Joe Alfred Izen, Jr. Ray Edwards And Bonnie Edwards v. Kenneth E. Ryals, Trustee of the East Texas Investments Trust ( 2019 )


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  • Appeal Dismissed in Part, Affirmed, and Memorandum Opinion filed April 18,
    2019.
    In the
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-17-00431-CV
    JOE ALFRED IZEN, JR.; RAY EDWARDS; AND BONNIE EDWARDS,
    Appellants
    v.
    KENNETH E. RYALS, TRUSTEE OF THE EAST TEXAS INVESTMENTS
    TRUST, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 55th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2014-43610A
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This is a dispute over real estate. The trial court granted summary judgment
    in favor of appellee Kenneth E. Ryals, Trustee of the East Texas Investments Trust
    (the “Trust”), and declared that as between the Trust and appellant Joe Alfred Izen,
    Jr., the Trust owned the property. The trial court later severed the Trust’s title and
    declaratory-judgment claims against Izen and made the summary judgment final and
    appealable. Izen’s primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by granting
    summary judgment in favor of the Trust.
    Because there is no final, appealable judgment for our review as to appellants
    Ray Edwards and Bonnie Edwards, we dismiss their interlocutory appeal. We
    overrule Izen’s issues1 and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    This case involves an approximately 3.4-acre tract of land along the Eastex
    Freeway in Houston (the “property”). The Trust acquired title to the property by
    general warranty deed in 2002. This property was at issue in two prior suits, one in
    2004 in Harris County Civil Court of Law No. 1 and one in 2007 in the 55th District
    Court of Harris County. Both cases resulted in final judgments in which the Trust
    was adjudicated to be the title owner of the property. In both cases, Izen was the
    attorney who represented the Trust. The 2007 case was captioned: “No. 2007-63116,
    Lisa       Ogden,   Steven     Gayle,      and       Wayne    Westbrook,       Plaintiffs    and
    Counter-Defendants vs. Kenneth Ryals as Managing Trustee of East Texas
    Investment[s] Trust, Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff.” In pertinent part, the final
    judgment in the 2007 case, signed July 29, 2010, ordered that:
     Ryals, as trustee for the Trust, have and recover title in fee simple
    to the real estate against and from Ogden, W. Westbrook, and
    Gayle who take nothing on their claim for trespass to try title;
     Ryals, as trustee for the Trust, recover reimbursement of
    $160,000 from the Trust for attorney’s fees owed to Izen for
    various legal services performed for the Trust;
     Ryals, as trustee for the Trust, recover reimbursement of $8,000
    1
    We lack jurisdiction to review Izen’s issue relating to the trial court’s granting of the
    Trust’s motion to expunge notice of lis pendens and for temporary injunction.
    2
    from the Trust for ad valorem taxes he paid and advanced for the
    benefit of the Trust;
     Ryals, as trustee for the Trust, have and recover against Ogden,
    W. Westbrook, and Gayle attorney’s fees owed to Izen for
    services performed for the Trust in this case in the amount of
    $60,000;
     the real estate awarded to the Trust by this judgment be sold at
    public auction;
     Ryals pay Izen $160,000 and reimburse Ryals $8,000 out of the
    first proceeds of such sale after payment of the sale costs; and
     Ryals, as trustee for the Trust, have all writs, including writs of
    execution and possession, necessary for the enforcement of the
    judgment.
    In 2012, this court affirmed the July 2010 final judgment. Ogden v. Ryals, No.
    14-10-01052-CV, 
    2012 WL 3016856
    , at *1, *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    July 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Izen also represented the Trust in that appeal.
    In April 2013, Izen filed for the issuance of a writ of execution. On June 4,
    2013, the Harris County Precinct One constable held a sale of the property under the
    writ of execution. Izen was the successful bidder and received a constable’s deed
    dated October 28, 2013, and filed November 21, 2013. The constable’s deed states
    in pertinent part:
    On . . . the 4th day of June, 2013 . . . , I sold said hereinafter
    described land and premises at public venue . . . , and the premises
    hereinafter described were sold to JOE ALFRED IZEN for the bid of
    Two Hundred Forth Thousand and No/100($240,000.00), Dollars . . . .
    . . . I . . . have granted, sold and conveyed, and by these presents
    do grant, sell and convey unto the said JOE ALFRED IZEN all of the
    estate, right, title and interest which the said LISA OGDEN, WAYNE
    WESTBROOK, AND STEVEN GAYLE had of, in and to the
    following land . . . .
    In 2014, CIG DT Holding, LLC, a cell phone tower company (the “Cell
    3
    Tower”), brought an interpleader suit against Izen and the Trust, alleging that the
    Cell Tower was leasing a portion of the property and that both Izen and the Trust
    had demanded the Cell Tower make the 2014 annual rent payment to them. The Cell
    Tower requested that the trial court allow the rent to be paid into the court’s registry.
    The Trust asserted counterclaims against the Cell Tower for recovery of rent,
    possession of the tract, declaratory relief canceling the lease or determining rights
    and obligations under the lease, and attorney’s fees. The Trust alleged that Izen
    represented to the Cell Tower and Ray Edwards and Bonnie Edwards2 that he is the
    owner of the property, collected rent from the Edwardses, and attempted to collect
    rent from the Cell Tower. The Trust asserted cross-claims against Izen for an
    accounting of rent collected, recovery of rent, declaratory relief canceling any lease,
    and attorney’s fees. The Trust also asserted cross-claims against Izen for trespass to
    try title, breach of fiduciary duty, cancellation of the constable’s deed, disgorgement
    of fees, and slander of title. The Trust alleged that the Edwardses were using and
    occupying the land without paying rent to the Trust. The Trust brought third-party
    claims against the Edwardses for recovery of rent, possession of the tract, declaratory
    relief canceling any lease, and attorney’s fees.
    Izen asserted cross-claims against the Trust and third-party claims against
    Ryals individually for breach of contract, malicious prosecution, declaratory relief
    regarding the invalidity of a $25,000 lien asserted by Ryals on the property,
    defamation, and confirmation of the constable’s sale and deed.
    The Edwardses asserted a third-party claim against the Trust for filing
    frivolous claims and sought attorney’s fees as sanctions.
    The case initially proceeded in the 80th District Court of Harris County and
    2
    The record consistently refers to the Edwardses as “d/b/a Big Man Diesel.”
    4
    was transferred to the 55th District Court by agreed order signed February 25, 2016.
    In April 2016, the Trust filed a traditional motion for partial summary
    judgment on “its trespass to try title and to quiet title claims”3 against Izen. The Trust
    argued that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because it could
    conclusively prove there were no genuine issues of material fact as to all the
    elements of its claims. The Trust further requested that the trial court declare the
    Trust the owner of the property and declare Izen’s constable’s deed invalid.
    Izen and the Edwardses filed a response, a traditional cross-motion for partial
    summary judgment, and a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Izen and the
    Edwardses also filed a plea to the jurisdiction.
    The trial court initially signed an order granting the Trust’s traditional motion
    for partial summary judgment on June 6, 2016.4 On June 6, 2016, the trial court
    signed an order denying Izen’s and the Edwardses’ traditional cross-motion for
    partial summary judgment and no-evidence motion for summary judgment.5 The
    Trust filed a motion to modify to correct two typographical errors in the June 6 order
    granting its traditional motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted
    the motion to modify, set aside the summary judgment signed on June 6, and entered
    an amended order. In its amended order signed July 25, 2016, the trial court stated
    that the Trust asked the court to grant summary judgment on its trespass-to-try-title
    and quiet-title claims against Izen. The trial court granted the Trust’s traditional
    3
    A suit to quiet title and a trespass-to-try-title claim are both actions to recover possession
    of land unlawfully withheld; a quiet-title suit is an equitable remedy and a trespass-to-try-title suit
    is a legal remedy afforded by statute. See Lance v. Robinson, 
    543 S.W.3d 723
    , 738–39 (Tex. 2018)
    (citing Cameron Cty. v. Tompkins, 
    422 S.W.3d 789
    , 797 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, pet.
    denied)).
    4
    This order is not in the record. The record also does not contain a transcript from the
    summary-judgment hearing held on June 6, 2016.
    5
    This order also is not in the record.
    5
    motion for partial summary judgment. In doing so, the trial court expressly stated
    that “[a]s between [the Trust] and Izen, [the Trust] is the owner of the Property” and
    “[t]he Constable’s Deed is set aside.” That same day, the trial court signed an order
    denying Izen’s and the Edwardses’ plea to the jurisdiction.
    The Trust filed a motion for severance of the partial summary judgment,
    which the trial court granted by order signed March 1, 2017. Specifically, the trial
    court severed out “[the Trust]’s causes of action for declaratory judgment and in
    trespass to try title brought against . . . Izen” into cause no. 2014-43610-A, and
    styled, “East Texas Investments Trust v. Joe Alfred Izen, Jr.” The trial court did not
    sever out any other parties or claims. The trial court specifically ordered that the
    amended summary judgment signed on July 25, 2016, was now a final judgment and
    was appealable.6
    Izen and the Edwardses filed their original motion for new trial on March 31,
    2017, which motion was overruled by operation of law as of May 15, 2017. See Tex.
    R. Civ. P. 306a(1), 329b(a), (c). Izen and the Edwardses filed their notice of appeal
    on May 30, 2017. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(1). In their notice of appeal from cause
