Kossie, Lexter Kennon ( 2015 )

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Lexter Kennon Kossie#700661
William McConnell
3001 South Emily Drive
Unit
jD^
Beeville, Texas 78102
April 12, 2015
APR 16 2011
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
P.O. BOX12308, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78T11
RE: WR NO.10,978-37 (Trial Ct. No.679887-S)
Application For Writ of Habeas Corpus
Dear Clerk:
Please find enclosed my original motion and objection
to be filed in the above case number and presented to the
court as soon as possible.
Thank you for your kind assistance.
Sincerely,
Lexter Kossie
cc: file Pro se Applicant
10 m I ^
NO. WR-10,978-37
EX PARTE g IN THE TEXAS COURT
§ OF CRIMINA|^EJ$spe^E^
LEXTER KENNON KOSSIE, § AUSTIN Y TJT'°
Applicant,
MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW/ MOTION FOR A LIVE
EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF SAID COURT:
NOW COMES LEXTER KENNON KOSSIE, pro se, in good faith,
files this his Motion In Opposition To Trial Court's Findings
And Conclusions Of Law/Motion For A Live Evidentiary Hearing
And Appointment Of Counsel. LEXTER KENNON KOSSIE, hereinafter
('Applicant') will show unto the Court that good grounds exists
for granting his motions.
I- Background
In November 1994, a jury found applicant guilty of the
felony offense of aggravated robbery in Cause Number 679887
("the primary case'), in the 185th Judicial District Court of
Harris County, Texas. The jury also found the enhancement par
agraph to be true and sentenced applicant to life in prison.
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed applicant's conviction
in an unpublished opinion issued on March 13, 1997. Rossie v.
State, NO.jl4-94-01171-CR, slip op. at 1,1997 WL 109996 (Tex.
App.-Houston L14th Dist.J March 13, 1997, n.jw.h.)(not desig
nated for publication). Applicant did not file a petition for
discretionary review with this Court.;
Page J'
II.] Writ History
Applicant has filed (16) sixteen previous applications
challenging his conviction and sentence in Cause No.679887.
Applicant's previous considered writ applications in Cause Nos.
679887-A, 679887-C, and 679887-J were denied without a written
order on March 15, 1995, granted on April 17, 1998 and denied
without a written order on May 5, 2008, respectively.
The remaining writ applications in Cause Nos.679887-B,
679887-D, 679887-E, 679887-F, 679887-G, 679887-H, 679887-1, 679887-
K, 679887-L, 679887-M, 679887-N, 679887-0, and 679887-P, were either
dismissed without a written order or dismissed as an abuse of the
writ.] Thus, this Court as a result never considered these appli
cations on the claims merits.
In an order dated February 6, 2008, this Court withdrew
its denial of applicant's first habeas corpus application (Cause
No.679887-A)(Ex parte Kossie, Writ No.10,987-09), and on recon
sideration dismissed that application because applicant's direct
appeal was then pending. (Ex parte Kossie, 2008 WL 366681(Tex.
Crim.App.2008)). This Court also withdrew its dismissal of (3)
three other habeas applications. Ex parte Kossie, Writ No. 10,
978-13; Ex parte Kossie, Writ No.10.978-14; and Ex parte Kossie,
Writ No. 10,978-15. This Court, thereafter denied relief re
quested in these writ applications on February 6, 2008.
After conclusion of applicant's direct appeal he filed
in essence his initial habeas corpus application in Cause No.
Page 2
679887-C considering this Court dismissed A and B writs for
tack of jurisdiction due to applicant's direct appeals was
then pending. On April 17, 1998, this Court granted relief
in Cause No.679887-C in the form of an out-of-time appeal to
allow applicant to file a petition for discretionary review.
Ex parte Kossie, Writ No.10,978-12 (Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals #73,038). In that writ application, as demonstrated
above should be considered applicant's initial application,
the claims included a claim that applicant's trial counsel
was constitutionally ineffective during the penalty phase of
applicant's sentencing trial, but it did not include a claim
that trial counsel's ineffectiveness consisted in part of a
failure adequately to investigate and to present mitigating
circumstances during the penalty phase of applicant's sentenc
ing trial.
