Ronny Lee Williams v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
12-15-00139-CR
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
11/16/2015 11:54:57 AM
Pam Estes
CLERK
NOS. 12-15-00139-CR
and 12-15-00140-CR
FILED IN
IN THE 12th COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
11/16/2015 11:54:57 AM
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS PAM ESTES
Clerk
SITTING AT TYLER, TEXAS
___________________________
RONNY LEE WILLIAMS,
Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee.
___________________________
Appealed from the 145TH District Court of
Nacogdoches County, Texas
Trial Court No. F1320424 and F1521685
ANDERS BRIEF
Noel D. Cooper
Texas Bar No. 00796397
LAW OFFICES OF NOEL D. COOPER
117 North St., Suite 2
Nacogdoches, Texas 75961
Telephone: (936) 564-9000
Telecopier: (936) 715-6022
noelcooper@noelcooper.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT,
RONNY LEE WILLIAMS
NOS. 12-15-00139-CR
and 12-15-00140-CR
RONNY LEE WILLIAMS,
Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee.
IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL
Appellant certifies that the following is a complete list of the parties,
attorneys, and any other person who has any interest in the outcome of this
lawsuit:
Noel D. Cooper
Texas Bar No. 00796397
LAW OFFICES OF NOEL D. COOPER
117 North St., Suite 2
Nacogdoches, Texas 75961
Telephone: (936) 564-9000
Telecopier: (936) 715-6022
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT,
RONNY LEE WILLIAMS
Nicole LoStracco
State Bar No. 00792906
Nacogdoches County District Attorney
101 W. Main, Suite 250
Nacogdoches, Texas 75961
Telephone: (936) 560-7766
Fax: (936) 560-6036
Email:nlostracco@co.nacogdoches.tx.us
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
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RONNY LEE WILLIAMS
TDCJ-ID # 02001514
Stiles Unit
3060 FM 3514
Beaumont, TX 77705
APPELLANT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL .......................................................... 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................. 4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................ 9
ISSUES PRESENTED ................................................................................. 10
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................. 10
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.............................................................. 20
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES..............................................................21
Standard for Anders Brief ...................................................................21
Potential Issue 1: Was the evidence is legally sufficient to
support Appellant’s convictions? ........................... 25
Potential Issue 2: Was Appellant’s trial counsel ineffective in
his representation of the Appellant?...................... 30
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 40
PRAYER .......................................................................................................41
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .............................................................. 42
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE....................................................................... 43
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Case Law
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493(1967) ................................................................................ 20, 21, 40, 41
Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316(Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ....................................................................... 27
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d, 893(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ...................................................................... 27
Bryson v. State, 820 S.W.2d 197(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no pet) ........................................... 24
Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ................................................................. 25, 28
Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192(Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ...................................................................... 27
Davis v. State, 930 S.W.2d 765(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.], pet. ref’d.).................................. 25, 32
Espinosa v. State, 853 S.W.2d 36(Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ....................................................................... 22
Ex Parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ...................................................................... 33
Ex Parte Gonzales, 204 S.W.3d 391(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ...................................................................... 34
Freeman v. State, 167 S.W.3d 114(Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.) ....................................................... 34
Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137(Tex. Crim. App. 1969) ........................................................................41
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Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243(Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ...................................................................... 27
Hernandez. v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53(Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ........................................................................31
Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ....................................................................... 30
High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807(Tex. Crim. App. 1978) ..................................................... 20, 33, 40, 41
Ieppert v. State, 908 S.W.2d 217(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ....................................................................... 22
Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768(Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ................................................................. 26, 32
Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842(Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.) ................................................ 37
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979) ................................................................................................. 26
Johnson v. United States, 360 F.2d 844(D.C. Cir. 1966) .................................................................................. 40
King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556(Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ...................................................................... 26
Krumboltz v. State, 945 S.W.2d 176(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.) ............................................. 38
Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234(Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ....................................................................... 27
McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ........................................................... 25, 32, 33
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Mercado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 291(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ...................................................................... 36
Milburn v. State, 15 S.W.3d 267(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) ............................ 34
Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ...................................................................... 39
Peck v. State, 923 S.W.2d 839(Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no pet.) ........................................................ 22
Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341(Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ....................................................................... 27
Rivera v. State, 123 S.W.3d 21(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2003, pet. ref’d) ................................ 34
Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ...................................................................... 33
Sanchez v. State, 222 S.W.3d 85(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) .......................................................................31
Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375(Tex. App.—Austin 1992, pet. ref’d, untimely)................................... 28
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984) .......................................................................... 25, 30, 31, 32, 39
Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ....................................................................... 33
White v. State, 671 S.W.2d 40(Tex. Crim. App. 1984) ....................................................................... 29
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Statutes
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 481.102 ............................................................................................ 29
§ 481.115 ............................................................................................. 29
TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 22.01 ................................................................................................ 29
§ 29.02 ............................................................................................... 28
§ 29.03 ............................................................................................... 28
§ 30.02 ............................................................................................... 28
-8-
NOS. 12-15-00139-CR
and 12-15-00140-CR
RONNY LEE WILLIAMS,
Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee.
