Access Orthodontics of East 7th Street, P .A. v. Miriam Jaimes ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
03-15-00081-CV
4382039
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
3/5/2015 11:25:31 AM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
NO. 03-15-00081-CV
________________________________________________________________
FILED IN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 3rd COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS
AT AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/5/2015 11:25:31 AM
_________________________________________________________________
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
ACCESS ORTHODONTICS OF EAST 7TH STREET, P.A.
Appellant
v.
MIRIAM JAIMES
Appellee
____________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 126th Judicial District Court
Of Travis County, Texas
The Honorable Amy Clark Meachum Presiding
______________________________________________________________
APPELLANT, ACCESS ORTHODONTICS OF EAST 7TH STREET,  P.A.’S, BRIEF
______________________________________________________________
Robert M. Anderton
State Bar No. 00795223
Mark J. Hanna
State Bar No. 08919500
900 Congress Avenue, Suite 250
Austin, Texas 78701
Telephone: (512) 477-6200
Facsimile: (512) 477-1188
mhanna@markjhanna.com
Jon M. Smith
State Bar No. 18630750
3305 Northland Drive
Suite 500
Austin, Texas 78731
Telephone: (512) 371-1006
Facsimile: (512) 476-6685
jon@jonmichaelsmith.com
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Appellant’s Brief – Page i
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant requests oral argument. Because of the unique nature of the issues
presented in this case, oral argument will assist the court in reaching its decision.
Appellant’s Brief – Page ii
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant: Access Orthodontics of East 7th Street, P.A.
Appellant’s Counsel: Robert M. Anderton
State Bar No. 00795223
Mark J. Hanna
State Bar No. 08919500
900 Congress Avenue, Suite 250
Austin, Texas 78701
Telephone: (512) 477-6200
Facsimile: (512) 477-1188
mhanna@markjhanna.com
Jon M. Smith
State Bar No. 18630750
3305 Northland Drive
Suite 500
Austin, Texas 78731
Telephone: (512) 371-1006
Facsimile: (512) 476-6685
jon@jonmichaelsmith.com
Appellee: Miriam Jaimes
Appellee’s  Counsel: J. Lynn Watson
The J.L. Watson Law Firm, P.C.
State Bar No. 20761510
9442 N. Capital of Texas Hwy.
Plaza 1, Suite 500
Austin, Texas 78759
Telephone: (512) 343-4526
Facsimile: (512) 582-2953
Appellant’s Brief – Page iii
REFERENCE TO THE PARTIES
Appellant will refer to Appellant, Access Orthodontics of East 7th Street, P.A. as
“Access”  and  Appellee,  Miriam Jaimes,  as  “Jaimes.”
REFERENCE TO THE RECORD
Reference Meaning
C.R. Clerk’s  Record  at  page  ___
R.R. Reporter’s  Record  at  page  ___:  line  ___
Appellant’s Brief – Page iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT………………………………………………..………..ii
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND  COUNSEL…………………………………….……………..iii
REFERENCE  TO  THE  PARTIES  …………………………………………………………….iv
REFERENCE  TO  THE  RECORD  ……………………………………………………………iv
TABLE  OF  CONTENTS……………………………………………………………..………….v
APPENDIX………………………………………………………………………………………vi
INDEX  OF  AUTHORITIES  ……………………………………………………………………vii
STATEMENT  OF  THE  CASE  …………………………………………………………………1
ISSUE PRESENTED……………………………………………………………………….......2
STATEMENT  OF  FACTS  …………………………………………………………….............2
STANDARD  OF  REVIEW  ……………………………………………………………………..4
SUMMARY  OF  THE  ARGUMENT  …………………………………………………………...5
ISSUE...............................................................................................................................5
Whether the Trial Court erred in denying  Access’ motion to dismiss pursuant to
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.351(b)..........................................................5
SUMMARY  ……………………………………………………………………………………...5
ARGUMENTS AND  AUTHORITIES  ………………………………………………………….5
CONCLUSION  ………………………………………………………………………………...12
PRAYER  ……………………………………………………………………………………….12
CERTIFICATE  OF  COMPLIANCE…………………………………………………………..14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ……………………………………………………….............15
Appellant’s Brief – Page v
APPENDIX
1. Order  Denying  Defendant’s  Motion  to  Dismiss  with  Prejudice  for  Failure  to
Provide Expert Report Pursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
§74.351(b)
2. Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.351
Appellant’s Brief – Page vi
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE
Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. 2001).......................4
Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp. v. Sanchez, 299 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2009, pet. denied).....................................................................................4
City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex. 2008)...................................8
Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 751-52 (Tex. 1988).........................................10
Cont’l  Cas.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Functional  Restoration  Assocs., 19 S.W.3d 393, 402 (Tex.
