Ex Parte: Christopher Reveles ( 2007 )

NUMBER 13-06-00143-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG   

EX PARTE: CHRISTOPHER REVELES

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

of Cameron County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Vela Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez

Appellant, Christopher Reveles, appeals from an order denying habeas corpus relief. We affirm.

I. Background

On August 10, 1999, appellant waived his right to counsel and pleaded guilty to the offense of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. The trial court found appellant guilty and placed him on probation for twelve months. Appellant successfully completed his community supervision and was discharged on September 6, 2000. On January 6, 2006, appellant filed his application for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. The trial court conducted a hearing on appellant's application, issued an order finding appellant's waiver to be valid, and denied appellant habeas corpus relief. Appellant now appeals from that order.

II. Jurisdiction

Before addressing the merits of appellant's issues, we first determine whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. As a general rule, no appeal lies from the refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Gonzales, 12 S.W.3d 913, 914 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd). However, if the trial court undertakes to rule upon the merits of the application, even if the court does not actually issue the writ of habeas corpus, an appeal from the denial of the requested relief on the merits of the applicant's claim is appropriate. Ex parte Hargett, 819 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In this case, the record reflects the trial court denied appellant relief on the merits of his claims. Therefore, we conclude we have jurisdiction over the appeal. ⁽¹⁾

III. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review

The burden of proof in a habeas corpus hearing is on the applicant. Ex parte Garza, 192 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.); Barras v. State, 902 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, pet. ref'd). In reviewing the denial of habeas relief, we view the evidence in light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam); Ex parte Countryman, 180 S.W.3d 418, 418 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we must affirm that court's ruling. Parrish v. State, 38 S.W.3d 831, 834 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd).

IV. Waiver of Right to Counsel

In his sole issue on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in accepting appellant's guilty plea absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to counsel. The record shows that appellant waived his right to counsel and did not contest his guilt of the misdemeanor offense. Because appellant pleaded guilty and did not contest his guilt, the trial court was only required to determine whether appellant's waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; it was not required to admonish him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Hatten v. State, 71 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 116, 119-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Moreover, if a defendant in a misdemeanor case where guilt is not contested signs a written waiver of counsel in court and there is no contradicting evidence or any evidence that the defendant was coerced or intimidated, the record is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant's waiver of counsel was valid. Hatten v. State, 89 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (op. on remand).

Although there is no reporter's record from the plea proceedings, the clerk's record contains a written waiver of rights signed by appellant, the prosecutor, and the presiding judge. According to the written waiver, appellant was duly admonished of his right to be represented by legal counsel and his right to have legal counsel appointed if he could not afford to employ counsel. The written waiver also states that the trial court found appellant competent and that the plea was entered only after the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel.

Furthermore, the judgment reflects that appellant appeared in court, waived his right to counsel in open court, and then proceeded to plead guilty. There is nothing in the record that indicates appellant was coerced or intimidated or that his waiver of the right to counsel was not made knowingly or intelligently. Consequently, we cannot find that the trial court erred in accepting appellant's guilty plea. Appellant's issue on appeal is overruled.

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's application for writ of habeas corpus.

ROGELIO VALDEZ  

Chief Justice

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed

this the 16th day of August, 2007.

1. A defendant convicted of a misdemeanor offense may attack the validity of the conviction by way of habeas corpus if he is either (1) confined or restrained as a result of a misdemeanor charge or conviction; or (2) is no longer confined, but is subject to collateral legal consequences resulting from the conviction. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.09 (Vernon 2005); Ex parte McCullough, 966 S.W.2d 529, 531-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Ex parte Crosley, 548 S.W.2d 409, 409-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that "if a misdemeanor judgment is void, and its existence may have detrimental collateral consequences in some future proceeding, it may be collaterally attacked, whether or not a term of probation was successfully served out." Tatum v. State, 846 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (per curiam). Thus, the fact that appellant completed his term of probation does not preclude this court from hearing his appeal.