Isaac Anthony Castrellon v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-22-00143-CR
___________________________
ISAAC ANTHONY CASTRELLON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from 396th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1589127D
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Isaac Anthony Castrellon appeals his sentences of ten years’
imprisonment1 for the offenses of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury,
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and accident involving serious bodily injury.
We will affirm.
I. Background
In June 2019, Castrellon was indicted for (1) second-degree felony aggravated
assault causing serious bodily injury (Count 1), (2) second-degree felony aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon (Count 2), and (3) third-degree felony accident involving
serious bodily injury (Count 3). The indictment also contained a separate deadly-
weapon-finding-notice paragraph.2
In July 2021, the State offered Castrellon a plea bargain whereby he would
receive six years’ incarceration in exchange for a guilty plea. However, Castrellon
rejected the State’s offer.
In January 2022, after being admonished by the trial court, Castrellon pleaded
guilty 3 to all three offenses and “true” to the indictment’s deadly weapon allegation.
1
As detailed below, these sentences are to run concurrently.
2
This paragraph indicates that a “DEADLY WEAPON, NAMELY: A
MOTOR VEHICLE” was used during the commission of or immediate flight from
the offenses.
3
Castrellon entered an “open plea”—that is, a guilty plea without the benefit of
a plea agreement.
2
Although Count 3 is a third-degree felony with a punishment range of two to ten
years and a fine not to exceed $10,000, the written admonishment form listed the
punishment range for all three offenses as two to 20 years in prison and a fine not to
exceed $10,000 (the punishment range applicable to second-degree felonies).
Nevertheless, Castrellon signed the admonishment form, which contained a written
waiver including acknowledgments that, among other things, Castrellon fully
understood the trial court’s admonishments and had no questions; he was aware of
the consequences of his plea; and his plea was knowingly, freely, and voluntarily
entered. The trial court acknowledged that the admonishments had been given, that
Castrellon’s plea was intelligently, freely, and voluntarily entered, and that the court
was accepting Castrellon’s guilty plea.
In July 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. After receiving the
presentence investigation report and hearing from Castrellon’s three witnesses, the
trial court sentenced Castrellon to ten years’ imprisonment on each count, with the
sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Castrellon raises two points. First, he asserts that his guilty plea was
involuntary because he was admonished for a second-degree felony punishment range
for all three offenses but the third count with which he was charged—accident
involving serious bodily injury—is actually a third-degree felony. Second, he contends
that the deadly weapon findings in the trial court’s judgments should be stricken
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because they are not sufficiently specific and do not match the allegations in the
indictment.
A. Point One: The Trial Court’s Incorrect Admonishment Did Not Render
Castrellon’s Guilty Plea Involuntary
In his first point, Castrellon argues that the trial court’s failure to properly
admonish him of the correct punishment range for Count 3 rendered his decision to
enter a guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. This argument lacks merit.
Under Article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a trial court
must admonish a defendant of the punishment range attached to the offense before
accepting the defendant’s guilty plea. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(1).
The purpose of Article 26.13 is to ensure that only constitutionally valid pleas—those
that are both knowing and voluntary—are entered by defendants and accepted by trial
courts. Meyers v. State, 623 S.W.2d 397, 402–03 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981)
(citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970)). An admonishment
that substantially complies with Article 26.13 is sufficient and establishes a prima facie
case that the defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 26.13(c); Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed us that when the record reflects
that the trial court incorrectly admonished a defendant regarding the punishment
range but assessed punishment within both the actual and misstated ranges, the
admonishment substantially complies with Article 26.13. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197;
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see Lemmons v. State, 133 S.W.3d 751, 757 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d).
The burden then shifts to the defendant to affirmatively show that he was not aware
of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed, such that the plea
was rendered involuntary. See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197 (interpreting Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c)); Lemmons, 133 S.W.3d at 757. In other words, once
substantial compliance is shown, “[a] defendant may still raise the claim that his plea
was not voluntary; however, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he
did not fully understand the consequences of his plea such that he suffered harm.”
Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197.
Here, the trial court substantially complied with Article 26.13(a)(1) because it
assessed Castrellon’s punishment within the actual and misstated ranges.4
See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197. Thus, to prevail on his first point, Castrellon must
affirmatively show that, despite the trial court’s substantial compliance, he was not
aware of the consequences of his plea as it related to the correct punishment range for
his offenses and was misled or harmed by the court’s admonishment. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c); Lemmons, 133 S.W.3d at 759. Castrellon has not met
this burden.