This Court did not reach the merits of applicant's
claim regarding whether trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective during the penalty phase of the sentencing trial,
instead, as pointed out above, this Court granted relief in
the form of allowing applicant to file an out-of-time appeal
to file a Pr.>jD;TR.] See again Ex parte Kossie, Writ No. 10.987-12
(Trial Court Cause No.679887-C).
III.] Applicant's Constitutional Claim
In the instant application pending before this Court
in Cause No.679887-S (Writ No.10,978-37), applicant presents
Page 3
a single constitutional deprivation claim that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to in
vestigate and present mitigating circumstances during the
penalty phase of the sentencing trial.
IV. Trial Court's Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law
On March 12,2015, applicant filed a post conviction
application for writ of habeas corpus with the 185th district
court alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective during
penalty phase of his sentencing trial by failing to investi
gate and present mitigating circumstances in which the trial
court received the writ application on March 20,2015. There
was no response filed by the State of Texas to the allegations
contained in the applications. Applicant presume the trial~
court made its own findings of fact and conclusions of law,u
that the application was a subsequent application barred by
sec.4 of article 11.07 Tex.Crim.Proc. Code, thereafter ordered
the clerk of that court to transmit same to this Court.
Ttois Court is not bound by a trial court's findings in
a habeas corpus action, however, this Court generally accept
those findings if they are supported by the record. Ex parte
Brandley, 781 S.W.;2d 886, 887-88 (Tex.Crim.jApp. 1985) .
V.] Section 4 Statement
Tex.Crim.Proc. Code art .]11.07 §4(a )(1) (b) (c ), provides
that: "If a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus
Page 4
is filed after final disposition of an initial applieation
challenging the same conviction, a court may not consider the
merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application
unless the application contains sufficient specific facts
establishing that: (1) the current claims and issues have not
been and could not have been presented previously in an origi
nal application or in a previously considered application fil
ed under this article because the factual or legal basis for
the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the
previous applications;
(b) For purposes of Subsection (a)(1), a legal basis
of a claim is unavailable on or before a date described by
Subsection (a)(1) if the legal basis was not recognized by
and could not have been reasonable formulated from a final
decision of the United States Supreme Court, a court of appeals
of the United States, or a court of appellate jurisdiction of
this state on or before that date.
VI. Legal Basis For Applicant's Subsequent Writ Application
On May 28, 2013, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its ruling in Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct.] 1911(2013).
Applicant did not discover Trevino until December 12, 2014,
the date in which offender Donald Wayne Herod #1538539, gave
applicant a copy of Trevino to read. After reading the case
applicant immediately wrote his prison law library suppervisor
Page 5
asking her to verify whether the hardback volume was on the
shelf. The volume was not. See exhibit A and any additional
exhibits mentioned hereinafter attached to memorandum and law
submitted with writ application.
On May 28, 2013, the date of the Trevino court's ruling,
applicant had already filed (16) sixteen previous applications
challenging his conviction and sentence in Cause No.679887.
Thus, claim presented in the instant writ application is pro
cedurally barred under § 4, Tex.Crim.Proc. Code art.11.07.
However, applicant contends that this Court should
excuse Itnis procedural default, on the ground that he had good
"cause" for not raising the claim at the right time, namely
that, not only had he lacked effective counsel during his
sentencing trial, but also lacked counsel during his first
collateral review proceeding. Applicant asserts that his con
tentions are well supported by the Supreme Court's decision
in Trevino,supra.
In Trevino, the Supreme Court held that lack of coun
sel on collateral review might excuse a defendant's. state law
procedural default. The Court wrote: LA J procedural default
will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substan
tial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the init
ial review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or coun
sel in that proceeding was ineffective."
The rationale, as the Trevino Court concluded was that
Page 6
the structure and design of the Texas appellate system in act-
ual operation, makes it "virtually impossible" for an ineffec
tive assistance of trial counsel claim to be presented on
direct review. The Court further found that Texas procedural
framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it
highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have
a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance-of-trial-counsel on direct appeal.