    no. 2014-43610-A, Izen and the Edwardses stated they:
    desire to appeal the Order for Severance[7] and the Final Judgment of
    this Court entered on the 1st day of March, 2017, against the
    Defendants, Joe Alfred Izen, Jr., and Ray Edwards and Bonnie Edwards
    d/b/a Big Man Diesel, and in favor of Cross-Plaintiff, Kenneth Ryals,
    Trustee of the [the Trust], severing Cause No. 2014-43610 severing
    [sic] certain cause of action into Cause No. 2014-43160A and entering
    6
    Also, on March 1, 2017, the trial court signed a severance order granting a motion for
    severance filed by CIG Comp Tower, LLC. The trial court ordered that the clerk create a new
    lawsuit with cause no. 2014-43610B, and styled, “CIG Comp Tower, LLC vs. Joe Alfred Izen, Jr.,
    and Kenneth Ryals, as Trustee of the East Texas Investment[s] Trust.” The appeal Izen filed in
    that case has been abated pending the disposition in this appeal.
    7
    Izen and the Edwardses do not raise any issue on appeal challenging the trial court’s
    granting of the Trust’s motion to sever.
    6
    Final Judgment to the Court of Appeals.
    II.   THE EDWARDSES’ APPEAL
    The record reflects that claims involving the Edwardses were still pending at
    the time of the severance order. Nothing in the amended summary judgment or the
    severance order (1) unequivocally expresses an intent to finally dispose of the entire
    case or (2) effects an actual disposition of all parties and claims remaining in the
    case at the time the order was signed. See Lentino v. Frost Nat’l Bank, 
    159 S.W.3d 651
    , 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). The severance order only
    severs the Trust’s declaratory-judgment and title claims against Izen and specifically
    makes only the amended summary judgment a final judgment.
    On March 27, 2019, notification was transmitted to all parties of the court’s
    intent to dismiss the Edwardses’ appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P.
    42.3(a). Izen’s and the Edwardses’ response has not shown that this court has
    jurisdiction to hear the Edwardses’ appeal. Because there is no final judgment from
    which Ray Edwards and Bonnie Edwards may take an appeal, see Lehmann v. Har-
    Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 195 (Tex. 2001), we dismiss the Edwardses’ appeal for
    lack of jurisdiction.
    III.    ANALYSIS IN IZEN’S APPEAL
    Izen brings five issues. First, he challenges the trial court’s grant of the Trust’s
    traditional motion for partial summary judgment and the denial of Izen’s traditional
    cross-motion for partial summary judgment and no-evidence summary-judgment
    motion. Second, Izen challenges the trial court’s denial of his plea to the jurisdiction.
    Third, Izen attacks the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial. Fourth, he
    challenges the trial court’s actions in expunging notices of lis pendens filed by Izen
    and entering an injunction against him without requiring the Trust to post a bond.
    And fifth, Izen contends that a May 2018 federal-court jury verdict and final
    7
    judgment established Izen’s rights as a mortgagee in possession based on res judicata
    and collateral estoppel.
    A. Subject-matter jurisdiction over the Trust’s claims
    We initially address issue two, as it challenges subject-matter jurisdiction,
    which is never presumed and cannot be waived. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air
    Control Bd., 
    852 S.W.2d 440
    , 443–44, 445 (Tex. 1993). “Whether the trial court has
    subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.” Appraisal
    Review Bd. of Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Spencer Square Ltd, 
    252 S.W.3d 842
    ,
    844 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). We conclude that the trial
    court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Trust’s claims.
    Izen does not dispute, and Texas law supports, that the trial court, as a district
    court, properly would have subject-matter jurisdiction over the Trust’s title and
    declaratory-judgment claims.8 However, Izen contends the Trust’s claims were
    “crooked maneuverings” that constituted “an impermissible collateral attack on the
    mandatory terms of the [July 2010] Final Judgment.” The Trust responds that it filed
    its claims to settle “the question of whether [the Trust] or Izen had title,” not to attack
    8
    See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 (district court has exclusive, original jurisdiction of “all actions,
    proceedings, and remedies,” except when constitution or other law confers jurisdiction on some
    other court); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.007 (“The district court has the jurisdiction provided by
    Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution.”); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 22.001–.045
    (governing trespass-to-try-title actions); Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 
    417 S.W.3d 909
    , 918–19 (Tex. 2013) (party may sue in district court to obtain adjudication of its title);
    Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Tr., 
    354 S.W.3d 384
    , 389 (Tex. 2011) (“Generally, a
    trespass to try title claim is the exclusive method in Texas for adjudicating disputed claims of title
    to real property.”); Meekins v. Wisnoski, 
    404 S.W.3d 690
    , 694–97 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (substance of plaintiff’s claim was trespass-to-try-title action rather than
    declaratory-judgment action when claim required determination of who, after sale by receiver of
    estate property, had title to portion of property); Inman v. Orndorff, 
    596 S.W.2d 236
    , 238–39 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ) (“The trial court had jurisdiction of the cause of action
    seeking to set aside the constable’s deed as a cloud on [plaintiff’s] title.”); see generally 
    Lance, 543 S.W.3d at 738
    (“We have never addressed the nuanced differences between quiet-title claims,
    trespass-to-try-title claims, and modern declaratory-judgment claims in any real depth.”).
    8
    the July 2010 final judgment, and that its claims were based on events occurring
    after the July 2010 final judgment.
    Our review of the Trust’s live pleading (second amended cross-action against
    Izen) does not reveal that the Trust sought to “avoid the binding force” of any portion
    of the July 2010 final judgment. See Browning v. Prostok, 
    165 S.W.3d 336
    , 346
    (Tex. 2005) (defining collateral attack as “an attempt to avoid the binding force of a
    judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or
    vacating the judgment, but in order to obtain some specific relief which the judgment
    currently stands as a bar against”). Regarding the July 2010 final judgment, the Trust
    alleged: “By final judgment in that suit, Ryals, as trustee, was, again, adjudicated the
    fee simple title owner of the tract. That judgment is valid, subsisting.” Therefore, the
    Trust did not seek to collaterally attack the July 2010 final judgment.9
    Izen also argues that the trial court was not “free to enter a modified summary
    judgment which rewrote the terms” of the July 2010 final judgment. He contends
    that the terms were binding on the trial court and the court’s “refusal to enforce those
    terms was a gross abuse of discretion.” Izen does not otherwise describe or explain
    what terms the trial court allegedly rewrote and refused to enforce. Our review of
    the amended summary judgment does not reveal that the trial court rewrote or
    refused to enforce the July 2010 final judgment.10
    We overrule Izen’s second issue.
    9
    Izen cites cases for the proposition that one who accepts the fruits of a judgment is
    estopped from asserting its invalidity. See Marshall v. Lockhead, 
    245 S.W.2d 307
    , 308 (Tex.
    App.—Waco 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Mueller v. Banks, 
    332 S.W.2d 783
    , 786 (Tex. App.—San
    Antonio 1960, no writ). Such cases are distinguishable; the Trust did not allege that the July 2010
    final judgment was invalid, but instead was “valid” and “subsisting.”
    10
    The case on which Izen relies does not persuade us otherwise. See Lone Star Cement
    Corp. v. Fair, 
    467 S.W.2d 402
    , 406 (Tex. 1971) (orig. proceeding) (determining judgment nunc
    pro tunc corrected judicial errors in prior judgment and therefore was void).
    9
    B. Summary judgment in favor of the Trust
    In his first issue, Izen argues that the trial court erred “when it denied [his]
    cross-motion(s) for traditional and no evidence motion for summary judgment and
    granted [the Trust’s] motion for summary judgment.” The trial court’s severance
    order did not sever Izen’s cross-claims against the Trust and Ryals into the separate
    cause or finally dispose of such claims. The amended summary judgment made final
    and appealable by the severance order does not state that the trial court considered
    Izen’s traditional cross-motion for partial summary judgment and no-evidence
    motion for summary judgment; rather, it states that the trial court considered the
    Trust’s traditional motion for partial summary judgment filed on April 26, 2016,
    “together with the response, summary judgment evidence and oral argument.” Nor
    does the severance order state that any order by the trial court denying Izen’s
    summary-judgment motions was now made a final judgment and appealable. On this
    record, we cannot conclude that the trial court ruled on competing motions for
    summary judgment. See Novak v. Stevens, 
    596 S.W.2d 848
    , 849 (Tex. 1980)
    (interlocutory denial of summary-judgment motion is not appealable unless parties
    file competing summary judgments). Therefore, we may not review the denial of
    Izen’s motions, and we limit our review to the arguments Izen raised in response to
    the Trust’s summary-judgment motion.
    1. The Trust conclusively established its claims.
    In its traditional motion for partial summary judgment, the Trust argued that
    it had sufficient evidence to conclusively prove each element of its claims for
    trespass to try title and quiet title. According to the Trust, it was entitled to summary
    judgment on its “claim to title to the real property and to declare Izen’s Constable’s
    deed invalid.” We first consider whether the Trust conclusively proved all essential
    elements of its claims to establish its right to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex.
    
