Ford, Quinn Jr. ( 2015 )

PD-0800&0801-15
PD-0800&0801-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 6/29/2015 5:21:30 PM
Accepted 7/1/2015 1:36:55 PM
NO. PD-_______________ ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
Quinn Ford Jr., Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
***************
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
***************
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
NO. 02-14-00176-CR, 02-14-00177-CR
TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1267457, 1267459
R. Scott Walker
STATE BAR # 24004972
222 W. Exchange Avenue
July 1, 2015 Fort Worth, TX 76164
(817) 478-9999
(817) 977-0163 FACSIMILE
scott@lawyerwalker.com
Attorney for Appellant
1
IDENTITY OF TRIAL JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL
The following is a complete list of all
parties, as well as the names and addresses of all
counsel.
Trial Judge: Honorable Everett Young
Appellant: Quinn Ford, Jr.
Trial Counsel: Edward E. Castillo
Attorney at Law
2101 Moneda St.
Fort Worth, Texas 76117
Michael P. Garcia
Attorney at Law
6207 Airport Freeway
Fort Worth, Texas 76117
Appellate Attorney for R. Scott Walker
Appellant: Attorney at Law
222 W. Exchange Avenue
Fort Worth, Texas 76164
Appellee: The State of Texas
Trial Attorney for Colin T. McLaughlin, &
Appellee: James R. Hudson
Tarrant County Assistant
District Attorneys
401 W. Belknap,
Fort Worth, Texas 76196
Appellate Attorney for Sharen Wilson
Appellee: Tarrant County
District Attorney
401 W. Belknap,
Fort Worth, Texas 76196
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
IDENTITY OF TRIAL JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL . . 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
STATEMENT DECLINING ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE. . . 6
QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ARGUMENT QUESTION NUMBER ONE (THE TRIAL JUDGE
ERRED BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR BAD ACT). 6
ARGUMENT QUESTION NUMBER TWO (The evidence was
insufficient to prove that Appellant was guilty
of evading arrest in a vehicle) . . . . . . . . 14
PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Jackson v. State,
17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex.Crim.App., 2000) . . . . 15
Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Montgomery v. State,
810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) . 6, 7, 10
State v. Beechum,
582 F.2d 898 (US Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1978).12, 13
STATUTES
Texas Penal Code,
§38.04 (Vernon 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Texas Rules of Evidence,
§403 (Vernon 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 16
STATEMENT DECLINING ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument of this case is not requested on
behalf of Appellant, and is hereby waived.
4
All references to Texas statutes, rules, etc.
are references to the latest edition published by
West Publishing Company, unless otherwise
indicated.
QUINN FORD, JR., Appellant-Applying for Review
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
************
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
************
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF
TEXAS:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal has resulted from a criminal
prosecution for aggravated assault and evading
arrest. On April 21, 2014, Appellant, Quinn Ford,
Jr., pled not guilty to the second degree offense
of aggravated assault and the third degree offense
of evading arrest. On April 23, 2014, after
evidence was presented, the jury found Quinn Ford,
Jr. guilty. The jury set punishment at 12 years
confinement. (C.R., Vol.1 p.56).
5
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision and
delivered its written non-published memorandum
opinion on May 28, 2015. The deadline for filing a
Petition for Discretionary Review is June 29, 2015.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1)Whether the trial judge erred by admitting
evidence of a prior bad act. R.R. Vol. 3, p. 9-39.
(2)Whether the evidence was legally sufficient
to prove that Quinn Ford was guilty of evading
arrest in a vehicle. R.R. Vol. 3, p. 114-123.
ARGUMENT QUESTION NUMBER ONE
APPLICABLE LAW: The trial judge erred by
admitting evidence of a prior bad act. Finding
prior bad act evidence to be relevant is the first
step in a trial court’s determination of whether
the evidence should be admitted before the jury.
Relevant evidence means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. Montgomery v. State, 810
6
S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). If the trial
court finds that the evidence is relevant, then the
trial court is to consider whether the evidence is
admissible under Tex. Rules of Evidence 403. If
the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, the evidence is to be excluded.
