Joel Price Morris v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
04-14-00126-CR
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
1/30/2015 12:13:05 PM
KEITH HOTTLE
CLERK
Court of Appeals No. 04-14-00126-CR
Trial Court Cause No. 5226
FILED IN
4th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE FOURTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
1/30/2015 12:13:05 PM
COURT OF APPEALS KEITH E. HOTTLE
Clerk
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
_______________________
JOEL PRICE MORRIS
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
_______________________
APPEALED FROM THE 216TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
KENDALL COUNTY, TEXAS
Honorable N. Keith Williams, Presiding
_____________________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
_____________________________________________________________
M. Patrick Maguire
State Bar No. 24002515
M. Patrick Maguire, P.C.
mpmlaw@ktc.com
945 Barnett Street
Kerrville, Texas 78028
Telephone (830) 895-2590
Facsimile (830) 895-2594
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT,
JOEL PRICE MORRIS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL 2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6
ISSUES PRESENTED 7
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 8
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TRAP 9.4 9
STATEMENT OF FACTS 10
ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES 11
ISSUE 1: The jury’s implicit finding that Appellant was not insane at the
time of the offense is so against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence as to be manifestly unjust. 11
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 31
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 32
1
Court of Appeals No. 04-14-00126-CR
Trial Court Cause No. 5226
IN THE FOURTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
_______________________
JOEL PRICE MORRIS
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
_____________________________________________________________
IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL
_____________________________________________________________
Appellant certifies that the following is a complete list of the parties,
attorneys, and any other person who has any interest in the outcome of
this appeal:
Appellant: Joel Price Morris
Appellee: The State of Texas
Attorney for Appellant: M. Patrick Maguire
M. Patrick Maguire, P.C.
945 Barnett Street
Kerrville, Texas 78028
Attorney for Appellee: Hon. E. Bruce Curry
216th Judicial District Attorney
200 Earl Garrett, Suite 202
Kerrville, Texas 78028
2
Trial Judge: Hon. N. Keith Williams
216th Judicial District Judge
700 Main Street
Kerrville, Texas 78028
3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Aschbacher v. State,
61 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. ref’d) 11
Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) 27
Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) 12, 30
Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) 11, 26
Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 12, 30
Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) 12
Morgan v. State, 869 S.W.2d 388
(Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, pet. ref’d) 30
Plough v. State,
725 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) 11
Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 23
United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 1984) 27
Van Guilder v. State, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) 12, 26
28-30
4
STATUTES AND RULES
Tex. Penal Code §2.04(d) 11
Tex. Penal Code §8.01(a) 11
5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Joel Price Morris, is appealing his conviction for the
offense of murder. Appellant pled not guilty by reason of insanity on
January 8, 2014. RR 6, 11. The jury found Appellant guilty and sentenced
him to life imprisonment. RR 8, 196. Appellant filed his notice of appeal
with the trial court on February 8, 2014. This brief is timely filed by being
electronically filed with the Fourth Court of Appeals on January 30, 2015.
6
APPELLANT'S ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. The jury’s implicit finding that Appellant was not insane at the
time of the offense is so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
** For purposes of reference in the Appellant’s Brief the following will
be the style used in referring to the record:
1. Reference to any portion of the Court Reporter’s Statement
of Facts will be denoted as “(RR____, ____),” representing
volume and page number, respectively.
2. The Transcript containing the District Clerk’s recorded
documents will be denoted as “(CR___, ___).”
7
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I. The evidence at trial clearly showed Appellant suffered from a
severe mental illness. The evidence at trial also showed that Appellant
believed that killing his father was the right and just thing to do as a result of
Appellant’s delusions that Appellant’s father was evil, that Appellant was
essentially the savior of the world, and by ridding the world of his father,
Appellant would receive great rewards. The jury’s rejection of Appellant’s
insanity defense is so against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
8
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Rule 9.4(i)(3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
I certify that this brief contains 5,718 words (counting all parts of the
document and relying upon the word count feature in the software used to
draft this brief). The body text is in 14 point font and the footnote text is in
12 point font.
