M.G. v. T.G. ( 2023 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-21-00433-CV
___________________________
M.G., Appellant
V.
T.G., Appellee
On Appeal from the 467th District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 20-2472-462
Before Kerr, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this restricted appeal, we consider whether sufficient evidence supports the
property division, child support, and attorney’s fees ordered in a default divorce and
SAPCR.1 Because the evidence does not support the property division and the total
child-support and attorney’s-fees awards, we reverse the judgment in part and remand
the case for a limited new trial.
Background
Appellant M.G. and Appellee T.G. married in 2016 and then had two children.
The couple separated in 2020. In March 2020, M.G. filed for divorce. In both March
and November 2020, she absconded with both children, who were found by law
enforcement. T.G. filed a counterpetition for divorce.
M.G. answered some discovery, but the parties did not exchange or file sworn
inventories of their property.2 After responding to T.G.’s discovery requests, M.G.’s
counsel moved to withdraw from representation because she had “not been able to
effectively communicate with” M.G. The trial court allowed M.G.’s counsel to
withdraw in mid April 2021, a little over a month and a half before the June 7,
2021 trial setting. M.G. took no further action in the trial court.
A SAPCR is a suit affecting the parent–child relationship. See Tex. Fam. Code
1
Ann. § 101.032(a).
2
M.G.’s counsel said in her forwarding email that M.G. “basically has no
financial information” and that counsel understood T.G. “made all of the financial
payments for obligations while they were living together.”
2
Although T.G. appeared for the trial, M.G. did not. T.G. testified about the
circumstances leading to the divorce, including M.G.’s mental-health and substance-
abuse problems––both before and after they sought a divorce––as well as M.G.’s
arrests and Child Protective Services involvement3 during the divorce’s pendency.
T.G. also testified that their 2016 car that M.G. had been driving since October
2021 was impounded in March 2021 and he had to pick it up. The car appeared to
have been crashed on multiple occasions; had writing on the console and a cigarette
burn inside; was full of food, garbage, clothing, and other items; and reeked of
cigarettes. According to T.G., the car was totaled.
T.G. testified that he and the children were living in a home that he and M.G.
had bought after marrying; its 2020 appraised value was “about $281,000,” and he
estimated their equity in the home to be $193,000. T.G. expected to continue making
the mortgage payments and wanted to remain living there with the children. 4
T.G. testified that he was seeking $130 a month for the children’s health
insurance, child support from January 2021 through June 2021, and prospective child
3
CPS, a Texas Department of Family and Protective Services division, became
involved with M.G. and the children in March 2020 after M.G. filed for divorce and
alleged that T.G. had sexually abused their daughter. CPS ruled out the allegations.
4
Before her counsel withdrew, M.G. had filed an amended petition in which
she sought to have the home sold and the proceeds divided. She also asked the trial
court to confirm as her separate property “all property [she] owned and claimed . . .
before her marriage” and asserted a claim for reimbursement to her separate estate for
community-estate contributions.
3
support based on what he estimated M.G.’s earning capacity to be based on her
education and work experience: $15 per hour. 5 T.G. also testified that M.G. was the
beneficiary of a trust fund created before their marriage and that he had no access to
or control over that fund.
The trial court admitted a summary of T.G.’s proposed relief, in which he
sought to have the following property awarded to him:
• the marital residence “with all equity, furniture, furnishings, fixtures and items
located” there and all associated debt and tax obligations;
• a 2008 truck and the totaled 2016 car;
• “[a]ll financial accounts, retirement accounts, and other assets in his possession
or subject to his control”;
• “[h]is personal belongings, including computers, clothes, and jewelry”; and
• “all credit card debt or loans in his name.”
T.G. also asked the trial court to award M.G.
• “[a]ll financial accounts, retirement accounts, and other assets in her possession
or subject to her control”;
• “[h]er personal belongings, including computers, clothes, and jewelry”;
• “all credit card debt or loans in her name”; and
• “[a]ny outstanding medical bills, psychiatric bills, criminal fees or fines, in her
name.”
