Jim H. Hamilton, Jr. v. Raymond E. Thompson ( 2008 )


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  •                                 NO. 12-07-00231-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    TYLER, TEXAS
    JIM H. HAMILTON, JR.,                            §           APPEAL FROM THE THIRD
    APPELLANT
    V.                                               §           JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
    RAYMOND E. THOMPSON, STEVEN R.
    SWIFT, DARRELL W. DEEL, JOEL F.
    BARBOSA, WAYNE E. WHITTEN,
    DAVID W. GREEN, BELINDA F. RASH,                 §           ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
    WILLIAM E. RASH, BENNIE J.
    COLEMAN, JR., T. RODDEY,
    AND ED OWENS,
    APPELLEES
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Jim H. Hamilton, Jr., an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional
    Division (“TDCJ”), proceeding pro se, filed an informa pauperis suit against eleven employees of
    TDCJ. Hamilton appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his suit pursuant to Texas Civil Practices
    and Remedies Code, section 14.005. In three issues, Hamilton argues that the trial court erred by
    failing to hold a hearing on his motion for reconsideration, dismissing his lawsuit, and assessing
    court costs against him. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Hamilton is an inmate previously housed in the Coffield Unit of TDCJ. On April 2, 2007,
    Hamilton, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a suit against Appellees Raymond E.
    Thompson, Steven R. Swift, Darrell W. Deel, Joel F. Barbosa, Wayne E. Whitten, David W. Green,
    Belinda F. Rash, William E. Rash, Bennie J. Coleman, Jr., T. Roddey, and Ed Owens. Hamilton
    alleges that all appellees are employees of TDCJ. In his petition, Hamilton sought a declaratory
    judgment as well as a preliminary and permanent injunction due to alleged violations in bringing and
    investigating a disciplinary complaint against him.
    On May 15, 2007, the trial court dismissed Hamilton’s suit without prejudice because he
    failed to file the claim before the thirty-first day after receiving the written decision from the
    grievance system as required under section 14.005 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code.
    Hamilton filed a motion for new trial, entitled “motion for reconsideration,” that was overruled by
    operation of law. This appeal followed.
    DISMISSAL OF SUIT UNDER CHAPTER 14
    In his second issue, Hamilton argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his suit. Chapter
    14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies to a lawsuit brought by an inmate who
    has filed an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs and imposes several procedural
    requirements that must be met before such a lawsuit may proceed. TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE
    ANN . §§ 14.002-.006 (Vernon 2002). An inmate’s suit may be dismissed if it fails to meet the
    procedural requirements imposed by Chapter 14. Thompson v. Rodriguez, 
    99 S.W.3d 328
    , 330
    (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2003, no pet.). Specifically, a court shall dismiss a claim if the inmate fails
    to file a claim before the thirty-first day after the date the inmate receives the written decision from
    the grievance system. TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE ANN . § 14.005(b) (Vernon 2002).
    We review a trial court’s dismissal of an inmate’s in forma pauperis suit under an abuse of
    discretion standard. Hickson v. Moya, 
    926 S.W.2d 397
    , 398 (Tex. App.–Waco 1996, no pet.). A
    trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, capriciously, and without reference to any guiding
    rules or principles. Lentworth v. Trahan, 
    981 S.W.2d 720
    , 722 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.]
    1998, no pet.). We will affirm a dismissal if it was proper under any legal theory. Johnson v.
    Lynaugh, 
    796 S.W.2d 705
    , 706–07 (Tex. 1990); Birdo v. Ament, 
    814 S.W.2d 808
    , 810 (Tex.
    App.–Waco 1991, writ denied). Even where a trial court gives an incorrect legal reason for its
    decision, the trial court’s assignment of a wrong reason is not automatically reversible error. Sells
    v. Drott, No. 12-07-00020-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5608, at *3 (Tex. App.–Tyler July 18, 2007,
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    pet. filed) (mem. op.) (citing Luxenberg v. Marshall, 
    835 S.W.2d 136
    , 141-42 (Tex. App.–Dallas
    1992, no writ)). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it reaches the right result, even where
    that result is based upon an incorrect legal reason. 
    Id. Therefore, when
    a trial court gives an
    incorrect legal reason for its decision, we will nevertheless uphold that decision on any proper
    grounds supported by the record. Id.; Archer v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice-Institutional Div., No.
    12-07-00012-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2691, at *6 (Tex. App.–Tyler Apr. 16, 2008, no
    pet.)(mem. op.). Trial courts are given broad discretion to determine whether an inmate’s in forma
    pauperis suit should be dismissed because (1) prisoners have a strong incentive to litigate; (2) the
    government bears the costs of an in forma pauperis suit; (3) sanctions are not effective; and (4) the
    dismissal of unmeritorious claims accrues to the benefit of state officials, courts, and meritorious
    claimants. Montana v. Patterson, 
    894 S.W.2d 812
    , 814-15 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1994, no writ).
    Here, the trial court dismissed Hamilton’s suit because it concluded the claim was not filed
    before the thirty-first day after receiving a written decision from the grievance system as required
    under section 14.005(b). See TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE ANN . § 14.005(b). However,
    Hamilton’s affidavit attached to his petition stated that he received the written decision from the
    grievance system on February 28, 2007. He then mailed his petition, according to his verification,
    on March 26, 2007, and it was filed on April 2, 2007. It appears that when the trial court determined
    that Hamilton failed to file his claim before the thirty-first day, it utilized the date of February 6,
    2007, the date that the decision was made by the grievance system, as the beginning of the thirty-one
    day time period. But there is no indication that Hamilton received a copy of the decision from the
    grievance system on February 6, 2007.