/s/ M. Patrick Maguire
M. Patrick Maguire,
Attorney for Appellant
9
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 3, 2011, Appellant arranged to eat lunch with his parents at
their home in Boerne, Texas. RR 6, 39. Appellant was going to get some
barbecue to bring over for lunch. RR 6, 40.
Appellant arrived at his parent’s home in the early afternoon on April
3, 2011. He walked into the house with a semi-automatic pistol and sought
out his father who was hanging curtains in a back bedroom. Appellant
walked past his mother, who was standing near the kitchen, and cornered his
father in the bedroom. RR 6, 41-42. Appellant then shot his father in the
torso 8 times. RR 6, 43. Appellant left the house, went back out to his car,
loaded an additional three rounds of ammunition in the pistol’s magazine,
went back in the house and shot his father in the head three more times. RR
6, 45. Appellant then left the house, got in his car and drove off. Appellant
was stopped by law enforcement officers and arrested. RR 6, 75-76.
Appellant suffered from severe schizophrenia which led to delusions
that his father was molesting him, that his father was evil, essentially Satan,
and that Appellant was commanded by God to kill his father. RR 8, 20.
Appellant pled not guilty by reason of insanity. RR 6, 11. The jury rejected
Appellant’s insanity defense, convicted him of murder, and sentenced him to
life imprisonment. RR 8, 196.
10
ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES
I.
The jury’s implicit finding that Appellant was not insane at the time of the
offense is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence
as to be manifestly unjust.
A. Standard of Review
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the
conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did
not know that his conduct was wrong. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 8.01(a). The
burden is on the accused to prove the defense by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. § 2.04(d). Although expert medical testimony may aid the
jury in its ultimate determination, it is not conclusive on the issue. Plough v.
State, 725 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.).
Whether insanity exonerates one from a criminal act involves medical,
legal, and ethical considerations. Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 948
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978). To incorporate the legal and ethical elements, a
jury should consider all of the evidence surrounding the offense. See id. at
951. The trier of fact may consider such evidence as the Appellant’s
demeanor before and after the offense, attempts to evade police, attempts to
conceal incriminating evidence, expressions of regret or fear of the
consequences of his actions, other possible motives for the offense, and
other explanations for his behavior. Aschbacher v. State, 61 S.W.3d 532,
11
535 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. ref’d). Only the jury can join the
non-medical components that must also be considered in deciding the
ultimate issue. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 949.
While jurors may reject the opinion of experts if it does not comport
with their ideas of sound logic, and they are not required to give conclusive
effect to the opinion of experts, jurors may not arbitrarily disregard such
testimony. Van Guilder v. State, 674 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio, 1984), affirmed, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
(emphasis added).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that the courts of
appeals are constitutionally empowered to determine whether factually
sufficient evidence supports the elements of a defendant’s affirmative
defense. Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clewis
v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In fact, the Court
of Criminal Appeals has expressly held that the courts of appeals have
conclusive jurisdiction over “questions of fact” concerning the proof of an
issue on which the defendant has the burden of proof and the burden of
persuasion. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 153-54 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990). The Meraz Court recognized that it had no power to disturb a
“question of fact” determined by a court of appeals in holding that “we now
12
join our brethren on the Texas Supreme Court and conclude that the “factual
conclusivity clause,” within Art. V, § 6 [of the Texas Constitution], operates
to limit our jurisdiction and confers conclusive jurisdiction on the courts of
appeals to resolve questions of weight and preponderance of the evidence
adequate to prove a matter that the defendant must prove. Moreover, when
the courts of appeals are called upon to exercise their fact jurisdiction, that
is, examine whether the appellant proved his affirmative defense or other
fact issue where the law has designated that the defendant has the burden of
proof by a preponderance of evidence, the correct standard of review is
whether after considering all the evidence relevant to the issue at hand, the
judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence
so as to be manifestly unjust.” Id. In essence, the courts of appeals are the
“final stop” regarding whether a jury’s verdict regarding the issue of insanity
is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be
manifestly unjust.
