Brazos Valley MHMR v. Gena Taylor ( 2009 )


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  •                                      IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-08-00323-CV
    BRAZOS VALLEY MHMR,
    Appellant
    v.
    GENA TAYLOR,
    Appellee
    From the 361st District Court
    Brazos County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 07-003212-CV-361
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Brazos Valley MHMR filed this interlocutory appeal, contending that the trial
    court erred in refusing to grant its plea to the jurisdiction. We will dismiss the appeal
    for want of jurisdiction.
    Appellate courts have jurisdiction over immediate appeals of interlocutory
    orders only if expressly provided by statute. Stary v. DeBord, 
    967 S.W.2d 352
    , 352-53
    (Tex. 1998). Because the statute authorizing interlocutory appeals is a narrow exception
    to the general rule that only final judgments and orders are appealable, it must be given
    a strict construction. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 
    8 S.W.3d 727
    , 730 (Tex.
    App.—Austin 1999, no pet.).
    Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides for an
    interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction by a
    governmental unit. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon 2008).
    Brazos Valley MHMR argues that the order from which it appeals is effectively a denial
    of its plea to the jurisdiction and is thus appealable under section 51.014(a)(8).1 Even
    assuming that an “effective denial” of a plea to the jurisdiction is appealable under
    section 51.014(a)(8), our review of the record reveals that the trial court did not
    effectively deny Brazos Valley MHMR’s plea to the jurisdiction. Instead, the trial court
    granted a continuance to allow Taylor discovery on the specific issue of jurisdiction
    before ruling on the plea.2 Thus, there is no order denying Brazos Valley MHMR’s plea
    1
    The order provides: (1) Brazos Valley MHMR’s “Plea to the Jurisdiction and Conditional Motion
    for Severance is continued until such time as Plaintiff has had an opportunity to conduct discovery with
    regards to the issue of whether [Brazos Valley MHMR] had notice of a claim being made against them by
    Plaintiff,” (2) “Plaintiff may depose the insurance adjuster(s) and/or defendant company
    representative(s) involved in investigating and handling this claim,” (3) a copy of the entire claims file
    must be delivered to the court for an in camera inspection to determine what documentation in the file
    might be privileged, and (4) the court will provide Plaintiff with a copy of the entire claims file, excluding
    any privileged documents, in order for Plaintiff to discover any evidence with regard to whether Brazos
    Valley MHMR had notice of a claim being presented to it and for Plaintiff to determine the identity of the
    proper individual(s) to depose as to the issue of notice.
    2        Brazos Valley MHMR cites the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Helton v. Clements, 
    787 F.2d 1016
    (5th Cir.
    1986), to support its argument that a trial court’s refusal to rule on a plea constitutes a denial of the plea
    and is thus appealable. In Helton, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the defenses of
    absolute and qualified immunity. Subsequently, the district court ordered: “[A]ll parties and attorneys
    are here notified that any further motions in this case will not be ruled upon by the court prior to trial but
    will be carried along with the trial of the case on the merits. The ruling applies to any pending motions. .
    . .” The defendants appealed, challenging the trial court’s refusal to rule on their motion to dismiss until
    trial. In addressing the order’s appealability, the Fifth Circuit held that an order that declines or refuses
    to rule on a motion to dismiss on the basis of a claim of immunity “is an appealable ‘final decision’ within
    the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” 
    Id. at 1017.
    The order
    Brazos Valley MHMR v. Taylor                                                                           Page 2
    to the jurisdiction from which it may appeal. Furthermore, neither a discovery order
    nor an order granting a continuance is an interlocutory order subject to immediate
    appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a); Pelt v. State Bd. of Ins., 
    802 S.W.2d 822
    , 827 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ).
    For these reasons, we dismiss this interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction.3
    In addition, although requested by Taylor, we decline to assess sanctions against Brazos
    Valley MHMR for bringing a frivolous appeal.
    REX D. DAVIS
    Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Reyna, and
    Justice Davis
    Appeal dismissed
    Opinion delivered and filed May 13, 2009
    [CV06]
    in this case is distinguishable, however. In this case, the trial court did not refuse to rule on Brazos Valley
    MHMR’s plea until trial; rather, it only continued the plea to allow Taylor discovery on the specific issue
    of jurisdiction. Respectfully, federal authority is also not controlling or persuasive in this cause.
    3     Brazos Valley MHMR requests in the alternative that we construe its brief as a petition for writ of
    mandamus, but no authority on point supports this request.
    Brazos Valley MHMR v. Taylor                                                                            Page 3