Stevie Blaschke Hanke v. State ( 2015 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-14-00326-CR
____________________
STEVIE BLASCHKE HANKE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 12-13994
________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Stevie Blaschke Hanke (Hanke), Appellant, guilty of
aggravated sexual assault of L.J., a nine-year-old girl.1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
22.021 (West Supp. 2014). The trial court sentenced Hanke to fifty years in prison.
In Hanke’s first two issues, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
1
We identify the victim by using initials that disguise her identity. See Tex.
Const. art. 1, § 30(a)(2) (granting crime victims the “right to be treated with
fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the
criminal justice process”).
1
admitting certain evidence. In his third issue, Hanke contends the trial court erred
in assessing punishment because the court punished Hanke for exercising his right
to a jury trial in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. We overrule
his issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
UNDERLYING FACTS
R.C. 2, L.J.’s mother, testified that she and Hanke had been “going out for
eight years[]” and that they lived together. On the evening of March 2, 2012, R.C.,
her two sons, and R.C.’s mother went grocery shopping. R.C. left her two
daughters, a nineteen-month-old and her nine-year-old daughter, L.J., with Hanke.
R.C. and her mother stopped at a couple of stores and then took the groceries to her
mother’s house. R.C. asked a friend to give R.C. a ride home. R.C. left the boys
with R.C.’s mother, and R.C.’s friend drove R.C. home. Once home, R.C. went
inside to see if Hanke would help her bring in the groceries. R.C. could not find
Hanke in the living room but heard water running in the bathroom. No one was in
the bathroom where the water was running, and the door to the master bedroom
was closed so R.C. opened the bedroom door. R.C. testified that she saw both of
her daughters naked. According to R.C., L.J. was on the bed with her legs apart
and Hanke had his shorts pulled down and Hanke was “moving back and forth
2
Throughout the reporter’s record L.J.’s mother is referenced with her full
name. For purposes of this opinion we will reference her as “R.C.”
2
between [L.J’s] legs while her legs were spread open.” R.C. testified that it
appeared to her that Hanke’s sexual organ was in contact with L.J.’s sexual organ.
R.C. testified that she asked Hanke what he was doing and he said he thought R.C.
did not love him anymore. R.C. told L.J. to get dressed and R.C. took L.J.’s sister
to R.C.’s friend’s car. R.C. told Hanke that she “couldn’t believe he turned out to
be a pedophile child rapist.” According to R.C., when she left Hanke was sitting on
the couch shaking his head, and R.C. told him she was going to call the police.
R.C. went to her mother’s house. R.C. testified that she walked into her mother’s
house crying, told her mother what happened, and then called the police. Officer
Spears and Officer Andrew responded to the call about fifteen minutes later.
According to R.C., the first adults L.J. talked to regarding what had
happened were R.C. and Officer Spears, and L.J. told them that night what had
happened. R.C. testified that L.J. told them that Hanke made L.J. lie down on the
bed and he “got between her legs and put[] his private part on her private part
moving it back and forth.” According to R.C., what L.J. described was consistent
with what R.C. had witnessed.
L.J., eleven years old at the time of trial, testified that she had known Hanke
most of her life and that he was her “mama’s boyfriend or something.” She
testified that on a night in March 2012, she was at home with Hanke and her little
3
sister, her brothers had gone to her grandmother’s house, and her mother had gone
to the store. She explained that she was getting ready to take a bath and was
undressed with her sister in one of the bedrooms when Hanke walked into the
room. According to L.J., Hanke did not have any pants or underwear on and he
touched her private part between her legs with his private part and was “rubbing
his private part against [hers.]” L.J. testified that Hanke also touched her with his
mouth between her legs. L.J. explained that R.C. took L.J. and her sister to the car,
and they all went to her grandmother’s house. L.J. told her mother what had
happened and also reported the incident to a policeman that night.
B.G., a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) and registered forensic nurse
specializing in sexual assault examinations employed by Child Abuse and Forensic
Services, testified that during the course of her duties as a SANE she examines
people who have been raped or sexually abused. On March 2, 2012, B.G.
examined L.J., and L.J. told her that L.J. was “fixing to take her bath, she and her
sister, and [Hanke] . . . asked her, you know, what she wanted him to buy her at the
store and then she had her clothes off and she took the diaper off of her sister and
she was laying on the bed and she told me that [Hanke] parted her legs and put his
mouth down there and then he took his -- his private and rubbed it on her.” B.G.
testified that L.J. told B.G. it was “embarrassing” and that it hurt. L.J. told B.G.