B. Analysis
Evidence of Insanity
The evidence of insanity that was presented at Appellant’s trial was
extensive. The common thread of Appellant’s mental illness, and insanity at
the time the offense was committed, ran through all the testimony of those
13
familiar with Appellant. Given the fact-intensive nature of the analysis that
this Court must undertake, it is important to highlight various portions of the
evidence that establish Appellant’s longstanding history of mental illness,
culminating in the acts that occurred on the day of the murder. Because both
the State’s expert and the Appellant’s expert agreed at trial that Appellant
was suffering from a severe mental illness, and the issue was whether
Appellant was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct,
Appellant has set out excerpts of fact-witness testimony, much of which
comes from the State’s case-in-chief, that supports Appellant’s affirmative
defense of insanity, including his lengthy history of mental illness, and
frequent bizarre behavior. The following excerpts are set out both for the
Court’s convenience and to demonstrate the overwhelming evidence of
insanity in this case.
Claudia Morris
Claudia Morris, Appellant’s mother, was the State’s first witness. Ms.
Morris testified that Appellant had chronic mental illness consisting of
schizophrenia which got so severe that in 2008, Appellant was no longer
able to work. RR 6, 38. Appellant’s paranoia in 2008 centered around the
government and people spying on him. RR 6, 48. Appellant actually
attacked his father at work one day and other co-workers of Appellant were
14
very troubled by Appellant’s bizarre behavior. RR 6, 48. Appellant was
committed to a mental hospital for several months as a result of his illness.
RR 6, 48-49. Appellant had multiple hospitalizations thereafter. RR 6, 50.
Ms. Morris confirmed that Appellant actually tried to poke his own eye out
because he believed a device had been implanted to monitor him. RR 6, 50.
Appellant was treated twice at San Antonio State Hospital for schizophrenia.
RR 6, 51. Appellant’s schizophrenia, and the delusions brought on by the
disease, deteriorated to the point that Ms. Morris and her husband had to
obtain a protective order seeking protection from Appellant. RR 6, 38; RR
6, 52.
Roger Baker
Roger Baker, a Kendall County deputy, was called by the State.
Deputy Baker related a story where Appellant came in to talk to him and
said that he had a microchip in his head. RR 6, 194. Appellant complained
that his father “medically induced” him in to trauma and sexually abused
Appellant. RR 6, 194.
Wade Canavan
Wade Canavan was called by the defense. Wade is Appellant’s
cousin. RR 7, 72. Wade testified about an incident that occurred about three
to six months prior to the killing where Appellant came to Wade’s house
15
rambling about filing a report that Appellant was being molested by his
father. RR 7, 75-79. Wade became frightened when Appellant said he was
going to kill his father. RR 7, 76. Wade became so alarmed that he had his
daughter leave the house while Wade tried to calm Appellant down. RR 7,
77-78. Ultimately, after cooking dinner for Appellant, taking Appellant to
the police department to air his complaints, letting Appellant stay in Wade’s
home for the night and generally trying to get Appellant to calm down,
Wade told Appellant to leave and not to return. RR 7, 80-85. His testimony
further buttresses the defense claim that Appellant was suffering from
delusions as a result of his mental illness, and further adds credence to
Appellant’s affirmative defense of insanity.
Jeffery Clark
Mr. Clark was a detention officer at the Kendall County Detention
Center. (RR 7, 97). Mr. Clark testified to the difference in Appellant’s
demeanor when he was taking his medication as opposed to when Appellant
was not compliant with his medication. When off medications, Appellant
would act bizarre, including making strange comments and having loud
outbursts. RR 7, 105. Appellant would say that he was Jesus, the son of
God. RR 7, 105. Mr. Clark testified that the longer Appellant was off his
medication, the more bizarre his behavior became. RR 7, 105-07. His
16
testimony generally corroborates that of others who have experience in
dealing with Appellant.
Christopher Ortiz
Christopher Ortiz was also a detention officer at the Kendall County
detention center. Similar to Mr. Clark’s testimony, Mr. Ortiz related
Appellant’s behavior shortly after being brought to jail after the killing and
also talked about Appellant’s general behavior while incarcerated. After
being brought to the jail after the killing, Mr. Ortiz testified that Appellant
stated that “he was relieved because he killed the only mother fucker he
needed to kill.” RR 7, 112. This would not appear to be the statement of
someone who felt it was wrong to kill someone. Mr. Ortiz further testified
that Appellant began refusing his medication while in custody. RR 7, 115.