ANDERS BRIEF
COMES NOW, Noel D. Cooper, court-appointed counsel for
Appellant, RONNY LEE WILLIAMS, in the above numbered cause, and
files this “Anders Brief” and would show this Honorable Court as follows:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. Appellant was charged by two indictments and
was tried on four felonies: aggravated robbery, burglary of a habitation,
assault on a public servant, and possession of a controlled substance. The
case was filed in the 145TH District Court under Cause Numbers F1320424
and F1521685.
Course of Proceedings. On May 1, 2013, a jury was selected, and
evidence was opened on May 18, 2015, and closed on May 19, 2013.
Arguments were heard on May 19, 2015, and the punishment phase took
place that day.
-9-
Trial Court Disposition. The jury found Appellant guilty of all four
counts. Appellant was sentenced to 20 years for possession of controlled
substance, 70 years for aggravated robbery, ten (10) years for the assault on
a public servant, and eight (8) years for the burglary of a habitation.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Potential Issue 1: Was the evidence is legally sufficient to support
Appellant’s?
Potential Issue 2: Was Appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective in his
representation of the Appellant during the jury trial?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to opening the evidence, Appellant was sworn in and the plea
bargain offer was placed on the record, and Appellant insisted that he
wanted a jury trial. RR 3:7-8.1 The Rule was invoked. RR 3:9. Appellant
pleaded “not guilty” to the charges read to the jury in the indictments. RR
3:14-15. Appellant’s trial counsel waived making an opening statement
prior to the State’s case-in-chief. RR 3:22.
1Because the two Reporter’s Records are identical, references to the trial transcript are
designated “RR” for each case.
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Guilt-Innocence Phase
Keith Hawkins
The State’s first witness was Keith Hawkins, an officer with the
Nacogdoches Police Department (“NPD”). RR 3:22-23. Mr. Hawkins
testified that it was the policy of NPD to take all persons on whom a TASER
had been used to the hospital so medical personnel can remove the TASER
barbs and inspect the small wounds. RR 3:32. On September 11, 2013, Mr.
Hawkins was working as a police sergeant for NPD. RR 3:35. A call came in
for a burglary/robbery, and he was the first officer on the scene. RR 3:36-
37. When he arrived, two men, Mr. Flanagan and Mr. Goad, were there and
Mr. Flanagan kept saying “I almost had him.” RR 3:37. The scene of the
alleged crime was the residence of Eugene Morgan. RR 3:39. When got out
of the unit, Mr. Flanagan and Mr. Goad informed him that their employer
had been attacked and gave him a description of the assailant. RR 3:40. Mr.
Hawkins checked on the injured person, Mr. Bright, who had a laceration
on his face. RR 3:40. Appellant was described as a black male with no shirt
and white shorts. RR 3:40. Mr. Hawkins believed that the Appellant had
left his shirt at the scene of the crime. RR 3:42. He also discovered shoes at
the scene, and Appellant was not wearing shoes when he was found. RR
3:42-43.
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After securing the scene, a suspect was located across the street from
the scene of the crime. RR 3:45. The suspect was hiding in a child’s
playhouse, trying to conceal himself. RR 3:45. When he arrived at the
location, Appellant was on the top level of the playhouse. RR 3:47. Mr.
Hawkins, along with two other officers, Keith Finchum and Nick Stewart,
attempted to take Appellant into custody, but he was swinging and kicking
at them. RR 3:48. Mr. Hawkins noticed that Appellant was wearing dark
Under Armour-type shorts, and there was a white pair of shorts on the
ground next to the playset. RR 3:50-51. Appellant was saying that he was
the Lord and then that he was the Devil. RR 3:51-52. After several minutes
of trying to talk Appellant down, the decision was made to use a TASER. RR
3:52. Appellant was struck with the TASER, but he just pulled the barbs
out. RR 3:53. He was then hit with a second TASER, and he pulled those
barbs out, too. RR 3:3-54. While Mr. Hawkins was reaching down for
another TASER, Mr. Finchum was struck in the face by Appellant. RR 3:54.
The third time Appellant was struck with a TASER also did not work. RR
3:54. The decision was made to go up and physically grab Appellant, and
then Appellant jumped off of the playset. RR 3:55-56. When Appellant
landed on the ground, he was immediately taken into custody. RR 3:56. At
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the jail, Appellant remained noncompliant and had to be placed into a
restraint chair. RR 3:57. Appellant was identified by Mr. Hawkins. RR 3:60.
Nick Stewart
Nick Stewart was employed by NPD on September 11, 2013. RR 3:64-
65. He was assigned to the Street Crimes Unit when the call came in for a
burglary in progress. RR 3:65-66. When he reached the area of the crime,
two witnesses pointed to Appellant who was standing at the top of a
treehouse. RR 3:67. Appellant was only wearing underwear. RR 3:70. His
first thought was that Appellant had possibly been using drugs. RR 3:71.
The officers tried to get Appellant to surrender, but they decided they had
to enter the treehouse. RR 3:71. Mr. Stewart entered first, followed by Mr.
Finchum and later Mr. Hawkins. RR 3:72. The officers tried to get
Appellant to surrender and comply, but Appellant would not, so Mr.