4
that L.J.’s mother had walked in and witnessed what Hanke was doing and then
Hanke stopped. B.G. explained at trial that during the examination she had noted
redness on both sides of L.J.’s vaginal opening which would be consistent with
somebody rubbing up against L.J.
K.S., a friend of both R.C. and Hanke, testified that she had known Hanke
for twenty-five years, and that on the morning of March 3, 2012, Hanke called her
and asked her to come pick him up. K.S. sent her boyfriend to get Hanke.
According to K.S., Hanke lived with K.S. and K.S.’s boyfriend for a while after the
incident. K.S. testified that Hanke cried every day for several days and told her he
had ruined his life and lost his family, but did not tell K.S. what had happened.
K.S. testified that one day she asked Hanke if he had “touched the children[,]” and
Hanke “just lowered his head and he started crying[.]”According to K.S., Hanke
told her that he did not remember everything clearly, that he had been drinking
beer and “smoking hydro[,]” which K.S. explained at trial was a very strong
marijuana, that Hanke said he remembered R.C. “going to go make groceries,” and
that L.J. and the nineteen month old were taking a bath. Hanke told K.S. that the
next thing he remembered he was rubbing his penis between L.J.’s legs. K.S. also
testified that Hanke admitted to her that he had oral sex with L.J. According to
5
K.S., Hanke told her that he knew it was wrong and he was planning on getting
money for an attorney, and then he would turn himself in to the authorities.
Officer Spears (Spears) with the Beaumont Police Department testified that
on March 2, 2012, he and Officer Andrew were dispatched to a residence to
investigate a call from a mother who stated she came home to find her child being
assaulted by her husband. When the officers arrived at L.J.’s grandmother’s
residence, L.J. was crying and appeared “really upset.” Spears testified that L.J.
made statements about being sexually abused. Spears testified that R.C. was
present while L.J. was making the statements. To his knowledge, he and R.C. were
the first people L.J. told about the assault in any detail. According to Spears, L.J.
said that Hanke, whom she referred to as her father, ran her bath water, and while
the water was running, L.J. and her sister were lying on the bed. She said that her
father came back to lie down with them and they were “play fighting.” L.J. told
Spears that her father bit her on the leg, then undressed her, forced her legs apart
and “messed” with her. Spears explained at trial that he understood her to mean
that she had been assaulted, that her behavior and demeanor were consistent with
an individual who had been sexually assaulted, and that he believed her outcry.
Spears testified that they notified their police sergeant, who notified a detective,
Child Protective Services, and B.G. Spears testified that L.J.’s grandmother
6
transported R.C. and L.J. to the hospital for B.G. to examine L.J., and the officers
stayed at the hospital until the examination was complete.
CPS Special Investigator Collins (Collins) testified that he interviewed
Hanke on May 22, 2012, while Hanke was incarcerated. Collins explained that he
followed CPS policies and procedures when conducting his investigation, and that
he was not required to give Hanke Miranda warnings because Collins was there to
conduct a civil investigation. According to Collins, Hanke voluntarily agreed to
speak with him about the case. Collins said that Hanke admitted to Collins that
Hanke put his mouth on L.J.’s vagina and that he was getting ready to have
intercourse with her when L.J.’s mother walked in and caught him.
Detective Duchamp (Duchamp) with the Beaumont Police Department
testified that he went to B.G.’s office on March 2, 2012, to meet with the officers
to gather information about the incident. Duchamp said he was advised that R.C.
had witnessed the incident, and that R.C. went to the police station where she
provided Duchamp with a sworn statement. According to Duchamp, L.J. was also
interviewed at the Garth House, a child advocacy center, on March 7, 2012, and he
said that L.J.’s statement from that interview was consistent with the outcry L.J.
made to Officer Spears the night of the incident. Detective Duchamp said he
submitted the case to the district attorney’s office and requested a warrant be
7
issued for Hanke’s arrest. Duchamp explained that no DNA was found from the
rape kit testing, but that it was not unusual for there not to be DNA for offenses of
a similar nature to this one.