Mr. Ortiz testified that Appellant reported that his cell was electrified, that
he was being gassed and he couldn’t sleep. RR 7, 116. Appellant would
also frequently shout, yell and curse at staff when off his medication. RR 7,
116. Mr. Ortiz stated that Appellant left for a period of time to apparently
get stabilized and that upon Appellant’s return, Appellant acted normal and
even apologized to Mr. Ortiz for his previous behavior. RR 7, 117. Again,
this is consistent with testimony from others familiar with Appellant who
17
testified that Appellant was like two different people depending upon
whether he was taking his medication.
Phillip Lopez
Phillip Lopez was also a detention officer at the Kendall County
detention center. RR 7, 121. Mr. Lopez related an incident where Appellant
tried to poke his eye out while in jail. RR 7, 122. On another occasion, Mr.
Lopez witnessed Appellant slamming his head into a metal shelf in the jail.
RR 7, 123. Appellant believed that his father had planted a camera in his
eye so he was attempting to poke his eye out to remove the camera. RR 7,
124. Appellant also believed that some of the jail staff were trying to poison
him. RR 7, 127.
Emelio Perada
Emelio Perada is a corporal with the Kendall County Sheriff’s Office.
RR 7, 132. Mr. Perada also related his knowledge of Appellant trying to
gouge out his eye and hitting his head against the metal shelf. RR 7, 134-35.
Mr. Perada also testified that Appellant told him that “you don’t need to
worry about me Perada. I killed the son of a bitch that I had to.” RR 7, 136.
Consistent with what others relayed about Appellant’s condition when
Appellant was not taking his medication, Mr. Perada testified that when
18
Appellant was not taking his medications, he would start “acting up” and
believing that guards were trying to kill him. RR 7, 137.
Brian Skop
One of the most important witnesses that testified concerning the issue
of sanity was Dr. Brian Skop, a forensic psychiatrist who was called by the
defense. RR 8, 8-9. Dr. Skop testified that the first time he met with
Appellant, on March 11, 2012, it was pretty clear that Appellant was “quite
psychotic.” RR 8, 14. Dr. Skop testified that Appellant suffered from
delusions that his father was actually his stepfather, who was an evil god,
that was implanting devices into people and blackmailing people to control
them as part of a secret society for the Masons. RR 8, 15. Dr. Skop testified
Appellant suffers from schizophrenia which is a “very severe mental illness
where people suffer from hallucinations, i.e., they hear things that aren’t
there, and delusions, which are beliefs that they have that are so real to them
that they consider it their reality.” RR 8, 16 (emphasis added). Dr. Skop
testified that Appellant “believed that he was going to take over as God, that
he was Jesus Christ and that he would rule the world. . .” RR 8, 16. Dr.
Skop believed that Appellant suffers from a “severe mental disease or
defect.” RR 8, 19.
19
Appellant, on the day that he murdered his father, believed he was
getting coded material from his “true father,” who Appellant thought was the
true God. RR 8, 20. The code that he would interpret on the day of the
incident when he was asked to get some barbecue at Rudy’s, and Appellant
interpreted that R stood for “Robert” (his father), the U stood for “you,” and
then DY stood for “die.” RR 8, 20. He believed this was a code received
from his “true father” that meant “Robert, you die.” RR 8, 20.
Appellant also saw codes in other areas on the day in question. For
instance, Dr. Skop testified that Appellant bought four magazines for the gun
that he purchased because he saw it as symbolic of the fact that his father
was born in 1944. RR 8, 21.
When asked to rate the seriousness of Appellant’s schizophrenia on a
scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the worst, Dr. Skop rated Appellant at a 10.
RR 8, 22.
Dr. Skop watched the interview with Appellant after he was arrested
for the murder. RR 8, 23. Dr. Skop testified that his impressions of
Appellant were consistent with what he had come to know about Appellant.