5
He estimated that at $15 per hour, her child-support obligation would be
$500 per month.
4
Finally, T.G. sought an order for M.G. to pay his attorney $25,000 for fees through
trial and $469 for expenses.6
The trial court rendered its ruling on the record. It granted the divorce and
T.G.’s requested property division, child support, $130 monthly medical-insurance
reimbursement, and attorney’s fees. The trial court also named T.G. the children’s
sole managing conservator with the exclusive right to determine their residence.7
On July 1, 2021, the trial court signed the final judgment incorporating its trial
rulings. M.G. filed this restricted appeal a little over five months later.
Issues and Standards of Review
In a single issue with five subissues, M.G. challenges the evidentiary sufficiency
of the prospective and retroactive child-support awards, the property division, and the
attorney’s-fees award.8 We apply the same standard of review––abuse of discretion––
to her child-support and property-division challenges. See Sandone v. Miller-Sandone,
Both T.G. and his counsel testified about the amount of attorney’s fees and
6
expenses he had incurred. The expenses were for records-subpoena and witness fees.
M.G. has not challenged the part of the judgment granting a divorce, nor has
7
she challenged any of the judgment’s non-child-support SAPCR provisions––
conservatorship and possession and access.
8
M.G. argues in her first subissue that she has met the requirements for a
restricted appeal. T.G. agrees that M.G. has met the jurisdictional requirements for
bringing a restricted appeal but does not concede error apparent on the face of the
record. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c), 30; In re S.W., 614 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Tex. App.––
Fort Worth 2020, no pet.). Therefore, we will review her remaining subissues about
error. See Norman Commc’ns v. Tex. Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997)
(holding that restricted-appeal error review includes sufficiency review).
5
116 S.W.3d 204, 205 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.) (“Most of the appealable
issues in a family[-]law case are evaluated against an abuse of discretion standard, be it
the issue of property division incident to divorce or partition, conservatorship,
visitation, or child support.”).
A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or if it
does not analyze or apply the law properly. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011).
Although a trial court does not abuse its discretion by deciding based on conflicting
evidence, sufficient evidence must nevertheless support the decision; therefore, the
traditional sufficiency-review standards are relevant to our review. Hamilton v.
Hamilton, No. 02-19-00211-CV, 2020 WL 6498528, at *3 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth
Nov. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re S.C., No. 02-17-00377-CV, 2018 WL 5289370,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Gunn v. McCoy,
554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018) (legal-sufficiency standard); Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,
715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g) (factual-sufficiency standard). Stated
another way, when we review if the trial court abused its discretion by ruling based on
legally or factually insufficient evidence, “we must determine (1) whether the trial
court had sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion and (2) whether the
trial court acted reasonably in applying its discretion to those facts.” Hamilton,
2020 WL 6498528, at *3.
6
Prospective and Retroactive Child Support
In her second and third subissues, M.G. argues that the prospective and
retroactive child-support awards are not supported by sufficient evidence because
T.G. did not present evidence establishing her net monthly resources.
Applicable Law
The Family Code requires a trial court determining child support to calculate
the obligor’s net resources available to pay that support. Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 154.062(a); see id. § 154.061(a) (“Whenever feasible, gross income should first
be computed on an annual basis and then should be recalculated to determine average
monthly gross income.”). In addition to wages, “[r]esources include . . . trust income.”
Id. § 154.062(b)(1), (5).
A trial court cannot adequately calculate net resources without some evidence
of a substantive and probative character. Marquez v. Moncada, 388 S.W.3d 736,
739 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); see In re L.A.-K., 596 S.W.3d 387,
397 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.). Once a party’s net resources are established,
the trial court must apply the Family Code’s guidelines to calculate the obligor’s
monthly child-support obligation. Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 538 S.W.3d 116, 118 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.122(a)); see Knight v.
Knight, 131 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. App.––El Paso 2004, no pet.) (explaining process
and citing governing Family Code provisions).
