Alexander Carenzo Carter v. State ( 2008 )

Opinion issued June 5, 2008

  In The

Court of Appeals  

For The  

First District of Texas  

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NO. 01-07-00741-CR

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ALEXANDER CARENZO CARTER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from 262nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1104376

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  MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellant, Alexander Carenzo Carter, was charged with the felony offense of aggravated robbery. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(1), (2) (Vernon 2007). Carter pleaded guilty to the indictment. After deliberating, the jury assessed punishment at 35 years’ confinement, plus a $10,000 fine.  

          In three points of error, Carter contends (1) the trial court erred in failing to conduct an inquiry with regard to his competency, (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request that the court conduct a competency inquiry to determine his fitness to stand trial, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move to suppress his videotaped statement.

          We affirm.I. Factual Background

          On Valentine’s Day 2007, Carter and an accomplice attacked Roberta Martinez after she left her office building. Martinez had opened the door to her vehicle when Carter shoved her across the driver’s seat and demanded her keys and cellular phone. Carter lay on top of Martinez’s body, threatened her with obscenities, and held a knife to her neck with one hand. With his other hand, he choked Martinez. Carter dragged Martinez out of the car, instructed her to keep her head down, and told her to avoid looking at him. Carter then ordered Martinez to “run to the left,” threatening to kill her if she ran in another direction or turned back to look at Carter and his accomplice. Carter and his accomplice eventually drove away in Martinez’s vehicle.

          Martinez returned to her office building, called the police, and provided them with her vehicle information. Shortly thereafter, while on patrol, Officer Hefferin with the Bellaire Police Department received a radio report of the car theft. Hefferin recognized the stolen car in traffic from the radio description and began to chase the vehicle. After the pursuit ensued, Carter crashed the stolen vehicle into a gate of an apartment complex; Carter and his accomplice exited the vehicle. Hefferin immediately apprehended Carter’s accomplice, but Carter fled through the apartment complex and hid behind a gate. After a few minutes, Carter surrendered to an officer with the Houston Police Department.

          During the guilt-innocence phase of Carter’s trial, Detective Lacy, also with the Bellaire Police Department, testified on behalf of the State. Lacy testified that he had advised Carter of his Miranda rights after officers had taken him to the police department. Lacy recounted that Carter indicated that he understood his constitutional rights, and Carter signed a document stating that he understood those rights. Carter indicated that he was willing to waive those rights and speak with Lacy. The trial court admitted a videotape of Detective Lacey’s interview.

          In his videotaped confession, Carter acknowledged that he had participated in the theft of Martinez’s vehicle with a man named “Ghost.” Carter denied that any weapon was used in the commission of the crime. Carter stated that he robbed Martinez to get back to the north side of town, and so that he could take his girlfriend out for Valentine’s Day.

          The next day, before resuming trial, Carter’s trial counsel informed the trial court that Carter had elected to withdraw his plea of “not guilty” and to plead guilty, leaving the issue of punishment to the jury. The following exchange then took place outside the presence of the jury:

Trial Court: We’re outside the presence of the jury back on the record . . . . We’re presently in trial on this matter, the jury, having been selected. I’ve been told by the lawyers in this case that Mr. Carter now wishes to change his plea from not guilty to guilty [of] the alleged offense . . . . Is that the understanding that everyone has?

                    Trial prosecutor: Yes, Your honor.

Carter’s Counsel: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

. . .

Trial Court: Let me explain this to you, Mr. Carter, during the pendency of this case, you have done several things that do not give me great comfort. You went into some type of fit in the holdover, and hit the glass. Then you came out and said you were incompetent, but then when you realized I wasn’t buying it, you suddenly regained your competency. I just want to make sure you understand something, if you’re doing this for any reason other than the one stated, and you plan to disrupt this trial or do something along those lines, that will not be a good thing to do. All right. I’m taking you at your word that this is what you want to do. You need to take me at my word. I’m dead serious about how we run business in this court; and this is a very serious offense. This jury is very sincere in their approach to the case, as is the attorney for the State, as is your lawyer, as am I and the court reporter; and I will allow you to do this if this is what you wish to do. If this is some ill-advised scheme to try to gain advantage and then do something to disrupt this court, I just advise against it. Are we all square on ths?

                    Carter: Yes, sir.

                    Trial Court: And this is what you wish to do?

                    Carter: Yes, sir.

Trial Court: All right. Are you pleading guilt[y] to this because you are guilty of it?

                    Carter: Yes, sir.

                    Trial Court: That includes using a knife?

                    Carter: Yes, sir.

