in Re William Carroll Robertson and Lester Eugene Robertson ( 2009 )


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  •                                  IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-09-00005-CV
    IN RE WILLIAM CARROLL ROBERTSON
    AND LESTER EUGENE ROBERTSON
    Original Proceeding
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In a prior proceeding, we were asked to decide certain issues. We did. We
    issued an opinion. In that opinion we decided only the specific issues presented to us by
    the parties then before us. We issued a judgment. Review was sought but denied. We
    issued our mandate.
    The trial court has now allowed a new party to intervene in the proceeding in the
    lower court. The trial court has abated the proceeding until more parties are added to
    the proceeding in the lower court. The trial court has stayed the execution of the
    judgment.
    We are now asked to compel the trial court to set aside these orders and enforce
    our mandate.
    Background facts
    William Hix owns property on Hog Creek, down-stream from property owned
    by the Robertsons.
    A soil conservation flood-retarding dam was built on Hix’s property, creating a
    lake of approximately 100 total surface acres, 90 of which are above real property, the
    dirt, owned by Hix and approximately 10 of which are above real property owned by
    the Robertsons and others.
    The Robertsons sought a declaratory judgment that Hog Creek was navigable at
    the area where the lake was constructed. According to the Robertsons, upon such a
    determination the lake waters would be owned by the State for the benefit of the public;
    and therefore, the Robertsons, as members of the public, would be entitled to use the
    water for recreation or sport.
    In the prior proceeding, the trial court so held and we modified the judgment
    and affirmed the trial court’s judgment as modified. Hix v. Robertson, 
    211 S.W.3d 423
    (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. denied). The Texas Supreme Court denied further review.
    Hix v. Robertson, No. 06-1119, 2007 Tex. LEXIS 1139 (Tex. Dec. 21, 2007) (rh’g denied May
    18, 2008).
    Our mandate issued July 25, 2008.
    Procedures Since the Mandate
    Since our mandate issued,
    1.         Coryell County moved to intervene.
    2.         Hix moved to abate the proceeding.
    In re Robertson                                                                    Page 2
    3.         Coryell County moved to abate the proceeding.
    4.         Hix moved to stay execution of the trial court’s judgment.
    5.         The trial court determined that the prior judgment was not final and
    granted all four motions.
    By mandamus, the Robertsons bring four issues which assert the trial court erred
    in its determination that the trial court’s judgment was not final and granting the
    motions listed above. They request that we compel the trial court to comply with this
    Court’s mandate.
    Did The Tenth Court of Appeals Have Jurisdiction?
    What happens if an order/judgment is truly interlocutory but is appealed? What
    happens if no one challenges the appellate court’s jurisdiction to decide an appeal that
    is interlocutory? What happens if the order/judgment was erroneously intended to be
    final but the error is not presented to the court of appeals and that error is, therefore,
    not reviewed and decided on appeal?
    This Court proceeded to review the issues presented in the prior proceeding
    which did not include an allegation or issue on the final nature of the trial court
    judgment. The question now presented by this mandamus proceeding is whether the
    conclusion was correct, and if it was not correct, then what is the effect on this Court’s
    judgment?
    In Lehmann v. Har-Con, the Texas Supreme Court gave the appellate courts a test
    to use to determine when a judgment is final for the purposes of appeal. Lehmann v.
    Har-Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    (Tex. 2001). The opinion discusses two alternate tests for
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    determining the finality of a judgment. The first test is that a judgment is not final
    unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party. 
    Id. at 205.
    The second test
    is that a judgment is not final unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally
    disposes of all claims and all parties. 
    Id. Restated, to
    meet this second test for finality,
    there must be some other clear indication in the judgment that the trial court intended
    the judgment to completely dispose of the entire case. 
    Id. The Robertsons
    argue that the judgment in this case meets Lehmann’s first test.
    We disagree. The judgment leaves serious questions about whether claims by one
    plaintiff, whether claims against one defendant, and whether at least one counterclaim
    by another defendant, were actually resolved by the judgment.
    The judgment does, however, meet the second test for finality as that test was
    restated in Lehmann—that there is a clear indication the trial court intended the
    judgment to completely dispose of the entire case. The portion of the judgment that
    meets the second test is as follows:
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the injunctions herein granted will
    become effective 30 days after this judgment is signed unless Defendants
    perfect an appeal to the Court of Appeals within that 30-day period. In
    the event that Defendants perfect an appeal within 30 days of the date this
    judgment is signed, the injunction will become effective 30 days after the
    date the appeal is dismissed, or 30 days after the date the Court of Appeals
    renders its judgment, whichever event occurs earlier. If an appeal is taken
    to the Supreme Court of Texas, the injunctions will not go into effect until
    30 days after a mandate is issued, if the Defendants are unsuccessful in the
    appeal.
    Because the trial court provided for the consequences of an appeal and how that appeal
    would impact the effective implementation date of the permanent injunction, it is clear
    In re Robertson                                                                       Page 4
    the trial court intended the judgment to completely dispose of the entire case.
    Accordingly, the order was final, erroneously final because it did not actually dispose of
    all the parties and claims, but final for the purposes of appeal; and we therefore had
    jurisdiction to decide the issues presented on appeal. 
    Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200
    .
    Mandamus and the Enforceability of Our Mandate
    When the trial court clerk receives the mandate from the appellate court, the
    appellate court's judgment must then be enforced. TEX. R. APP. P. 51.1(b). A district
    court has no discretion to interpret or review an appellate court's mandate or judgment.
    In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P'ship, 
    157 S.W.3d 524
    , 527 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, orig.
    proceeding); Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 
    824 S.W.2d 254
    , 255 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    1992, writ dism’d woj); Schliemann v. Garcia, 
    685 S.W.2d 690
    , 692 (Tex. App.—San
    Antonio 1984, orig. proceeding). A trial court's failure or refusal to comply with a court
    of appeals mandate is an abuse of discretion. Lee v. Downey, 
    842 S.W.2d 646
    , 648 (Tex.
    1992). Further, a writ of mandamus will issue to compel compliance with the mandate
    of an appellate court. 
    Schliemann, 685 S.W.2d at 692
    ; accord Wells v. Littlefield, 
    62 Tex. 28
    ,
    31 (1884).
    Instead of enforcing our judgment when it received our mandate, the trial court,
    upon Hix’s motion, stayed the execution of the judgment. By staying the enforcement
    of the judgment, the trial court refused to comply with our mandate. The trial court
    had no discretion to refuse to enforce the mandate of this Court.
    Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is granted. A writ will issue
    only if the trial court does not withdraw the portion of its order signed December 9,
    In re Robertson                                                                         Page 5
    2008 that stayed the execution of the trial court’s judgment, as modified and affirmed
    by the judgment of this Court, within 30 days from the date of this opinion.1
    TOM GRAY
    Chief Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Reyna, and
    Justice Davis
    Petition granted
    Opinion delivered and filed April 15, 2009
    [OT06]
    1 We need not review the other issues presented to us by this mandamus, so we do not decide them.
    Further, while there was some discussion both in the briefs of the parties and at oral argument of the
    meaning and scope of certain terms or provisions of the trial court’s judgment that was affirmed as
    modified by our judgment, we have not been asked and we do not express or imply any construction,
    interpretation, or meaning of, including a determination of who might be bound by, the trial court’s
    judgment which we affirmed as modified.
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