7
Analysis
The record does not show whether M.G. was employed at the time of trial. In
her February 2021 interrogatory responses, she stated that she had been working at
Hooters “for a short period of weeks” but other than that, she had not been
employed since May 6, 2016. T.G. testified that M.G. lacked only “about 20 to
30 hours” of credit to obtain her bachelor’s degree. He estimated that she could earn
“about $15 an hour” based on her education and work experience. T.G. also testified
that M.G. had access to a trust fund from which she could pay child support.
Although M.G. had not received regular monthly trust-fund payments, she relied on
her mother to make payments from the fund “on a case-by-case basis.” According to
T.G., “if [M.G.] did need a monthly amount, her mom would be more than happy to
provide that for her.” 9 T.G. asked the trial court to award him retroactive and
prospective child support of $500 per month based on M.G.’s estimated earning
capacity of $15 an hour.
T.G. did not provide evidence of M.G.’s past or present resources; he merely
estimated her earning ability via work and possibly her trust fund. Without evidence
about the amount of resources available to her, the Family Code required the trial
court to presume that M.G. worked 40 hours per week earning the federal minimum
wage. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.068(a) (“In the absence of evidence of a party’s
9
Records admitted at trial noted that M.G.’s relationship with her mother was
“strained.”
8
resources, . . . the court shall presume that the party has income equal to the federal
minimum wage for a 40-hour week to which the support guidelines may be
applied.”).10
Therefore, without a statutory basis to set child support based solely on M.G.’s
earning potential and in the absence of evidence of M.G.’s total net resources, the trial
court could rely only on the current federal minimum wage: $7.25 an hour. See
29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1)(C). Thus, a person earning the federal minimum wage would
gross $290 per week and $15,080 per year ($290 multiplied by 52), or $1,257 monthly.
L.A.-K., 596 S.W.3d at 398. Under the statutory child-support guidelines, a person
T.G. instead cites Family Code Section 154.0655, which directs the trial court
10
to consider a list of background circumstances––including education and job skills––
“[i]n the absence of evidence of a party’s resources.” Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 154.0655(c). But this section applies only to a child-support proceeding
pending on or filed after September 1, 2021. Act effective September 1, 2021, 87th
Leg., R.S., ch. 552, § 14. Therefore, this section could not have applied at the time of
trial.
T.G. also argues that the trial court could have instead relied on Section
154.066 to calculate child support based solely on M.G.’s earning capacity.
Id. § 154.066 (“If the actual income of the obligor is significantly less than what the
obligor could earn because of intentional unemployment or underemployment, the
court may apply the support guidelines to the earning potential of the obligor.”). But
the record does not support child support based on that section because (1) the trial
court did not make the required express finding that M.G. was intentionally
unemployed or underemployed, see Iliff, 339 S.W.3d at 80; In re A.A.T., 583 S.W.3d
914, 924 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.); and (2) Section 154.066 requires proof
of the obligor’s current earnings, A.A.T., 583 S.W.3d at 924 (explaining that under
Section 154.066, obligor must first provide proof of current earnings and then obligee
has burden to prove obligor is intentionally unemployed or underemployed, which
obligor can rebut with, among other evidence, proof that employment situation is
caused by “health needs”).
9
with two children must pay 25 percent of her monthly net resources. See Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 154.125(b). Thus, even without adjusting for the difference between
gross and net wages, in the absence of evidence about the amount of M.G.’s income,
the trial court could have ordered her to pay no more than $314.25 per month.11 See
L.A.-K., 596 S.W.3d at 398.