Applicant contends that the instant case is the typical
case in which the Trevino Court contemplated and envisioned _if
considering that the facts of the instant case are indistin
guishable from those of the Trevino case. As in Trevino, appli
cant's trial counsel failed to investigate and present mitigat
ing circumstances during the penalty phase of his trial. Speci
fically, applicant claims he received ineffective assistance of
trial counsel during his punishment trial when counsel (1)
waived the 10 days to prepare for the punishment trial with
out applicant's written consent or on record in open court (2)
failed to inform applicant of his right to testify at the punv./t
ishment trial or inquire into whether applicant had a desire to
(3) failed to inquire into whether applicant had character wit
nesses (4) failed to consult with an expert in regards to the
effect of chronic use of crack cocaine (5) failed to adduce
evidence of applicant's general life and character and (6)
Page 7
wholly failed to investigate and present any mitigating cir
cumstances during the penalty phase after having sufficient
leads of applicant's drug addiction.
The Trevino Court has concluded that, Texas procedure
makes it "virtually impossible"Pfor an appellate counsel to
adequately present an ineffective assistance Lof trial counselj
claim as in the instant case, on direct review, citing Robinson
v. State, 16 S.]W.3d 808, 810-811 (Tex.Crim. App. 2000) .
Furthermore, this Court itself has found that "the
inherent nature of most ineffective"assistance" of trial coun
sel "claims" mean that the court record will often faileto "con-
taiLnJ the information necessary to substantiate" the claim. Ex
parte Torres, 943 S.W.]2d 469, 475 (1997) (en banc) .
This Court has further found that, "a writ of habeas
corpus" issued in state collateral proceedings ordinarily "is
essential to gathering the facts necessary to...evaluate....
Lineffective-assistance-of-trial-counselJ claim." Torres,supra,
at 475. See Robinson, supra, at 810-811 (noting that there is
"not generally a realistic opportunity to adequately develop
the record for appeal in post-trial motions" and that "Ltjhe
time requirements for filing and presenting a motion for new
trial would have made it virtually impossible for appellate
counsel to adequately present an ineffective assistance claim
to the trial court").
Page 8 '
See also Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813-814, and
n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)("LIJn the vast majority of cases, the
undeveloped record on direct appeal will be insufficient for
an appellant to satisfy the dual prongs of Strickland"; only
"Lrjarely will a reviewing court be provided the opportunity
to make its determination on direct appeal with a record cap
able of providing a fair evaluation of the claim..."); Good-
speed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App.2005)(simi
lar); Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102-103 (Tex.Crim.App.
2005)(similar);Kx parte Brown, 158 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Tex.Crim.
App. 2005) (per curiam) (similar); Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.]2d
954, 957 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)(per curiam)(similar). See also
42 G.]Dix & J.] Schmolesky, Texas Practice Series §29:76, pp.844-
845 (3d ed. 2011)(hereinafter Texas Practice)(explaining that
"Lojften" the requirement that a claim of ineffective assis
tance of trial counsel be supported by a record containing
direct evidence of why counsel acted.as she/he did "will re
quire that the claim ... be raised in postconviction habeas
proceedings where a full record on the matter can be raised").
Applicant's appellate counsel did not claim on appeal
that applicant's trial counsel had been constitutionally inef
fective during the penalty phase of the trial court proceeding
and even had appellate counsel pursued the ineffectiveness of
trial counsel on appeal, it would have been virtually impossible
Page 9
to adequately brief the claim. That is because review of such
a claim normally requires a different attorney, because it
often "dependLsJ on evidence outside the trial record." and
because efforts to expand the record on direct appeal may run
afoul of "LaJbbreviated deadlines." depriving the new attorney
of "adequate time...to investigate the ineffective assistance
claim." See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S.] 1 (2012). The instant
case is the type of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim in which the Trevino Court contemplated and envisioned.
