Jermey Shoun Myers AKA Jeremy Shoun Myers v. State ( 2018 )


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  •                      In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-18-00027-CR
    ___________________________
    JERMEY SHOUN MYERS AKA JEREMY SHOUN MYERS, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1
    Tarrant County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 1433128D
    Before Sudderth, C.J.; Meier and Kerr, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    A jury found that Jermey Shoun Myers committed capital murder, the trial
    court sentenced him to life without parole as required by law, and Myers appealed. See
    
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.31
    (a)(2), 19.03(a)(2) (West Supp. 2018). In a single issue,
    Myers contends that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on the lesser-
    included offense of murder because there was evidence from which the jury could
    have rationally concluded that he did not participate in the victim’s kidnapping—the
    aggravating offense that turned her murder into capital murder. We hold that the trial
    court did not err, and so we affirm.
    I. Background
    In the indictment, the State alleged that Myers caused Brittany Chappell’s death
    while committing or attempting to commit the offense of kidnapping, a capital-
    murder felony. See 
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03
    (a)(2). During the charge
    conferences, Myers twice requested and the trial court twice denied a jury instruction
    on the lesser-included offense of murder based on Myers’s contention that he had not
    participated in Chappell’s kidnapping.
    Leveraging the trial court’s denial into his final argument, Myers urged the jury
    to acquit him of capital murder because the State had not proved the aggravating
    offense, kidnapping. In its rebuttal, the State argued the contrary: “That is kidnapping.
    If that’s not kidnapping, I don’t know what is.”
    2
    With the battle lines drawn over whether Myers murdered Chappell while
    participating in her kidnapping, the jury sent out the following note: “Our qu[e]stions
    are around kidnapping. [1] What’s the legal definition of kidnapping? We just want the
    simplest term of kidnapping. [2] What does restrain have to do w/ the charges?
    [3] Does [‘]restrain[’] have the same meaning as [‘]abduct[’]?” The trial court
    responded that the definitions were in the charge and instructed the jury to refer to
    the charge and to continue deliberating. And indeed, the charge did define those
    terms.1 Less than an hour later, the jury found Myers guilty of capital murder.
    1
    Page 1 provided, in pertinent part:
    A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or
    knowingly causes the death of an individual.
    A person commits the offense of capital murder if the person
    intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or
    attempting to commit kidnapping.
    A person commits the offense of kidnapping if he intentionally or
    knowingly abducts another person.
    ....
    “Restrain” means to restrict a person’s movements without
    consent, so as to interfere substantially with the person’s liberty, by
    moving the person from one place to another or by confining the
    person. Restraint is “without consent” if it is accomplished by force,
    intimidation, or deception.
    “Abduct” means to restrain a person with intent to prevent her
    liberation by secreting or holding her in a place where she is not likely to
    be found; or using or threatening to use deadly force.
    See 
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 20.01
    (1)(A), (2)(A), (B), 20.03(a) (West 2011).
    3
    II. Issue
    In contending that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on the
    lesser-included offense of murder, Myers essentially argues that there were instances
    during the kidnapping when he was absent and other times when, although present,
    he passively observed; thus, he suggests, the jury could have used those instances to
    acquit him of kidnapping. Pointing to the jury note, he argues that the jury itself
    questioned his role, if any, in the kidnapping. While we agree that Myers was not
    always present or actively participating in the kidnapping, we disagree that it makes
    any difference for lesser-included-offense, jury-charge purposes.
    III. Discussion
    A. Standard of review
    We use a two-step analysis to determine whether an appellant was entitled to a
    lesser-included-offense instruction. Hall v. State, 
    225 S.W.3d 524
    , 528 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2007); Rousseau v. State, 
    855 S.W.2d 666
    , 672–73 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
    
    510 U.S. 919
     (1993). First, the lesser offense must come within code of criminal
    procedure article 37.09’s requirements. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09 (West
    2006); Moore v. State, 
    969 S.W.2d 4
    , 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Next, some evidence
    must exist in the record that would permit a jury to rationally find that if the
    defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense. Hall, 
    225 S.W.3d at 536
    ;
    Salinas v. State, 
    163 S.W.3d 734
    , 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at
    672–73.
    4
    The parties do not dispute—and we agree—that as alleged here, murder is a
    lesser-included offense of capital murder under article 37.09. See Tex. Code Crim.
    Proc. Ann. art. 37.09(1); Zamora v. State, 
    998 S.W.2d 290
    , 293 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
    1999, pet. ref’d).