Stewart tried to grab Appellant by the leg. RR 3:72. When that did not
work, the officers decided to use a TASER. RR 3:72-73. The TASER was
ineffective. RR 3:73. The officers tried using a TASER on Appellant multiple
times. RR 3:73-74. While Mr. Finchum was trying to reload his TASER,
Appellant swung his right hand and hit Mr. Finchum in the face with a
closed fist. RR 3:75-76. During the incident in the treehouse, Appellant was
threatening to urinate on the officers. RR 3:84.
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Walter McKee
Walter McKee was an officer with the Nacogdoches Police
Department. RR 3:90. On the date of the incident, Mr. McKee responded to
a burglary call to assist in locating the assailant. RR 3:91. Mr. McKee was
one of the last officers to arrive at the treehouse. RR 3:92. He was handed a
pair of white shorts by Mr. Stewart, and when he searched the shorts he
found a vanilla extract bottle in a black bag which he knew was a common
carrying vessel for users of PCP because the dark, tinted bottles protect the
PCP from being degraded by sunlight. RR 3:93. Mr. McKee did not open
the bottle because he was afraid of coming in contact with PCP, and it is the
policy of the Nacogdoches Police Department to not try to field test
suspected PCP. RR 3:95-96. Mr. McKee took the bottle back to the evidence
locker at the headquarters of the Nacogdoches Police Department. RR 3:97.
Appellant’s trial counsel stipulated that the substance in the bottle
was PCP. RR 3:98-99. Appellant’s trial counsel also stipulated to the
laboratory report that the bottle contained 10.11 grams of phencyclidine,
PCP. RR 3:103. Finall, Appellant’s trial counsel stipulated to the
admissibility of the medical records of Keith Finchum from September 11,
2013. RR 3:105.
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Roy Harrison
Roy Harrison was a nurse in the emergency room at Nacogdoches
Memorial Hospital, RR 3:108, and he was working as a nurse on September
11, 2013. RR 3:110. Mr. Harrison knew Mr. Finchum, because Mr. Finchum
had worked security at the hospital. RR 3:110. Mr. Finchum came to the ER
complaining of facial pain after being struck in the face, and his face was
visibly red and swollen. RR 3:111.
Theodore Flanagan
Mr. Flanagan was a resident of Nacogdoches who knew Morgan
Bright. RR 3:115. He met Mr. Bright while he was homeless and staying at
Godtel in Nacogdoches because Mr. Bright would pickup Mr. Flanagan to
work on his property while he was a Godtel resident. RR 3:116. Mr.
Flanagan was working for Mr. Bright on the date of the accident. RR 3:118.
Will, who now lives in Minnesota, was working there, too. RR 3:116-17. Mr.
Flanagan and Will were clearing brush when a Hispanic boy told them that
someone was at Mr. Bright’s house, and then later they could hear Mr.
Bright calling for them. RR 3:118-19. While walking back, Mr. Flanagan saw
Mr. Bright’s legs go up in the air and then come down, so he and Will
started running toward Mr. Bright. RR 3:119. When they got to Mr. Bright,
Appellant was there wearing nothing but his shorts, and he jumped the
-15-
fence. RR 3:119-20. Mr. Bright’s face was bloody. RR 3:121. He saw
Appellant hitting Mr. Bright. RR 3:122.
Morgan Eugene Bright
Morgan Eugene Bright was a retired resident of Nacogdoches. RR
3:126. On September 11, 2013, he had taken a load of wood to the dump,
and a neighbor told him that he had someone in his house. RR 3:129-30.
He thought it was someone trying to buy a car or car parts, so he told his
helpers to finish loading up his truck. RR 3:131. When Mr. Bright arrived at
his house, he did not see a car parked in his driveway, but the door was
open on the west end of the house, and he saw someone inside his home.
RR 3:132. Mr. Bright was 99% sure that Appellant was the person who was
in his house, but Appellant was 30 to 35 pounds heavier at the time of trial
than the man in his house. RR 3:141. The man in his house was taking food
out of the freezer. RR 3:134. When Mr. Bright asked the man to put the
food back, the man confronted him and kept asking, “Are you the devil?”
RR 3:135. Mr. Bright walked about half the way to where his helpers were
working and yelled that he needed some help. RR 3:136. While he was
outside, the man had removed his shirt and shoes which he had been
wearing, but he was still wearing his white shorts. RR 3:139-40. Mr. Bright
went back inside and the man assaulted him. RR 3:136-37. While being
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assaulted, Teddy yelled at the man, and then he quit assaulting Mr. Bright.
RR 3:138. At the time of the incident, Mr. Bright was 66 years old, and he
had been on social security disability since 2012. RR 3:138. The police
recovered the shirt and shoes. RR 3:139. Mr. Bright lost nine (9) teeth
because of the assault. RR 3:140.
James Buckingham
James Buckingham was a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry.
RR 4:6. Dr. Buckingham examined Appellant for insanity. RR 4:7.
Appellant told Dr. Buckingham that he had used PCP on September 11,
2013, and he knew what he did was wrong. RR 4:13. Dr. Buckingham
testified that voluntary consumption of drugs would nullify any insanity
defense. RR 4:15. Appellant did not provide Dr. Buckingham with any
indication that he had not voluntarily used PCP on September 11, 2013. RR
4:16. The circumstances of the offense suggested led Dr. Buckingham to
conclude that Appellant was not insane at the time of the offense. RR 4:18.