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 377
(Tex.Crim.App. 1990).
Analysis
The Court of Appeals opinion states that
evidence showing that the Complainant “fled to
SafeHaven” could not have constituted a prior bad
act of Appellant separate and apart from the
threats that allegedly were made at the time
Complainant went to SafeHaven, and that such
evidence could not have harmed Appellant. Neither
of these propositions is supported by the record.
The trial judge clearly erred by admitting
evidence of a prior bad act. Immediately prior to
trial, Defense Counsel presented three oral motions
in limine, the third of which related to any prior
7
bad acts of Appellant that may be offered in the
guilt/innocence phase of trial. Counsel for the
State responded by asking to make an offer of
proof. The prosecutor stated that he intended to
solicit testimony from Ms. Ford that three days
prior to the offense, she had moved from the home,
where she and Mr. Ford lived, to ‘SafeHaven,’ due
to domestic problems in the home, without
specifically stating the nature of the domestic
problems. As noted by Defense Counsel, it is
common knowledge that ‘SafeHaven’ is a home for
battered women. (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 12, lines 9-10).
There is no doubt that allowing the testimony would
make it clear to the jury that Ms. Ford was a
battered woman and that Mr. Ford had assaulted her
in some way about three days prior to the incident
in question. The fact that the prosecutor brought
this up in response to Defense Counsel’s Motion in
Limine on prior bad acts indicates that even the
prosecutor believed it was evidence of a prior bad
act. During the discussion on the Motion in
Limine, Defense Counsel objected on relevance
8
grounds, (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 12, lines 14-18), 404(b)
grounds, (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 10, lines 1-3), and 403
grounds, (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 12, lines 11-13). During
the trial, when the evidence was presented, Defense
Counsel renewed his objection and was given a
running objection by the trial judge. (R.R. Vol.
3, p. 39, lines 1-7).
After the discussion on the oral Motion in
Limine, the trial judge ruled that he would allow
the State to solicit testimony that, due to a
domestic situation, Ms. Ford had moved to
‘SafeHaven,’ in effect, overruling Defense
Counsel’s motion. Therefore, the evidence
indicating that Mr. Ford assaulted his wife three
days prior to the incident in question was allowed
into evidence. The ruling was erroneous. It
should also be noted that the prosecution went
beyond the judge’s ruling by stating multiple
times, in front of the jury, that Ms. Ford fled to
‘SafeHaven.’ (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 39, lines 9-10),
(R.R. Vol. 4, p.38, Lines 22-23). At one point,
Ms. Ford and the prosecutor even referred to
9
‘SafeHaven’ as ‘the shelter’. (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 50,
line 23-25).
Saying Ms. Ford ‘fled,’ instead of moved, is
even a stronger implication that Quinn Ford must
have assaulted Ms. Ford in some way. There is no
doubt that these statements constituted evidence of
a prior bad act.
As previously mentioned, Defense Counsel
objected on relevance grounds. (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 12,
lines 14-18). Ms. Ford moved to ‘SafeHaven’ three
days prior to the incident in question. Therefore,
the assault that caused her to move happened at
least three days prior to the incident in question.
The only relevance would be to show bad character
of the defendant and that he acted in conformity
therewith on the day of the offense. However,
any evidence that has any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence is
relevant. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 375
(Tex.Crim.App. 1990). The assaultive behavior that
10
is implicit in the use of the word ‘SafeHaven,’
would certainly make it more likely that Mr. Ford
was guilty of the Aggravated Assault offense that
allegedly occurred three days later. Therefore,
Appellate Counsel concedes that the evidence was
legally relevant. In fact, it is so relevant that
it is very likely that without the evidence, Quinn
Ford would have been found not guilty.
The State may argue that the contested evidence
is actually contextual same transaction evidence.
However, the evidence in question is not contextual
same transaction evidence. As pointed out by
Defense Counsel (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 12, lines 5-13),
that argument simply does not hold water. The wife
could have simply stated that she had moved out of
the house, without mentioning ‘SafeHaven.’ The
evidence was not in any way necessary to put the
events in context. The trial judge abused his
discretion by allowing the ‘SafeHaven’ language.