    So the dispositive issue is whether some record evidence exists from which a
    jury could rationally find that if Myers is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense
    of murder. See Hall, 
    225 S.W.3d at 536
    ; Salinas, 
    163 S.W.3d at 741
    ; Rousseau,
    855 S.W.2d at 672–73. We evaluate the evidence in the context of the entire record.
    Moore, 
    969 S.W.2d at 8
    . There must be some evidence from which a rational jury
    could acquit the defendant of the greater offense while convicting him of the lesser-
    included offense. 
    Id.
     We may not consider whether the evidence is credible,
    controverted, or in conflict with other evidence. 
    Id.
     Anything more than a scintilla of
    evidence may be sufficient to entitle a defendant to a lesser charge. Hall, 
    225 S.W.3d at 536
    . The evidence must show that the lesser-included offense is a valid, rational
    alternative to the charged offense. 
    Id.
     It is not enough that such evidence “would
    support a conviction for the lesser[-]included offense, as if that were the only offense
    the jury was authorized to convict upon.” Moreno v. State, 
    858 S.W.2d 453
    , 459 (Tex.
    Crim. App.), cert. denied, 
    510 U.S. 966
     (1993). Rather, the record must also show a
    rational basis for the jury to reject convicting the defendant of the greater, capital
    offense. Zamora, 
    998 S.W.2d at 293
    .
    5
    B. Myers’s arguments
    Throughout Myers’s brief, he points to times and events when he was either
    not present or was not an active participant. For example, Myers correctly notes that
    he did not participate in Chappell’s initial abduction and concludes that by the time he
    appeared, others had already completed her kidnapping. But caselaw refutes Myers’s
    argument: an abduction and restraint do not necessarily occur in a single act but form
    a continuous, ongoing event. See Weaver v. State, 
    657 S.W.2d 148
    , 150 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1983). As we will show, Chappell remained restrained well beyond the initial
    abduction.
    Myers also cherry-picks moments when although he was present, he was not
    actively participating. For example, he can point to times when he was not the person
    who put Chappell in a closet, to moments when he did not kick Chappell while others
    did, to an aggravated assault and robbery of another person (Justin Francis) at which
    Myers asserts he was a passive observer, and to testimony indicating that he played no
    part in the decision to kill Chappell. These arguments also fail because the charge
    authorized the jury to convict him as a party. See 
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02
    (a)(2) (West 2011).2 Myers appears to argue that he simply was present and that
    2
    The charge included a “party” instruction:
    A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by
    the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the
    commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or
    6
    presence alone is not enough to make him a party. See Barrientos, 539 S.W.3d at 489–
    90. But the evidence showed far more than mere presence; it showed that he actively
    participated, with the intent to promote and assist the kidnapping.
    C. The evidence
    The evidence showed two other parties to the offense: Albert Martinez and his
    girlfriend Alexandria Flores.
    Martinez was a face-tattooed convicted felon who was a member of the Tango
    Blast prison gang. He did not testify.
    Flores did testify and acknowledged pleading guilty to murder in exchange for a
    35-year sentence and her testimony against her co-defendants. She also acknowledged
    that Martinez pleaded guilty to capital murder and received a life-without-parole
    sentence.
    1. Flores’s testimony
    Flores testified that in late September 2015, she and Martinez met Chappell at a
    Fort Worth “game room,” which witnesses described as an illegal gambling
    establishment, and invited Chappell back to their apartment. Flores asserted that
    although neither she nor Martinez had ever met Chappell before, Chappell accepted
    their invitation and that not only did Chappell accept, but she even had the person she
    attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Mere presence
    alone will not constitute one a party to an offense.
    See id.; Barrientos v. State, 
    539 S.W.3d 482
    , 489–90 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2017, no pet.).
    7
    was with drive the three of them to Martinez and Flores’s apartment, which other
    witnesses described as being in an unsafe neighborhood. One witness stated that the
    apartment was in Fort Worth’s Stop Six area, another described it as being in “the
    projects,” and the investigating detective labeled it simply as in an area of “very high”
    crime—an area in which he had previously investigated two murders and assisted
    other detectives on approximately four or five other cases. The detective agreed that it
    was not an area where people tended to cooperate with the police.3
    Inside the apartment, the three went upstairs to Martinez and Flores’s
    bedroom, where they smoked methamphetamine.4 There was a second bedroom
    upstairs, but Flores’s six-month-old daughter occupied it.5
    3
    Flores was the only witness who testified about how she and Martinez
    managed to get Chappell into their apartment, and as noted, she testified that
    Chappell went there willingly. The unidentified driver did not testify. Other evidence
    suggested that Francis could supply Martinez with Rohypnol, “the date rape drug,”
    but at trial Francis denied having sold any Rohypnol to Martinez before the offense
    occurred. (The medical examiner did not check for Rohypnol during Chappell’s
    autopsy.) Regardless of whether Chappell went voluntarily to the apartment, we agree
    with Myers that the evidence shows that he arrived after Martinez and Flores had
    already secured Chappell in their bedroom.