4
As noted above, the admonishment form incorrectly stated the punishment
range as two to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine not to exceed $10,000—the range
for second degree felonies—whereas the actual punishment range for Count 3—a
third degree felony—was two to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine not to exceed
$10,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33–12.34. Thus, the trial court’s sentence of
ten years’ imprisonment falls within both the actual and misstated ranges.
5
In Martinez, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that because “[t]he only
support in the record for appellant’s contention that his plea was involuntary [was] the
incorrect admonishment form,” the appellant had not sustained his burden to show
the involuntariness of his plea. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197. The same is true here.
Like the appellant in Martinez, Castrellon points to nothing in the appellate record
except the incorrect admonishment form to indicate that he was actually harmed or
misled in making his determination to enter a guilty plea. See id. Instead, he relies
solely on the error in the admonishment form to show that his plea was involuntary.
Accordingly, Castrellon has not satisfied his burden. See id.We overrule Castrellon’s first point.
B. Point Two: The Deadly Weapon Findings in the Judgments Need Not
Be Stricken
In his second point, Castrellon argues that the deadly weapon findings in the
trial court’s judgments should be stricken because they are not sufficiently specific and
do not accurately reflect the deadly weapon allegations in the indictment. Specifically,
Castrellon asserts that the recitation under the “Findings on Deadly Weapon” section
of each judgment of “Yes, not a firearm” constitutes an inaccurate, non-specific
deadly weapon finding. This argument is meritless.
If a defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of or
the immediate flight from a felony offense, a deadly weapon finding may be entered
on the judgment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 42.01, § 1(21), 42A.054(b)–(c). A
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deadly weapon finding must be specific and separate from the charged offense.
Ex parte Brooks, 722 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Thus, “the judgment
must contain something more than, for example, the mere ‘recitation of the offense in
the judgment with the words ‘deadly weapon,’ or ‘firearm used,’ or other similar
phrases added to the offense for which the defendant is convicted.’” Cobb v. State, 95
S.W.3d 664, 667 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (quoting Brooks, 722
S.W.2d at 142). But a trial court’s utilization of standard deadly weapon findings in
pre-printed judgment forms may satisfy the requirements of specificity and
separateness. See id. (holding that the standard Harris County affirmative deadly
weapon finding—“Affirmative finding: deadly weapon: yes (circled)”—satisfied the
requirements of separateness and specificity); Polanco v. State, 914 S.W.2d 269, 272
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, pet ref’d) (holding pre-printed, fill-in-the-blank
judgment containing “a pre-printed item: FINDING USE OF DEADLY
WEAPON” next to which was typed “Affirmative Finding” satisfied the requirements
of separateness and specificity). And a deadly weapon finding need not indicate the
specific type of deadly weapon found unless it was a firearm. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 42A.054(d); Hooks v. State, 860 S.W.2d 110, 114 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993) (interpreting former Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) (repealed
2017)).
Here, the trial court’s judgments indicated its deadly weapon finding in two
separate places. As noted above, the first page of each judgment contained a
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recitation of “Yes, not a firearm” under the section labeled “Findings on Deadly
Weapon.” In addition, each judgment’s second page contained a section for “special
findings” under which the trial court noted “DEADLY WEAPON FINDING
NOTICE – TRUE.” These affirmative deadly weapon findings are specific and
separate from the charged offense and therefore satisfy the requirements of articles
42.01 and 42A.054 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. arts. 42.01, § 1(21), 42A.054(b)–(c); Brooks, 722 S.W.2d at 142.
Castrellon suggests that the deadly weapon findings were inadequate because
they did not specifically identify the type of deadly weapon reflected in the
indictment—a motor vehicle. But because the deadly weapon associated with
Castrellon’s offense was not a firearm, the judgment need not specify that the deadly
weapon was a motor vehicle. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.054(d); Hooks,
860 S.W.2d at 114 n.7.
We overrule Castrellon’s second point.
III. Conclusion
Having overruled both of Castrellon’s points, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie Sudderth
Chief Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: February 23, 2023
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