Also, Defense Counsel objected to the evidence
under Rule 403. (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 12, lines 11-13).
11
Rule 403 States:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. TRE 403.
The probative value which is compared to the unfair
prejudice is the probative value that relates to
the permissible purpose. United States v. Beechum
582 F.2d 898, 914 (US Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1978). In
this case, the permissible purpose is to put the
events on the day of the offense in context. The
prosecution argued that the ‘SafeHaven’ language
was necessary to put the events in context, and
without the language, it would not make any sense
to the jury about what was going on. (R.R. Vol. 3,
p. 10-11). Again, this argument is absurd. Ms.
Ford could say that she moved out three days
earlier without mentioning ‘SafeHaven.’ That would
make perfect sense. Therefore, the probative value
of the ‘SafeHaven’ language is miniscule at best.
In contrast, the danger of unfair prejudice is
enormous. Telling the jury that Quinn Ford
12
committed an offense against the same victim three
days earlier is extremely prejudicial. The Fifth
Circuit pointed out in Beechum that one of the
dangers inherent in the admission of extrinsic
offense evidence is that the jury may convict the
defendant not for the offense charged, but for the
extrinsic offense. The opinion further states that
this danger is particularly great when the
extrinsic activity was not the subject of a
conviction, and the jury may feel that the
defendant should be punished for that activity even
if he is not guilty of the offense charged. United
States v. Beechum 582 F.2d 898, 914 (US Ct. App. 5th
Circuit, 1978). The concerns in Beechum outline
precisely the unfair prejudice created in the
instant case by using the ‘SafeHaven’ language.
Also, the reason the evidence is relevant in the
first place is that evidence of a domestic offense
against the same victim three days before the
charged offense certainly makes the jury believe it
is more likely that Quinn Ford committed the
offense in which he is charged. The prejudice is
13
certainly unfair and greatly outweighs the
miniscule probative value. The trial judge erred
in admitting the evidence. For these same reasons,
it is obvious the error was harmful. It is very
possible the jury would have voted not guilty had
this evidence been excluded.
ARGUMENT QUESTION NUMBER TWO
APPLICABLE LAW: (legal sufficiency): The
evidence was legally insufficient to prove that
Quinn Ford was guilty of evading arrest in a
vehicle. In general, the test for determining
legal sufficiency requires the Appellate Court to
review all the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict and determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, (1979);
Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex.Crim.App.
2000).
In order for one to be convicted of evading
arrest, he or she must intentionally flee from a
14
person he knows is a peace officer or federal
special investigator attempting lawfully to arrest
or detain him. (Texas Penal Code §38.04) There is
no definition of ‘flee’ in the Texas Penal Code,
but the commonly used definition is to try to
escape by running away.
ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals opinion states that while
there is very little law that delineates what does
or does not constitute “intentionally” fleeing from
a peace officer, it does not appear that speed is a
consideration in making the determination. Speed,
as well as all the other facts relating to the
incident should certainly be considered when
determining whether a person “intentionally” flees
from a peace officer. Any and all cases that hold
otherwise should be overruled. This area of the
law certainly needs clarification from this
Honorable Court.
The evidenc, in the instant case was legally
insufficient to establish that Quinn Ford was
guilty of evading arrest or detention. The
15
evidence showed that when officers attempted to
stop the vehicle, Mr. Ford, at a reasonable rate of
speed, drove around the block and stopped his
vehicle in his driveway. He immediately told
police that he did so in order to prevent his car
from being towed. (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 118-123).