2000).................................................................................................................................8
Crawford v. Ace Sign, Inc., 917 S.W.2d 12, 14-15 (Tex. 1996)......................................10
Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 851 (Tex. 2005).....................6
Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2004)....................................6
GTE Southwest v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611 (Tex. 1999).........................................10
Inst.  for  Women’s  Health,  P.L.L.C.  v.  Imad, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1182 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2006, no writ).............................................................................................11
Jernigan v. Langley, 195 S.W.3d 91 93 (Tex. 2006)(per curiam).....................................4
Marks  v.  St.  Luke’s  Episcopal  Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Tex. 2010).........................7
Martin v. Texas Dental Plans, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 799, 805 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1997, writ denied)...........................................................................................................11
McAllen Hospitals, L.P. v. Gomez, No. 13-12-00421-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 1990
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013)...................................................................................11
Mokkala v. Mead, 178 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet.
denied)..............................................................................................................................4
Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. 1986).......................................................10
Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 44 (Tex. 1995)...........................................10
PM Management-Trinity NC, LLC v. Kumets, 368 S.W.3d 711, 720 (Tex. App.—Austin
2012, pet. filed)...............................................................................................................11
Appellant’s Brief – Page vii
Sci. Image Ctr. Mgmt. v. Brewer, 282 S.W.3d 233, 237-38 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet.
denied)..............................................................................................................................6
St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652-53 (Tex. 1987)............................10
State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006)......................................................8
Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Stradley, 210 S.W.3d 770, 773 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2006, pet. denied).............................................................................................................4
Walden v. Jeffery, 907 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. 1995)....................................................6,9
Washam v. Hughes, 638 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d
n.r.e.)..............................................................................................................................10
STATUTES
Texas Business & Commerce Code §17.41, et seq……………………………................2
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.001, et seq..................................................2
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, §74.001(10).......................................................7
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, §74.001(12)(A)(ii)..............................................7
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.001(13)..............................................6, 8-10
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.004..............................................................9
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.051(a)..........................................................3
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.052(a)..........................................................3
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.351(b)..................................................1-3, 5
Texas Government Code §311.011(a).............................................................................8
Appellant’s Brief – Page viii
NO. 03-15-00081-CV
________________________________________________________________
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AUSTIN, TEXAS
_________________________________________________________________
ACCESS ORTHODONTICS OF EAST 7TH STREET, P.A.
Appellant
v.
MIRIAM JAIMES
Appellee
____________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 126th Judicial District Court
Of Travis County, Texas
The Honorable Amy Clark Meachum Presiding
______________________________________________________________
APPELLANT, ACCESS ORTHODONTICS OF EAST 7TH STREET,  P.A.’S, BRIEF
______________________________________________________________
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellant, Access Orthodontics of East 7th Street, P.A., files this brief requesting
that this Court reverse the   Trial   Court’s   Order   Denying   Defendant’s   Motion   to   Dismiss
with Prejudice for Failure to File Expert Report Pursuant to Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code §74.351(b) and would show as follows:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal of the   Trial   Court’s denial   of   Access’ motion to
dismiss   plaintiff’s   claims   for   failure   to   file   an   expert   report   pursuant   to   Texas   Civil
Practice & Remedies Code §74.351(b). The Trial Court erred in determining that the
Appellant’s Brief – Page 1
claims   asserted   by   Jaimes   were   not   “health   care   liability   claims”   as   defined   by   the
Texas  Medical  Liability  Act  (“TMLA”).  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §74.001, et seq.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented is whether the Trial Court  erred  in  denying  Access’ motion
to dismiss pursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.351(b).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jaimes filed her original petition against Access on January 20, 2014. (C.R. 3-8)
In her petition she claimed that Access had violated various provisions of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §17.41, et seq. (C.R. 6). Jaimes
based her claims on the allegations that “Access had offered to provide orthodontic
services and goods of full braces (upper and lower), including complete services, at the
cost   of   $4,000.00.”   (C.R. 5) Jaimes went on to allege that Access presented a
document  to  her  entitled  “Payment  Options”  that  summarized  and  confirmed  the  offer of
complete braces for $4,000.00 and that set up a payment schedule. (C.R. 5) Jaimes
alleged that she paid for the braces in full, but that Access had failed to set an
appointment to remove the braces. (C.R. 5) She also alleged that she scheduled an
appointment with Access to have the braces removed but that Access cancelled it.