The jury found Hanke guilty of aggravated assault of a child. Hanke elected
to have the trial court assess punishment. After a punishment hearing, the trial
court sentenced Hanke to fifty years of confinement. Hanke appealed.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
In Hanke’s first issue, he argues the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting hearsay testimony regarding out-of-court statements purportedly made
by L.J. to B.G. (the SANE) and out-of-court statements purportedly made by L.J.
to Officer Spears and to R.C,, arguing that the trial court improperly determined
that such statements were “outcry statements.” In his second issue, Hanke contends
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting “irrelevant, prejudicial testimony
of K.S.” and allowing K.S. to testify “in a manner that sought to have the jury
penalize Hanke for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial and tainted the
jury verdict.” In his third issue, he contends that, in assessing punishment, the trial
court punished Hanke for exercising his right to a jury trial in violation of his state
and federal constitutional rights.
8
L.J.’S STATEMENTS TO R.C., OFFICER SPEARS, AND B.G.
In his first issue, Hanke challenges the admissibility of testimony regarding
out-of-court statements purportedly made by L.J. to R.C., Officer Spears, and B.G.
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of
discretion standard. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101-02 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996). We will not reverse a ruling as long as it falls “within the ‘zone of
reasonable disagreement.’” Id. at 102 (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d
372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g).
Hanke argues that Officer Spears’s and R.C.’s testimony regarding L.J.’s
outcry was inadmissible because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing outside
the presence of the jury or make a finding on the record that the statements were
reliable under article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.072 (West Supp. 2014). Article 38.072 provides a
statutory exception to the hearsay rule for outcry statements made by a child victim
of a sexual offense so long as that statement is a description of the offense and is
offered into evidence by the first adult complainant told of the offense. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.072, § 2; Sanchez v. State, 354 S.W.3d 476, 484
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Outcry testimony admitted in compliance with article
38.072 is considered substantive evidence, admissible for the truth of the matter
9
asserted in the testimony. Rodriguez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); Duran v. State, 163 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005,
no pet.).
Article 38.072 applies to statements made by the sexual abuse victim that
describe the alleged offense. Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 90-91 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990). A statement that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of article
38.072 is not inadmissible because of the hearsay rule if, on or before the
fourteenth day before the proceeding begins, the State notifies the defendant of its
intention to offer the outcry statement, provides the defendant with the name of the
witness through whom it wishes to offer the statement, and provides the defendant
with “a written summary of the statement.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
38.072, § 2(b); Sanchez, 354 S.W.3d at 484 (“The State must provide a summary
of the outcry statement that will be offered into evidence.”). Section 2(b) of article
38.072 also requires the trial court to conduct a hearing outside the presence of the
jury to determine that the outcry statement is reliable based on time, content, and
circumstances of the statement. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.072, § 2(b)(2).
Article 38.072’s notice and hearing requirements are mandatory and must be
complied with in order for an outcry statement to be admissible over a hearsay
objection. See Long v. State, 800 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
10
The erroneous admission of outcry testimony in violation of Article 38.072
is a non-constitutional error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Duncan v. State, 95
S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d). Pursuant to
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), a non-constitutional error must be
disregarded unless it affected the defendant’s substantial rights, i.e., the error had a
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Tex.
R. App. P. 44.2(b); see Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91, 93 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011). This Court will not overturn a criminal conviction for non-constitutional
error if we, after examining the record as a whole, have fair assurance that the error
did not influence the jury, or influenced the jury only slightly. Barshaw, 342
S.W.3d at 93.
In assessing the likelihood that the jury’s decision was affected by the error,
we consider everything in the record, including factors such as the nature of the
evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error and how it might
be considered in connection with other evidence in the case, whether the State
emphasized the error, and whether overwhelming evidence of guilt was present.
Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Bagheri v. State, 119
S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Any such error is harmless if the same
or similar evidence is admitted without objection at another point in the trial. Nino
11
v. State, 223 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)
(holding erroneous designation of outcry witness under article 38.072 was
harmless because similar testimony was admitted through complainant); Duncan,
95 S.W.3d at 672 (holding improper admission of outcry testimony was harmless
because similar facts were admitted through complainant, pediatrician, and medical
records).