The statute requires that a defendant must
intentionally flee from officers. Quinn did not
intentionally flee. He simply drove around the
block, stopped, and told the officers that he did
not want to get his car towed. He did not violate
the statute. When the prosecutor asked the police
officer what his opinion was as to whether Mr. Ford
was attempting to flee, his response was, “I mean,
I feel that, you know, with us being uniformed
police officers having a marked vehicle and we were
trying to – we were trying to effect a stop and he
continued to drive away from us, that he was
evading.” (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 114). It is obvious
that the officer believed that if the detainee does
not stop immediately, he or she is guilty of
evading. That is not the law. The person must be
16
fleeing or trying to get away. The evidence is
insufficient to show that Quinn Ford was guilty of
evading arrest in a vehicle.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Quinn Ford,
Jr., Appellant, prays that this petition be
granted, the case be reversed, or for whatever
other relief he has shown himself entitled.
Respectfully Submitted,
s/Scott Walker
_________________________
By: Scott Walker
Attorney for Appellant
222 W. Exchange Avenue
Fort Worth, Texas 76164
(817) 478-9999
(817) 977-0163 FAX
scott@lawyerwalker.com
State Bar No. 24004972
17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of this petition was served by first
class mail to the Office of Criminal District
Attorney, Tarrant County Courthouse, 401 W.
Belknap, Fort Worth, Texas 76196 and to the State
Prosecuting Attorney at P.O. Box 12405, Austin,
Texas 78711 on the 30th day of June, 2015.
/s/ R. Scott Walker
R. SCOTT WALKER
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this document complies with the
length requirements as set forth by the Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure in that this document
contains 2734 words, and that the document is in 14
point type.
/s/ R. Scott Walker
R. SCOTT WALKER
18
APPENDIX
19
COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00176-CR
NO. 02-14-00177-CR
QUINN FORD, JR. APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NOS. 1267457D, 1267459D
----------
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
----------
A jury convicted Appellant Quinn Ford, Jr. of aggravated assault and
evading arrest or detention using a vehicle, charged in separate indictments.
The jury assessed his punishment at twelve years’ and two years’ confinement,
respectively. The trial court sentenced him accordingly. Appellant brings two
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
issues on appeal, challenging the admission of evidence of a prior bad act and
the sufficiency of the evidence of evading arrest in a vehicle. Because we hold
that the trial court did not reversibly err, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
Brief Facts
Complainant testified that Appellant, who was her husband at the time of
the incident, intentionally struck her vehicle, with her inside it, with his car while
traveling at speeds of up to forty miles per hour. Three days before the incident,
she had moved from their home to SafeHaven because of marital issues. She
did not take the couple’s three children with her when she left, and after a couple
of days, Appellant dropped the children off with Complainant’s sister. Appellant
had dropped the children off with only the clothes they were wearing, so when he
called Complainant the next day to tell her to come to the house to pick up the
children’s clothes or he would destroy them, she agreed to do so.
Complainant asked Appellant to put the clothes outside, but he refused, so
she went inside the house upon her arrival. The clothes were not inside the
house, and Appellant explained that he had wanted her to come inside the house
so they could talk. He hugged her, put her on his lap, and spoke of
reconciliation. They eventually engaged in sexual intercourse, and when
Appellant said he was hungry, Complainant drove the two of them to a pizza
restaurant.
Complainant testified that she was afraid of Appellant. She believed that
she could not get away from Appellant and tried to appease him, agreeing to
2
reconcile with him. When they returned to the house, Appellant became angry
when she refused to get out of the car. He punched and kicked the dashboard,
cracked the windshield with a Snapple bottle, and threatened to kill her. She
turned off the ignition and pretended to get out of the car. Appellant got out of
the car, and when he closed his door, Complainant locked the doors and started
the car. As she was trying to drive away, Appellant ran around the car and threw
the bottle at the driver’s side window, shattering the bottle. Complainant drove
off, and Appellant chased her in his car, trying to block her car with his. Rather
than going to SafeHaven, she went to the police station, calling ahead so officers
could meet her in the parking lot. As she pulled into the parking lot, Appellant
swerved around her, hit her car on the passenger side, and fled. The police
broadcast instructions for other officers to go after him, assuming that he was
heading home.
Two officers saw Appellant near his house. They followed him and
engaged their lights and sirens. Appellant continued driving until he reached his
house and pulled into his driveway. They placed him under arrest, and he told
the officers that he had not stopped because he did not want his car towed.
