Melissa Jean Pool v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                   ACCEPTED
    06-15-00131-CR
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    12/15/2015 12:20:33 PM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    CLERK
    No. 06-15-00131-CR
    In the                        FILED IN
    6th COURT OF APPEALS
    Court of Appeals               TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    12/15/2015 12:20:33 PM
    Of the Sixth Appellate District        DEBBIE AUTREY
    Clerk
    Of the State of Texas
    __________________________
    Melissa Jean Pool
    v.
    The State of Texas
    __________________________
    Appeal from Cause No. 2015-0550-CR2
    In the County Court at Law No. 2
    Of McLennan County, Texas
    __________________________
    Brief for Appellant
    __________________________
    Christopher L. King
    100 N. 6th St., Suite 902
    Waco, TX 76701
    SBN: 24088864
    Telephone: 254-717-8600
    Email: callahankinglaw.com
    Attorney for Appellant
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
    Appellant
    Melissa Jean Pool
    By:   Christopher L. King
    Callahan & King, P.L.L.C.
    100 N. 6th St., Suite 902
    Waco, TX 76701
    Telephone: 254-717-8600
    SBN: 24088864
    Email: callahankinglaw@gmail.com
    Appellee
    The State of Texas
    By:   Abel Reyna
    Criminal District Attorney, McLennan County
    219 N. 6th St., Suite 200
    Waco, TX 76701
    Telephone: 254-757-5084
    SBN: 24000087
    i
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Identity of Parties and Counsel   i
    Table of Contents                 ii
    Index of Authorities              iii
    Preliminary Statement             1
    Point of Error No. 1              2
    Statement of Facts            2
    Summary of Argument           2
    Argument                      2
    Conclusion                    6
    Prayer for Relief                 6
    ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASE LAW                                                            Page
    Blankenship v. State, 
    673 S.W.2d 578
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)         2, 3
    Faretta v. California, 
    422 U.S. 806
    (1975)                          3
    Fernandez v. State, 
    283 S.W.3d 25
    (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no   3, 4
    pet).
    Goffney v. State, 
    843 S.W.2d 583
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)             3, 
    6 Grant v
    . State, 
    255 S.W.3d 642
    (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet)    
    4 Mart. v
    . State, 
    630 S.W.2d 952
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)              3
    CONSTITUTIONS
    Tex. Const. art. I, § 10.                                           2
    STATUTES
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 1.051.                                 2
    iii
    TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
    Comes now Melissa Jean Pool, hereinafter referred to as appellant, and
    submits this brief pursuant to the provisions of the Texas Rules of Appellate
    Procedure in support of his/her request for a new trial in appellate Cause No. 06-
    15-00131-CR.
    PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
    On June 30, 2015, in the County Court at Law No. 2of McLennan County,
    the Honorable Thomas Bradley Cates presiding, the appellant was convicted by a
    jury of the offense of interference with public duties after a plea of not guilty.
    The punishment was assessed by the court at thirty days incarceration in the
    county jail. The prosecuting attorney was Mr. Aubrey Robertson and appellant
    appeared pro se. The trial court appointed Mr. Christopher L. King as stand-by
    counsel.
    1
    Point of Error No. 1: The trial court erred by inadequately admonishing
    Defendant regarding self-representation on the record, and thus failed to
    ensure that Defendant’s waiver of counsel was competently, knowingly, and
    voluntarily made
    I.     Statement of Facts
    Defendant was present for several pre-trial hearings and throughout trial,
    but the reporter’s record from these proceedings does not contain any significant
    admonishment related to the dangers of self-representation or inquiry into her
    capacity to represent herself. (R.R., Vol. II, p. 1; R.R. Supp., Vol. I, p. 1)
    II.    Summary of argument
    The record does not reflect that the trial court judge adequately
    admonished Defendant on the dangers of self-representation, and thus
    Defendant’s waiver of counsel was not made knowingly and voluntarily. This
    violates Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. An objection to this
    error need not be raised at trial, and prejudice is presumed.
    III.   Argument
    The Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution guarantee the right to counsel to a person facing potential
    imprisonment in a criminal case. Blankenship v. State, 
    673 S.W.2d 578
    , 582
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The Texas state constitution guarantees the right to
    counsel. Tex. Const. art. I, § 10. The Texas Legislature has also provided a
    statutory right to counsel. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 1.051.
    2
    Criminal defendants also have a constitutional right to represent
    themselves without the assistance of counsel. 
    Blankenship, 673 S.W.2d at 582
    .
    To invoke his right to self-representation a defendant “should be made aware of
    the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Faretta v. California, 
    422 U.S. 806
    , 835 (1975). The record must establish that “he knows what he is
    doing, and his choice is made with his eyes open.” 