Specifically, Appellant talked about being Jesus and that killing his father
was right, that it was going to end the reign of terror, and that he was going
to move into a mansion after the killing. RR 8, 24. Dr. Skop also addressed
20
the fact that Appellant was talking about things being implanted in his body,
which is a fairly common delusion that schizophrenics have. RR 8, 24.
Dr. Skop reviewed the medical records from Appellant’s multiple
psychiatric hospitalizations. RR 8, 25. Appellant had been treated for
mental illness at North Texas State Hospital, Timberlawn Hospital, San
Antonio State Hospital, Austin State Hospital, Metrocare, IntraCare Medical
Center, Terrell State Hospital, Memorial Hermann Hospital, and Hill
Country Mental Health and Mental Retardation. RR 8, 25-26. Appellant
had been to some of these facilities on multiple occasions. These records
reinforced Dr. Skop’s opinion regarding Appellant’s mental condition and
his severe mental illness. RR 8, 26. Appellant wanting to kill his father is
the reason why he was hospitalized on almost every occasion. RR 8, 27.
Dr. Skop’s opinion was that as a result of Appellant’s severe mental
illness, Appellant did not know that what he was doing was wrong. RR 8,
29; RR 8, 34. Appellant believed that he was Jesus Christ and that his father
was Satan. RR 8, 29. Appellant believed that his father had been raping and
torturing Appellant his whole life and that he needed to be killed. RR 8, 29.
Appellant believed that by killing his father, he would bring peace on earth,
and dislodge the evil that he believed his father was perpetrating by having
people murdered and by implanting devices in them. RR 8, 29. Appellant
21
thought he was doing the correct thing at that time by killing his father. RR
8, 29-30.
Dr. Skop drew a good distinction in pointing out that simply because
Appellant may have known it was illegal to kill his father does not mean that
in his mind, as a result of his severe mental illness, that he believed it was
wrong. RR 8, 40. Even though Appellant may have known that he would
be arrested for killing his father, he believed it was the morally right thing to
do. RR 8, 41.
Robert Cantu
Dr. Robert Cantu is a forensic psychiatrist who testified on behalf of
the State. RR 8, 62. Dr. Cantu met with Appellant in December 2013. RR
8, 68. Dr. Cantu agreed with Dr. Skop that Appellant suffered from severe
mental illness. RR 8, 73. Dr. Cantu’s opinion that Appellant was legally
sane at the time of the killing stemmed from evidence that he believed
showed that Appellant knew the consequences of his conduct (i.e., that he
would be arrested). RR 8, 90-97.
Evidence that Appellant did not know conduct wrong
Essentially, Dr. Cantu’s testimony that Appellant appreciated that his
conduct was “wrong” was based upon the fact that Appellant knew his
conduct was “legally” wrong, as opposed to morally wrong. See, e.g., Ruffin
22
v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that under
Texas law, whether a defendant is insane turns on whether he knew his
conduct was illegal). However, Dr. Cantu’s testimony is blunted by several
facts.
Appellant did not attempt to flee from police. He pulled over and
peacefully surrendered. RR 8, 96. He threw the gun out of the car in plain
view of police officers to avoid being shot. RR 8, 96. After the killing,
Appellant said in the interview that he “was at peace with the world,” that
“he died for everyone’s sins,” and that he would “become king of the
world.” RR 8, 100. Appellant also stated that killing his father was right
because it ended his “reign of terror.” RR 8, 101. These are not the
statements of someone who believed that his conduct was legally wrong.
These are the statements of a person who believed he was both legally and
morally justified in killing his father. In fact, Appellant told Dr. Cantu that
he “never thought he would be wrong.” RR 8, 106. In fact, Appellant
apparently did not want to get shot because then he couldn’t be pardoned by
the President. RR 8, 118.
The Defense proved Appellant’s Insanity
Both experts agreed that Appellant suffered from a severe mental
illness. The difference in the opinions of Dr. Skop and Dr. Cantu broke
23
down on whether Appellant understood that his conduct was wrong. Dr.
Skop believed that Appellant did not know his conduct was wrong, and
when asked whether Appellant “may” have known his conduct was illegal,
he said yes. Dr. Skop did not state that he believed that Appellant knew his
conduct was legally wrong.