Thus, for the reasons stated above, applicant should be allowed
to proceed on this forum with his procedurally defaulted consti
tutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. More
over, applicant has shown that the legal basis for which allows
him to present his claim in the instant writ application was not
recognized by and could not have been reasonably formulated from
a final decision of the United States Supreme Court, a court of
appeals of the United States, or a court of appellate jurisdic
tion of this state on or before May 28, 2013, the date in which
Trevino v. Thaler was decided by the United States Supreme Court,
133 S. Ct. 1911(2013).
VII- Facts Warranting An Evidentiary Hearing
On November 13, 1993, applicant and Eugene Williams
had been doing crack cocaine prior to the robbery. See exhibit
Page 10
B. After running out of crack and money they stopped at a
Burger King restaurant in which applicant allegedly robbed
by displaying a brown gun handle tucked inside of his waist
band hanging out. (Reporter's Record, Vol III,pp.107-108).
Applicant initially told his trial counsel that the cashier
that was working at the Burger King was his acquaintance and
that she had freely given him the money out of the register
and that no robbery actually had occurred. See exhibit C p.'l
par. 2 Applicant later confessed to trial counsel and told her
that he had lied on the cashier because the cashier was lieing
about seeing a gun. See exhibit C p.2 par.5. He also told trial
counsel that he and Eugene Williams had been doing crack cocaine
prior to the robbery and had applicant not been on crack he
would not have robbed the Burger King. See exhibit C p.3 par.
11. He told counsel that he did not have a gun and that he
only had his hand underneath his jacket faking as though he
had something. See exhibit C p.2 par.5. Applicant asked coun
sel ,to help him get into CENIKOR DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAM. Counr
sel told him that it was no way they would accept him with his
violent criminal background without ever making a motion to
try to get applicant into the program. See exhibit C p.2 par.
6 & 7.
Page 11
Applicant then filed a pro se Motion To Be Placed In
A Substance Abuse Treatment Program but the trial court judge
refused to rule on the motion. Since the trial court judge
would not rule on the motion and the cashier was not going
to tell the truth that she did not actually see a gun, appli
cant felt that he had no choice except to go to trial and
claim that the cashier was his acquaintance and that she had
freely allowed him to steal the money out of the register.
Applicant insisted on going to trial with his fabricated de
fense. Though counsel did not want to go to trial on this de
fense because she knew that the cashier did not freely allow
applicant to steal the money or otherwise participate in the
crime counsel just went through the motions at trial but never
had any real intentions of winning the case. See exhibit C
p.2 par.] 8.
The jury found applicant guilty on November 29, 1994,
of aggravated robbery by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon
to wit: a firearm. On that same day counsel waived the 10 days
to prepare for sentencing trial without applicant's consent or
on record in open court. Counsel had no intentions to present
any mitigating evidence during the punishment trial because
she was still angry at applicant for dragging her through the
guilt or innocent stage on the fabricated defense. See exhibit
Page 12
C p.4 par 12. When the trial court asked, "Does either side
have any evidence that they wish to offer on punishment?"
Counsel replied, "The defense rests, Your Honor". See Report
er.:*.: srRecord Vol V, pp. 7 & 9.
VIII. Arguments And Authorities Supporting A Remand To
Trial Court For A Live Evidentiary Hearing
Applicant contends that there are controverted pre
viously unresolved issues relating directly to the legality
of his confinement which must be resolved requiring a live
evidentiary hearing whereas trial counsel can specifically
respond to the allegations of her ineffectiveness during
applicant's sentencing trial. Applicant has alleged specific
facts in his writ application which if are proven true would
entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Firstly, applicant con
tends that trial counsel must explain under oath why she waiv
ed the 10 days to prepare for applicant's sentencing trial
without his consent or on the record in open court as provid
ed by TEX.CRIM.PROC. CODE art. 1.051. In Ex parte Dunham,650
S.W.2d 825 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) and Ex parte Morse, 591 S.W.2d
904 (Tex. Crim.App.1980) both emphasize that a lawyer's lack
of time to prepare for trial os one of several factors that
could lead to habeas corpus relief, but this factor alone may
may not be enough to merit relief. This right may be waived if
not raised at trial. In other words, an applicant will not be
Page 13
able to obtain writ relief absent a showing of harm or request
for additional time to prepare for trial. See Ex parte Reed,
610 S.jW.2d 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 198 1) .
Here, in the instant case, additional time was requir
ed so that counsel could have consulted with applicant to deter
mine whether he had any character witnesses that were willing
to testify and whether these witnesses could have provided rel
evant testimony for the jurors to consider in mitigating pun
ishment. JoAnn Kossie and Lucinda Kossie had such evidence and
were willing to provide their testimony had counsel contacted
then and prepared them for the sentencing trial.See exhibit D.