Dr. Buckingham diagnosed Appellant as having a psychotic disorder. RR
4:18. Appellant could have believed that Mr. Bright was the devil. RR 4:20.
Appellant entered Mr. Bright’s house to get a drink to cool off. RR 4:22. Dr.
Buckingham did not believe that the offenses on September 11, 2013, would
have happened if Appellant had not been smoking PCP. RR 4:24.
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Frank Murphy
Frank Murphy was a psychiatrist in private practice who specialized
in forensic psychiatry. RR 4:26. Dr. Murphy examined Appellant in October
2014. RR 4:27. Appellant admitted to using PCP on the date of the incident,
and he did not say that he ingested the PCP involuntarily. RR 4:31-32.
Appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia, and violence amount a
schizophrenic patient is uncommon. RR 4:33. Dr. Murphy did not see any
evidence that Appellant did not know that his actions were wrong. RR 4:35.
Appellant
Appellant chose not to testify and did not present any evidence during
guilt or innocence. RR 4:42.
Punishment Phase
During the punishment phase, the State and Appellant’s trial counsel
stipulated to a driving while intoxicated conviction in 2010, a driving while
license invalid conviction in 2006, a possession of marijuana conviction in
2006, an evading arrest conviction in 2006, a second-offense driving while
intoxicated conviction in 2012, a conviction for failure to stop and render
aid in 2012, a felony conviction for delivery of marijuana in 2004, a felony
conviction for credit card abuse in 2010, a felony conviction for evading
arrest in 2012, and three convictions for failure to appear in 2006. RR 5:7-
-18-
9. The State and Appellant’s trial counsel also stipulated that Appellant was
the same person about whom the State’s first three witnesses would be
testifying. RR 5:12.
Robert Collier
Mr. Collier was employed for almost four years by the Nacogdoches
Police Department. RR 5:13. On July 4, 2013, Mr. Collier came in contact
with Appellant while doing a medical assist call as a police officer. RR 5:14.
At the call, he found Appellant in a back bedroom, incoherent and
thrashing about. RR 5:15. When entering the house, Mr. Collier could smell
the chemical odor of PCP. RR 5:15-16. Appellant had been smoking PCP
and had ingested some and smoked methamphetamines earlier in the day.
RR 5:17. Appellant was taken to the hospital because it was feared he had
overdosed. RR 5:17.
Jonathan Durham
Jonathan Durham was employed by the Nacogdoches Police
Department as a patrolman. RR 5:18. On August 30, 2013, Mr. Durham
responded to a welfare check involving Appellant. RR 5:19. Appellant was
passed out in the street, and he admitted to smoking PCP, and he was
arrested for public intoxication. RR 5:20.
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Brett Ayers
Brett Ayers worked as a police officer for the Nacogdoches Police
Department. RR 5:21-22. On August 21, 2013, he responded to a call
regarding a suspicious person where he found Appellant on the porch of the
caller’s residence, and Appellant appeared to be intoxicated. RR 5:22-23.
Mr. Ayers smelled a chemical that he associated with PCP. RR 5:23.
Appellant was arrested for public intoxication. RR 5:24.
Appellant
Appellant did not take the stand or present any evidence during the
punishment phase of the trial. RR 5:25-26.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In compliance with the requirements of Anders v. California, 396
U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967) and High v. State, 573 S.W.2d
807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), the undersigned attorney states that he has
diligently reviewed and evaluated the entire record and investigated all
possible grounds for appeal, but his review and investigation have revealed
no error to bring to the Court’s attention. Counsel would respectfully show
the Court that the instant appeal would be wholly frivolous and without
merit and that appellate counsel should be permitted to withdraw. Id.-20-
Matters considered by appellate counsel in reaching this conclusion are set
forth above as well as below in additional detail.
In reaching the conclusion that this appeal is without merit, Appellate
Counsel advances two possible appellate issues which could possibly be
raised. Those issues reference possible trial errors consisting of: (1) the
evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding
that the Appellant was in possession of a controlled substance under one
gram; and (2) the Appellant’s trial counsel failed to provide effective
assistance of counsel denying the Appellant a fair trial.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
Standard for Anders Brief.
After a thorough review of the record, Appellant’s counsel is unable to
find any errors which he, in good faith, can urge which warrant a reversal of
the sentences handed down by the trial court. Counsel is aware that he has
a duty to advance arguable grounds of error. Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
736, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 19 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). There are two possible or
potential errors to investigate on appeal, but research reflects that both
legal issues are frivolous based upon standing case and statutory law. The
following is the general review of the record considered by the Appellate
Counsel in reaching this conclusion:
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1. The Complaint and Information. The Appellant’s indictments are in
the proper form. CR 7; CR2 6;2 Peck v. State, 923 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 1996, no pet.). There are no errors concerning the charging
instrument. Ieppert v. State, 908 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
2. Pre-Trial Motions and Hearings. Several pretrial motions were
filed. Initially, Appellant’s competency was questioned and he was deemed
incompetent to stand trial by the trial court. CR 11-12. Upon regaining
competency, CR 32-37, Appellant’s trial counsel requested that he be tried
by two different psychiatrists on the issue of insanity; CR 38-39, 46-47; and
Appellant’s trial counsel gave notice of the insanity defense. CR 40-41.