And although T.G. presented evidence that M.G. had access to a trust fund, he
presented no evidence of any particular amount to which she had access, and he
testified that whether M.G. could obtain money from the trust account depended on
her mother.12 Even with T.G.’s assertion that M.G.’s mother would give her whatever
11
T.G. also contends that ample evidence supported the trial court’s deviating
from the established child-support guidelines due to her trust-fund access, pre-divorce
lack of visitation with the children, and post-divorce supervised access to the children.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.123(a)–(b) (allowing trial court to deviate from
guidelines if evidence––including child-specific needs, both parents’ net resources and
circumstances, and “amount of time of possession of and access to a child”––rebuts
presumption that applying guidelines is in child’s best interest). But the judgment
states that the child-support order was “based on [M.G.’s] earning ability to obtain full
time employment at the rate of at least . . . $15.00 . . . per hour.” Also, T.G. himself
testified about M.G.’s mental-health and substance-abuse struggles, as well as her
arrests during the divorce’s pendency. Other evidence showed that after moving out
of their home, M.G. lived with her aunt and also lived in shelter housing that CPS had
helped find for her. Furthermore, in discussing M.G.’s absence with the trial court,
T.G.’s counsel represented that M.G. had been arrested and hospitalized multiple
times, that another warrant had been issued for her arrest, and that counsel did not
know if M.G. even had access to her email. Thus, the record does not show that the
trial court intended to deviate from the required federal-minimum-wage default
provision.
For this reason, Family Code Section 154.067, cited in T.G.’s brief, also does
12
not apply to this record. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.067(a) (providing that trial court
may, when appropriate, “assign a reasonable amount of deemed income attributable
10
she needed, the trial court still had no way to know how much trust money would be
available to M.G. and when.
Thus, contrary to T.G.’s argument, the trial court heard no substantive and
probative evidence on which to base a $500 monthly child-support obligation. 13 We
sustain M.G.’s second and third subissues.
Property Division
M.G. contends in her fourth subissue that no evidence supports the judgment’s
property division. According to M.G., T.G.’s testimony solely about the marital
to assets that do not currently produce income” and if doing so must consider
whether that property can be liquidated); L.A.-K., 596 S.W.3d at 398 (“[T]here is no
basis in the record upon which the trial court could deem income attributable to
Father’s assets because there is no evidence of how much is in each fund and whether
or under what circumstances any of those funds can be liquidated.”).
13
M.G. also contends that T.G. did not properly request retroactive child
support in his pleadings. See In re Marriage of Day, 497 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tex. App.––
Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (addressing in restricted appeal whether
judgment conformed to pleadings); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 301; Martinez v. Martinez,
61 S.W.3d 589, 590 (Tex. App.––San Antonio 2001, no pet.) (“Specific notice is
required when retroactive child support is being sought.” (quoting In re J.G.Z.,
963 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tex. App.––Texarkana 1998, no pet.)). T.G. did not seek child
support for a time before either divorce petition’s filing date; instead, he sought child
support accruing while his counterpetition was pending––from January 2021 to June
2021. The language in his counterpetition requesting a temporary order requiring
M.G. “to provide child support and medical support as deemed appropriate by the
Court” provided M.G. fair and adequate notice that T.G. sought child support during
the case’s pendency but after the counterpetition’s filing. See, e.g., Kebodeaux v.
Kebodeaux, No. 04-20-00147-CV, 2021 WL 3639814, at *2 (Tex. App.––San Antonio
Aug. 18, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Taylor v. Taylor, 337 S.W.3d 398, 401 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (op. on reh’g).
11
residence’s value––without any documentary evidence or testimony showing any
other property values––does not sufficiently support the property division. We agree.
Applicable Law
A divorce’s property division must be “just and right, having due regard for the
rights of each party and any children of the marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001.
Although the trial court need not equally divide the community estate, its division
must be equitable and supported by a reasonable basis. Sandone, 116 S.W.3d at 207.
Even a default judgment’s property division must be supported by sufficient proof
that it is just and right. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.701; Sandone, 116 S.W.3d at 207;
see also Giles v. Giles, No. 01-20-00571-CV, 2022 WL 2251814, at *8 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] June 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); Wilson v. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d
533, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
Analysis
Here, although T.G. testified to the value of what is likely the parties’ most
valuable asset14 and alluded to M.G.’s trust-fund access, 15 he provided no evidence of
the value of any other property, much less the extent or total value of the community
14
T.G.’s testimony was sufficient evidence of the home’s value. See In re Marriage
of Nadar, No. 05-17-00537-CV, 2018 WL 1373900, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 19,
2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
15
Nothing in the decree confirms M.G.’s trust fund as her separate property or
divides it as community property. See Cleaver v. Cleaver, 935 S.W.2d 491, 493–94,
497 (Tex. App.––Tyler 1996, no pet.).