Mitigating circumstances relevant to punishment are circum
stances of the nature that JoAnn Kossie and Lucinda Kossie
could have testified to, which would support a belief that
defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to
such circumstances are less culpable than others who have no
such excuse. See Muhammad v. State, 46 S.W.3d 493 (Tex.App.-El
Paso 2001, no pet.).
Secondly, applicant contends that an evidentiary hear
ing is needed so counsel can explain why at no time prior or
during the punishment trial did counsel inform applicant of
his right to testify or inquire into whether applicant desired
to testify. Within hours after the jury's finding of guilt,
counsel rushed into the sentencing trial.Counsel was totally
Page 14
unprepared for the sentencing trial, and had no intentions to
be or even letting applicant take the stand. In fact, counsel's
only sentencing trial strategy was just to sit in as a "warm"
body attorney and let the prosecutor roast applicant with his
violent prior criminal record.Applicant contends that had coun
sel inquired into whether he desired to testify he would have
insisted on taking the stand to at least admit the truth that
he did not know the cashier as he had tried to lead the jurors
to believe. He would also have let the jurors know that he re
spected their decision in finding that he had used a firearm
but would have let them know that he did not have a gun during
the robbery and that the only reason he had gone to trial was
because the cashier had lied about seeing a brown gun handle.
He would have let the jurors know how remorseful he. was in try
ing to implicate the cashier as a party to the crime but at the
time he thought that it was in his best interest to do so. He
He would have also let the jurors know that prior to committing
the robbery he had done crack cocaine and had he not been on
crack he would not have committed the robbery. He would have
explained to them how intense the craving was for him to get
more crack into his system and that the craving prevented him
from conforming his behavior to the law. Applicant would have
told the jurors that he lost all self-control because the crav
ing was unbearable and all that matter at that time was that he
page 15
got some money to buy some more crack. He would have explained
to them that he had been in several drug treatment facilities
for chronic use of crack cocaine and alcohol abuse. Counsel
could have easily verified this by acquiring and presenting
evidence of applicant's medical records and documentation of
applicant's crack addiction from the parole office. Thus,thirdly,
an live evidentiary hearing is needed so trial counsel can ex
plain why she made no attempt to retrieve this evidence for
mitigating punishment even when applicant had provided her
with sufficient leads of his drug addiction. Fourthly, counsel
must explain why she made no attempts to consult with an expert
in regards to the effect of chronic use of crack cocaine. Dr.
Harry Bonnell explains in his sworn affidavit that the craving
for cocaine can take control of rational thinking and make the
person more capable of committing crimes and other illegal
behaviors. See exhibit E.
With a minimum amount of investigating counsel could
have discovered that chronic use of crack cocaine can cause
temporarily insanity and that evidence of temporarily insanity
could have been admitted for mitigation of punishment at appli
cant's sentencing trial.]See Seek v. State, b4b S.W.2d 557 (Tex.
App.-Houston List Dist.jJ 1982)("Evidence of temporarily insan
ity caused by intoxication was admissible in mitigation of pen
alty for aggravated rape"). V.T.C.A. Penal Code §§ 8.04, 21.02
Page 16
(b)(2-4). With this evidence counsel could have requested an
instruction on temparary insanity for the jurors to consider
and in all likelihood counsel would have succeeded with her
requests.
Applicant further contends that an live evidentiary
hearing is needed so counsel can explain why she made no at
tempt to adduce or produce any evidence of applicant's general
life and character. At the time of the offense applicant was
a certified lab optician and was working full-time at McDuffy
Optical. He he"was married and had 3 kids ages 10 months, 3
years old and 13 years old and that he was a good father to
his kids. Applicant contends that this evidence was relevant
and with a minimum amount of investigation counsel could have
discovered even more evidence of applicant's general life and
character that only a lawyer can do. Evidence is relevant to
the assessment of punishment if it provides information about
about the defendant's life and characteristics. See Minor v.