As to Hanke’s challenge to the admissibility of R.C.’s testimony about what
L.J. told R.C., we note that R.C. was an eyewitness to the incident. Before the State
elicited testimony from R.C. about what L.J. told R.C. and Officer Spears about the
incident, R.C. had already testified regarding what R.C. personally observed as an
eyewitness. Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court abused its discretion
by allowing R.C. and Officer Spears to testify about what L.J. told them on the
night of the assault, even if such testimony was not in compliance with article
38.072, we would not reverse unless the error affected Hanke’s substantial rights.
See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b).
Aside from Officer Spears’s and R.C.’s testimony about L.J.’s testimony to
them, the evidence supporting Hanke’s guilty verdict includes L.J.’s testimony of
the sexual assault, R.C.’s eyewitness testimony regarding what she observed when
she walked in on Hanke during the sexual assault, and two admissions by Hanke.
12
Hanke argues that the admission of the improper testimony made the evidence
against him “overwhelming” and “improperly bolstered the testimony and
credibility of L.J., who was nine years old at the time of the alleged offense and
eleven years old at the time of trial.” Officer Spears’s testimony and R.C.’s
testimony regarding statements to them was cumulative of other testimony in the
record. See Sanchez, 269 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that he was harmed by admission of hearsay
testimony from officer reiterating what victim told him about assaults because
“what we have before us is the same evidence being presented to the jury through
multiple sources to prove the same facts. It is this redundancy or cumulative nature
of the evidence that proves fatal to [defendant’s] argument”); Chapman v. State,
150 S.W.3d 809, 814 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (stating
“improper admission of evidence is not reversible error if the same or similar
evidence is admitted without objection at another point in the trial”); Duncan, 95
S.W.3d at 672.
After considering everything in the record, including the nature of the
evidence supporting the verdict, the testimony of the victim, , the fact that similar
evidence was admitted without objection from the victim as well as an eyewitness
and an investigator for CPS, we are reasonably assured that any error in admitting
13
either R.C.’s testimony about what L.J. told R.C., or the Officer’s testimony about
what L.J. told him did not influence the jury’s verdict in this case or had but a
slight effect. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Schutz v. State, 63 S.W.3d 442, 444-46
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Therefore, we overrule Hanke’s challenge to the
admission of R.C.’s testimony and the Officer’s testimony.
Next, we examine Hanke’s challenge to certain testimony provided by B.G.,
the SANE nurse. When the State began questioning B.G. regarding what L.J. told
her prior to the sexual assault examination, Hanke objected arguing it was hearsay
and violated Hanke’s right to confront and cross-examine the witness. The State
responded that the statements were non-hearsay because they were not offered for
the truth of the matter asserted, and they were “history given as a result of medical
examination for diagnosis” and admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(4).
The trial court overruled Hanke’s objections.
In arguing that the trial court erred in admitting B.G.’s testimony, Hanke
contends on appeal that the statements were clearly offered for the truth of the
matter asserted, and that there is “no evidence in the record that L.J. knew or was
aware that any statements she made were for the purpose of medical diagnosis or
treatment, or that she was aware that proper diagnosis and treatment were
dependent on the truth of her statements.” Hanke also argues that the admission of
14
this testimony violated his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine L.J.
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). We address his
constitutional challenge first.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Hanke argues that in Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court held that “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses
absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and
only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” 541 U.S.
at 59. Crawford applies only when the declarant does not testify at trial. See id. at
59 & n.9. Therefore, “when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of [that witness’s] prior
testimonial statements.” Id. at 59 n.9 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162
(1970) (“For where the declarant is not absent, but is present to testify and to
submit to cross-examination, our cases, if anything, support the conclusion that the
admission of his out-of-court statements does not create a confrontation
problem.”)). L.J. testified at Hanke’s trial and Hanke had the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine L.J. We conclude that the admission of the testimony
15
from B.G. did not violate Hanke’s right to confront and cross-examine L.J., and we
overrule his constitutional challenge.
Next, we examine Hanke’s argument that B.G.’s testimony about what L.J.
told B.G. was hearsay, and that the trial court erred in overruling the hearsay
objection. “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” Tex. R. Evid. 801(d) (1999, superseded 2015). “Hearsay is not
admissible except as provided by statute or [the Rules of Evidence] or by other
rules prescribed pursuant to statutory authority.” Tex. R. Evid. 802 (1999,
superseded 2015). As to B.G.’s testimony regarding what L.J. told B.G. about the
sexual assault, the State specifically informed the trial court that it sought to utilize
Rule 803(4), an exception to the hearsay rule that allows for the admission of
qualifying hearsay statements.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
. . . .