Evidence of Prior Bad Act
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court reversibly erred by
admitting evidence that Complainant was living at SafeHaven, a shelter for
battered women, because that was evidence of a prior bad act. He raised his
3
objection in a motion in limine, which was overruled, and again when the
evidence was offered. He was also granted a running objection to the evidence.
In support of his argument, he points out that the prosecutor stated
“multiple times, in front of the jury, that [Complainant] fled to ‘SafeHaven.’”
Appellant also notes that the prosecutor referred to “SafeHaven” as “the shelter.”
Appellant concedes that the evidence was relevant, although at trial one of the
objections was to relevance, but argues that the State provided no rule 404(b)
notice of the extraneous bad act, although he had made a proper request before
trial. He also concedes that there is no such request in the record. He also
candidly concedes that the State provided “timely notice prior to trial that it would
offer evidence of the prior threats which allegedly occurred three days before the
incident in question.” He argues, however, that although the State’s notice lists
twenty-eight separate prior bad acts, “there is no notice of the evidence offered at
trial, being that [Complainant] fled to ‘SafeHaven’ three days prior to the incident
in question.”
We frankly cannot understand how Complainant’s fleeing to SafeHaven
three days before the events alleged as the offenses at bar is a bad act of
Appellant separate and apart from the threats that allegedly were made at the
time Complainant went to SafeHaven. Even if it could be construed as a
separate bad act of Appellant and even if we found its admission erroneous, we
fail to understand how Appellant could have been harmed. Appellant does not
allege constitutional error. We would therefore apply the standard of review
4
required for nonconstitutional error, disregarding it if it did not affect Appellant’s
substantial rights. 2 A substantial right is affected when the error had a
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. 3
Conversely, an error does not affect a substantial right if we have “fair assurance
that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” 4 Complainant
testified that she had left her home and her children because she was afraid of
Appellant. She testified to the prior acts of misconduct of which Appellant had
notice. If the trial court erred by admitting evidence that Complainant went to
SafeHaven, a shelter, which we do not hold, then any such error would have
been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the evidence admitted
showing Complainant’s fear of Appellant and his prior acts of misconduct. We
overrule Appellant’s first issue.
Evading Arrest or Detention
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to
prove his guilt of evading arrest with a vehicle because he did not flee. He
alleges that he merely drove around the block and pulled into his driveway so his
2
See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 194 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997).
3
King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1253 (1946)).
4
Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Johnson v.
State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
5
car would not be towed. A person commits the offense of evading arrest or
detention with a vehicle if, using a vehicle, he “intentionally flees from a person
he knows is a peace officer or federal special investigator attempting lawfully to
arrest or detain him.” 5 There is very little law on this issue that arises from similar
facts. Our sister courts have held that failing to submit to an officer’s show of
authority is sufficient to satisfy the elements of evading arrest. 6 Speed
apparently is not a consideration in determining whether a person is guilty of
evading arrest. Even crawling away from a police officer has been seen to
constitute evading arrest. 7
In reviewing the evidence for sufficiency, we consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. 8 Applying the appropriate standard of review, we hold that the jury as trier
of fact rationally could have found the elements of the crime of evading arrest or
detention with the use of a vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt if they believed
5
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04 (West Supp. 2014).
6
See Lopez v. State, 415 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013,
no pet.); Horne v. State, 228 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no
pet.); Mayfield v. State, 219 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no
pet.).
7
Leos v. State, 880 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, no
pet.).
8
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979).
6
that, after the officers engaged their lights and sirens, Appellant continued driving
instead of pulling over at the earliest possible moment on the residential street.
We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgments.
/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: May 28, 2015
7
COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00176-CR
Quinn Ford, Jr. § From the 297th District Court
§ of Tarrant County (1267457D)
v. § May 28, 2015
§ Opinion by Justice Dauphinot
The State of Texas § (nfp)
JUDGMENT
This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that
there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
By _/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot______________
Justice Lee Ann Dauphinot