Dennis Keith Brooks v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                            COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-14-00269-CR
    NO. 02-14-00270-CR
    DENNIS KEITH BROOKS                                                APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                      STATE
    ----------
    FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NOS. 1257517D, 1292820D
    ----------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION1 ON REHEARING
    ----------
    We have reviewed Appellant’s motion for rehearing, asserting that the
    judicial confession signed by Appellant Dennis Keith Brooks was not admitted
    into evidence. We deny the motion for rehearing. We withdraw our March 26,
    2015 opinion and judgment and substitute the following to make it clear that the
    trial court took judicial notice of the judicial confession.
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    Brooks pleaded guilty to two separate felony offenses of driving while
    intoxicated, and the trial court sentenced him to two years’ confinement for each
    offense with the sentences to run concurrently. In his sole point, Brooks argues
    that the State presented no evidence against him when he entered his guilty
    pleas, and thus there is no evidence supporting his guilty pleas. We will affirm.
    The appellate standard of review announced in Jackson v. Virginia2 is not
    applicable when the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enters a
    plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Chindaphone v. State, 
    241 S.W.3d 217
    , 219
    (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d). A sufficiency review on appeal of a
    guilty plea is confined to determining whether there is sufficient evidence to
    support the judgment of guilt under article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal
    Procedure. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (West 2005). The appellate
    court will affirm the trial court’s judgment if the State introduced evidence that
    embraces every essential element of the charged offense and is sufficient to
    establish the defendant’s guilt. 
    Chindaphone, 241 S.W.3d at 219
    .
    No person can be convicted of a felony except on the verdict of a jury duly
    rendered and recorded or when the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo
    contendere and has, in writing in open court, waived his right to trial by jury in
    accordance with articles 1.13 and 1.14, provided that the State presents
    sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt and that the court accepts the
    2
    
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    (1979).
    2
    evidence as the basis for its judgment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. A
    trial court cannot render a felony conviction based on a guilty plea without
    sufficient evidence to support the charged offense.        Menefee v. State, 
    287 S.W.3d 9
    , 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15.
    A judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a conviction
    based on a guilty plea and satisfies the requirements of article 1.15 as long as
    the judicial confession embraces every element of the charged offense.
    
    Menefee, 287 S.W.3d at 13
    ; Dinnery v. State, 
    592 S.W.2d 343
    , 353 (Tex. Crim.
    App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (op. on reh’g); 
    Chindaphone, 241 S.W.3d at 219
    . When
    the defendant specifically states in the judicial confession, “I have read the
    indictment or information filed in this case and I committed each and every act
    alleged therein,” the judicial confession alone is sufficient evidence to support the
    guilty plea under article 1.15 of the code of criminal procedure. 
    Dinnery, 592 S.W.2d at 353
    ; 
    Chindaphone, 241 S.W.3d at 220
    .
    Here, Brooks executed a judicial confession in each case that specifically
    states,
    I have read the indictment or information filed in this case and I
    committed each and every act alleged therein, except those acts
    waived by the State. All facts alleged in the indictment or
    information are true and correct. I am guilty of the instant offense as
    well as all lesser included offenses.
    On the page of the written plea admonishments immediately following the judicial
    confession, the following paragraph appears:
    3
    In open court we join and approve the waiver of jury trial . . .
    and the stipulations of evidence pursuant to Art. 1.15, Code of
    Criminal Procedure. . . . It is agreed that the Court may take judicial
    notice of this document and the Court takes judicial notice of same.
    The signatures of Brooks’s attorney, the prosecutor, and the trial judge appear
    after the paragraph.      The trial court’s judicial notice of a judicial confession
    satisfies the requirement of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 1.15 that
    evidence be introduced to support a plea of guilty.        See 
    Chindaphone, 241 S.W.3d at 219
    (stating that when trial court takes judicial notice of a judicial
    confession, the State is not required to introduce the judicial confession into
    evidence).    Because Brooks executed a judicial confession in each case
    acknowledging that he had read the indictment and had committed every act
    alleged in the indictment and because the trial court took judicial notice of each
    confession, we hold that sufficient evidence exists to support Brooks’s guilty
    pleas. See 
    Menefee, 287 S.W.3d at 13
    ; see also 
    Dinnery, 592 S.W.2d at 353
    ;
    
    Chindaphone, 241 S.W.3d at 220
    . We therefore overrule Brooks’s sole point and
    affirm the trial court’s judgments.
    /s/ Sue Walker
    SUE WALKER
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: GARDNER, DAUPHINOT, and WALKER, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: May 14, 2015
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-14-00269-CR

Filed Date: 5/18/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/18/2015