    10 Rawle Civ
    . P. 166a(c).
    To prove a trespass-to-try-title claim, a plaintiff must establish one of the
    following: (1) a regular chain of conveyances from the sovereign; (2) a superior title
    from a common source; (3) title by limitations; or (4) title by prior possession that
    was not abandoned. Martin v. Amerman, 
    133 S.W.3d 262
    , 265 (Tex. 2004); see
    generally Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 22.001. The plaintiff need only establish one of
    the four accepted methods to recover. See Kennedy Con., Inc. v. Forman, 
    316 S.W.3d 129
    , 138 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). To prevail in a
    trespass-to-try-title action, the plaintiff must prove the strength of his own title and
    not the weakness of the defendant’s title. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 
    884 S.W.2d 763
    , 768 (Tex. 1994). In its summary-judgment motion, the Trust argued that it
    conclusively proved both (1) a regular chain of conveyances from the sovereign and
    (2) superior title from a common source. We conclude that the Trust established its
    right to title by proving superior title from a common source.
    A plaintiff seeking summary judgment on his suit to quiet title must prove:
    (1) he has a right of ownership and (2) the adverse claim is a cloud on the title that
    equity will remove. Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 
    371 S.W.3d 366
    , 388 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). Such a claim relies on the invalidity
    of the opposing party’s claim to the property. 
    Id. A cloud
    on title that equity will
    remove exists when a claim or encumbrance is shown, which on its face, if valid,
    would affect or impair the title of the property owner. 
    Id. The effect
    of a suit to quiet
    title is to declare invalid or ineffective the defendant’s claim to title. 
    Id. Superior title
    from a common source. To prevail on a claim of superior title
    out of a common source, the plaintiff must show a complete chain of title for its
    claim from the common source, connect the defendant’s title to the same source,
    and, in the process, show the superiority of its claim to the defendant’s. Dames v.
    11
    Strong, 
    659 S.W.2d 127
    , 131 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
    Generally, the holder of older title from a common source holds superior title, unless
    a holder of later title shows that he acquired title as a bona fide purchaser for value
    and without notice of an earlier existing interest. Wells v. Kan. Univ. Endowment
    Ass’n, 
    825 S.W.2d 483
    , 486 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
    The Trust asserted that it had superior title based on the July 2010 final judgment.
    The Trust argued that any possible claim or cloud of title to the property held by
    defendants Ogden, W. Westbrook, and Gayle was judicially removed by the July
    2010 final judgment, which decreed that Ryals, as trustee for the Trust, have and
    recover “title in fee simple” to the property against and from Ogden, W. Westbrook,
    and Gayle, and that Ogden, W. Westbrook, and Gayle take nothing on their
    trespass-to-try-title claims.
    The Trust contended that based on the July 2010 final judgment at the time of
    the constable’s sale in June 2013, Ogden, W. Westbrook, and Gayle did not own any
    interest in the property. Because the July 2010 final judgment vested title in fee
    simple in the Trust and predated the constable’s sale, the Trust argued that its title
    was superior to Izen’s purported title. See Diversified, Inc. v. Hall, 
    23 S.W.3d 403
    ,
    406 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (“Generally, the earlier title
    emanating from a common source is better title and superior to others.”); see also
    Longoria v. Lasater, 
    292 S.W.3d 156
    , 165 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet.
    denied) (op. on reh’g) (“‘Perfect title’ means fee simple title, or ‘a title that does not
    disclose a patent defect that may require a lawsuit to defend it . . . title that is good
    both at law and in equity.’”); Fee Simple, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
    (“An interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law,
    endures until the current holder dies without heirs”).
    The Trust asserted that the constable’s deed relied on by Izen amounted to a
    12
    quitclaim deed. See Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P’ship I-E v. Newton Corp., 
    161 S.W.3d 482
    , 486 (Tex. 2005) (“In deciding whether an instrument is a quitclaim
    deed, courts look to whether the language of the instrument, taken as a whole,
    conveyed property itself or merely the grantor’s rights.”); 
    Hall, 23 S.W.3d at 407
    (“A quitclaim deed conveys any title, interest, or claim of the grantor, but it does not
    profess that the title is valid nor does it contain any warrant or covenants of title.”).
    We agree. The language of the constable’s deed conveyed “all of the estate, right,
    title and interest which the said LISA OGDEN, WAYNE WESTBROOK, AND
    STEVEN GAYLE had of, in and to the following land premises, viz: . . .” and did
    not warrant that title was valid. See 
    Hall, 23 S.W.3d at 407
    (constable’s deed
    conveying “all of the estate, right, title and interest which the said [judgment debtor]
    had” and that did not contain any covenant of warranty found to be quitclaim deed).
    Because the constable’s deed was a quitclaim deed, the Trust argued that Izen
    was not a bona fide purchaser and could not show superior title. See Madison v.
    Gordon, 
    39 S.W.3d 604
    , 606 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (“Status as a bona fide
    purchaser is an affirmative defense to a title dispute.”); 
    Hall, 23 S.W.3d at 407
    (“As
    the purchaser of a quitclaim deed, Diversified cannot enjoy the protections afforded
    a bona fide purchaser, because a grantee in a quitclaim deed is not an innocent
    purchaser without notice.”). We again agree. Izen in the constable’s deed received
    only what interests Ogden, W. Westbrook, and Gayle had in the property, which
    were no interests. And as the purchaser of a quitclaim deed who had notice of the
    Trust’s earlier interest based on the July 2010 final judgment, Izen could not enjoy
    the protections of a bona fide purchaser. Even considered in the light most favorable
    to Izen, the summary-judgment record shows that the Trust conclusively established
    the strength of its title based on a superior title from a common source.
    13
    On appeal, Izen challenges the Trust’s reliance on Hall,11 arguing that in this
    case there was no common source of title because “Izen derived his title from the
    Constable’s Sale out of Ryals, not some earlier predecessor in title.”12 We reject this
    argument. The Trust linked both its title and Izen’s purported title based on the
    constable’s deed to the “common source” of the July 2010 final judgment. The
    evidence shows that, as of the time of the constable’s sale, the Trust—not Ogden,
    W. Westbrook, and Gayle—held title in fee simple to the property based on the July
    2010 final judgment. Ogden, W. Westbrook, and Gayle took nothing on their title
    claims in the July 2010 final judgment. Next, Izen argues that even if the constable’s
    deed was treated as a quitclaim deed, “a quit claim deed out of Ryals/[the Trust] . . .
    was more than enough to pass title” and “Izen’s alleged lack of status as a bona fide