There were no errors occurring during the pretrial proceedings. Espinosa v.
State, 853 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
3. Trial Motions. There were no trial motions filed by either party. CR
passim, CR2 passim. Appellant’s trial counsel made no objections.
4. Jury Selection. The voir dire was recorded. RR 2:1. Appellant’s trial
counsel made no objections during voir dire and no errors were noted or
preserved. RR 2:passim.
2“CR” shall reference the Clerk’s Record in F1320424, and “CR2” shall reference the
Clerk’s Record in F1521685.
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5. The Guilt /Innocence Phase.
a. The State & Appellant’s Opening Statement. The State's
opening Statement appears in the record, RR 3:15, and there were no
defense objections during the State's opening statement. RR 3:passim.
Examination of the State's opening statement reveals that it was in proper
form, not subject to objection, and without legal error. Appellant’s trial
counsel did not give an opening statement following the State’s, RR 3:22
and because Appellant elected to not testify, Appellant’s trial counsel gave
no testimony at the introduction of evidence from Appellant. RR 4:passim.
b. The State's Evidence. The State called eight (8) witnesses in
addition to introducing 15 exhibits during the guilt-innocence phase.
c. Objections. Appellant’s trial counsel made no objections
during the State’s case-in-chief. A reading of the record fails to reflect any
glaring errors in the failure to make any other objections to the evidence
and testimony by the State.
d. The Defendant's Evidence. The Appellant’s trial counsel did
not call any witnesses during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial and did
not offer any exhibits. All of the Courts rulings appear to be proper. No
error occurred and no error was preserved.
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e. The Guilt/Innocence Charge. The Guilt/Innocence charge is
contained in the record to which there were no objections. RR 4:42-43.
f. The State's Guilt/Innocence Closing Argument. The State's
Guilt/Innocence arguments appear in the record. RR 4:76. No defense
objection was made during the State’s guilt/innocence argument. State’s
argument revealed nothing improper. Bryson, 820 S.W.2d at 198-99.
g. The Defense's Guilt/Innocence Closing argument. The
defense's guilt/innocence argument appears in the record. RR 4:74. There
were no objections during defense's argument. No error occurred and no
error was preserved. . Bryson, 820 S.W.2d at 198-99.
h. The Guilt/Innocence Verdict of the Jury. The
Guilt/Innocence verdict of the jury appears in the record. CRS 28.
Examination of the verdict reveals that it is in proper form. The defense
made no complaint in the record regarding the form or verdict, and
accordingly, no errors occurred and none were preserved. Bryson, 820
S.W.2d at 198-99.
6. The Punishment Phase. Appellant elected to have the jury assess
punishment. CR 56. The sentence was not unreasonable. The record fails to
reflect any error of law by the trial court in the rulings. Bryson, 820 S.W.2d
at 198-99.
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7. Sufficiency of the Evidence. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the
evidence, a court of appeals shall not set aside a jury verdict unless it is so
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong
and unjust. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). If a
person were to provide a Cliff’s Notes version of the trial, it might read,
“Appellant abuses dissociative drug, burgles an elderly person’s home, robs
and severely injures the elderly person after being discovered, flees [not
very far] from the crime scene to a treehouse where he assaults a police
officer, and is found to have possessed that same dissociative drug.”
8. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Ineffectiveness of counsel is
usually difficult to determine upon direct appeal. The court of appeals must
indulge in a strong presumption in favor of avoiding a finding of ineffective
assistance and the burden is onerous. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996). Appellant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient (below the objective standard of reasonableness) and that but for
this deficiency, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The
court of appeals will indulge in a strong presumption of reasonableness in
counsel’s conduct, and examine the trial as a whole, considering error in
trial strategy only if counsel’s actions are without plausible basis. Davis v.
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State, 930 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.], pet. ref’d.). If
there exists any plausible basis for counsel’s actions, the court of appeals
may not speculate on reasons for that action when the record contains no
evidence for the actions. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994). This was not a complicated case. It appears from the record
that the Appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective.
Potential Issue 1: Was the evidence is legally sufficient to
support Appellant’s convictions?
Argument & Authorities
Standard of Review
Legal sufficiency of the evidence “is an essential of the due process
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment that no person shall be made to
suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof –
defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a
reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” Jackson
v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). The standard of review is whether,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 319; King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000). This standard is the only standard that a reviewing court will
apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each
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element of the offense which the State is required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d, 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). The appellate court will consider all evidence admitted, whether
proper or improper. “Every fact need not point directly or independently to
the defendant’s guilt [citation omitted]. A conclusion of guilt can rest on the
combined cumulative for of all incriminating circumstances.” Conner v.
State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The jury is the exclusive
judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given
to that testimony. Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994); Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the elements of
the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge, one that
“accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
necessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the
State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense
for which the defendant was tried.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The charge should not merely quote the elements of
the offense listed in the statute, but should list the statutory elements “as
modified by the charging instrument.” Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243,
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254 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). “A hypothetically correct charge has its basis in
the indictment allegations.” Id. at 255.