(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or
sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or
external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment.
16
Tex. R. Evid. 803(4) (1999, superseded 2015). For statements to be admissible
under Rule 803(4), the proponent of the evidence must show that (1) the declarant
was aware that the statements were made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment and that proper diagnosis or treatment depended on the veracity of the
statement and (2) the particular statement offered is also “pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment,” that is, it was reasonable for the health care provider to rely on the
particular information in treating the declarant. Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571,
588-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Mbugua v. State, 312 S.W.3d 657, 670-71 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d).
On appeal, Hanke cites to Taylor in support of his argument that that there is
“no evidence in the record that L.J. knew or was aware that any statements she
made were for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, or that she was aware
that proper diagnosis and treatment were dependent on the truth of her statements.”
We conclude that Taylor is inapposite to the facts in this case.
In Taylor, the Court of Criminal Appeals analyzed federal cases involving
Rule 803(4) in the context of how Rule 803(4) would apply to non-medical
professionals. Id. at 579-84. In this case, the statements were made by a victim to a
sexual assault nurse examiner and were given specifically in the context of the
SANE examination. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support an
17
inference that L.J. understood the need to be truthful during the SANE examination
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony in
question. See Franklin v. State, 459 S.W.3d 670, 674, 677-78 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (evidence was sufficient to support an inference that the
children understood the need to be truthful during the SANE evaluation and trial
court did not abuse its discretion to admit SANE reports and testimony under Rule
803(4) where SANE testified that prior to the examination she identified herself as
a nurse to the children; she explained to them that she was meeting with them to
conduct a medical examination; she detailed the procedures of the examination to
the children; and, in her opinion, the children understood that the examination was
for medical diagnosis and treatment); Prieto v. State, 337 S.W.3d 918, 920-21
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. ref’d) (the SANE’s testimony regarding the
child-victim’s statements to the nurse were not inadmissible hearsay because the
trial court could have found that the child’s statements to the nurse were
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment under Rule 803(4) where the nurse
testified as to her duties and responsibilities as a SANE, that the sexual assault
examination process includes obtaining a history from the child and explaining to
the child the process, that the child indicated that she understood, and how the
nurse’s examination, diagnosis, testing, and treatment were related to the child-
18
victim’s account of the abuse); see also Tuckness v. State, No. 07-12-00235-CR &
No. 07-12-00236-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 14333, at **7-11 (Tex. App—
Amarillo Nov. 21, 2013, pet. ref’d), (overruling appellant’s challenge to the
veracity of the child-victim’s statement to the SANE under Rule 803(4) because
admission of the nurse’s testimony regarding the child-victim’s medical history
portion of the examination was not outside the zone of reasonable disagreement
where trial court observed the child-victim testify about seeing the nurse and
giving the medical history and the reviewing court gives deference to the trial
court’s purview to observe the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses).
B.G. testified that she talked to L.J. in the nurse’s office before going into
the exam room. B.G. explained that she asked L.J. if L.J. knew why she was there.
B.G. told L.J. to tell her in her own words why she was there. According to B.G.,
B.G. obtained a history of the assault from L.J. for the purpose of “diagnosis and
treatment.” B.G. testified that L.J. told her that she and her sister were getting
ready to take a bath and had taken their clothes off and Hanke “put his mouth
down there and then he took his – his private and rubbed it on her.” The trial court
could have inferred from B.G.’s testimony and from L.J.’s testimony that L.J.
knew or was aware that any statements she made to B.G. were pertinent to the
purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, and that L.J. was aware that she needed
19
to be truthful, and that the child understood the SANE examination was for
medical diagnosis and treatment. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting B.G.’s testimony regarding what L.J. told B.G. about the
assault. Furthermore, even if the admission of that portion of B.G.’s testimony had
been erroneous, such error would have been harmless because the same or similar
evidence was also offered through the testimony of L.J., and similar testimony was
provided by R.C. when R.C. testified what R.C. personally witnessed. See Coble v.
State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d
274, 302 n. 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Issue one is overruled.