    purchaser for value is irrelevant.” Again, we disagree. The constable’s deed did not
    convey any interest of the Trust, but instead that of Ogden, W. Westbrook, and
    Gayle, who had no interest. As in Hall, Izen “received nothing more than a chance
    at title” and as the purchaser of a quitclaim deed did not enjoy the protections of a
    bona fide purchaser. 
    See 23 S.W.3d at 407
    .
    Declaration setting aside constable’s deed. When the Trust conclusively
    proved its superior right of ownership to the property and when the recorded
    constable’s deed presented a cloud on the Trust’s title to the property that it was
    11
    Izen did not address the applicability of Hall in the trial court. We construe this argument
    as an attack on the legal sufficiency of the Trust’s common-source ground expressly relied on its
    summary-judgment motion, which Izen may raise for the first time on appeal. See M.D. Anderson
    Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 
    28 S.W.3d 22
    , 23 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Rhône–
    Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 
    997 S.W.2d 217
    , 223 (Tex. 1999), and City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin
    Auth., 
    589 S.W.2d 671
    , 678 (Tex. 1979)).
    12
    In addition, the case relied on by Izen does not apply because the Trust was not the
    grantor in the constable’s deed to Izen. See Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Houston v. Musick, 
    517 S.W.2d 627
    , 630 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974), rev’d on other grounds, 
    531 S.W.2d 581
    (Tex. 1975).
    14
    entitled to have removed, the trial court properly could declare in the amended
    summary judgment: “The Constable’s Deed is set aside. As between [the Trust] and
    Izen, [the Trust] is the owner of the Property.” See I-10 Colony, Inc. v. Chao Kuan
    Lee, 
    393 S.W.3d 467
    , 476–77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied)
    (concluding that trial court was able to make “declarations” regarding title in
    judgment); Inman v. Orndorff, 
    596 S.W.2d 236
    , 238–39 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 1980, no writ) (modifying judgment to “decree that the cloud cast on the title
    of [plaintiff] to the subject property by the deed issued by the constable to
    [defendant] be removed”).
    Because the Trust’s traditional motion and summary-judgment evidence
    facially established its right to judgment as a matter of law, see Tex. R. Civ. P.
    166a(c), we now consider whether Izen raised a genuine, material fact issue
    sufficient to defeat summary judgment, see M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v.
    Willrich, 
    28 S.W.3d 22
    , 23 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam).
    2. Izen failed to raise a fact issue to avoid the Trust’s summary judgment.
    Confirmation of the constable’s sale. Izen argues he can avoid summary
    judgment because he raised genuine issues of material fact that the constable’s sale
    should be affirmed. According to Izen, the sale should be affirmed because (1) the
    price received was fair and (2) the constable’s listing and sale of Ogden’s, W.
    Westbrook’s, and Gayle’s equitable title to the property “was not an irregularity.”
    Izen does not point us to, and we have not located, any authority providing the
    requisite elements of what is required to affirm a constable’s sale, as opposed to set
    it aside, either as a cause of action or as an affirmative defense. Cf. Beneficial Mortg.
    Corp.-B01 v. Lopez, No. 04-03-00215-CV, 
    2005 WL 1224613
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—
    San Antonio May 25, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A sheriff’s sale of real property
    will be set aside only on proof of (1) an irregularity calculated to affect the sale, (2) a
    15
    grossly inadequate sales price, and (3) a causal connection between the irregularity
    and the selling price.”). In any event, we assume without deciding that Izen could
    assert confirmation of the constable’s sale as a defense to avoid summary judgment.
    We disagree, however, that Izen raised sufficient fact issues.
    (1) Price received at sale. Regarding the adequacy of the sales price, Izen
    stated: “Izen’s Declaration testimony establishe[d] that the Constable received a fair
    price for the property at the June 4, 2013, sale.” Izen referenced a paragraph of his
    summary-judgment declaration, which stated “his opinion as current owner of record
    title of the disputed property” that “the price Joe Alfred Izen, Jr. paid for the property
    in question—$240,000.00 plus $113,199.87 plus $3,170.00 in the total amount of
    $356,369.87 was a fair consideration for a June 4, 2013 purchase of the disputed
    property at a public sale that was not grossly inadequate or inadequate sales price.”
    In his brief, Izen points to a paragraph from Izen’s declaration dated October 3, 2016,
    which referenced a tax-judgment exhibit that purportedly “contained a finding of the
    fair market value of the property as of the date the tax judgment was signed, October
    22, 2013, in the amount of $401,407.00.” We do not consider evidence that was not
    before the trial court when it ruled on the Trust’s summary-judgment motion.13 Even
    assuming that Izen properly was able to testify as to the value of the property for
    purposes of the property-owner rule,14 and even considering the same evidence of
    the October 2013 tax judgment in Izen’s declaration dated May 23, 2016 (which we
    13
    See Saad v. Valdez, No. 14-15-00845-CV, 
    2017 WL 1181241
    , at *7–*8 & n.3 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 30, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“We consider only evidence that
    was before the trial court at the time it ruled on the particular summary judgment motions being
    challenged.”); McMahan v. Greenwood, 
    108 S.W.3d 467
    , 485 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).
    14
    A property owner is qualified to testify to the value of his property, but his testimony
    must be substantiated by facts and may not be based solely on the owner’s word. See Tex. R. Evid.
    701; Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Justiss, 
    397 S.W.3d 150
    , 156–59 (Tex. 2012); DZM, Inc. v.
    Garren, 
    467 S.W.3d 700
    , 703–05 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
    16
    have located on our own in the summary-judgment record), Izen has not shown that
    the price received at the earlier constable’s sale in June 2013 was fair. See Preston
    Reserve, L.L.C. v. Compass Bank, 
    373 S.W.3d 652
    , 663, 668 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (trial court could not consider price at subsequent sale as
    evidence of fair market value at time of foreclosure sale without showing of
    comparable market conditions).15
    (2) Lack of irregularity of sale; conveyance of equitable title. To support the
    lack of irregularity of the constable’s sale and that Izen’s title based on the
    constable’s sale and deed was superior, Izen argued that the equitable interests and
    title of Ogden, W. Westbrook, and Gayle as trust beneficiaries were subject to sale
    by writ of execution. Izen also argued that such equitable title may prevail over bare
    legal title in a trespass-to-try-title suit. Even assuming without deciding that Izen
    presented sufficient legal grounds,16 he did not present sufficient evidence to