In deciding whether or not evidence in a given case is legally
sufficient, the court must look at all of the evidence adduced at trial to
determine if viewing all the evidence impartially, it must set aside the
verdict because it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence
as to be clearly wrong and unjust.” Clewis, 922 S.W.2d 126; Stone v. State,
823 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, pet. ref’d, untimely).
The evidence was legally sufficient.
The charge included jury questions on Aggravated Robbery, Assault
on a Public Servant, and Burglary of a Habitation, CR 61, as well as
Possession of a Controlled Substance in the amount of four grams or more
but less than 200 grams. CR2 10. A person commits aggravated robbery if
he intentionally or knowingly threatens of places another in fear of
imminent bodily injury or death and causes bodily injury to a person 65
years of age or older. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 29.02, 29.03. The State is not
required to prove that a completed theft occurred. White v. State, 671
S.W.2d 40, 41-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). A person commits the offense of
Assault on a Public Servant if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
causes bodily injury to another who the actor knows to be a public servant.
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TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1),(b)(1). A person commits the offense of
Burglary of a Habitation if the person, without the effective consent of the
owner, enters a habitation with the intent to commit theft. TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 30.02(a)(1). A person commits the offense of possession of a PCP if he
intentionally or knowingly possesses a PCP. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
481.102(8), 481.115.
The easiest case to analyze is the case against Appellant for
possession of PCP. Appellant’s trial counsel conceded that at the time
Appellant was arrested that he was in possession of PCP, RR 3:98-103, as
the Controlled Substance Analysis Laboratory Report clearly indicated that
Appellant was in possession of PCP. CR 6:16. Appellate counsel suspects
that this was in an effort by Appellant’s trial counsel, not to shirk his
responsibility to defend Appellant, but to set up an argument for the
mitigation of punishment was will be discussed below.
The aggravated robbery and burglary cases rested upon two
witnesses, Theodore Flanagan and Morgan Bright. Both men testified that a
person was in the residence of Mr. Bright, and Mr. Flanagan testified that it
was undoubtedly Appellant who was assaulting Mr. Bright inside Mr.
Bright’s home. Mr. Bright testified to both his age, the fact that Appellant
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was assaulting him, including his injuries, that Appellant did not have
permission to be in his home, and that Appellant was stealing from him.
The case against Appellant for Assaulting a Public Servant was
equally straight forward. While officers of the Nacogdoches Police
Department were trying to arrest and detain Appellant, he assaulted one of
the officers by striking him in the face. This evidence supported the jury’s
verdict, and since the jury is the sole trier of fact and any inconsistencies in
the evidence are deemed to have been resolved by the jury in favor of their
verdict, it is unlikely that Appellant could prevail on the issue of legal
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.
Potential Issue 2: Was Appellant’s trial counsel was
ineffective in his representation of the Appellant during the jury
trial?
Argument & Authorities
Standard of Review.
The Appellant would no doubt criticize Trial Counsel for many of his
decisions throughout the trial. However, in this appeal attacking Trial
Counsel on ineffectiveness will most likely be fruitless. The adequacy of
counsel’s representation is evaluated using the two-part standard
articulated by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 2068 (1984) and adopted by Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770,
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772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Sanchez v. State, 222 S.W.3d 85, 90 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006). The test is: 1) whether the attorney’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms, and 2) whether there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the results of the proceedings could
have been different. Id. Reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. Hernandez. v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53,
55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
The reviewing court begins with the presumption that counsel’s
actions and decisions were reasonably professional and motivated by sound
trial strategy. Sanchez, 222 S.W.3d at 90. The party challenging counsel’s
effectiveness has the burden to rebut the presumption by presenting
evidence. Id. at 90.
Appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective.
In the present case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that but
for the trial counsel’s performance, the outcome of the case at hand would
have been different as required by the second prong of the Strickland test.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694-95, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068
(1984). Strickland requires that, to show ineffective assistance of counsel,
an appellant must prove that his attorney’s representation fell below an
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objective standard of reasonableness under the prevailing professional
norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for those
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Id. at 694-95.
Ineffectiveness of counsel is usually difficult to determine upon direct
appeal. The court of appeals must indulge in a strong presumption in favor
of avoiding a finding of ineffective assistance and the burden is onerous.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and McFarland v. State,
928 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The Appellant must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient (below the objective standard of
reasonableness) and but for that deficiency, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. The court of appeals will indulge in a strong
presumption of reasonableness in counsel’s conduct, and examine the trial
as a whole, considering error in trial strategy only if counsel’s actions are
without plausible basis. Davis, 930 S.W.2d at 767. If there exists any
plausible basis for counsel’s actions, the Court of Appeals may not speculate
on reasons for that action when the record contains no evidence for the
actions. Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771.