ADMISSION OF K.S.’S TESTIMONY
In his second issue, Hanke argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
“admitting irrelevant, prejudicial testimony of [K.S.] and allow[ing] [K.S.] to
testify in a manner that sought to have the jury penalize Hanke for exercising his
constitutional right to a jury trial and tainted the jury verdict.” Hanke specifically
complains about K.S.’s testimony during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial
wherein K.S. stated that Hanke “took [L.J.’s] childhood away from her. He was her
stepfather. He was the only father she loved, knew, and he took that away from
her, and he is victimizing her again today.” Hanke’s counsel objected to this
statement by K.S. on the grounds that the testimony was nonresponsive, not
20
relevant, and that any probative value of the testimony was outweighed by the
prejudicial nature of the testimony. The trial court overruled the objections. K.S.
then testified as follows:
[Hanke] victimized [L.J.] one more time this time, this time now.
There’s no reason this child should have gone through what she went
through today. One more time she is his victim, one more time. It’s
not fair to that child. He should have been man enough. You do the
crime at least stand up and say, hey, I did it. Let’s not waste
everybody’s time. Let’s not hurt this child any more. She has been
hurt enough. She will be affected for the rest of her life. I am a victim
of child abuse. I know how she will be for the rest of her life.
On appeal, Hanke contends that the prosecutor emphasized K.S.’s testimony
during closing arguments, and that “[i]nstead of improperly making the argument
to the jury himself, the prosecutor and the trial court allowed this witness to make
an improper plea to the jury, holding herself out as an expert in such matters as a
person who was herself a victim of child abuse.” According to Hanke, the trial
court abused its discretion in overruling the objections and in admitting K.S.’s
testimony because the testimony “improperly tainted the jury verdict and violated
[his] Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair and impartial jury trial.”
Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred in overruling the
objections Hanke made at trial to the complained-of testimony, we conclude that
on the entire record before us, the admission of K.S.’s testimony did not deprive
Hanke of a fair and impartial trial nor does it amount to fundamental error. In light
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of the other testimony and evidence presented to the jury, which included L.J.’s
testimony, R.C.’s eyewitness testimony, and a CPS investigator’s testimony that
Hanke admitted to sexually assaulting L.J., the admission of the complained-of
testimony by K.S. was harmless under Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Issue two is overruled.
PUNISHMENT
In Hanke’s third issue, he argues that, in assessing punishment, the trial
court punished Hanke for exercising his right to a jury trial in violation of his state
and federal constitutional rights. Hanke complains about the statements made by
the State during its closing argument during the punishment phase and the
comments made by the trial court prior to the trial court’s pronouncement of
punishment. During closing arguments at the punishment phase, the prosecutor
argued the following:
Your Honor, I will just simply state, you’ve heard the
testimony. You have seen the evidence. What this individual did I
think [K.S.] put it best, . . . that [Hanke] stole that little girl’s
innocence. What he did was the most basic violation of trust and
abhorrent on the most fundamental level. What price do we put on
that little girl’s innocence? What price do we put on what he did to
her? He admitted this case or admitted this offense to no less than two
people. We have [an] eyewitness[]. The evidence was overwhelming.
The jury came back very, very quickly. This is a First Degree Felony,
Your Honor, he is looking at 5 years up to 99 years or life. I don’t
know what to ask for. What price do we put on nine-year old [L.J.]’s
innocence? He stands up here now saying that he is sorry, but I would
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like to point out that he only does that after he has been convicted.
Bottom line was he was banking on the fact that [R.C.] and [L.J.]
would not show up to testify. That’s what he was counting on, and
because of that he put that little girl through that experience again. I
think that should count for something as well. We’re looking at up to
life in prison, Your Honor. I think something in the higher end of that
spectrum would be totally and completely justifiable.
Defense counsel questioned whether the State was implying or saying that,
because Hanke exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial, he should be
punished for exercising that right. The State responded that it was a
mischaracterization of the State’s argument. Now for the first time on appeal,
Hanke also complains of the following comment by the trial court prior to
assessing his punishment:
. . . . [K.S.], who probably knows Mr. Hanke better than anybody, said
in regard to what you said, [defense counsel], about being punished
for exercising your right to trial. Of course, everybody has a right to a
trial, but when the evidence is as overwhelming as it was in this case
to get a verdict in 10 minutes after a day and a half trial it’s unique.
