J. Steven Unger and Ellen L. Unger v. Randy Reaves and Gary Reaves ( 2006 )

PER CURIAM HEADING

                NO. 12-06-00099-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

J. STEVEN UNGER AND

ELLEN L. UNGER,  §          APPEAL FROM THE 392ND

APPELLANTS

V.        §          JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

RANDY REAVES AND

GARY REAVES,       §          HENDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

APPELLEES

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

            Appellants, J. Steven Unger and Ellen L. Unger, attempt to appeal an order denying their motion for clarification or, alternatively, motion for judgment nunc pro tunc, which was signed on March 22, 2006.  The motion related to an order signed on December 12, 2005 granting the Ungers a permanent injunction against Appellees, Randy Reaves and Gary Reaves, in a real property case.

            Unless otherwise authorized by statute, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment.  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code. Ann. §§ 51.012, 51.014 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).  A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it disposes of all pending parties and claims in the record, except as necessary to carry out the decree.  Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001).  An order denying a motion for clarification is not a final, appealable order.  Dick Poe Motors, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 169 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2005, no pet.).  Similarly, an order denying a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc is not a final, appealable order.  Shadowbrook Apartments v. Abu-Ahmad, 783 S.W.2d 210, 210 (Tex. 1990).

            On March 26, 2006, the Ungers filed a withdrawal of notice of appeal in the trial court, but not in this Court.  On April 7, 2006, the Clerk of this Court notified the Ungers, pursuant to rule of appellate procedure 37.2, that the information received in this appeal does not include a final judgment or appealable order and therefore does not show the jurisdiction of this Court.  The Ungers were further notified that the appeal would be dismissed unless the information filed was amended on or before April 17, 2006 to show our jurisdiction.  In response to our notice, the Ungers cited Starr v. Starr, 690 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1985, no writ) in support of their contention that a motion to clarify is a final, appealable order.  The order in that case was entered in a statutory clarification proceeding and, as such, was determined to be a final judgment.  Therefore, Starr is distinguishable from the case at hand.

            This Court’s appellate jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final judgments and such interlocutory orders as the legislature has deemed appealable.  City of Houston v. Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. 1993); see, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014.  Because the order the Ungers seek to appeal is neither a final judgment nor an interlocutory order deemed appealable by the legislature, we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.  Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P.  42.3(a). We take no action on the Reaves’s motion to dismiss.

Opinion delivered April 28, 2006.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and DeVasto, J.

(PUBLISH)