          Following Carter’s guilty plea before the jury, the trial proceeded to the punishment phase. There, Carter testified on his own behalf. Carter explained that it was his accomplice’s idea to rob Martinez. He testified that he thought about his actions in jail and was sorry for committing the offense. He told the jury that he committed the robbery in order to obtain money to take his girlfriend out for Valentine’s Day. Carter denied holding a knife to Martinez’s neck during the robbery, stating he instead held the knife by his hip. Finally, Carter testified he was “traumatized” by the robbery.

II. Discussion

A.      Competency to Stand Trial

          Carter first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in accepting his plea of guilty and proceeding with punishment without a competency inquiry.

          We review a trial court’s decision not to conduct a competency inquiry under an abuse of discretion standard. Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Lawrence v. State, 169 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d). A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003 (b) (Vernon Supp. 2007). A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he lacks: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him. Id. art. 46B.003 (a). Either party may suggest by motion, or the trial court may suggest on its own motion, that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004(a). If evidence suggesting the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial comes to the attention of the court, the court on its own motion shall suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007). On suggestion that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall determine by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004(c).   

          In this case, the trial court ordered that Carter undergo a psychiatric evaluation prior to trial. In the trial court’s order, it noted that Carter stated he was having memory problems. Id. Carter asserts that reports from court personnel that Carter had, at some point, exhibited symptoms of a “mental disturbance” raised the question of his fitness to stand trial. Carter further asserts that the fact that he underwent the court ordered psychiatric examination before trial and was on some type of medication should have alerted the trial court to make a further inquiry into his competence.

          Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not holding an informal inquiry into Carter’s competence to stand trial because no evidence exists in the record that suggests that Carter did not have (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007). There is no evidence indicating recent severe mental illness, moderate mental retardation, or truly bizarre acts by Carter. See Salahud-Din v. State, 206 S.W.3d 203, 209 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. ref’d). Significantly, Carter testified lucidly in the punishment phase of trial and responded appropriately to questions from both defense counsel and the State. See id. at 209. Nothing in Carter’s testimony in this case is irrational; he testified that he regretted committing the crime, but that his accomplice and his need for money pressured him into it. See id. Finally, Carter was able to communicate with the trial judge and appeared to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him.

          We hold that Carter’s assertions do not establish the required elements of incompetency concerning his ability to consult with his counsel with a reasonable degree of understanding or a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. See Brown, 129 S.W.3d at 766; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Accordingly, the trial court’s failure to conduct a competency inquiry did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

B.      Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

          1.       Trial Counsel’s Failure to Move for a Competency Inquiry

          In his second point of error, Carter contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his attorney failed to move for an inquiry by the court to determine Carter’s mental competence to stand trial.

          We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Under the Strickland test, a defendant must prove (1) his trial counsel’s representation was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance was so serious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. To establish both prongs, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard of prevailing professional norms, and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 690–94, 104 S. Ct. at 2066–68. An defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong makes it unnecessary for a court to consider the other prong. Id. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. This test is applied to claims arising under the Texas Constitution as well as those arising under the United States Constitution. Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

          Our review of defense counsel’s performance is highly deferential, beginning with the strong presumption that the attorney’s actions were reasonably professional and were motivated by sound trial strategy. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). When the record is silent as to trial counsel’s strategy, we will not conclude that defense counsel’s assistance was ineffective unless the challenged conduct was “‘so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’” Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).  

          When considering the first prong of Strickland, we must decide whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to refute the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). To this end, the Strickland standard requires Carter to rebut the presumption of adequate assistance by a preponderance of the evidence.   See Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

          The analysis we used in Carter’s first issue on appeal applies to Carter’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nothing indicates that defense counsel possessed credible information to present to the trial court regarding Carter’s incompetency to stand trial. See Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must be affirmatively supported by the record). As Carter’s brief notes, “the record . . . is bereft of any evidence of the history of [Carter’s] psychiatric illness, or of its exact nature[.]” Carter thus has not rebutted the presumption that trial counsel made her decision not to request a competency inquiry in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Gamble v. State, 916 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.). In light of these facts, we hold that the record is insufficient to show trial counsel’s performance was deficient.  

          2.       Trial Counsel’s Failure to Move to Suppress Carter’s Videotaped Confession

          Carter further complains he received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel did not move to suppress his videotaped confession on the basis that he was incompetent to give it. Again, the record lacks evidence that Carter was incompetent at the time he gave his confession and, therefore, that his counsel should have moved to suppress the confession on these grounds. At the time Carter gave his statement, he said he understood his rights, waived them, and voluntarily spoke to officers. We hold that trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress Carter’s statement on this basis appears to have been made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. See Jackson, 973 S.W.2d at 955.  

III. Conclusion

          We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to inquire into Carter’s competency to stand trial, and that counsel did not render ineffective assistance. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

                                                                        Jane Bland,

                                                                        Justice

Panel consists of Justices Taft, Jennings, and Bland.

Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).