    establish Ogden, W. Westbrook, and Gayle were beneficiaries of the Trust owning
    equitable title to the property. Izen relied on his declaration, which simply states:
    “Lisa Ogden, Wayne Westbrook, and Steven Gayle, were the beneficiaries of the
    East Texas Investments Trust.” Such a broad, conclusory statement without
    underlying factual support does not constitute competent summary-judgment
    evidence. See Arkoma Basin Expl. Co., Inc. v. FMF Assocs. 1990-A, Ltd., 
    249 S.W.3d 380
    , 389 & n.32 (Tex. 2008); Doherty v. Old Place, Inc., 
    316 S.W.3d 840
    ,
    15
    In his response, Izen recognized: “The fairness of the price received, whether the
    consideration paid was ‘inadequate’ or even ‘grossly inadequate,’ must be determined as of the
    date of sale and the condition of the property and title being sold.”
    16
    See 
    Longoria, 292 S.W.3d at 165
    (“An owner of a superior equitable title may recover
    in a trespass to try title action if the record shows the equitable title is superior to the defendant’s
    bare legal title.”); Brelsford v. Scheltz, 
    564 S.W.2d 404
    , 406 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978,
    writ ref’d n.r.e.); Jensen v. Wilkinson, 
    133 S.W.2d 982
    , 986–87 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1939, writ
    dism’d judgm’t cor.) (op. on reh’g).
    17
    845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (“Appellant’s
    statements that he claims ‘fee simple title’ to the property based on his prior
    possession of the land without abandonment or, alternatively, his occupation of the
    land in peaceable and adverse possession are merely conclusory and unsupported by
    factual evidence.”). Izen also relied on our opinion affirming the July 2010 final
    judgment. However, there, we did not address or determine any status or equitable
    title of Ogden, W. Westbrook, and Gayle as beneficiaries of the Trust; our only
    reference was to these parties as “purported beneficiaries.” See Ogden, 
    2012 WL 3016856
    , at *1.
    Izen as party to judgment or judgment creditor. Also, Izen sought to support
    the validity of the constable’s sale and show the superiority of Izen’s constable’s
    deed on the ground that “a judgment awarding attorney’s fees directly to a party’s
    attorney is valid and enforceable.” In other words, “Izen was entitled to collect the
    attorney’s fees awarded him by the July 29, 2010 Final Judgment.” Similarly, on
    appeal, Izen argues that he was a party to and a creditor under the July 2010 final
    judgment entitled to a writ of execution and to collect his attorney’s fees. We
    disagree. Our review of the July 2010 final judgment does not indicate that Izen was
    himself a party in the 2007 case or that the trial court made any award of attorney’s
    fees directly to Izen. Accordingly, the authorities cited by Izen do not apply. 17
    17
    See, e.g., Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Cooper, 
    77 S.W. 263
    , 266 (Tex. App.—Galveston
    1903, no writ) (because judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff’s attorney for half of amount
    recovered as contingent fee “in no wise affect[ed]” defendant, its complaint regarding same was
    not allowed); Rampy v. Rampy, 
    432 S.W.2d 175
    , 176–77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1968,
    no writ) (discussing cases in which divorce judgment ordered defendant to directly pay attorney’s
    fees to plaintiff’s attorney). In his brief, Izen also relies on Sommers v. Concepcion, 
    20 S.W.3d 27
    ,
    32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). However, the cited portion of the case
    pertains to a nonprecedential, unpublished appeal in which a trial court order recognized that an
    attorney could enforce his contract for attorney’s fees. See Velasquez v. Lunsford, No. 14-95-
    00172-CV, 
    1996 WL 544429
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 26, 1996, no writ)
    (not designated for publication). Izen has not cited, and we have not located in the record, any trial
    court order recognizing that Izen had any claim based on a contract with the Trust for his attorney’s
    18
    Rather, the July 2010 final judgment expressly decreed that Ryals as trustee of the
    Trust recover reimbursement from the Trust for $160,000 in Izen’s legal services for
    Trust. The July 2010 final judgment ordered that Ryals as trustee of the Trust have
    all writs of execution and possession necessary for the enforcement of the judgment.
    While the July 2010 final judgment provided that Ryals pay Izen his $160,000
    attorney’s fees from the proceeds of a public sale of the property, it was Ryals as
    trustee of the Trust, not Izen, who was awarded reimbursement and all writs.
    Quasi- and judicial estoppel. In his response, Izen argued that by claiming
    title under the July 2010 final judgment the Trust was judicially estopped from
    collaterally attacking the enforcement of that judgment’s provisions requiring sale
    of the property and payment of attorney’s fees. Likewise, on appeal, Izen argues that
    “judicial estoppel barred Ryals from attempting to prevent a constable’s sale and
    payment of Izen’s attorney’s fees out of the sales proceeds.” Izen also asserted quasi-
    estoppel as an affirmative defense. Both in the trial court and on appeal, Izen
    describes the Trust’s conduct as acceptance of the benefits. See supra note 9; see
    also Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 
    22 S.W.3d 857
    , 864 (Tex. 2000)
    (“[A]cceptance of the benefits, is a species of quasi-estoppel.”).
    Judicial estoppel precludes a party from adopting a position inconsistent with
    one that it successfully maintained in an earlier proceeding. Pleasant Glade
    Assembly of God v. Schubert, 
    264 S.W.3d 1
    , 6 (Tex. 2008). The doctrine of judicial
    estoppel applies if these elements are present: (1) a sworn, prior inconsistent
    statement made in a judicial proceeding; (2) the party now sought to be estopped
    fees. Izen also cites Nicholson v. Mills, 
    227 S.W.2d 354
    (Tex. App.—Galveston 1950, writ ref’d).
    In Nicholson, the face of the judgment stated that “said cause is dismissed at costs of plaintiffs, for
    which let execution issue; fee of auditor heretofore appointed being heretofore taxed as costs.” 
    Id. at 357;
    see Tex. R. Civ. P. 172 (“The court shall award reasonable compensation to such auditor
    to be taxed as costs of suit.”). Izen’s attorney’s fees were not awarded to him or “taxed as costs”
    in the July 2010 final judgment.
    19
    successfully maintained the prior position; (3) the prior inconsistent statement was
    not made inadvertently or because of mistake, fraud, or duress; and (4) the statement
    was deliberate, clear, and unequivocal. In re Marriage of Butts, 
    444 S.W.3d 147
    ,
    151 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The doctrine of quasi-estoppel
    precludes a person from asserting, to another’s disadvantage, a right inconsistent
    with a position previously taken. 
    Lopez, 22 S.W.3d at 864
    . Quasi-estoppel applies
    when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position
    inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced. 
    Id. We reject
    Izen’s attempts to invoke these related defensive doctrines. Below
    and on appeal, Izen generally points to trial testimony by Ryals in the 2007 case
    where Ryals stated he was asking the trial court to “[p]ay all of the due debts [sic]