She said - - [K.S.] said, Let’s not hurt this child any more. You have
ruined her life forever. That’s what [K.S.] said, and I think what she
had reference to was putting this girl through this experience when it
didn’t have to happen. The evidence is overwhelming as the jury so
appropriately said. So victimizing the girl once in the bedroom and
once in this courtroom is to me a very serious compromise of what if
you are [sic] going to be sorry you wouldn’t do something like that.
This girl’s life is ruined forever. I assess punishment, Mr. Hanke, in
your case and you are sentenced to serve 50 years in the Department
of Criminal Justice.
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According to Hanke, this statement by the trial court at punishment “clearly
establish[ed] that the trial court punished Hanke for exercising his Constitutional
rights[]” and that “the trial court’s own reference to [K.S.]’s improper testimony
demonstrates that her improper and prejudicial testimony influenced the jury’s
verdict and the court’s assessment of punishment.” Hanke cites to Villarreal v.
State, 860 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993, no pet.) in support of his
argument.
In Villarreal, the prosecutor argued to the jury during the punishment phase
of the trial that Villarreal “made a conscious decision to rape a ten-year-old child.
But he didn’t do it just once. He forced her to have to come into this courtroom in
front of a bunch of strangers[.]” 860 S.W.2d at 649. Defense counsel objected. Id.
The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the
argument for any purpose, but overruled the defendant’s motion for mistrial. Id.
The Waco Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor’s argument did not fall into
any of the categories of proper jury argument set out in Alejandro v. State, 493
S.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Proper jury argument must fall
within one of the following categories: (1) a summation of evidence, (2) a
reasonable deduction from the evidence, (3) an answer to argument of opposing
counsel, or (4) a plea for law enforcement. See id. In reversing the judgment on
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punishment only and remanding the cause for a new trial, the Waco Court of
Appeals noted that “[i]f an instruction is given but a motion for mistrial is denied,
error results only when the argument is extreme, manifestly improper, injects new
or harmful facts into the case, or violates a mandatory statutory provision and was
thus so inflammatory that its prejudicial effect could not reasonably be removed
from the minds of the jury by the instruction given.” See Villarreal, 860 S.W.2d at
649 (citing Washington v. State, 822 S.W.2d 110, 118 (Tex. App.—Waco 1991),
rev’d on other grounds, 856 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)).
The present case is distinguishable from Villarreal because Hanke elected to
have his punishment assessed by the trial court and not the jury. We note that prior
to the trial court assessing Hanke’s punishment, the prosecutor clarified that he
“was not intending to imply that [Hanke] should be sanctioned for exercising his
right to a jury[]” and the prosecutor explained to the court that the State was
“merely wanting to point out that [Hanke] did not show any bit of remorse, despite
having made two confessions and having an eyewitness[,] until he [was] found
guilty.”
We will not overturn a trial judge’s decision on punishment absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984). When a defendant is adjudicated guilty, he is subject to the
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entire range of punishment for the offense. Johnson v. State, No. 02-12-00207-CR
& No. 02-12-00208-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4369, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Apr. 4, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also
Ditto v. State, 988 S.W.2d 236, 239 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). As a general rule,
a sentence that is within the range of punishment established by the Legislature
will not be disturbed on appeal. Jackson, 680 S.W.3d at 814. Hanke’s possible
punishment range was five to ninety-nine years or life in prison. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 12.32 (West 2011). The trial court sentenced Hanke to fifty years of
confinement, which is well within the range allowed by the Legislature for the
offense in question.
To the extent, if any, that Hanke is arguing that the trial court’s comments
show that the trial court was biased or not impartial in assessing Hanke’s sentence,
we note that “[j]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or
disapproving of, or even hostile to counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do
not support a bias or partiality challenge.” Dockstader v. State, 233 S.W.3d 98, 108
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d). Further, “expressions of
impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger[]” do not establish bias or
partiality. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994). Rather, the
defendant must show “a ‘deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make
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fair judgment impossible.’” Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 191, 198 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. ref’d) (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). We find
nothing in the record to establish that the trial judge was biased or prejudiced or
otherwise failed to remain neutral during the punishment hearing. Issue three is
overruled. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on January 7, 2015
Opinion Delivered September 23, 2015
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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