    Id. The trial
    court is
    responsible for making sure that the record fully shows that the defendant’s
    waiver of counsel is made with a clear understanding of the consequences of
    self-representation. Martin v. State, 
    630 S.W.2d 952
    , 954 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1982).
    While there is not a specific requirement that the trial court inquire into a
    defendant’s age, education, background, or mental health history, “the record
    must contain proper admonishments concerning pro se representation and any
    necessary inquiries of the defendant so that the trial court may make an
    assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” Goffney v.
    State, 
    843 S.W.2d 583
    , 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (emphasis in original).
    Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. 
    Id. Indeed, “courts
    indulge every reasonable presumption against the validity of a waiver of
    counsel.” Fernandez v. State, 
    283 S.W.3d 25
    , 28 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
    2009, no pet). The admonishments should be given even if standby counsel is
    3
    appointed. Grant v. State, 
    255 S.W.3d 642
    , 647 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no
    pet).
    Additionally, when a trial court fails to sufficiently admonish a defendant
    on the dangers of self-representation on the record, the defendant’s waiver of
    counsel is invalid. 
    Fernandez, 283 S.W.3d at 31
    . An invalid waiver results in a
    denial of the constitutional right to counsel. 
    Id. Because this
    is a structural
    defect, prejudice is presumed, and this is reversible error not subject to a harm
    analysis. 
    Id. The record
    in this matter does not contain adequate admonishments
    regarding the dangers of self-representation. The clerk’s record contains a
    written waiver of counsel form signed by the defendant on April 15, 2015. (C.R.,
    Vol. I, p. 12) That document indicates that a hearing was held, but the reporter’s
    record does not contain any information from that hearing. The reporter’s record
    from the pre-trial hearing conducted on June 10, 2015 does not contain
    admonishments regarding the dangers of self-representation as required by
    Faretta. (R.R. Supp., Vol. I, p. 1)
    Similarly, the final pre-trial hearing did not contain adequate
    admonishments either. The reporter’s record from the pre-trial hearing conducted
    on June 25, 2015 indicates that the Assistant District Attorney (ADA)
    prosecuting the case did not believe that the defendant was “competent” to
    4
    represent herself at trial. (R.R., Vol. II, p. 11) The ADA specifically enumerated
    that he did not think the defendant even understood what she was charged with.
    (R.R., Vol. II, p. 11) During that hearing the defendant indicated that she wanted
    to attach a civil suit to the case. (R.R., Vol. II, p. 9) The Defendant indicated a
    lack of understanding of the case or the consequences of self-representation, and
    even the State’s representative agreed. In response to this, the judge decided to
    appoint standby counsel and stated that it “is a dangerous practice” for a
    defendant to represent himself. (R.R., Vol. II, p. 13) The judge mentioned that
    loss of liberty could result from a conviction, (R.R., Vol. II, p. 14), but that is as
    close as he came to admonishing the defendant about the consequences of self-
    representation. The judge made no inquiry during this hearing into specific
    attributes of the defendant such as her education, background, or mental health
    history.
    At no point in the records before the Court was the defendant made aware
    of the profound consequences of self-representation so that she could enter her
    trial with her “eyes open” as required by the Supreme Court in Faretta. In the
    record before this court, the trial court did not make any inquiry into the
    defendant’s training, education, or experience with the legal system. In fact, the
    defendant’s own conduct in trying to link a civil matter to this criminal case
    demonstrated her lack of understanding.
    5
    IV.   Conclusion
    The court erred by not giving clear admonishments regarding the dangers
    of self-representation and ensuring that the defendant’s waiver of counsel was
    made knowingly and voluntarily. This error was not cured by the last-minute
    appointment of standby counsel. As the Court of Criminal Appeals stated in
    Goffney, “The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence
    which must show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and
    understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not a waiver.” 
    Goffney, 843 S.W.2d at 585
    .
    PRAYER FOR RELIEF
    For the reasons herein alleged, the Appellant was denied a fair trial in this
    case, and the judgment and sentence should be set aside and Appellant granted a
    new trial.
    Respectfully submitted,
    ___/s/ Christopher L King____________________
    Christopher L King
    Attorney for Appellant
    State Bar No. 24088864
    One Liberty Place
    100 N. 6th Street, Suite 902
    Waco, Texas 76701
    Phone (254) 717-8600
    Fax (254) 313-3200
    Email: callahankinglaw@gmail.com
    6
    I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
    document has been sent via Electronic Mail to Abel Reyna, Criminal District
    Attorney for McLennan County, on December 15, 2015.
    __________/s/ Christopher L King_______________
    Christopher L King
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-15-00131-CR

Filed Date: 12/15/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/30/2016