Phyllis Gwen Pruitt v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                             ACCEPTED
    06-14-00217-CR
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    2/26/2015 9:43:45 AM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    CLERK
    NO.06-14-00217-CR
    FILED IN
    6th COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    1N THE COURT OF APPEALS
    2/26/2015 9:43:45 AM
    FOR THE                          DEBBIE AUTREY
    Clerk
    SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    PHYLLIS GWEN PRUITT
    Appellant
    v.
    STATE OF TEXAS
    Appellee
    APPEALED FROM THE 124'h JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    OF GREGG COUNTY, TEXAS
    TRIAL COURT NO. 44139-B
    BRIEF OF APPELLANT
    KYLE DANSBY
    ATTORNEY AT LAW
    P.O. BOX 1914
    MARSHALL, TX 75671
    (903) 738-6162
    (888) 410-1583 (FAX)
    kdansbylaw@gmail.com
    STATE BARNO: 24059180
    1
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Page
    TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................... 2
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. 3
    IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES .......................................................................... 3
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................... 5
    ISSUE PRESENTED               .......................................................................................... 5
    Appellant's sentence is not grossly disproportional to the crime committed in violation of
    the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This is assuming arguendo that trial
    counsel preserved this argument for appeal, as trial counsel did not object to the sentence and did
    not file a motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................... 5
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.. ..................................................................... 6
    PRESERVATION OF ERROR .............................................................................. 7
    ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 8
    PRAyER ............................................................................................................ 9
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................................... 10
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................. 10
    2
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASES:
    Harmelin v. Michigan, 
    501 U.S. 957
    (1991) ............................................................... 9
    Solemv. Helm, 
    463 U.S. 277
    , 291-92 (1983) .............................................................. 9
    McGruder v. Puckett, 
    954 F.2d 313
    , 316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied ....................................... 9
    Currie v. State, 
    516 S.W.2d 684
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) ................................................ 7
    High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    , 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) ............................................ 7
    Jordan v. State, 
    495 S.W.2d 949
    ,952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) ......................................... 8
    Castaneda v. State, 
    135 S.W.3d 719
    , 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet) ........................... 7
    Escochea v. State, 
    139 S.W.3d 67
    , 80 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) ..................... 8
    Jacoby v. State, 
    227 S.W.3d 128
    ,130 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd) ............. 7
    Mullins v. State, 
    208 S.W.3d 469
    , 470 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, no pe!.) ......................... 9
    Trevino v. State, 
    174 S.W.3d 925
    , 928 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. ref'd) .................. 
    8 Wilson v
    . State, 
    955 S.W.2d 693
    (Tex. App. - Waco 1997, order), disp. on merits, 
    3 S.W.3d 223
            (Tex. App. - Waco, 1999, pet. ref d) ............................................................... 7
    Winchester v. State, 246 S.W.3d 386,388 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd) .................... 9
    STATUTES:
    TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §481.115(a) (West 2013) ................................. 8
    TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §481.115 (b) (West 2013) ................................ 8
    TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.34(a) (West 2013) ......................................................... 8
    TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.35(a) (West 2013) ......................................................... 8
    TEX. R. APP. P. 33.l(a)(I) .................................................................................. 7
    IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES
    Phyllis Gwen PlUitt: Appellant
    Gregg County Jail
    3
    101 E. Methvin, Suite 635
    Longview, TX 75601
    Kyle Dansby: Trial counsel for Appellant
    P.O. Box 1914
    Marshall, TX 75671
    kdansbylaw@gmail.com
    Kyle Dansby: Appellate counsel for Appellant
    P.O. Box 1914
    Marshall, TX 75671
    kdansbylaw@gmail.com
    Chris Botto: Assistant District Attorney at open plea & sentencing
    Gregg County District Attorney's Office
    101 E. Methvin, Suite 333
    Longview, TX 75601
    chris.botto@co.gregg.tx.us
    Zan Brown: Assistant District Attorney on appeal
    Gregg County District Attorney's Office
    101 E. Methvin, Suite 333
    Longview, TX 75601
    zan.brown@co.gregg.tx.us
    Alfonso Charles: trial judge, 124th District Court, Gregg COlmty, Texas
    101 E. Methvin, Suite 447
    Longview, TX 75601
    Terri.Shepherd@co.gregg.tx.us (court coordinator)
    4
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Phyllis Gwen Pruitt (hereinafter referred to as "Appellant") entered an open plea of guilty to two
    COWltS of Possession of a Controlled Substance in the I 24th District Court on November 24,
    2014. C.R. 18 (43975-B);C.R, 8 (44139-B); R.R. Vol. 1,5. After receiving all exhibits into
    evidence, and after hearing all the evidence, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 7 years in the
    penitentiary and 15 months state jail, sentences to nUl concurrently. R.R. Vol. 1,41. Appellant
    filed an appeal of this sentence.
