Arnold Harms v. State ( 2005 )

                             NUMBER 13-03-00744-CR

                         COURT OF APPEALS

                     THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                         CORPUS CHRISTI B EDINBURG

ARNOLD HARMS A/K/A ARNOLD C. HARMS, JR.,                       Appellant,

                                                             v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                                    Appellee.

    On appeal from the 319th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Hinojosa and Rodriguez

                         Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa

A jury found appellant, Arnold Harms a/k/a Arnold C. Harms, Jr., guilty of one count of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit a felony offense to an elderly individual^[1] and one count of injury to an elderly individual with a deadly weapon.^[2]  The jury also made an affirmative finding that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of both offenses.  The jury assessed appellant=s punishment at (1) ten years= imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for the burglary of a habitation count and (2) fifteen years= imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for the injury to an elderly individual count.  The jury recommended that the ten-year prison sentence for the burglary of a habitation count be suspended and that appellant be placed on community supervision for ten years.  The trial court followed the recommendation, suspended the ten-year prison sentence for the burglary of a habitation count and placed appellant on community supervision for ten years.  The trial court has certified that this is not a plea-bargain case and appellant has the right of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).  In a single point of error, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support appellant=s convictions. Specifically, appellant asserts the jury=s rejection of appellant=s insanity defense is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.  We affirm.       

                                                   A.  Factual Background

On June 13, 2003, appellant entered 67-year-old Gerald Kipp=s home through the garage side door, went upstairs to his bedroom, and attacked him with a butcher knife.  Appellant stabbed Kipp approximately eight times.  When police officers arrived, they separated the two men and arrested appellant.

Appellant testified that he went over to talk to Kipp.  After knocking loudly on the front door and getting no response, he went around and found the garage side door open.  Appellant called out for Kipp and, getting no response, entered the home. He then went upstairs to a room where he noticed a light was on.  As he entered the room, appellant found his ex-wife lying naked in bed with Kipp. Appellant testified that he was horrified, his legs were shaking, and he turned and ran downstairs.  Everything then went black.  When appellant Asnapped out of it,@ somebody was holding a knife on him and the police were present.

            Dr. Raul Capitaine, a psychiatrist, testified as an expert witness for appellant. Dr. Capitaine opined that appellant was insane at the time of the offense and, because of that defect, did not know his conduct was wrong.  Dr. Capitaine testified appellant did not remember anything that happened after he saw his ex-wife naked in bed with another man.      Dr. Joel Kutnick, a psychiatrist, testified as an expert witness for the State.  Dr. Kutnick said he believed appellant was terribly depressed and very emotionally disturbed.  However, he did not believe appellant was insane at the time of the offense.  By its guilty verdict, the jury implicitly found appellant was not insane at the time of the offense.

                                  B.  Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence

When we review a claim that a jury=s finding against the defense of insanity is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, we consider all evidence relevant to the issue of insanity in a neutral light to determine whether the finding against the affirmative defense is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.  Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Love v. State, 909 S.W.2d 930, 943 (Tex. App.BEl Paso 1995, pet. ref=d); see also Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  We inquire whether a rational trier of fact could have determined the defendant failed to prove the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Love, 909 S.W.2d at 943.  Even where the finding of guilt might be adequately supported if taken alone, it may still be against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence when viewed using the proper standard.  Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 875.  The issue of insanity at the time of the offense lies within the province of the jury, and this Court will overturn the jury=s decision only where insanity is undisputed or resolved to one end of the spectrum outside the realm of discretion.  Id. at 878.  We may reverse a jury's finding only if the verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is Amanifestly unjust,@ Ashocks the conscience,@ or Aclearly demonstrates bias.@  Meraz, 785 S.W.2d at 154.

                                                                  C.  Analysis

To establish an insanity defense, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the offense, he, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.  Ward v. State, 787 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1990, pet. ref'd).  Expert testimony on the issue of a person's inability to determine right from wrong does not establish insanity as a matter of law.  Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). In fact, while expert testimony may be helpful to a jury, the issue of insanity is outside the purview of medical experts and should be left to the discretion of the trier of fact.  Id. at 952‑53.

Dr. Capitaine, appellant=s expert witness, said appellant experienced disassociative states during which he was unable to distinguish right from wrong.  Dr. Capitaine opined that appellant suffered from disassociative amnesia and could not remember anything that happened during the commission of the offense.  Experiencing the trauma of seeing the woman he believed to be his wife, naked in bed with another man, made appellant lose complete contact with reality and made him enter a disassociative state.  It was Dr. Capitaine=s expert opinion that appellant was legally insane at the time of the offense.  On cross-examination, Dr. Capitaine admitted that his diagnoses of Aadjustment disorder and disassociative amnesia are not serious mental illness.@

Dr. Kutnick, the State=s expert witness, testified that even if appellant suffered memory loss as he claimed, he still had his full mental faculties at the time of the offense and that appellant=s rage and anger, which had been building over a period of months, did not constitute a mental illness or prevent him from knowing that his attack on Kipp was wrong.  Dr. Kutnick testified that appellant=s rage and hostility stemmed from his obsession with his ex-wife, but Aincreasing rage and hostility still allow you to know that certain actions are wrong.@  Dr. Kutnick stated that even though a person has memory loss due to disassociative amnesia, Awhile the event is going on they have their full mental faculties.@

While no single piece of evidence is dispositive, the record clearly shows controverting evidence regarding whether appellant knew the difference between right and wrong. We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have resolved the conflicting testimony regarding legal insanity against appellant.  We hold that the jury=s implicit rejection of appellant=s insanity defense is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is Amanifestly unjust,@ Ashocked the conscience,@ or Aclearly demonstrated bias.@  Accordingly, we overrule appellant=s sole point of error. 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA

Justice

Do not publish.  See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed this

the 4th day of August, 2005.

---

^[1] See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 30.02 (Vernon 2003).

^[2] See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 22.04 (Vernon 2003).