in the Interest of J.H., S v. and C v. Children ( 2022 )


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  •                   In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-22-00284-CV
    ___________________________
    IN THE INTEREST OF J.H., S.V., AND C.V., CHILDREN
    On Appeal from the 325th District Court
    Tarrant County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 325-695108-21
    Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Appellant D.V. (Mother) appeals a judgment terminating her parent–child
    relationship with her children, J.H., S.V., and C.V.1 The trial court found that the
    Department of Family and Protective Services had proved four conduct-based
    grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the
    children’s best interest. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (R),
    (2). The trial court awarded permanent managing conservatorship of J.H., S.V., and
    C.V. to the Department. Mother timely appealed.
    II. BACKGROUND
    Mother’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief asserting that “there are no
    potential meritorious grounds for appeal” and that Mother’s appeal is therefore
    frivolous. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744–45, 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    , 1400 (1967);
    see also In re K.M., 
    98 S.W.3d 774
    , 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, order)
    (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases), disp. on
    merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 
    2003 WL 2006583
    , at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1,
    1
    We use aliases for the children. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002
    (d); Tex. R.
    App. P. 9.8(b)(2). The trial court also terminated the parent–child relationship
    between J.H. and her alleged father, C.L. C.L. was never located and has not appealed
    the trial court’s termination order. C.A.’s parent–child relationship with S.V. and C.V.
    was also terminated. C.A. timely perfected his own appeal from the termination but
    subsequently moved to dismiss his appeal. We granted the motion and dismissed
    C.A.’s appeal only. In re J.H., No. 02-22-00284-CV, 
    2022 WL 4373601
    , at *1 (Tex.
    App.—Fort Worth Sept. 22, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
    2
    2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Counsel’s brief meets the Anders requirements
    by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are
    no arguable grounds to advance on appeal.
    We provided Mother the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate record
    and to file a pro se response, but she did not do so. The Department has agreed that
    Appellant has no meritorious grounds for appeal and thus has declined to file a
    responsive brief.
    III. DISCUSSION
    When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate
    record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-
    00219-CV, 
    2018 WL 4496240
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.)
    (mem. op.); see Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We also
    consider the Anders brief itself and, if filed, any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-
    18-00073-CV, 
    2018 WL 3288591
    , at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet.
    denied) (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
    (orig. proceeding).
    We have carefully reviewed appellate counsel’s Anders brief and the appellate
    record. Having found no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this appeal is
    without merit. See In re D.D., 
    279 S.W.3d 849
    , 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet.
    denied); see also Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
    3
    Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating the parent–child
    relationship between Mother and J.H., S.V., and C.V.
    Counsel remains appointed in this appeal through proceedings in the supreme
    court unless otherwise relieved from his duties for good cause in accordance with
    Family Code Section 107.016. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016
    ; In re P.M.,
    
    520 S.W.3d 24
    , 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (order).
    IV. CONCLUSION
    We agree with counsel that Mother’s appeal is frivolous; thus, we affirm the
    trial court’s judgment.
    /s/ Dana Womack
    Dana Womack
    Justice
    Delivered: November 17, 2022
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