    Nonetheless, Hamilton, as an inmate proceeding in forma pauperis, must comply with all the
    requirements of Chapter 14. Specifically, section 14.004(a) of the Texas Civil Practices and
    Remedies Code provides that an inmate must file an affidavit of declaration identifying each suit,
    other than a suit under the Family Code, previously brought by the person and in which the person
    was not represented by an attorney, without regard to whether the person was an inmate at the time
    the suit was brought. TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE ANN . § 14.004(a)(1) (Vernon 2002). Further,
    the inmate must describe each suit that was previously brought by stating the operative facts for
    which relief was sought, listing the case name, cause number, and the court in which the suit was
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    brought, identifying each party named in the suit, and stating the result of the suit. TEX . CIV . PRAC.
    & REM . CODE ANN . § 14.004(a)(2). Although Hamilton listed two previous cases in his affidavit,
    he did not state the operative facts for which relief was sought in either case. Thus, Hamilton failed
    to comply with section 14.004(a)(2) and the trial court properly dismissed his suit. See Archer, 2008
    Tex. App. LEXIS 2691, at *6; Sells, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5608, at *3. Hamilton’s second issue
    is overruled.
    HEARING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
    In his first issue, Hamilton alleges that the trial court erred by not holding a hearing on his
    motion for reconsideration. A trial court need not hold a hearing on a motion for reconsideration or
    new trial unless the motion presents questions of material fact upon which evidence must be
    developed and heard. See Estate of Pollack v. McMurrey, 
    858 S.W.2d 388
    , 392 (Tex. 1993). Here,
    Hamilton asserted in his motion for reconsideration that his claim was timely filed and that his
    affidavit of declaration describing his prior lawsuits was sufficient under section 14.004(a)(2).1
    These matters could be determined from the record without the development of evidence. Therefore,
    the trial court did not err in failing to hold a hearing on Hamilton’s motion for reconsideration. See
    
    id. Hamilton’s first
    issue is overruled.
    COURT COSTS
    In his third issue, Hamilton argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay court costs
    when his suit was not dismissed as frivolous or malicious. Further, he contends that the imposition
    of such court costs violates his equal protection rights. Section 14.006 of the Texas Civil Practices
    and Remedies Code provides that a court may order an inmate who has filed a claim to pay court
    fees, court costs, and other costs. TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE ANN . § 14.006(a) (Vernon 2002).
    According to the clear language of the statute, the trial court was authorized to assess court costs
    against Hamilton even though his claim was not dismissed as frivolous or malicious. We note that
    the trial court’s order also follows subsections (b) and (c) of section 14.006 in ordering the amount
    1
    Hamilton addressed the affidavit in his motion for reconsideration because the trial court’s docket sheet
    includes a notation that Hamilton “also failed to include affidavit re previous filings as set forth in § 14.004(a)[.]”
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    of court costs and fees to be paid by Hamilton. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
    in ordering Hamilton to pay court costs. See Thomas v. Knight, 
    52 S.W.3d 292
    , 296 (Tex.
    App.–Corpus Christi 2001, pet denied).
    Hamilton also contends that the imposition of court costs against him violates his equal
    protection rights because his suit was not frivolous and none of the appellees suffered any monetary
    losses as they had not yet participated in any court proceedings. Hamilton admits that he did not
    make an equal protection argument to the trial court. A constitutional claim must have been asserted
    in the trial court in order to be raised on appeal. Dreyer v. Greene, 
    871 S.W.2d 697
    , 698 (Tex.
    1993). Because Hamilton did not raise his equal protection claim with the trial court, he has waived
    this argument.
    Even had he not waived his equal protection argument, Hamilton would not prevail. To assert
    an equal protection claim, Hamilton must establish that he was treated differently than other
    similarly situated parties and that he was treated differently without a reasonable basis. Sanders v.
    Palunsky, 
    36 S.W.3d 222
    , 225 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). The procedural
    requirements of Chapter 14 apply equally to all inmate suits in forma pauperis. See TEX . CIV . PRAC.
    & REM . CODE ANN . §§ 14.002-.006; 
    Sanders, 36 S.W.3d at 225
    . The record does not indicate nor
    has Hamilton shown that he was treated differently than any other indigent Texas inmate. Further,
    no court has recognized inmates as a suspect class or recognized the right to file successive civil suits
    as a fundamental right. 
    Sanders, 36 S.W.3d at 225
    . Because Chapter 14 neither singles out
    individuals of a suspect class nor implicates a fundamental right, it must only be rationally related
    to a legitimate state interest to survive an equal protection challenge. 
    Id. Chapter 14
    was “designed
    to control the flood of frivolous lawsuits being filed in the courts of this State by prison inmates,
    consuming valuable judicial resources with little offsetting benefit.” 
    Hickson, 926 S.W.2d at 399
    .
    Prohibiting inmates with a history of instituting frivolous and malicious litigation from proceeding
    in forma pauperis clearly serves to deter such abuses of our judicial system. See 
    Sanders, 36 S.W.3d at 226
    . Because Hamilton did not establish that he was treated differently than other indigent inmates
    and the State had a legitimate state interest in instituting Chapter 14, Hamilton’s equal protection
    challenge is without merit.
    Hamilton’s third issue is overruled.
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    DISPOSITION
    Having overruled Hamilton’s first, second, and third issues, we affirm the trial court’s order
    of dismissal.
    BRIAN HOYLE
    Justice
    Opinion delivered June 30, 2008.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
    (PUBLISH)
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