Court’s have consistently stated that it looks to the totality of
representation and not isolated instances when judging the effectiveness of
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counsel, as follows: “Isolated instances in the record reflecting errors of
omission or commission do not render counsel's performance ineffective,
nor can ineffective assistance of counsel be established by isolating one
portion of trial counsel's performance for examination.” McFarland, 928
S.W.2d at 483. Counsel's performance is judged by “the totality of the
representation” and “judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential” with every effort made to eliminate the distorting effects
of hindsight. See Id.; Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 483 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006); see also Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999) (an appellate court looks to the totality of the representation
and the particular circumstances of each case in evaluating the effectiveness
of counsel).
A Defendant in entitled to rely upon counsel to make an independent
examination of the facts and circumstances for guilt/innocence. Ex Parte
Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “[C]ounsel has a duty
to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Id. at 466-67. When
determining whether counsel was ineffective, “a particular decision not to
investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s
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judgment’s.” Id. at 467 (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-22, 123
S.Ct. 2527, (2003)). The same standard applies to punishment. See
Freeman v. State, 167 S.W.3d 114, 117-18 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.)
(failure to investigate client’s mental health issues ineffective assistance);
Rivera v. State, 123 S.W.3d 21, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2003, pet.
ref’d) (trial counsel’s failure to make reasonable investigation fell below
professional standard); Milburn v. State, 15 S.W.3d 267, 270-71 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (trial counsel’s failure to offer
any mitigating evidence was ineffective assistance); see also Ex Parte
Gonzales, 204 S.W.3d 391, 398-400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (trial counsel
ineffective for failing to investigate mitigating evidence).
In the instant case, the trial transcript and record reflect that the
Appellant’s trial counsel demonstrated an excellent knowledge of the facts
of the case and handled the representation of his client in an effective
fashion to the extent that any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
would most certainly fail particularly when considering the totality of the
circumstances of the trial as a whole.
Without any testimony from Appellant’s trial counsel regarding his
strategy, we are left to make assumptions based on the trial transcript, and
that evidence leads appellate counsel to surmise that Appellant’s trial
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counsel was attempting to minimize Appellant’s punishment exposure. The
offenses happened. That much was not contested at trial, and was most
likely incontrovertible. The question then for Appellant’s trial counsel
would then be to give a jury an explanation as to why Appellate committed
the offenses in order to minimize Appellant’s exposure during punishment.
In this case, the record establishes that at the beginning of the proceedings
after indictment that Appellant was not competent to stand trial. CR 11-12.
Once Appellant regained his competency, his trial counsel initially sought
to raise an insanity defense, but the evidence would not support that
defense. CR 44-45, 50-54. Thus, Appellant’s trial counsel apparently
attempted to mitigate Appellant’s exposure though a process of questioning
most of the witnesses about Appellant’s apparent mental state.
As a further potential issue to show ineffective assistance of counsel
by the Appellant’s trial counsel, it has been held that appellate counsel is
required to undertake an independent investigation of the facts including
those that bear upon punishment.
During the punishment phase of the trial, Appellant chose not to take
the stand in his own defense, and this was likely caused in part by his
mental illness. It is apparent from the record that Appellant’s trial counsel
investigated Appellant’s mental health issues and other mitigation
-35-
evidence, but that evidence available did little to stem the tide against the
overwhelming evidence offered by the State. First, not only was Appellant
competent to stand trial, CR 32-37, but his trial counsel had requested that
he be examined for insanity, and two experts reported that he was sane at
the time of the offenses. CR 44-45, 50-54. More importantly, Appellant was
able to testify about his mental health issues during the punishment
hearing. RR 5:26.
In the event that the Appellant believes that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the severity of the punishment
rendered by the trial court in this case, the record fails to support such a
contention or claim. Trial counsel did not object to the severity of the
sentence assessed, either at the conclusion of the hearing or in a motion for
new trial, and based upon the decision of the jury, there were no grounds
upon which to appeal that required preserving. Therefore, there is nothing
to argue on appeal in that regard, because counsel did not preserve error.
Mercado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Even if counsel had preserved error regarding the severity of the
sentence, the argument would be frivolous. There are two types of
punishment error regarding the severity of the sentence: (1) cruel and
unusual punishment, and (2) disproportionality. This sentence is not cruel
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and unusual. The punishments assessed by the jury suggest that they
assessed punishments for each offense specific to each crime, with the most
severe punishment for the aggravated robbery, likely due in part to the
severity of the injuries suffered by Mr. Bright. Further, evidence was
presented during the punishment phase of the trial that in addition to the
charged offenses, Appellant had a very lengthy criminal record as well as
numerous previous encounters with law enforcement preceding the trial
due to Appellant’s abuse of PCP. Given the facts presented during the trial,
it was within the sole discretion of the trial court to determine the
Appellant’s sentence. Punishment within the statutory range is generally
not considered to be cruel and unusual punishment. Jackson v. State, 989
S.W.2d 842, 845 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.) (citing Jordan v.
State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)). Also notable is the fact
that the jury did not sentence Appellant to life in prison.
Even if a sentence is not cruel and unusual, it may still be grossly
disproportionate to the crime. To determine whether a sentence is grossly
disproportionate, the appellate court first looks to the gravity of the offense
and the length of the prison sentence. If it determines from this analysis
that the sentence was disproportionate, the appellate court then considers:
(1) sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (2)
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sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Krumboltz v.