Dr. Cantu, on the other hand, opined that Appellant’s actions basically
“inferred” that he knew his conduct was legally wrong. However, this
opinion piles inference upon inference. Appellant’s conduct was clearly
“mission-oriented” in that he believed he was righteously justified and
anointed to kill his father for a multitude of reasons, all of which were
legally justified in his mind to protect not only himself, but the world, from
the things that Appellant’s delusions led him to believe his father was guilty
of. For instance, Dr. Cantu suggested that Appellant’s concealing the gun
from his mother when he went into his father’s house was indicative of the
fact that he knew what he was about to do was legally wrong. RR 8, 82-83.
However, this ignores the context of why Appellant was doing what he did.
Appellant believed this had to be done and it is clear he took precautions to
ensure that nothing would interfere with the success of his “mission.” In
other words, the inference is that Appellant took this action so that his
mother would not try and stop or interfere with his plans to kill his father.
24
Dr. Cantu makes the same inference by stating that Appellant would not
have thrown the gun out of the car window, or would have worried about
getting shot, if he had done nothing wrong. RR 8, 83. Again, this ignores
the context. Part of Appellant’s “mission” was to reap the rewards that his
delusions led him to believe he would receive as a result of his actions.
Obviously, having a gun in one’s hand while in the presence of a police
officer is a recipe for being shot. What Dr. Cantu ignores in his analysis is
that if Appellant truly believed his conduct was legally wrong, why would
he discard a murder weapon in the plain view of police officers? This
actually flies in the face of Dr. Cantu’s analysis.
Dr. Cantu also deduced that Appellant’s response to Dr. Cantu’s
question of why Appellant went back in the house to shoot his father a
second time, and Appellant answered “I wanted to make sure I killed him, or
I would go to jail” was an admission that Appellant knew that killing his
father was legally wrong. RR 8, 83. However, Appellant’s statement was
inferring that unless Appellant did not kill his father, he would go to jail.
Therefore, this statement is an indication that Appellant did not believe his
actions were legally wrong. Clearly, this is the rationale of an insane
individual. Finally, Dr. Cantu pointed out that Appellant drove the speed
limit on the way to his father’s house and when asked why he did this
25
Appellant responded “[s]o that I wouldn’t get in trouble.” RR 8, 84. This
statement does not support the contention that Appellant knew that killing
his father was legally wrong. It supports the contention that Appellant was
focused on not doing anything to interfere with his plans (i.e., not getting
stopped by the police on the way to completing his “mission”).
The issue of legal insanity is not a strictly medical opinion, rather, it
involves legal and ethical considerations that only a jury can decide.
Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). As a result,
the issue of insanity may be determined by the total body of evidence
presented, not just by the expert opinions. Therefore, in a case such as this,
it is important to scrutinize the other evidence available upon which the jury
could have rested their decision. This is the rationale for setting forth in
Appellant’s brief, the evidence of Appellant’s history of mental illness.
A review of this evidence leads one to conclude that the jury
arbitrarily rejected the overwhelming evidence in this case that Appellant
was insane at the time of the offense. The law is clear that while a jury may
accept or reject expert testimony, a jury is not free to arbitrarily reject expert
testimony of insanity. Van Guilder v. State, 674 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio, 1984), affirmed, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985).
26
Even after the offense, Appellant continued to relate his bizarre and
irrational beliefs supporting why he killed his father. One of the most
important aspects of Appellant’s videotaped confession is that he believed
that he was justified in killing his father because of the things that he
believed his father had done to him and was going to do to him, as well as
the threat Appellant’s father posed to the world as a whole.
The issue of insanity is concerned with the subjective state of mind of
the accused at the time the offense was committed, i.e., whether the accused
appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct. United States v. Lyons, 739
F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 1984) (holding that the relevant inquiry when
determining insanity is the actual subjective state of mind of the defendant).
Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the question
of insanity should focus on whether a defendant understood the nature and
quality of his action and whether it was an act he ought to do. Bigby v.
State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
Appellant did not believe that what he did was wrong because he
believed he was justified in taking action in order to vindicate himself for all
of the evil things that his mental illness led him to believe his father had
done to him, what his father was still doing to him and what his father was
going to do in the future, particularly in light of the fact that he had
27
repeatedly been turned away by the police when Appellant complained to
them.
