over 4 grams and less than 200 grams with intent to deliver, a first degree felony. The appellant’s range of punishment was enhanced with two prior felony convictions. The trial court sentenced appellant to 40 years in prison.

               Appellant’s appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating that, in his opinion, the record reflects no reversible error and no grounds on for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Appellant filed a pro se response. In two issues, appellant asserts that (1) the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge and (2) there is insufficient evidence to show that he entered into an agreement to commit the offense of selling or delivering the controlled substance, but was rather entrapped by law enforcement agents. We affirm.

    Background

              On June 9, 2004, Officer Sinegal was working street level narcotics. He received a call from an informant about a large amount of cocaine being moved by a man named, “Ken.” Officer Sinegal recruited Officer King, a female officer, to assist him in the investigation. Officers Sinegal and King met with the informant, Pamela Edwards. After meeting, they agreed that Sinegal would pretend to be an ex-convict recently released from prison who was looking to make some money and who knew Ms. Edwards because he was the father of her child.  

              Ms. Edwards called appellant to set up a deal, and Officer Sinegal negotiated a price for a four ounces of crack cocaine. The agreed price on the deal was $450 a cookie. They agreed on a meeting place, and Officer Sinegal sent marked police cars to wait for his call.

              Officer Sinegal did not have the money agreed upon, and he sent Officer King to view the cocaine and notify him. She strapped to her bra a phone with an open line so that Officer Sinegal could hear what was being said. Officer King got in appellant’s car and, upon seeing the cocaine and its location, made an excuse to get out of the car. Officer King then told Officer Sinegal that she had seen the cocaine and its location.  

              Officer Sinegal told the marked police car to stop appellant’s car. Once the scene was secured, Officer King identified appellant. Upon confirmation by Officer Sinegal of the location of the drugs, Officer Griffin located the cocaine in the exact location where Officer King told him to look. The field test for the drugs was positive for cocaine. The evidence recovered from appellant was cocaine weighing 112.3 grams including any adulterants and dilutants.

              At trial, appellant’s counsel was allowed to conduct voir dire, and, at the conclusion of voir dire, he accepted the jury as impaneled without objection. After the jury had been selected and the venire panel dismissed, appellant’s trial counsel presented the trial court with a Batson motion complaining that the jury panel selection was racially motivated. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). Trial counsel argued that none of the African-American prospective jurors were questioned about disqualifications to serve. The trial court denied the motion and then allowed the State to give its reasons for striking the African-American venire members. The trial court made a finding that the State gave racially neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes and that there was no discriminatory process involved in selecting the jury.

    Discussion

                Appellant’s appointed counsel on appeal has filed an Anders brief, stating that he has found no arguable points of error to raise on appeal and moving to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400. The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and detailing why there are no arguable grounds for reversal. Id. 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. 1400; see also High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 810-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Appellant has filed a pro se brief.

              A court of appeals has two options when an Anders brief and a subsequent pro se brief are filed. Upon reviewing the entire record, it may determine that (1) the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it finds no reversible error or (2) there are arguable grounds for appeal and remand the cause to the trial court for appointment of new appellate counsel. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

              We have carefully reviewed the entire appellate record. We conclude that there is no reversible error and that the appeal is wholly frivolous. See id.Conclusion  

              We affirm the judgment of the trial court and grant appointed appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Stephens v. State, 35 S.W.3d 770, 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

     

                                                                 George C. Hanks, Jr.

                                                                 Justice



    Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Keyes, and Hanks.

    Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).