in the Interest of F.M., a Child ( 2022 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-22-00270-CV
___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF F.M., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 324th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 324-698664-21
Before Kerr, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
F.M. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights
to his son F.M. (Finn)1 and awarding permanent managing conservatorship of Finn to
the Department of Family and Protective Services. 2 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (Q), (b)(2). We will affirm.
Father’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that Father’s
appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396,
1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003,
order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights-termination cases), disp.
on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May
1, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Father’s counsel has also moved to
withdraw as Father’s counsel.
The brief meets Anders’s requirements by presenting a professional evaluation
of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced
on appeal. Father’s counsel provided Father with copies of the Anders brief and the
withdrawal motion and has informed Father of his rights to request and to review the
1
We use aliases to identify the parties. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d);
Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
The trial court also terminated Finn’s mother’s parental rights, but Finn’s
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mother has not appealed.
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appellate record3 and to file a pro se response in this court. We also informed Father
that his appointed appellate counsel had filed an Anders brief and gave him an
opportunity to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se response to the Anders
brief.
Father filed a motion for pro se access to the record. We, in turn, sent him
copies of the appellate record and the Anders brief and gave him an opportunity to file
a response. Father filed a pro se response. The Department notified us that it agrees
with Father’s counsel that no meritorious grounds for appeal exist and thus has
declined to file a responsive brief.
In assessing the correctness of a compliant Anders brief’s conclusion that an
appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights is frivolous, we must
independently examine the appellate record to determine if any arguable grounds for
appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d
503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). We also consider the Anders brief itself and any pro se
response. In re K.M., No. 02-18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—
To that end, Father’s counsel explained to Father the process of obtaining the
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appellate record; furnished him with a motion for pro se access to the record, which
lacked only Father’s signature and date; and provided him with our mailing address
and the motion’s filing deadline.
3
Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403,
408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
We have carefully reviewed counsel’s Anders brief, the appellate record, and
Father’s pro se response. Finding nothing in the record that could arguably support an
appeal, we agree with counsel that Father’s appeal is frivolous and without merit. See
Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d
849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). We will thus affirm the trial court’s
order terminating Father’s parental rights to Finn.
But we deny Father’s counsel’s motion to withdraw because counsel did not
show good cause for withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the
appeal is frivolous. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (order); In re C.J.,
501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). Accordingly,
Father’s counsel remains appointed in this case through proceedings in the Texas
Supreme Court unless otherwise relieved from her duties for good cause in
accordance with Texas Family Code Section 107.016(2)(C). See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at
27–28; see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(2)(C).
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Delivered: November 17, 2022
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