(C.R. 5) She claimed that she attempted to reschedule the appointment multiple times
Appellant’s Brief – Page 2
but that Access repeatedly cancelled and made excuses in order to avoid removing the
braces. (C.R. 5)
Jaimes alleged that she was damaged because Access failed to remove her
braces. (C.R. 7) Jaimes claimed in paragraph 14 of the petition economic and mental
anguish damages  as  a  result  of  Access’ conduct. (C.R. 7)
Access answered on February 13, 2014, alleging in a verified plea that the
services that it had provided to Jaimes were health care services. (C.R. 12-15) Access
went   on   to   allege   in   its   answer   that   Jaimes’   claims   were   subject   to   Chapter   74   of   the
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code and that Jaimes had failed to provide Access
with notice of suit as required by Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.051(a) nor
did she provide Access with a medical authorization as required by Texas Civil Practice
& Remedies Code §74.052(a). (C.R. 13)
On May 16, 2014 Jaimes filed her first amended petition adding an allegation that
her claims were for monetary damage of more than $100,000.00 but less than
$200,000.00. (C.R. 16-22) All of the claims in her original petition were repeated in the
first amended petition. (C.R. 16-22) Jaimes did not serve an expert report regarding her
health care liability claims.
On August 21, 2014, Access filed its motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure
to provide an expert report pursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
§74.351(b). (C.R. 23-32) The   motion   alleged   that   Jaimes’   claims   were   health care
liability claims as defined by Chapter 74. (C.R. 23-24) The motion further alleged that
Jaimes had not complied with Chapter 74 because she did not serve an expert report as
required by the statute. (C.R. 24) Jaimes did not file a response to the motion.
Appellant’s Brief – Page 3
A hearing was held on the motion on December 16, 2014. (R.R. 1) Attorneys
appeared for both parties and argued the motion. (R.R. 2-3) Counsel for Access
testified   to   reasonable   and   necessary   attorney’s  fees   in  the   amount  of   $5,345.00.   (RR
15:3-16:23) The trial court denied the motion by order dated January 21, 2015. (C.R.
41) Access filed its notice of appeal on February 4, 2015. (C.R. 45-46)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A  trial  court’s  denial  of  a  motion  to  dismiss  for  failure  to  comply  with  the  TMLA’s
expert report requirement is ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Jernigan v.
Langley, 195 S.W.3d 91 93 (Tex. 2006)(per curiam); Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. v.
Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. 2001). However, whether a claim is a health care
liability claim pursuant to section 74.351 is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.
Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp. v. Sanchez, 299 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2009, pet. denied), citing Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Stradley, 210
S.W.3d 770, 773 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied); Mokkala v. Mead, 178
S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
POINT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in denying Access’ motion   to   dismiss   Jaimes’ claims for
failure to serve an expert report as required by Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
Chapter 74.
Appellant’s Brief – Page 4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ISSUE
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying Access’
motion   to   dismiss   Jaimes’ claims for failure to serve an expert report as required by
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 74.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Jaimes’ claims  are  “health care  liability  claims”  as  defined  by  Chapter  74  because
they   specifically   relate   to   a   claimed   “lack   of   treatment”   which   proximately   resulted   in
“injury”  to  Ms.  Jaimes.    Despite artfully pleading these claims as DTPA claims,  Jaimes’
claims are health care liability claims as defined by Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code. Because Jaimes failed to serve an expert report pursuant
to Section 74.351(b)  her  lawsuit   must   be   dismissed   with   prejudice  and   attorney’s  fees
should be awarded against her.