    to it and all of the attorney fees that’s been accumulated what we had to defend and
    try the cases” out of “the proceeds of the [property] sale” and stated he thought all
    court-ordered moneys “ought to be paid.” Izen also points to the Trust’s response to
    a request for admission in which the Trust admitted that it was “dissatisfied with the
    jury award to Ryals of Eight Thousand ($8,000.00) Dollars instead of the amounts
    Ryals claimed for reimbursement which the jury rejected.” However, statements in
    support of the payment of the Trust’s debts out of the sale of the property and
    disappointment with a portion of the July 2010 final judgment are not necessarily
    inconsistent with the Trust’s title challenge under circumstances where Izen obtained
    a writ of execution on a judgment to which he was not a party or creditor, purchased
    at a constable’s sale nonexistent interest on property, and received a quitclaim
    constable’s deed. Nor does Izen explain how it would be unconscionable to allow
    the Trust to maintain its title challenge.
    Ryals’s authorization; Izen’s implied authority. On appeal, Izen asserts that
    “Ryals authorized Izen to sell the Highway 59 property at constable’s sale in order
    20
    to pay [the Trust]’s attorney’s fees, costs, and debts.” We have not located where in
    his response Izen raised Ryals’s authorization as a ground to avoid summary
    judgment. However, in its amended summary-judgment order, the trial court stated:
    “Izen claims he conducted the constable’s sale with authority from his client, but he
    admitted at the hearing that he has no summary judgment evidence which supports
    that position.” The trial court also stated: “Izen had no authority to conduct the
    constable’s sale which resulted in the Constable’s Deed.” Therefore, we will
    consider this subissue.
    Izen argues that the “trial court cannot try summary judgment fact issues by
    oral testimony at a summary judgment hearing.” Izen claims that he never made any
    statement admitting “that he had no summary judgment evidence proving that Ryals
    authorized the execution sale.” Izen does not cite any portion of the record in
    support. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g), (i). Nor does the record contain a transcript of
    the June 6, 2016 summary-judgment hearing. In any event, contrary to his
    contention, Izen did not “produce[] evidence that Ryals authorized the issuance of
    the writ of execution and the Constable’s Sale.” Izen again points to Ryals’s
    testimony in the 2007 case trial where Ryals stated that he was asking the trial court
    to “[p]ay all of the due debts [sic] to it and all of the attorney fees that’s been
    accumulated what we had to defend and try the cases” out of “the proceeds of the
    [property] sale” and stated he thought all court-ordered moneys “ought to be paid.”
    Izen also points to Ryals’s State Bar grievance complaint form against Izen, in which
    Ryals stated:
    At this point, unbeknownst, nor the way I would have handled the sell
    [sic]. I was told to meet Izen by Izen at this auction. The property should
    have been sold so the max amount of money that the property is worth
    could have been recovered for the beneficiaries and myself.
    Izen then bought this property and with two constables stole the
    21
    proceeds of the sale. This sale was a secret sale.[18]
    Finally, Izen points to his summary-judgment affidavit and declaration in support.
    In Izen’s affidavit, he referenced Ryals’s trial testimony in the 2007 case. In Izen’s
    declaration,19 he stated: “There was no ‘secret sale.’ I fully informed Ryals of the
    details of the sale including the date and time and location and that Ryals was free
    to bid.” Izen also stated:
    Prior to the date of the June 4, 2016 [sic] sale, I instructed Kenneth
    Ryals, as Managing Trustee for [the Trust], to attend the sale and to
    meet me at the sale and specifically informed him of the place, date and
    time, June 4, 2013. I instructed Ryals to arrive on that date at the Family
    Law Building where the sale was to be held. Ryals arrived at the Family
    Law Building where the sale was to take place [sic] until the sale began.
    Ryals remained at the Family Law Building where the sale took place
    and was present when the sale was called, bids were received on the
    property, the successful bidder was declared, and the sale ended.
    None of this evidence shows that Ryals as trustee of the Trust authorized Izen
    with regard to issuance of the writ of execution and constable’s sale in favor of Izen.
    See Authorization, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Official permission
    to do something; sanction or warrant.”); see also Authority, BLACK’S LAW
    DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The official right or permission to act, esp. to act
    legally on another’s behalf; esp., the power of one person to affect another’s legal
    relations by acts done in accordance with the other’s manifestations of assent; the
    power delegated by a principal to an agent.”). Izen declared that he “ordered the Writ
    of Execution” without any mention of doing so on behalf of the Trust or Ryals as
    trustee of the Trust. The constable’s deed does not state that the writ of execution
    18
    This last sentence was handwritten.
    19
    Izen again relies on his declaration dated October 3, 2016, which was not before the trial
    court when it ruled on the Trust’s traditional motion for partial summary judgment. See supra note
    13. We consider instead similar paragraphs included in Izen’s declaration dated May 23, 2016.
    22
    was issued in favor of the Trust or Ryals as trustee of the Trust, but rather in favor
    of Izen as a “plaintiff” who “recovered a judgment against” Ogden, W. Westbrook,
    and Gayle. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 629 (writ of execution “shall describe the judgment,
    stating . . . the names of the parties in whose favor and against whom the judgment
    was rendered”). That Ryals approved of funds from a sale of the property being used
    to pay for the Trust’s debts is not evidence that Ryals authorized Izen as a nonparty
    to the July 2010 final judgment to obtain a writ of execution in Izen’s name for a
    constable’s sale. That Izen informed Ryals of the date, time, and place of the
    constable’s sale and that Ryals attended is not evidence that Ryals authorized Izen
    to order a writ of execution in Izen’s favor to conduct such constable’s sale.20
    Izen also contends that “Izen’s authority to order the writ of execution and to
    obtain a constable’s sale of the property as ordered in the July 29, 2010 final
    judgment was implied.” That is, as part of his “representation of Ryals/[the Trust],”
    Izen was taking action “necessary to enforce the client’s case.” Izen fails to include
    any citations to the record in this section of his argument and therefore did not
    adequately brief this subissue. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). In any event, Izen does
    not explain, and we fail to see, how obtaining a writ of execution and constable’s
    sale in Izen’s own favor as a nonparty, as opposed to in favor of the Trust, which
    was to have all writs of execution and possession as the successful party under the
    July 2010 final judgment, would fall within the scope of any continued
    representation of the Trust. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 629; Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc.,
    