12
estate. Thus, the trial court did not have sufficient evidence upon which to base a just-
and-right comparison. See Giles, 2022 WL 2251814, at *10; Watson v. Watson,
286 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
T.G. argues that sufficient evidence supports an inequitable property division,
citing M.G.’s destruction of the car, her abandonment of the children and home, her
mental-health and substance-abuse problems, and her criminal and CPS history
affecting the marriage and family. Although this evidence is relevant to a
disproportionate-division determination, without evidence of the community estate’s
total value, no court could determine whether the property division is actually
disproportionate. See Sandone, 116 S.W.3d at 207–08 (“Without the ability to determine
the size of the community pie, we can make no determination that the slices awarded
to each spouse were just and right.”). Therefore, we conclude that M.G. has shown
error in the property division. See Watson, 286 S.W.3d at 525 (reversing default decree
in similar circumstances); see also In re Marriage of Flores, No. 13-20-00313-CV,
2021 WL 6037665, at *4 (Tex. App.––Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 21, 2021, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (same); Wilson, 132 S.W.3d at 537–38 (same); Sandone, 116 S.W.3d at
208 (same); Haley v. Haley, 713 S.W.2d 801, 802–03 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.]
1986, no writ) (same).
T.G. relies on cases declining to find property-division error urged by
appellants who did not provide the trial court with their own evidence of property
value. See Delgado v. Delgado, 587 S.W.3d 450, 454–56 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no
13
pet.) (first citing Howe v. Howe, 551 S.W.3d 236, 254 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no
pet.); then citing Capellen v. Capellen, 888 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994,
writ denied)); LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 761 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 1988) (citing Mata v. Mata, 710 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. App.––Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 1986, no writ)), writ denied, 778 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1989); Wallace v.
Wallace, 623 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ dism’d). But
these are not default cases: unlike here, the parties in those cases participated at trial
and had the opportunity to present their own evidence, so these cases are inapposite.
Because T.G. did not present sufficient evidence to support the default
property division, we sustain M.G.’s fourth subissue.
Attorney’s Fees
M.G. argues in her fifth subissue that parts of the attorney’s fees award have no
evidentiary support. We agree.
Applicable Law
A trial court may award attorney’s fees in a SAPCR. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 106.002. A trial court may also apportion attorney’s fees as part of a just-and-right
property division. Capellen, 888 S.W.2d at 544–45. But any awarded fees must be
supported by sufficient reasonableness-and-necessity evidence. See In re M.L., No. 14-
19-00037-CV, 2021 WL 281071, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 28,
2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).
14
To calculate attorney’s fees, the trial court must first determine the reasonable
hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate; the fee claimant bears the
burden to prove both. Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d
469, 498 (Tex. 2019). At a minimum, the claimant must prove (1) the particular
services performed, (2) who performed them, (3) approximately when they were
performed, (4) the reasonable time required to perform them, and (5) the reasonable
hourly rate for each person performing them. Id. at 498, 502. Reasonableness and
necessity do not depend solely on the contractual fee arrangement between the
prevailing party and its attorney; the base lodestar calculation should reflect hours
reasonably expended for litigation-necessary services and a reasonable hourly rate
required to provide those services. Id. at 498–99; El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d
757, 760 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that trial court calculates lodestar). Courts presume
“that the base lodestar calculation, when supported by sufficient evidence, reflects the
reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees that can be shifted to the non-prevailing
party.” Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 499.
Analysis
The trial court admitted into evidence T.G.’s retainer agreement and his
attorney’s invoices and billing records. T.G. testified that he believed the fees were
reasonable and necessary. T.G.’s counsel also testified that she practices family law in
the DFW area at a $300 hourly rate and that her board-certified boss––who also
worked on the case––bills at a $495 hourly rate but discounted that rate for this case.