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
A  plaintiff  in  a  “health care  liability  claim”  must  serve  an  expert  report  in  a  timely
fashion or have its lawsuit dismissed with prejudice. Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code §74.351(b) states that if an expert report is not provided as required by the Act,
the  court  “shall”  enter  an  order  that  (1)  awards  reasonable  attorney’s  fees  and  costs  of
court incurred by the physician or health care provider; and (2) dismisses the claim with
prejudice to its refiling. As stated above, it is undisputed that Jaimes did not serve an
expert report in the trial court. The question then becomes whether her claim is a
“health  care  liability  claim”  as  defined  by  the  statute.
Appellant’s Brief – Page 5
Jaimes’ Claim is a Health Care Liability Claim
Whether a claim is a health care liability claim depends on the underlying nature of
the claim being made. Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2004).
In   determining   a   claim’s   underlying   nature,   we   consider   the   duties   allegedly   breached
as well as the allegedly wrongful conduct, looking to the factual allegations to determine
the gravamen of the complaint and not being bound by the form of the pleading or how
complaints are labeled. Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 851
(Tex. 2005). If the act or omission alleged in the complaint is an inseparable part of the
rendition of health care services, then the claim is a health care liability claim.
Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 848; Walden v. Jeffery, 907 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. 1995).
The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that plaintiffs cannot, through artful
pleading, avoid the strictures of Chapter 74 by recasting health care liability claims as
other causes of action. Sci. Image Ctr. Mgmt. v. Brewer, 282 S.W.3d 233, 237-38 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
Section 74.001(13) of the statute defines “Health  care  liability  claim” as a “cause of
action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or
other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or
safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which
proximately   results   in   injury   to   or   death   of   a   claimant,   whether   the   claimant’s   claim   or
cause of action sounds in contract   or   tort.” A claim is a health care liability claim
governed by chapter 74 if it alleges a breach of accepted standards of health care or if
Appellant’s Brief – Page 6
the claim is inseparable from the rendition of health care. Marks  v.  St.  Luke’s  Episcopal
Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Tex. 2010).
The Texas Supreme Court has held that there are three elements in a health care
liability claim: (1) A physician or health care provider must be a defendant; (2) The suit
must be about the patient’s   treatment,   lack  of   treatment  or  some other departure from
accepted standards of medical care or health care or safety;;   and   (3)   the   defendant’s
act, omission or other departure must proximately cause the patient’s   injury   or   death.
Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 662. As explained in the following paragraphs,   Jaimes’ claim
satisfies all  three  elements  and  is,  therefore,  a  “health  care  liability  claim.”
Access  is  a  “Health  Care  Provider”
Access  is  a  “health  care  provider”  as  defined  by  the  TMLA.     The term “Health  care
provider”   includes   “professional association”   and   “dentist”. Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code, §74.001(12)(A)(ii). Additionally, the   term   “health   care”   means   “any
act or treatment performed or furnished, or that should have been performed or
furnished, by any health care provider for, to or on behalf of a patient during the
patient’s   medical   care,   treatment   or   confinement.   Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§74.001(10).
Access   fits   the   definition   of   “health   care   provider”   because   it   is   a   professional
association that provides dental services as alleged by Jaimes in her petition. (C.R. 17-
18)     Additionally,   Jaimes’ claim   is   for   an   act   or   treatment   “that   should   have   been
performed”   – the removal of her braces. (C.R. 19) Therefore,   it   is   clear   that   Jaimes’
claim  is  for  “health  care.”      The  first  element  of  “health  care  liability  claim”  is  satisfied.
Appellant’s Brief – Page 7
Jaimes’ Claim  is  for  a  “Lack  of  Treatment”
The  first  amended  petition  itself  makes  it  clear  that  the  complaint  is  about  a  “lack  of
treatment”   or   an   “act   or   treatment   that   should   have   been   performed”   – the failure to
remove the braces. (C.R. 5)
When construing a statute, words and phrases are read in context and construed
according   to   the   rules   of   grammar  and   common  usage.  Tex.   Gov’t   Code   §311.011(a).