    705 S.W.2d 690
    , 693 (Tex. 1986) (“[A]cts and omissions within the scope of [an
    20
    Izen contends that any complaint by the Trust concerning the constable’s sale or the
    provisions of the July 2010 final judgment amounts to “invited error.” Izen does not explain how
    the doctrine of invited error would apply under circumstances in which Izen did not present
    evidence of Ryals’s authorization for the sale and the Trust did not challenge the July 2010 final
    judgment.
    23
    attorney’s] employment are regarded as the client’s acts.”); see also Implied
    Authority, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Authority intentionally
    given by the principal to the agent as a result of the principal’s conduct, such as the
    principal’s earlier acquiescence to the agent’s actions.”).21
    Ability of attorney to bid at sale;“misrecital” in the constable’s deed;
    inequitable conduct; and public policy. On appeal, Izen argues that when Ryals for
    the Trust authorized the issuance of the writ of execution and the constable’s sale,
    Izen was not “out of line” when he successfully bid at the sale of his client’s property
    to collect his attorney’s fees. We already have determined that Izen did not present
    evidence of authority or implied authority.
    Izen also contends that the constable’s deed merely contained a “misrecital”
    or “technicality” “that the right, title, and interest, of the [Trust] beneficiaries
    (equitable title) was being sold and conveyed to Izen instead of the legal title of
    Ryals/Trustee.” Izen contends that such misrecital “did not effect [sic] the title
    passed to Izen” or the sales price of the property. In addition, Izen argues that
    “Ryals/[the Trust]” cannot invoke equity to force another constable’s sale without
    showing that another sale would bring a higher price and without “payment of the
    just debt which [the Trust] owed Izen” for his legal work. Finally, Izen asserts that
    Texas public policy upholds constable’s sales wherever possible. Because Izen did
    not raise any of these arguments in his response, we do not consider these grounds
    on appeal to avoid summary judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Tex. R. App. P.
    33.1(a); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 
    589 S.W.2d 671
    , 678 (Tex.
    1979).
    21
    The case Izen cites does not support his position. See Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cash Inv.,
    Inc., 
    970 S.W.2d 535
    , 537 (Tex. 1998) (“A valid judgment, execution, and sale are required to
    pass title to property at an execution sale.”).
    24
    Validity of lease; possession; reimbursement. Also, within his first issue, Izen
    attempts to challenge “another summary judgment issued in favor of Ryals
    purporting to hold the month-to-month [lease] between Izen and [the Edwardses]
    which paid the advalorem [sic] taxes on the Highway 59 property invalid.” In
    September 2016, the Trust filed a traditional motion for partial summary judgment
    against the Edwardses on the Trust’s claim that no lease agreement exists between
    the Trust and the Edwardses and for issuance of a writ of possession of the property.
    Izen further contends that “Ryals failed to tender prompt payment of the
    attorney’s fees and reimbursement of advalorem [sic] taxes and costs, with interest,
    and lost any right to redeem the property after the constable’s sale.” In October 2016,
    Izen and the Edwardses filed a traditional motion for partial summary judgment “to
    enforce their rights to remain in possession of the property sold by the Constable’s
    Deed until Ryals pays reimbursement.”
    Izen fails to include any citations to the record in these sections of his
    argument and therefore did not adequately brief these subissues. See Tex. R. App.
    P. 38.1(i). In any event, the trial court did not address or finally dispose of any lease
    or possession claims by the Trust against the Edwardses or any reimbursement or
    possession claims by Izen or the Edwardses against the Trust or Ryals in the July
    2016 amended summary-judgment order. Nor did the severance order include or
    finally dispose of such claims or specify that rulings relating to such claims, if any,
    were now final and appealable. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review these
    subissues. See 
    Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195
    ; 
    Lentino, 159 S.W.3d at 653
    .
    Having reviewed the summary-judgment evidence under well-established
    standards, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 
    236 S.W.3d 754
    , 755 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam); City of Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
    , 822–24 (Tex. 2005), we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the
    25
    Trust’s traditional motion for partial summary judgment.
    We overrule Izen’s first issue.
    3. Izen’s motion for new trial
    In Izen’s related third issue, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion
    for new trial.22 We will reverse a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial only
    for an abuse of discretion. See Director, State Employees Workers’ Comp. Div. v.
    Evans, 
    889 S.W.2d 266
    , 268 (Tex. 1994).
    Izen contends:
    The trial court ignored all of the points raised by Izen . . . in the Motion
    for New Trial and refused to modify its ruling that Izen had no right to
    receive payment of the attorney’s fees awarded directly to him under
    the July 29, 2010 Final Judgment and that Izen . . . had failed to produce
    any summary judgment evidence that Ryals approved the issuance of a
    writ of execution and Constable’s Sale.
    Izen argues the trial court’s ruling was “manifest error” and his motion should have
    been granted. However, he fails to cite to any portion of the record or any legal
    authority. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Izen also fails to provide any substantive
    analysis of “the points” raised in his new-trial motion or explain how the trial court
    abused its discretion. Because Izen inadequately briefed this issue, we do not
    consider it. See Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 
    271 S.W.3d 928
    , 931–32
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
    We overrule Izen’s third issue.
    22
    Izen refers to a motion for new trial denied “by a separate order dated May 30, 2018
    [sic].” However, the only timely motion Izen filed in relation to the July 2016 amended summary
    judgment made final and appealable by the trial court’s March 2017 severance order was the
    motion for new trial filed on March 31, 2017, which was overruled by operation of law as of May
    15, 2017.
    26
    C. Lis-pendens expunction and temporary-injunction order
    In his fourth issue, Izen challenges the trial court’s actions in expunging the
    lis pendens filed by Izen and in entering an injunction against him without requiring
    the Trust to post a bond. We lack jurisdiction over this issue.
    The final judgment in this case was signed on March 1, 2017, when the trial
    court granted the Trust a severance of its title and declaratory-judgment claims and
    made the July 2016 amended summary judgment a final, appealable judgment. See
    Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C., 
    63 S.W.3d 795
    , 795 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (“As a rule, the severance of an interlocutory
    judgment into a separate cause makes it final.”). Izen expressly noted in his notice
    of appeal that he was appealing from the judgment “signed on the 1st day of March,
    2017.” Izen stated that he filed his motion for new trial on March 31, 2017, which
    was overruled by operation of law on May 15, 2017. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(1),
    329b(a), (c). Izen’s notice of appeal, filed on May 30, 2017, was timely. See Tex. R.
    App. P. 26.1(a).
    The trial court signed its order granting the Trust’s motion to expunge Izen’s
    notice of lis pendens on May 22, 2017. In this order, the trial court ordered two
    notices of lis pendens filed by Izen on March 13, 2017 and April 21, 2017 expunged.
    The trial court also ordered Izen to cease and desist from filing additional notices of
    lis pendens involving the property.
    The trial court signed its severance order over two-and-a-half months before
    the court signed its expunction order. See Lee v. Lee, 
    528 S.W.3d 201
    , 210–11 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (interlocutory order only becomes
    appealable when merged into subsequent, final, appealable order). In addition, Izen
    did not state in his notice of appeal that he was appealing from an order signed May
    22, 2017. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(d)(2) (notice of appeal must “state the date of the
    27
    judgment or order appealed from”). Therefore, Izen did not preserve any available
    appeal23 from the trial court’s May 22, 2017 order.
    Consequently, we do not consider Izen’s fourth issue.
    D. Res judicata and collateral estoppel
    In his fifth issue, Izen argues that a federal-court jury verdict and an amended
    final judgment entered in May 2018 “required reversal and rendition of this cause
    on appeal” in his favor. We reject Izen’s attempts to rely on principles of res judicata
    and collateral estoppel.
    First, we do not consider documents an appellant appends to his brief that are
    not contained in the record. See Bencon Mgmt. & Gen. Contracting, Inc. v. Boyer,
    Inc., 
    178 S.W.3d 198
    , 210–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). In
    any event, Izen asserts that such jury verdict and amended final judgment present
    the “last final judgment” upholding “Izen’s claim to rights as a mortgagee in
    possession.” However, as Izen acknowledges in his brief, “[t]he trial court below did
    not adjudicate that claim.” And, as discussed above, the trial court did not sever or
    issue any final judgment on Izen’s claims. Moreover, Izen did not raise the doctrines
    of res judicata and collateral estoppel based on any federal-court litigation in his
    summary-judgment response. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a);
    Clear Creek Basin 
    Auth., 589 S.W.2d at 678
    . Finally, Izen does not explain, and we
    fail to see, how any verdict and final judgment entered more than a year after the
    final summary judgment in this case, would support res judicata or collateral
    23
    Compare Marks v. Starratt, No. 14-09-00269-CV, 
    2009 WL 1312180
    , at *1 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 7, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (no statute provides
    for appeal from interlocutory order that cancels lis pendens) with 
    id. (indicating orders
    enjoining
    filing of lis pendens are appealable interlocutory orders for temporary injunction (citing Tex. Civ.
    Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4))).
    28
    estoppel.24
    We overrule Izen’s fifth issue.
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    The Edwardses’ interlocutory appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We
    affirm the trial court’s judgment as to all Izen’s issues over which we have
    jurisdiction.
    /s/    Charles A. Spain
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Bourliot, and Spain.
    24
    See Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 
    962 S.W.2d 507
    , 521 (Tex.
    1998) (doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when issue was fully and fairly litigated in prior
    action and was essential to judgment in prior action); Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 
    919 S.W.2d 644
    , 652 (Tex. 1996) (res judicata precludes relitigation of claims that have been finally
    adjudicated or arise out of same subject matter and could have been litigated in prior action). We
    express no opinion regarding the applicability of collateral estoppel or res judicata based on any
    May 2018 federal-court verdict and judgment to any claims remaining among the parties.
    29
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-17-00431-CV