    4
    The toxicology confirmed that Chappell had methamphetamine in her system.
    5
    Flores maintained that her daughter was in the apartment only after they had
    killed Chappell and while they were disposing of Chappell’s body. Sometime after the
    murder, Flores absconded, and her understanding was that someone had later
    swapped the bedrooms so that her daughter now occupied the bedroom in which
    Chappell had been killed.
    8
    At some point, Chappell ostensibly disclosed that she knew a place with
    money, guns, and a safe. Because Flores and Martinez wanted to “rob [the] property,”
    Martinez started questioning Chappell about the location. But when Chappell refused
    to tell, Martinez hit her repeatedly with a belt, and after Martinez rebuked Flores for
    not participating, Flores punched Chappell with her fists.
    Myers, who lived next door, later came over to Martinez and Flores’s
    apartment, and Martinez took him upstairs to the bedroom and showed him
    Chappell, who was then lying on the floor. After talking briefly to Martinez, Myers
    too started hitting Chappell—for perhaps 10 to 15 minutes—after which Martinez
    put Chappell into a closet.
    Flores testified that they held Chappell for about two days during which time
    Chappell was repeatedly put into and taken out of the closet; Flores also said that
    Myers was in and out of the bedroom throughout that time. When asked whether
    Myers ever helped put Chappell back in the closet, Flores answered, “Yes. She was in
    and out so many times, you know.” When asked how many times Myers helped, she
    answered that she did not know, just that it was “[n]ot every time.” The first time
    Myers appeared with Chappell present—the time he beat her for 10 to 15 minutes—
    Flores said that it was fair to say that both Myers and Martinez put Chappell back in
    the closet.
    Flores next described how the decision to kill Chappell came about, asserting
    that initially she and Martinez had talked about letting Chappell go. As Flores was
    9
    untying Chappell’s hands, Chappell threatened to tell—presumably the authorities—if
    they released her. Martinez heard Chappell’s comment, and after he expressed some
    confusion over it, Chappell repeated that if they let her go, she was going to tell on
    them. Apparently rethinking the matter, Martinez then decided that they would have
    to kill her.
    Martinez and Flores initially tried to suffocate Chappell with a Walmart
    shopping bag, but their first attempt failed when Chappell bit through the bag.
    Because Chappell was struggling, Myers held her down by her legs and thighs while
    Flores, who by this time “just want[ed] it to be over,” grabbed a shower curtain and
    gave it to Martinez, who then wrapped it around Chappell’s head, face, and neck while
    Myers continued to hold her legs. Martinez squeezed Chappell’s neck until she
    stopped struggling. When asked how long Chappell struggled, Flores responded,
    “Well, at the time it seemed like forever.” Martinez and Myers then pushed Chappell’s
    body back into the closet.6
    After Myers had helped kill Chappell, he continued to act in lockstep with
    Martinez and Flores. Myers participated in disposing of Chappell’s body, which (with
    the help of a fourth person) consisted of loading her body in an SUV, going to a
    Chappell’s mother testified that Chappell was 30 years old at the time of her
    6
    death, that Chappell and her two young children lived with her, and that she was
    helping support Chappell while Chappell was between jobs.
    10
    filling station to buy gas, transporting the body to a brushy area, dousing it with gas,
    and setting it on fire.7
    Once back at Martinez and Flores’s apartment, Martinez recorded a
    conversation on his cell phone during which Myers can be heard saying—at least
    according to Myers’s ex-girlfriend who recognized his voice—“we killed that bitch.”
    Flores recognized Martinez’s, Myers’s, and her voice on the recording and admitted at
    trial that they were discussing Chappell’s murder. She maintained that Martinez had
    put a gun to her head during the entire conversation. Myers’s father, whom the State
    also called to the stand, acknowledged recognizing Myers’s voice but denied being
    able to make out what Myers had said. At the recording’s end, Martinez can be heard
    saying, “I recorded 12 minutes of y’all.” Martinez apparently intended to use the
    recording as an insurance policy against Flores and Myers.