Words that are not defined are given their ordinary meaning unless a contrary intention
is apparent from the context, or unless such a construction leads to absurd results. City
of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex. 2008). When possible, the
Legislature’s  intent  is  drawn  from  the  plain meaning of the words chosen, giving effect
to all words so   that   none   of   the   statute’s   language   is   treated   as   surplusage.   State v.
Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006); Cont’l   Cas.   Ins.   Co.   v.   Functional
Restoration Assocs., 19 S.W.3d 393, 402 (Tex. 2000).
As stated above, Section 74.001(13) defines a “Health   care   liability   claim”   as   a
“cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of
treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or
health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health
care,  which  proximately  results  in  injury  to  or  death  of  a  claimant,  whether  the  claimant’s
claim  or  cause  of  action  sounds  in  contract  or  tort.” (emphasis added)    Ms.  Jaimes’ sole
complaint is that her braces were not removed – a lack of treatment.
The Texas Supreme Court has previously held that claims arising from alleged
misrepresentations related to dental work amount to a health care liability claim. Walden
Appellant’s Brief – Page 8
v. Jeffery, 907 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1995). In Walden, the plaintiff sued her dentist for
failing to provide her dentures that fit, as he had promised. Walden, 907 S.W.2d at 447.
The plaintiff made claims under the DTPA, breach of warranty and breach of contract.
Id.     The   Supreme   Court   held   that   the   dentist’s   providing   of   the   dentures   was   an
inseparable part of his rendition of health care services  and  that  therefore  the  plaintiff’s
claims were health care liability claims. Walden, 907 S.W.2d at 448. Similarly, the
providing and removal of braces was an inseparable part of the rendition of health care
services provided by Access to Jaimes. Therefore, the claim for failure to remove the
braces was a health care liability claim.
The Act also specifically states that the DTPA does not apply to health care liability
claims.     Section   74.004   states,   “Notwithstanding   any   other   law,   Sections   17.41-17.63,
Business & Commerce Code, do not apply to physicians or health care providers with
respect to claims for damages for personal injury or death resulting, or alleged to have
resulted,   from   negligence   on   the   part   of   any   physician   or   health   care   provider.”
Although  Jaimes  attempts  to  avoid  the  TMLA  by  avoiding  the  use  of  the  term  “negligent”
or  “negligence”  that  is  the nature of her claim and the statute specifically excepts such
claims from the DTPA.
It   is   also   important   to   note   here   the   last   phrase   of   the   definition   of   “health   care
liability  claim”  which  states,  “whether  the  claimant’s  claim  or  cause of action sounds in
tort or contract.”  Tex.  Civ.  Prac.  &  Rem.  Code  §74.001(13).    Jaimes’ claim is essentially
a breach of contract claim. She alleges that she entered into an agreement for the
provision of full braces for a set price, that she performed by paying and that Access
breached the agreement by failing to take off the braces. A simple breach of contract
Appellant’s Brief – Page 9
claim does not give rise to liability under the DTPA. Crawford v. Ace Sign, Inc., 917
S.W.2d 12, 14-15 (Tex. 1996).
Because   Ms.   Jaimes’ claim fits the plain   language   of   the   definition   of   “health care
liability  claim”  the  second element is satisfied.
Jaimes  Claims  an  “Injury”
The  third  element  of  a  “health care  liability  claim”  is  that  the  alleged  action
of   the   defendant   “proximately   results   in   injury   or   death   of   a   claimant.”   Tex.   Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code §74.001(13). This element is satisfied because Jaimes
claims  that  Access’ conduct proximately caused an injury – mental anguish.
The   statute   does   not   define   the   word   “injury.”     But,   as   stated   above,   in
interpreting statutes, when an undefined term is used its usual and customary
meaning is assigned. Texas  courts  have  long  used  the  term  “injury”  to  describe
purely mental injury. Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. 1986); Coates
v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 751-52 (Tex. 1988); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v.
Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652-53 (Tex. 1987); Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901
S.W.2d 434, 44 (Tex. 1995); GTE Southwest v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611
(Tex. 1999); Washam v. Hughes, 638 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982,
writ  ref’d  n.r.e.).
