Stephen William Kenton v. Ramiro Olvera ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                                  NO. 12-07-00411-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    TYLER, TEXAS
    STEPHEN WILLIAM KENTON,                           §           APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH
    APPELLANT
    V.                                                §           JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
    RAMIRO OLVERA,
    APPELLEE                                          §           SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This appeal concerns the amount of damages for past and future medical expenses
    attributable to an auto accident. In a bench trial, the trial court found for the plaintiff, Appellant
    Stephen Kenton, and awarded $3,000.00 for past physical pain and mental anguish, disfigurement,
    and physical impairment suffered as a result of the accident and damages for past medical expenses
    in the amount of $482.00. Kenton presents two issues on appeal. In his first issue, Kenton contends
    the trial court erred in not awarding damages for past medical expenses in the sum of $2,642.00. In
    his second issue, Kenton claims the trial court erred in not awarding $8,000.00 in future medical
    expenses despite what Kenton claims was Appellee Ramiro Olvera’s judicial admission that
    damages for future medical expenses in that amount was fair and reasonable. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    On September 7, 2002, Kenton was the driver of a Chevrolet pickup pulling a bass boat on
    a trailer. Kenton’s vehicle was stopped at an intersection on Gentry Parkway in Tyler, Texas,
    waiting for the traffic to start moving. In his rear view mirror, Kenton saw a pickup truck behind
    him, in his lane and accelerating toward the rear of his vehicle. Realizing that a collision was
    certain, Kenton pressed hard on the brake of his stopped truck with his right foot and braced himself
    for the impact. The pickup plowed into the boat and boat trailer Kenton was towing imbedding the
    boat’s propeller in its grill and knocking Kenton’s truck and trailer fifteen feet down the roadway.
    Kenton got out of his pickup and was walking back toward the other vehicle when its driver
    suddenly backed his vehicle, then sped away down a side street scattering auto parts and fluid.
    Kenton saw and immediately recorded the license number of the vehicle.
    At trial, Kenton identified Olvera as the driver of the 1990 Chevrolet pickup that had crashed
    into his boat and trailer. Olvera maintained he was in Oklahoma when the wreck occurred and could
    not have been the driver.
    Two weeks after the accident, Kenton consulted F. Corry Payne, III, M.D. complaining of
    pain inside the knee that was more severe when he had to walk, kneel, or squat. The x-rays of the
    right knee were normal. Dr. Payne determined that Kenton had sustained “a right knee jamming
    injury to the articular cartilage and subchondral bone.” At a follow up visit on October 10, 2002,
    Dr. Payne’s examination revealed a full range of motion but Grade IV crepitation or popping with
    flexion or extension. Dr. Payne scheduled an MRI examination and another visit for two weeks
    later. Kenton cancelled the MRI citing financial problems. He returned sixteen months later on
    February 16, 2004, complaining that his knee had not improved. Kenton brought an open air MRI
    study with him that had been ordered by a chiropractor he had consulted only recently. At this point,
    Dr. Payne told him that arthroscopy might be the only solution, and Kenton told him he wished to
    proceed. However, once again he did not return.
    At trial, two and one-half years later, Kenton testified that he had scheduled the operation for
    August 23, 2006. He testified that he had delayed the operation because he did not have the money
    to pay for it. Kenton scheduled the operation shortly after Dr. Payne’s deposition during which the
    doctor testified that he had not seen Kenton for two and one-half years.
    Kenton filed affidavits in compliance with Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section
    18.001 stating that the amounts charged for his medical expenses were reasonable and the services
    provided were necessary. The affidavits establish the amounts charged and services provided as
    follows:
    2
    $ 440.00                   Corry Payne, M.D.
    $ 685.00                   Accident & Injury Pain Center
    $1475.00                   White Rock Open Air MRI
    $ 42.00                    Lone Star Radiology
    Olvera filed no affidavit as provided by section 18.001 controverting the reasonableness or necessity
    of the expenses incurred.
    After the close of evidence, the trial court ordered the parties to submit findings of fact and
    conclusions of law. Kenton asked the court to find that he would need surgery to repair the damage
    to his knee from the collision. Kenton asked the court to find that $12,000.00 was a reasonable and
    necessary expense for that purpose.
    Olvera, in his proposed findings, asked the court to find that he “was not involved and
    therefore not negligent on the occasion of the collision . . . .” His proposed finding of fact 11 reads
    as follows:
    Fair and reasonable compensation for medical expenses which Stephen Kenton will, in
    reasonable probability, incur in the future as a result of the accident of September 7, 2002, in which
    Ramiro Olvera was not involved, is $8,000.00.
    The trial court found that, as a result of his injuries sustained in the car wreck, Kenton
    incurred reasonable and necessary medical expenses in the past for treatment by Dr. Payne in the sum
    of $440.00 and by Lone Star Radiology in the sum of $42.00. The trial court further found that
    Kenton would not need future medical care for injuries sustained in the wreck.
    EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF SECTION 18.001 AFFIDAVIT
    CONCERNING COST AND NECESSITY OF SERVICES
    In his first issue, Appellant complains that the trial court’s award of $482.00 for past medical
    expenses was against the great weight of the evidence because the amount of medical expenses
    proven as reasonable and necessary by uncontroverted affidavits pursuant to the Texas Civil Practice
    and Remedies Code section 18.001 amounted to $2,642.00.
    Applicable Law
    Section 18.001 provides that
    3
    [u]nless a controverting affidavit is filed as provided by this section, an affidavit that the amount a
    person charged for a service was reasonable at the time and place that the service was provided and
    that the service was necessary is sufficient evidence to support a finding of fact by judge or jury that
    the amount charged was reasonable or that the service was necessary.
    TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE ANN . § 18.001(b) (Vernon 2008). An affidavit in compliance with
    section 18.001 is sufficient to show that the medical expenses incurred were reasonable and
    necessary, but it does not establish that those damages were caused by the defendant’s negligence
    and therefore does not establish the plaintiff’s entitlement to those damages as a matter of law.
    Sloan v. Molandes, 
    32 S.W.3d 745
    , 752 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2000, no pet.); Beauchamp v.
    Hambrick, 
    901 S.W.2d 747
    , 749 (Tex. App.–Eastland 1995, no writ).
    A trial court’s findings of fact and a jury’s verdict are reviewed for factual sufficiency of the
    evidence by the same legal standard. Ortiz v. Jones, 
    917 S.W.2d 770
    , 772 (Tex. 1996). In reviewing
    factual sufficiency, the court of appeals must weigh all the evidence. 
    Id. “Findings may
    be
    overturned only if they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be
    clearly wrong and unjust.” 
    Id. In a
    bench trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of
    the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Texas W. Oil & Gas Corp. v. El Paso Gas
    Trans. Co., 
    631 S.W.2d 521
    , 524 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The trial court may
    accept or reject any witness’s testimony in whole or in part. 
    Id. Discussion Kenton
    argues that there was absolutely no testimony that the treatment received from all the
    providers was for anything but for injuries caused by the collision. He further points out that there
    was no controverting affidavit filed challenging the reasonableness of or the necessity for those
    services.
    In his deposition testimony, Dr. Payne testified without objection that he could not think of
    any reason to see a chiropractor for a knee injury. In his testimony, Dr. Payne also indicated that the
    open air MRI performed by White Rock Open Air MRI was valueless as a diagnostic aid. Dr. Payne
    had at the outset recommended an enclosed MRI. Therefore, there was evidence in the record,
    admitted without objection, that Kenton’s expenses incurred at Accident and Injury Pain Center
    ($685.00) and White Rock Open Air MRI ($1,475.00) were neither reasonable nor necessary. Upon
    the submission of affidavits in compliance with section 18.001 attesting to the reasonableness and
    4
    necessity of medical expenses, the statute provides for the exclusion of evidence to the contrary, in
    the absence of a properly filed controverting affidavit. Hong v. Bennett, 
    209 S.W.3d 795
    , 800 (Tex.
    App.–Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). An uncontroverted section 18.001 affidavit provides legally
    sufficient but not conclusive evidence to support a finding that the amount charged for a service was
    reasonable and the service necessary. 
    Id. The affidavits
    of the reasonableness of and necessity for Kenton’s medical expenses were
    not conclusive. The trial court was justified in inferring from Dr. Payne’s testimony that the
    expenses Kenton incurred at the Accident and Injury Pain Center and White Rock Open Air MRI
    were, in fact, not reasonable and unnecessary for his treatment. The trial court’s finding was not
    against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Kenton’s first issue is overruled.
    JUDICIAL ADMISSION
    In his second issue, Kenton complains that the trial court erred in refusing to give effect to
    Olvera’s proposed finding of fact number 11 as a judicial admission that Kenton would require
    future medical expenses in the amount of $8,000.00.
    Applicable Law
    The elements required for a judicial admission are (1) a statement made during the course
    of a judicial proceeding, (2) that is contrary to an essential fact or defense asserted by the person
    making the admission, (3) that is deliberate, clear, and unequivocal, (4) that, if given conclusive
    effect, would be consistent with public policy, and (5) that is not destructive of the opposing party’s
    theory of recovery. Laredo Med. Group Corp. v. Mireles, 
    155 S.W.3d 417
    , 429 (Tex. App.–San
    Antonio 2004, writ denied).
    Discussion
    Kenton characterizes as a judicial admission Olvera’s proposed finding of fact number 11
    that “[f]air and reasonable compensation for medical expenses which Stephen Kenton will, in
    reasonable probability, incur in the future as a result of the accident of September 7, 2002, in which
    Ramiro Olvera was not involved, is $8,000.00.” (Emphasis added.).
    Like Olvera’s other proposed findings, the finding in question, if adopted, would have been
    entirely destructive of Kenton’s recovery. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to give
    5
    effect to the proposed finding as a judicial admission that Kenton would require $8,000.00 in future
    medical expenses. Appellant’s second issue is overruled.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    BILL BASS
    Justice
    Opinion delivered April 30, 2009.
    Panel consisted of Worthen. C.J., Hoyle, J., and Bass, Retired Justice, Twelfth Court of Appeals, Tyler, sitting by assignment.
    (PUBLISH)
    6