Filed Date: 4/18/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021

Authorities (41)

Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Cooper , 33 Tex. Civ. App. 319 ( 1903 )

Canton-Carter v. Baylor College of Medicine , 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 9599 ( 2008 )

Clint Independent School District v. Cash Investments, Inc. , 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 916 ( 1998 )

Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Associates 1990-A, Ltd. , 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 342 ( 2008 )

Wells v. Kansas University Endowment Ass'n , 825 S.W.2d 483 ( 1992 )

McMahan v. Greenwood , 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 4662 ( 2003 )

Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert , 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1086 ( 2008 )

Bencon Management & General Contracting, Inc. v. Boyer, Inc. , 178 S.W.3d 198 ( 2005 )

AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASS'N OF HOUSTON v. Musick , 1974 Tex. App. LEXIS 2840 ( 1974 )

City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority , 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 7 ( 1979 )

Doherty v. OLD PLACE, INC. , 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5749 ( 2010 )

Lentino v. Frost National Bank , 159 S.W.3d 651 ( 2004 )

Brelsford v. Scheltz , 1978 Tex. App. LEXIS 3046 ( 1978 )

Jensen v. Wilkinson , 133 S.W.2d 982 ( 1939 )

Diversified, Inc. v. Hall , 23 S.W.3d 403 ( 2000 )

Marshall v. Lockhead , 1952 Tex. App. LEXIS 2197 ( 1952 )

Geodyne Energy Income Production Partnership I-E v. Newton ... , 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 551 ( 2005 )

Novak v. Stevens , 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 263 ( 1980 )

Mueller v. Banks , 1960 Tex. App. LEXIS 2029 ( 1960 )

Nicholson v. Mills , 1950 Tex. App. LEXIS 1891 ( 1950 )

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