State, 91 S.W.3d 824 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth.2002).
Finally, applicant contends that trial counsel wholly
failed to investigate and present any mitigating circumstances
during the penalty phase of the trial. Applicant had been in
several drug treatment facilities, namely, Herman Hospital, St,
Joseph Hospital, West Oaks Hospital and his parole officer had
him admitted into treatment at the Texas House which at that
time was a facility for paroleess with drug addictions. All of
Page 17
this evidence was documented by the parole board and with a
minimum amount of investigation counsel would have discover
ed this evidence which would easily supported a request for
an instruction on temporary insanity. While Strickland does
not require defense counsel to investigate each and every
potential lead, or present any mitigating evidence at all, it
does require attorneys to put forth enough investigation efforts
to base their decision not to present a mitigating case on a
thorough understanding of the available evidence. See Ex parte
Woods, No.WR-62,627-01, 2005 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 1859 (Nov.2.
2005)(designated for publication).
Here, in the instant case, counsel was provided with
potential leads by applicant that his temporary insanity by
chronic use of crack could have been offered as evidence to
show that while applicant was under the influence of crack the
craving overpowered him which prevented applicant from conform
ing his behavior to laws. Once counsel had these leads she was
required to probe, inquire, investigate, consult and seek out
whatever evidence she could discover to support an instruction
on temporary insanity so that the jurors could consider as evi- ,
dence in mitigating punishment at applicant's penalty trial.
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to crime. Tex.Penal
Code Ann.§ 8.04(a)(Vernon 1994), however, evidence of temparary
insanity caused by intoxication may be introduced in mitigation
of punishment. See Reyna v. State, 11 S.;W.3d 401 (Court of Appeals
Page 18
List Dist] 2000). See also Frias v. State, 775 S.W.;2d 871 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1989 no pet.).
In conclusion, applicant contends that evidence of his
temporary insanity caused by chronic use of crack might have
proved the mitigating factor that would have promoted jurors
to give him a lenient sentence instead of the maximum sentence
of life in which he received. With a minimum amount of investi
gation counsel could have discovered a wealth of additional
evidence, thus, counsel's failure to investigate and present
any mitigating circumstances deprived applicant of effective
assistance of counsel making his sentencing trial fundamentally
unfair. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.; 510 (2003).
Respectfully submitted,
/ sv7>"^c^ygd4^-&-
Lexter Kennon Kossie
TDCJ-CID #700661
William McConnell Unit
3001 South Emily Drive
Beeville, Texas 78102
Appearing Pro se
Afnf ..20:
SIGNED ON THIS (9> day ofJWW__, 2015.
Page 19
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, p r e i s e s ARE cons id e r e d,
Applicant prays that this Court will find that this is a per
missible subsequent writ application under § 4(a)(1)(b)(c),
art.;11.07 because the legal basis for the claim alleged in
the instant case was unavailable on the date applicant filed
his initial application or any previous considered applica
tion in that the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) was not decided until
May 28, 2013, almost 15 years after applicant had filed his
initial writ application and after any previously considered
writ applications filed by the applicant.
Applicant prays this Court will further find that there
are controverted, previously unresolved issues relating direct
ly to the legality of applicant's confinement which must be
resolved requiring a live evidentiary hearing in order that
applicant's trial counsel can specifically respond to the
allegations contained in the writ application in Cause No.
679887-S pending before this Court, thereafter hold said
pending application in abeyance and remand the case back to
trial court for such evidentiary with an order that applicant
be appointed counsel for that proceeding.
zs/ cyCkjyfajlJi^AJuSL-
Lexter Kennon Kossie
Pro se Applicant
Page 20
INMATE-S UNSWORM DECLARATION
I, Lexter Kennon Kossie,#700661, being presently
incarcerated at the William McConnell Unit in Beeville,
Texas, declare under penalty of perjury that, according to
my beliefs and memory, the allegations made in my writ
application are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Lexter Kennon Kossie
Page 21