15
Counsel described the need to obtain an emergency order for the children’s return
and her attempts to obtain discovery; she also provided copies of M.G.’s discovery
responses, which the trial court admitted. According to counsel, “the fees incurred
by” T.G. were reasonable and necessary.
M.G. challenges $5,696.59 of the $25,000 attorney’s-fees award because the
billing records support only $19,303.41. The last time entry listed is on June 2, 2021––
five days before trial. Although T.G. testified that he had incurred expenses through
trial in addition to the billed amounts––$25,000 total––his counsel did not testify to
the total hours worked by attorneys and legal assistants from June 2, 2021, through
the June 7, 2021 trial date; nor did she testify to the reasonableness and necessity of
any specific work done between June 2 and June 7, 2021.
Whether attorney’s fees are reasonable and necessary requires expert testimony.
Lederer v. Lederer, No. 14-21-00012-CV, 2022 WL 11551156, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 20, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, the additional
$5,696.59 not testified to by T.G.’s counsel or supported by the billing records was
not supported by sufficient proof. See Hoffman v. Mena, No. 03-19-00409-CV,
2021 WL 2460637, at *11 (Tex. App.––Austin June 17, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.);
Drabek v. Cavazos, No. 13-14-00063-CV, 2014 WL 4402501, at *3 (Tex. App.––Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Aug. 29, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (collecting cases).
M.G. also argues that insufficient evidence supports the amounts charged for
an unidentified person with the initials SJT, contending that it is unclear whether SJT
16
is an attorney or paralegal and that T.G. presented no evidence of that person’s
qualifications or hourly rate’s reasonableness. Regardless of whether SJT is a paralegal
or attorney,16 we agree that T.G. provided no evidence to support that person’s
qualifications or whether that person’s $175 hourly rate was reasonable.
Although T.G.’s counsel testified that her paralegal’s hourly billing rate was
$35, she did not testify that rate was reasonable. See Nguyen Ngoc Giao v. Smith &
Lamm, P.C., 714 S.W.2d 144, 149 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ)
(noting that agreement to pay certain sum per hour is not proof of reasonableness); see
also Mortensen v. Villegas, 630 S.W.3d 355, 368 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.).
Likewise, she did not testify about the reasonableness of any $175 hourly rate for an
associate attorney. See Martinez Jardon v. Pfister, 593 S.W.3d 810, 840 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2019, no pet.). Additionally, although the trial court admitted résumés showing
T.G.’s counsel’s and her boss’s qualifications, the record contains no résumé or other
evidence showing SJT’s qualifications that might support a conclusion that the billed
$175 hourly rate was reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that no evidence supports
the reasonableness of $6,693.75, the total amount billed for SJT’s fees. See, e.g.,
Mahmoud v. Jackson, No. 05-21-00302-CV, 2022 WL 2167683, at *8 (Tex. App.—
Dallas June 16, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); Arnold v. Addison, No. 05-20-00001-CV,
16
From the names and billing rates identified in the retainer agreement, it
appears that SJT is an associate attorney.
17
2021 WL 5984875, at *16 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 17, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.);
Mortensen, 630 S.W.3d at 368.
Because no evidence supports the trial court’s award of $12,390.3417 of the
attorney’s fees, we sustain M.G.’s fifth subissue.
Conclusion
Because we have sustained M.G.’s second through fifth subissues, we also
sustain her first subissue, in which she contends that she has shown error apparent on
the record’s face. Accordingly, we reverse the challenged parts of the trial court’s
judgment––the child-support assessment, property division, and $12,390.34 of the
attorney’s-fees award––but we affirm the remainder––the divorce grant, non-child-
support SAPCR rulings, and $12,609.66 in attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter,
No. 09-13-00461-CV, 2015 WL 4571315, at *6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 30, 2015,
no pet.) (mem. op.); Wilson, 132 S.W.3d at 539. We remand the case for a limited new
trial solely on the child-support assessment and property division.
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Delivered: February 23, 2023
17
This amount is the sum of $5,696.59 and $6,693.75.
18