To conclude that Appellant was not insane, the jury must basically
disregard the extensive evidence of Appellant’s chronic mental illness and
his history of bizarre acts, and it totally ignores the core fact that Appellant
had a deep-seated belief, flowing from his mental illness, that his father was
evil and needed to be eliminated. The belief system that Appellant held
toward his father formed the basis that his conduct was morally and legally
justified, or not wrong.
Van Guilder v. State
The evidence offered at trial of Appellant’s insanity at the time of the
offense was significant. Van Guilder v. State, 674 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio, 1984), affirmed, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985). Appellant submits that the Van Guilder opinion is persuasive
authority applicable to Appellant’s case.
In Van Guilder, the defendant was indicted for five offenses growing
out of one continuous transaction. Id. at 916. One indictment was for the
offense of murder, and the other four indictments were for attempted
murder. Id. The jury convicted Van Guilder of the first offense and found
her not guilty by reason of insanity on the other four indictments. Id. Van
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Guilder argued that the jury verdict was contrary to the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust and that
the verdict was contrary to the evidence as a matter of law because she had
established the affirmative defense of insanity. Id. at 917.
Van Guilder’s evidence consisted of testimony by friends, family and
medical experts. Her medical history established that she was raised in an
abusive family where substance abuse, physical abuse and sexual
molestation were routine. Id. In addition to Van Guilder’s lengthy history
of mental illness, as related by the witnesses, four medical doctors testified
that Van Guilder was insane at the time of the offenses. Id. at 917-18. The
State offered no rebuttal testimony on the issue of insanity. Id. at 918.
In the Van Guilder case, this Court analyzed the evidence presented
and held that Van Guilder established insanity as a matter of law, reversed
the trial court’s judgment and rendered a judgment that Van Guilder was not
guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 920. This Court also stated in the Van
Guilder opinion, in dicta, that “[c]onsidering all of the evidence, we further
believe that the finding by the jury of the vital fact of sanity is so contrary to
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong.
Were we to reach the great weight and preponderance of the evidence point,
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we would likewise sustain it, which would result in a remand for a new
trial.” Id.
Morgan v. State
Appellant submits that his case is also analogous to Morgan v. State,
869 S.W.2d 388, 388-89 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, pet. ref’d), where three
medical experts examined the defendant within weeks of a shooting and all
determined that he was afflicted with a severe mental disease which
rendered him incapable of knowing his conduct was wrong. The
defendant’s relatives testified that he was “mentally sick,” “withdrawn,” and
“way out” at the time of the shooting. Although the State offered one
psychologist who examined the defendant five months after the shooting and
determined he was not legally insane at the time of the shooting, the
appellate court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Id.
CONCLUSION
The authority granted in Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013), to disagree with the fact finder’s determination is
appropriate when the record clearly indicates such a step is necessary to
arrest the occurrence of a manifest injustice.
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The evidence of Appellant’s insanity is compelling. Appellant
submits that this is a case where the record demonstrates that the appellate
court must step in to prevent a manifest injustice. Accordingly, Appellant
prays this honorable court reverse the judgment of the trial court herein and
remand for a new trial or render a judgment of acquittal by reason of
insanity.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant respectfully
prays that this Honorable Court sustain the appellate contentions herein,
reverse the judgment of conviction entered below and remand this cause for
a new trial, or in the alternative, reverse the judgment of conviction entered
below and render a judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity.
Respectfully submitted,
M. PATRICK MAGUIRE, P.C.
/s/ M. Patrick Maguire
M. Patrick Maguire
State Bar No. 24002515
945 Barnett Street
Kerrville, Texas 78028
Telephone (830) 895-2590
Facsimile (830) 895-2594
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT,
JOEL PRICE MORRIS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy of
Appellant's Brief to counsel for the State, Hon. E. Bruce Curry, via hand
delivery, and whose address is 200 Earl Garrett, Suite 202, Kerrville, Texas
78028, on this the 30th day of January, 2015.
/s/ M. Patrick Maguire
M. Patrick Maguire
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