State, 945 S.W.2d 176, 177 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.). In the
current appeal, there is nothing to indicate that the threshold issue of
disproportionality has been satisfied. Appellant was fully aware of the range
of punishment available to the jury during the punishment phase of the
trial, meaning, 5 to 99 years, or life, with up to a $10,000.00 fine for the
aggravated robbery, and Appellant had already been admonished that he
turned down a 20-year plea bargain offer. RR 3:7-8. Therefore, any
disproportionality argument would fail along with any ineffective assistance
of counsel claim pursuant to the record.
The Appellant’s trial counsel fully and thoroughly represented the
Appellant during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. After listening to
the testimony of the State’s witnesses, who were thoroughly and rigorously
cross-examined by Appellant’s trial counsel, the jury found the Appellant
guilty as charged in the indictments. The Appellant’s trial counsel clearly
demonstrated knowledge of his client’s case supporting his investigation
and knowledge of the facts associated with the charge against his client.
Due to the fact that eyewitness testimony linked Appellant to the crime,
there is nothing in the record to indicate that “but for the trial counsel’s
performance,” the outcome of the case at hand would have been different as
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required by the second prong of the Strickland test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694-95, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Strickland requires that, to show ineffective
assistance of counsel, an appellant must prove that his attorney’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under the
prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for those unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Id. at 694-95. Given the vigorous representation of his
client by the Trial Counsel, it is unlikely that any other representation of the
Appellant would have resulted in a different outcome. As a result, it is not
likely that the Appellant would prevail on this issue.
Further, As the Court of Criminal of Appeals has previously stated,
rarely will the record on direct appeal be sufficient to show that counsel's
conduct was so deficient as to meet the first prong of Strickland as the
"reasonableness of counsel's choices often involves facts that do not appear
in the appellate record." Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). An application
for a post-conviction writ of a habeas corpus is the more appropriate
vehicle to raise and develop ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id.Consequently, Appellate Counsel can not find within the Appellate Record
sufficient specific facts to challenge Trial Counsel’s decisions at trial. Trial
-39-
Counsel’s reasons for the decisions made at trial do not appear in the
Appellate Record.
In conclusion, it is Appellate Counsel’s professional opinion based
upon a thorough evaluation over the record that there was no reversible
error reflected by the record. Therefore, Appellate Counsel’s professional
opinion is that this appeal is without merit and frivolous. No other potential
points of ineffective assistance of counsel may be found in the record.
CONCLUSION
Because Appellate Counsel, after a thorough review of the record, is
unable to identify any potentially meritorious points on appeal, it is the
professional opinion of the undersigned counsel that the appeal is frivolous
and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see
Johnson v. United States, 360 F.2d 844, 846 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger,
J. concurring): (“An attorney owes his first duty to the court. His oath
requires him to be absolutely honest even though his client’s interests may
seem to require a contrary course.”)
Counsel has executed an attached Certificate of Service certifying that
he is sending Appellant a copy of his Motion to Withdraw, and a copy of
this Brief, with an explanation of Appellant’s further rights regarding his
appeal. High v. State, 537 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
-40-
PRAYER
Counsel has conducted a professional evaluation of the record in this
cause and reluctantly concluded that as a matter of professional judgment,
the record contains no reversible error and no jurisdictional defects are
present. Where counsel concludes that there are no arguable grounds for
reversal, he is required to present a professional evaluation of the record
demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced as has
been done in the instant case. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967);
Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). The record does
not support a meritorious argument for reversal of the jury trial’s
conviction and punishment sentence of the Appellant. Pursuant to the
requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. at 744-45, and High v.
State, 573 S.W.2d at 813, counsel has documented that he has furnished
Appellant with a copy of this brief, contemporaneous with the filing of this
brief, and has notified Appellant that he has the right to review the record
and to file any brief that he deems appropriate. Counsel therefore
respectfully requests that the Court accept his brief, and he be allowed to
withdraw from representation of Appellant upon disposition of the appeal.
-41-
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Noel D. Cooper
Noel D. Cooper
Texas Bar No. 00796397
LAW OFFICES OF NOEL D.
COOPER
117 North St., Suite 2
Nacogdoches, Texas 75961
Telephone: (936) 564-9000
Telecopier: (936) 715-6022
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT,
RONNY LEE WILLIAMS
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3), I certify that this document is
computer generated and contains 6, 836 words based on a computer word
count.
/s/Noel D. Cooper
Noel D. Cooper
-42-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I delivered a copy of this Anders Brief to each attorney of
record or party in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
on November 16, 2015, at the addresses and manners below.
Nicole LoStracco
State Bar No. 00792906
Nacogdoches County District Attorney
101 W. Main, Suite 250
Nacogdoches, Texas 75961
Telephone: (936) 560-7766
Fax: (936) 560-6036
Email:nlostracco@co.nacogdoches.tx.us
Via Electronic Service
RONNY LEE WILLIAMS
TDCJ-ID # 02001514
Stiles Unit
3060 FM 3514
Beaumont, TX 77705
Via First Class Mail and CMRRR
/s/Noel D. Cooper
Noel D. Cooper
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