    2. Francis’s testimony
    Flores was not the only person who provided testimony placing Myers in
    Martinez and Flores’ apartment during the kidnapping. Francis testified that after he
    delivered Rohypnol to Martinez and Flores’s apartment, Martinez told him to wait;
    Martinez, Flores, and Myers then left the room. About 15 minutes later when the
    7
    Pursuant to a plea bargain, this fourth person pleaded guilty to tampering with
    or fabricating physical evidence by altering, destroying, or concealing a human corpse.
    See 
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.09
    (c) (West 2016). In exchange for his guilty plea, he
    received a seven-year sentence and had to testify truthfully, but he did not testify at
    Myers’s trial.
    11
    three returned, Flores put a gun to Francis’s head while Martinez accused him of
    delivering fake drugs; Martinez then went through Francis’s pockets and took his
    money, phone, and a bag of methamphetamine that Francis had hidden in his sock.
    While all this was happening, Myers pulled up his shirt to display a gun in his
    waistband to Francis. When asked whether Myers was showing the gun as a sign that
    he was on Francis’s side and would intervene if things went poorly, Francis
    responded, “No. . . . [That] [d]oesn’t fit with what happened.” Francis testified that by
    raising his waistband and displaying his gun, Myers was communicating that he was
    not afraid to use it.
    Francis then related how Martinez walked him into a bedroom and how
    Martinez dragged a woman—“belly down and her arms . . . tied behind her back”—
    out of a closet and threw her on the bed. Francis described the woman as “[f]rantic”
    as she asked “why they were doing this to her.” When Flores pointed out to Martinez
    that the woman had bled on the bed, Martinez erupted in anger and threw the woman
    on the floor where Martinez and Flores then kicked her. After the kicking stopped,
    Martinez dragged the woman back into the closet while Myers, who had been
    standing nearby but not participating in the kicking, held the door open and then
    closed it behind her. Martinez let Francis leave after he promised to return with real
    Rohypnol, but Francis did not return and testified that he never intended to. He said,
    “I was pretty scared for my life, and I really just wanted to leave any way I could.”
    12
    Not only did Francis not return, but he did not call the police to tell them
    about the obviously kidnapped woman he had seen in Martinez and Flores’s
    apartment. When confronted about not helping Chappell, he explained, “I was just
    scared.”
    Like Flores, Francis admitted testifying as part of a plea bargain: in exchange
    for his testimony, the State did not prosecute him for felony drug possession and
    agreed to probation along with credit for time served for two driving-while-
    intoxicated charges.
    D. Analysis
    From start to finish, the evidence—regardless of its source—showed Myers
    acting in concert with Martinez and Flores. Martinez and Flores kidnapped Chappell
    and beat her in an unsuccessful attempt to compel her to identify a location they
    wanted to rob. Myers beat Chappell at least once. That he did not participate in every
    beating and at least once merely watched does not affirmatively show that he was not
    a party to the kidnapping.
    And Myers also restrained Chappell. Evidence showed that on at least one
    occasion he held the door open while Martinez put Chappell into the closet and
    closed the door behind her. Ultimately, though, the issue is not really limited to
    whether Myers put Chappell into the closet. She was as much restrained in the
    bedroom as she was in the bedroom closet. Flores—speaking of her own attempts to
    leave after Martinez had hit her on many previous occasions—testified that leaving
    13
    the bedroom against Martinez’s wishes, much less leaving the apartment, was not an
    option because Martinez’s father guarded the downstairs area.8 Thus at the very least,
    Myers participated in restraining Chappell in the bedroom.
    To be entitled to a jury charge on the lesser-included offense of murder, Myers
    had to show that the jury could rationally reject the greater offense—capital murder—
    by finding that Myers committed only the murder but not the aggravating offense of
    kidnapping. See Zamora, 
    998 S.W.2d at 293
    . Although the jury was free to believe or
    disbelieve all or part of the evidence, it would be irrational in this case for the jury to
    simultaneously believe that Myers participated in the murder but not in the
    kidnapping, which preceded and ultimately led to the murder. See 
    id.
     Myers’s
    participation in the murder necessarily arose from his participation in the kidnapping.
    We thus hold that the record does not reflect a rational basis for the jury to
    have rejected the aggravating offense of kidnapping and to have found Myers guilty
    only of murdering Chappell. See 
    id.
     at 293–94. Thus, the trial court did not err by
    denying Myers’s requested charge, and we overrule his sole issue.
    IV.   Conclusion
    Having overruled Myers’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    8
    Martinez’s father babysat Flores’s daughter in her bedroom while Martinez
    and Flores carried Chappell’s body downstairs.
    14
    /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
    ELIZABETH KERR
    JUSTICE
    Do Not Publish
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    Delivered: December 13, 2018
    15
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-18-00027-CR

Filed Date: 12/13/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/15/2018