    ISSUE PRESENTED
    Appellant's sentence is not grossly disproportional to the crime committed in violation of the
    Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This is assuming arguendo that trial
    counsel preserved this argument for appeal, as trial counsel did not object to the sentence and did
    not file a motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Appellant was first indicted for Possession of a Controlled Substance >= 1 gram < 4 grams in
    cause number 43975-B. C.R. 4 (43975-B). The offense was alleged to have occurred on January
    20, 2014. 
    Id. Appellant was
    subsequently indicted for Possession of a Controlled Substance less
    than one gram for an offense alleged to have occurred on JWle 19, 2014. C.R. 4 (44139-B).
    Appellant pled guilty to both indictments in an open plea to the trial court on November 27,
    2014. R.R. Vol. 1,5. Appellant testified. She testified she was 56 years old and primarily
    cleaned houses for a living. R.R. Vol. I, 14. Appellant testified she had two felony convictions.
    
    Id. at 14-5.
    The first felony conviction was in 1994 from the Louisiana; Appellant received and
    successfully completed probation. 
    Id. The second
    felony conviction was in 2005 from Sarasota
    5
    County, Florida for the offense of possession with intent to sell; Appellant received probation
    and that probation was ultimately revoked. 
    Id. at 15.
    Appellant testified that she hoped the trial
    court would place her on probation with drug rehabilitation as a condition of probation. 
    Id. at 20.
    Appellant testified that her drug use could stem from being molested as a child. 
    Id. at 22-3.
    Appellant stated that she felt probation with drug rehabilitation would better assist her than being
    sentenced to the penitentiary. 
    Id. at 25.
    On cross examination, Appellant testified that in the first offense she was caught in a motel room
    with 3.4-3.5 grams of methamphetamine. 
    Id. at 25-6.
    She further admitted that the drugs were
    located by police in her bra. 
    Id. at 27.
    She testified that, in both instances, she was in the wrong
    place at the wrong time. 
    Id. at 28.
    She stated she does not use drugs intravenously. 
    Id. at 29.
    When she was asked why, in one of the cases, her credit card was found near drugs, used
    syringes, and used spoons, Appellmlt denied that any of the materials, except her credit card,
    were hers. 
    Id. She later
    denied purchasing the 3.5 grams of methamphetamine, and testified the
    drugs were handed to her. 
    Id. at 31.
    Appellant also later denied selling drugs. 
    Id. at 32.
    The trial court noted that he did not think Appellmlt was being fully truthful in her testimony. 
    Id. at 41.
    He then sentenced Appellant to 7 years and 15 months state jail, sentences to nm
    concurrently. 
    Id. SUMMARY OF
    THE ARGUMENT
    Appellate counsel can locate no arguable grounds for appeal, and as a result, files the Anders
    brief with a corresponding Appellant's Counsel's Motion to Withdraw. A copy of the Brief in
    SuppOli of Motion to WithdTaw and the corresponding motion has been forwarded to Appellant
    with a letter explaining what has been done. See Exhibit A to Appellant's Counsel's Motion to
    6
    Withdraw. Appellant has been advised she has thirty days to file a pro se response or a motion
    requesting an extension of time in which to file the response, pursuant to Wilson v. State, 
    955 S.W.2d 693
    (Tex. App. - Waco 1997, order), disp. on merits, 
    3 S.W.3d 223
    (Tex. App. - Waco,
    1999, pet. ref d). See Appellant's Counsel's Motion to Withdraw.
    Appellate counsel has thoroughly read and reviewed the entire appellate record in search of any
    arguable grounds of error to raise that would support either a reversal of Appellant's sentence or
    some other form of relief. After reviewing the record and researching the potential grounds for
    appeal, appellate counsel is unable to find any error for which he, in good faith, can mge a
    reversal of her sentence or any other relief.
