Leon Bradford, Jr. v. State ( 2007 )

                                                                                                        NO. 12-06-00206-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

LEON BRADFORD, JR.,    §                      APPEAL FROM THE 241ST

APPELLANT

V.        §                      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE   §                      SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

            Leon Bradford, Jr. appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated.  Appellant’s counsel filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967) and Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). We affirm.

Background

            Appellant was charged by indictment with driving while intoxicated.¹  The indictment  contained a jurisdictional paragraph, which alleged that, prior to the commission of the charged offense, Appellant had twice been convicted of an offense relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.  Further, the indictment included an enhancement paragraph, which alleged that, prior to the commission of the charged offense, Appellant had been convicted of felony theft. Because of these jurisdictional and enhancement paragraphs, the offense of driving while intoxicated is a second degree felony.²

            At a hearing on April 10, 2006, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to driving while intoxicated charged in the indictment. Appellant pleaded “true” to the jurisdictional and enhancement paragraphs in the indictment.  Appellant and his counsel signed an acknowledgment of admonishments, a waiver of trial by jury, a sworn waiver of confrontation and agreement to stipulate, an agreement to stipulate testimony, and a judicial confession in which Appellant swore that all allegations pleaded in the indictment was true.  The trial court adjudged Appellant guilty.  After a sentencing hearing, the court assessed Appellant’s punishment at eighteen years of imprisonment. This appeal followed.

Analysis pursuant to Anders v. California

            Appellant’s counsel filed a brief in compliance with Anders and Gainous, stating that he has diligently reviewed the appellate record and is of the opinion that the record reflects no reversible

error and that there is no error upon which an appeal can be predicated.  From our review of counsel’s brief, it is apparent that he is well acquainted with the facts in these cases. In compliance with Anders, Gainous, and High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), counsel’s brief presents a chronological summation of the procedural history of the case and further states that counsel is unable to raise any meritorious issues for appeal.³ We have likewise reviewed the record for reversible error and have found none.

Conclusion

            As required by Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), Appellant’s counsel has moved for leave to withdraw. We carried the motion for consideration with the merits of the appeal. Having done so and finding no reversible error, Appellant’s counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is hereby granted and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Opinion delivered April 30, 2007.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

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¹ Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003).

² An offense under section 49.04 of the Texas Penal Code is a third degree felony if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the person has previously been convicted two times of any other offense relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.09(b)(2) (Vernon 2003). If it is shown on the trial of a third degree felony that the defendant has been once before convicted of a felony, on conviction he shall be punished for a second degree felony. Id. § 12.42(a)(3) (Vernon 2003). A second degree felony is punishable by imprisonment for any term of not more than twenty years or less than two years and, in addition, a fine not to exceed $10,000. Id. § 12.33 (Vernon 2003).

³ Counsel for Appellant certified that he provided Appellant with a copy of his brief and that Appellant was given time to file his own brief in this cause. The time for filing such a brief has expired and we have received no pro se brief.