Harvey Williams v. Cathy Shaw ( 2018 )

Opinion issued December 13, 2018
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-17-00768-CV
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HARVEY WILLIAMS, Appellant
V.
CATHY SHAW, Appellee
On Appeal from the 506th District Court
Waller County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 16-12-24061
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Harvey Williams appeals from the trial court’s summary-judgment order in
favor of Cathy Shaw on her claims for conversion and breach of contract and her
declaratory-judgment action. However, the trial court’s summary-judgment order
is not a final judgment. It does not resolve Williams’s counterclaims. And it does
not contain finality language or any other clear indication that the trial court
intended the order to completely dispose of all parties and all claims. Because the
trial court’s summary-judgment order is not final, and because Williams has not
shown that the order is otherwise appealable, we dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
Background
This case arises from the breach of a contract for the sale of real property. In
2009, Shaw and Williams entered into a contract-for-deed by which Shaw agreed
to sell to Williams real property located in Hempstead, Texas. Under the contract,
Williams agreed to make an initial down payment and to satisfy the remaining
balance through monthly installments. Shaw agreed to allow Williams to possess
the property and to transfer title to him by executing a general warranty deed after
Williams had paid for the property in full.
In December 2016, Shaw filed her original petition, alleging that Williams
had stopped making the monthly installments, breached other provisions of the
contract, and converted funds she had provided him to improve the property. Shaw
asserted claims for conversion, breach of contract, and negligence and sought
money damages and a declaratory judgment.
In August 2017, Shaw moved for summary judgment, arguing that she was
entitled as a matter of law to damages for the converted funds, damages for rent for
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the period during which Williams possessed the property without paying for it, and
a declaration that title to the property was vested in her.
About a month after Shaw filed her summary-judgment motion, Williams
filed a counterclaim. He asserted claims for fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation,
unjust enrichment, and various statutory violations. He also sought a declaratory
judgment.
One week later, the trial court held a hearing on Shaw’s summary-judgment
motion. At the end of the hearing, the trial court granted Shaw’s motion. In its
order, the trial court (1) awarded Shaw damages for the converted funds and for
lost rent, (2) declared that the contract-for-deed was null and void, that full title to
the property was vested in Shaw, and that Shaw was entitled to immediate
possession of the property, and (3) ordered that Williams vacate the property
within a month. The summary-judgment order did not dismiss or otherwise dispose
of Williams’s counterclaims. Nor did it state that it was final and appealable or
otherwise contain finality language.
Williams appeals.
Lack of Jurisdiction
Absent a statute allowing an interlocutory appeal, a party may only appeal
from a final judgment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 51.012, .014;
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). When, as here,
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“there has not been a conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not
final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and
party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all
claims and all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. “If a party appeals from a
summary judgment that disposes of some but not all claims between the parties,
the appellate court must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.” Duke v. Am.
W. Steel, LLC, 526 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no
pet.).
The trial court’s summary-judgment order is not a final judgment. It does not
actually dispose of every pending claim and party or clearly and unequivocally
state that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d
at 205. Williams’s counterclaims against Shaw are still pending.
A party seeking review of a partial summary judgment generally must show
that the interlocutory order is appealable under Section 51.014 of the Civil Practice
and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a) (permitting,
under certain circumstances, interlocutory appeals from orders disposing of
specified claims and issues). Williams has not argued or otherwise demonstrated
that Section 51.014 applies. Nor did he respond to our notice of intent to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction, which sought an explanation of why we have jurisdiction in
this case.
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Because the record shows that Williams’s counterclaims against Shaw
remain pending in the trial court, the trial court’s summary-judgment order is not
final and appealable. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Massengale, and Brown.
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