    Appellate counsel is aware that he has a duty to advance all arguable grounds of error that would
    Appellant a reversal of sentence or any other relief. Counsel must demonstrate why there are no
    arguable grounds to be advanced. High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    ,812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978);
    Currie v. State, 
    516 S.W.2d 684
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Therefore, cOIDlsel presents to the
    Comt the following maj or issue reviewed:
    PRESERVATION OF ERROR
    Trial counsel appears to have waived this issue for appeal. Trial counsel did not object to the
    sentence when it was pronounced, and trial counsel did not file a motion for new trial or arrest of
    judgment. Failure to do either oftllese results in a waiver. See Tex.R.App.P. 33.1 (a)(l); Jacoby
    v. State, 
    227 S.W.3d 128
    , 130 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. refd); Castaneda v.
    State, 
    135 S.W.3d 719
    , 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet).
    7
    ARGUMENT
    Appellant's sentence is not grossly disproportional to the crime committed. While the sentences
    are on the higher end of the punishment range, the sentences do not constitute cruel and unusual
    punislullent lmder the Eighth Amendment. This assumes arguendo that trial counsel properly
    preserved this issue for appeal, as trial counsel did not object to the sentence nor did he file a
    motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment.
    As long as the sentence falls within the punishment range of the statute, then courts have long
    held that the punishment is not grossly disproportional. See Jordan v. State, 
    495 S.W.2d 949
    ,
    952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Trevino v. State, 
    174 S.W.3d 925
    ,928 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
    2005, pet. reEd); see also Escochea v. State, 
    139 S.W.3d 67
    ,80 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004,
    no pet.). Appellant pled guilty to two indictments for Possession of a Controlled Substance. The
    first indictment alleged possession of less tban four grams, but more than one gram. C.R. 4
    (43975-B). This offense is a third degree felony. TEX HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
    §481.115(c) (West 2013). A third degree felony is punishable by no less than two years and no
    more than 10 years in a penitentiary. TEX PEN. CODE ANN. §12.34(a). For this charge,
    Appellant was sentenced to seven years in the penitentiary. R.R. Vol. 1,41. The second
    indictment alleged possession ofless than one gram. C.R. 4 (44139-B). This offense is a state
    jail felony. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §481.115(b) (West 2013). A state jail
    felony is punishable by no less than 180 days and no more than two years in a state jail facility.
    TEX PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.35(a). For this chm'ge, Appellant was sentenced to fifteen months
    in a state jail facility. R.R. Vol. 1,41. These sentences were ordered to run concurrently. ld.
    Even though a sentence falls within the statutory punishment range, appellate comis must
    detel'lnine whether the sentence is grossly dispropoliional under the Appellant's federal
    8
    constitutional rights. Winchester v. State, 246 S.W.3d 386,388 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet.
    ref'd); Mullins v. State, 
    208 S.W.3d 469
    , 470 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.). First, courts
    look at the gravity of the offense compared to the severity of the sentence. Solem v. Helm, 
    463 U.S. 277
    , 291-92 (1983); McGruder v. Puckett, 
    954 F.2d 313
    ,316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied.
    Appellate courts then consider sentences for similar crimes in the same jurisdiction, and
    sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions. See 
    Solem, 463 U.S. at 292
    . In light of
    Harmelin v. Michigan, courts do not address the second and third issue unless the initial
    comparison of the gravity and severity create an inference that the sentence is grossly
    disproportional. Harmelin v. Michigan, 
    501 U.S. 957
    (1991); 
    McGruder, 954 F.2d at 316
    .
    The initial comparison does create an inference that the sentence is grossly disproportional.
    Based on the testimony of Appellant, her criminal history, and the fact that she committed a
    second felony while out of bond for the first felony, there is no inference that the sentence is
    grossly disproportional. Since no inference is created, the other two elements are not considered,
    and no evidence was placed in the record for the Court to review sentences for the same crime in
    this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction.
    PRAYER
    Wherefore, premises considered, appellate counsel respectfully requests that Appellant's
    Counsel's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel be granted or for such other and further relief to
    which Appellant may be entitled.
    Respectf'ully submitted,
    Kyle Dansby
    Attorney at Law
    P.O. 1914
    9
    Marshall. TX 75671
    (903) 738-6162
    (888) 410-1583 (fax)
    kdansbylaw@gmail.com
    /s/ Kyle Dansby
    Kyle Dansby
    State Bar No: 24059180
    Attorney for Appellant
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I certify that this brief contains 1,562 words according to the computer program used to prepare
    this document.
    /s/ Kyle Dansby
    Kyle Dansby
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    A copy of this brief was sent via email to Zan Brown, attorney for Appellee, on the 24th day of
    February, 2015.
    /s/ Kyle Dansby
    Kyle Dansby
    10