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals has held that a DTPA claim for an
economic injury accompanied by mental anguish was sufficient to satisfy the
requirement   of   an   “injury”   to   qualify   as   a   health   care   liability   claim. McAllen
Appellant’s Brief – Page 10
Hospitals, L.P. v. Gomez, No. 13-12-00421-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 1990
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013). In the McAllen Hospitals case, Gomez
claimed that the hospital overcharged him for services, that was unconscionable
under the DTPA and it caused him to suffer mental anguish. McAllen p. 8. The
court held that a claim for mental anguish damages satisfied   the   “injury”
requirement and cited the Kumets case decided by this court. McAllen, p. 9,
citing PM Management-Trinity NC, LLC v. Kumets, 368 S.W.3d 711, 720 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2012) affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds, PM
Management-Trinity NC, LLC v. Kumets, 404 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 2013).
In Kumets, this court considered whether a retaliation claim qualified as a
health care liability claim. In deciding that it did not, the court stated, “in   the
context of a medical negligence claim, and particularly the language of section
74.351(a)  of  the  TMLA  (“injury  to  or  death  of  a  claimant”),  the  term  “injury”  would
seem to carry with it the implication that the alleged deviation from an accepted
standard of care must cause the plaintiff to suffer some personal injury, whether
physical,  mental,  or  emotional.”  Kumets, 368 S.W.3d at 7201.
Because  Jaimes’ claim  for  mental  anguish  qualifies  as  an  “injury”  under  the
TMLA, the third element of the  analysis  is  met  and  Jaimes’ claim  is  a  “health  care
1
See also Inst.  for  Women’s  Health,  P.L.L.C.  v.  Imad, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1182 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2006, no writ) in  which  the  San  Antonio  court  of  appeals  held  that  a  couple’s  claim  for  mental
anguish,  loss  of  companionship  and  society  and  medical  bills  because  of  the  defendant’s  destruction  of
several embryos was a health care liability claim. The court cited Martin v. Texas Dental Plans, Inc., 948
S.W.2d 799, 805 (Tex. App.—San  Antonio  1997,  writ  denied)  for  the  proposition  that  “mental  anguish  is  a
compensable  injury.”
Appellant’s Brief – Page 11
liability  claim”  as  defined  by  the  TMLA.    Therefore,  the  trial  court was in error to
deny  Access’ motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court erred when it denied the motion to dismiss. Therefore, this court
should reverse the court of appeals and render judgment that the case is dismissed with
prejudice to its refiling and that Access is awarded attorneys fees in the amount of
$5,345.00.
PRAYER
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, Appellant prays that this Court reverse the
trial   court’s order   denying   the   motion   to   dismiss,   and   render   judgment   that   Appellee’s
claims  are  dismissed  with  prejudice  and  order  her  to  pay  attorney’s  fees in the amount
of $5,345.00.
Respectfully submitted,
LAW OFFICES OF HANNA & ANDERTON
By:__________________________________
Robert M. Anderton
State Bar No. 00795223
Mark J. Hanna
State Bar No. 08919500
900 Congress Avenue, Suite 250
Austin, Texas 78701
Telephone: (512) 477-6200
Facsimile: (512) 477-1188
Email: mhanna@markjhanna.com
Appellant’s Brief – Page 12
Jon M. Smith
State Bar No. 18630750
3305 Northland Drive
Suite 500
Austin, Texas 78731
Telephone: (512) 371-1006
Facsimile: (512) 476-6685
Email: jon@jonmichaelsmith.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I, Jon Michael Smith, do hereby certify that the Appellant’s Brief contains 2,848
words, according to the word count of the computer program used to prepare it, in
compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3).
/s/ Jon Smith
____________________________________
Jon Michael Smith
Appellant’s Brief – Page 13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jon Michael Smith, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
APPELLANT’S  BRIEF was delivered to all attorneys of record as listed below via fax on
March 4, 2015.
J. Lynn Watson
The J.L. Watson Law Firm, P.C.
State Bar No. 20761510
9442 N. Capital of Texas Hwy.
Plaza 1, Suite 500
Austin, Texas 78759
(512) 582-2953
_____________________________________
ROBERT M. ANDERTON
Appellant’s Brief – Page 14
-APPENDIX 1-
-APPENDIX 2-