Steven Painter, Tonya Wright, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Earl A. Wright, III, Virginia Weaver, Individually and as Next Friend of Albert A. Carrillo, a Minor, Tabatha P. Rosello, Individually and as Representative v. Amerimex Drilling I, LTD. ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
08-14-00134-CV
EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS
08-14-00134-CV EL PASO, TEXAS
12/18/2015 11:55:11 AM
DENISE PACHECO
CLERK
NO. 11-12-00322-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
FOR THE 8th COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS
12/18/2015 11:55:11 AM
EL PASO, TEXAS
DENISE PACHECO
Clerk
STEVEN PAINTER; TONYA WRIGHT, Individually and as Representative of the
ESTATE OF EARL A. WRIGHT, III, DECEASED; VIRGINIA WEAVER, Individually and
As Next Friend of ALBERT A. CARILLO, A MINOR; TABITHA R. ROSELLO,
Individually and as Representative of the ESTATE OF ALBERT CARILLO, DECEASED
Appellants,
V.
AMERIMEX DRILLING I, LTD.
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 83D JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PECOS COUNTY, TEXAS
APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING
David W. Lauritzen Rahul Malhotra
State Bar No. 00796934 State Bar No. 00797781
DLauritzen@CBTD.com Rahul@TheMalhotraLawFirm.com
COTTON, BLEDSOE, TIGHE & DAWSON, PC THE MALHOTRA LAW FIRM
P.O. Box 2776 319 North Grant Avenue
Midland, Texas 797002-2776 Odessa, Texas 79761
P: 432.685.5782 | F: 432.682.3672 P: 432.580.4878 | F: 432.337.7283
Jon Hanna
State Bar No. 08919200
JHanna7534@aol.com
HANNA LAW FIRM, PC ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
302 Chestnut Street
Abilene, Texas 79704
P: 325.673.6952 | F: 325.673.4496
DECEMBER 18, 2015
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
To the best of Appellants’ knowledge, the following is a complete list of
parties and counsel to the judgment being appealed, as required by Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38.1(a).
Presiding Judge: The Honorable Pete Gomez, Jr.
83d Judicial District Court
Pecos County, Texas
Appellants: STEVEN PAINTER;
TONYA WRIGHT, Individually and as Representative
of the ESTATE OF EARL A. WRIGHT, III, DECEASED;
VIRGINIA WEAVER, Individually and As Next Friend
of ALBERT A. CARILLO, A MINOR;
TABITHA R. ROSELLO, Individually and as
Representative of the ESTATE OF ALBERT CARILLO,
DECEASED
Trial & Appellate Jon Hanna
Counsel: State Bar No. 08919200
STEVEN PAINTER; JHanna7534@aol.com
HANNA LAW FIRM, PC
TONYA WRIGHT, 302 Chestnut Street
Individually and as Abilene, Texas 79704
Representative of the P: 325.673.6952 | F: 325.673.4496
ESTATE OF EARL A.
WRIGHT, III,
DECEASED
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling—Mot. Rehearing Page 2
Trial & Appellate Rahul Malhotra
Counsel: State Bar No. 00797781
VIRGINIA WEAVER, Rahul@TheMalhotraLawFirm.com
Individually and As THE MALHOTRA LAW FIRM
Next Friend of ALBERT 319 North Grant Avenue
A. CARILLO, A MINOR; Odessa, Texas 79761
P: 432.580.4878 | F: 432.337.7283
TABITHA R. ROSELLO,
Individually and as
Representative of the
ESTATE OF ALBERT
CARILLO, DECEASED
Appellate Counsel for All David W. Lauritzen
Appellants: State Bar No. 00796934
DLauritzen@CBTD.com
COTTON, BLEDSOE, TIGHE & DAWSON, PC
P.O. Box 2776
Midland, Texas 797002-2776
P: 432.685.5782 | F: 432.682.3672
Appellees: AMERIMEX DRILLING I, LTD.
Trial & Appellate Karen C. Burgess
Counsel: RICHARDSON + BURGESS, LLP
221 West 6th Street, Suite 900
Austin, Texas 78701-3445
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling—Mot. Rehearing Page 3
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
APPELLANTS, STEVEN PAINTER; TONYA WRIGHT, Individually and as
Representative of the ESTATE OF EARL A. WRIGHT, III, DECEASED; VIRGINIA
WEAVER, Individually and As Next Friend of ALBERT A. CARILLO, A MINOR; and
TABITHA R. ROSELLO, Individually and as Representative of the ESTATE OF ALBERT
CARILLO, DECEASED file this Motion for Rearing.
I. GROUNDS FOR REHEARING
Appellants respectfully request a rehearing because the Court’s Opinion
focuses on the employer’s control, but the focus is properly on whether the driver
was furthering the interests of his employer at the time of the incident. The Opinion
moots employer vicarious liability by imposing an impractical control standard,
never before applied to direct employers. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd.’s
(“Amerimex”) employee, Mr. Burchett, was acting in the course and scope of his
employment and furthering Amerimex’s business interests at the time of the
dreadful, deadly incident.
II. ARGUMENT
A. Driving the crew was part of Amerimex’s contractual obligation.
The Amerimex-SandRidge Contract (also, the “Contract”) identifies,
particularizes, and covers the business services Amerimex was to perform as part of
Amerimex’s regularly conducted business operations for SandRidge. See R. at 94–
106 (Amerimex Mot. Sum. J., Ex. C (Jun. 25, 2012)). The Contract was signed by
Glen Murphree, Amerimex’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”). Id. at 100. The
Contract was intended to further the business interests of the contracting parties.
The Amerimex-SandRidge Contract clearly identifies driving the crew to and
from the wellsite as part of Amerimex’s duties under the contract. Id. at 99,
§ 27.9(B). The Contract commands Amerimex to have its Driller ferry the crew
working on the SandRidge well. Id. The contract explicitly states: Amerimex “shall
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling—Mot. Rehearing Page 4
invoice … [SandRidge] for and pay each Driller to receive $50/day to drive crew
out to well location.” Id. That is clear, unambiguous language within the four-
corners of the document.
None of the cases cited or relied upon by this Court in its Opinion have that
particular and highly relevant fact. Burchett and his crew did not simply decide to
carpool out of a self-interest or on their own volition. No, quite the contrary,
Amerimex definitively agreed and contractually promised SandRidge that
Amerimex would have the Amerimex Driller ferry the Amerimex crew.
B. This Court incorrectly concluded Appellants’ arguments.
1. Remote drilling site has nothing to do with the coming and going rule.
This Court incorrectly “discern[ed]” that Appellants contend “the nature of
remote drilling sites presents an exception to the general rule … [that] coming from
or going to work is not within the course and scope of employment.” Op., p. 6. The
reason Mr. Burchett was within the course and scope of employment was because
he was executing a contractual provision on behalf of and for his employer. See R.
at 99, § 27.9(B). The Amerimex-SandRidge contract required Amerimex to pay an
Amerimex Driller to transport the Amerimex crew to and from the SandRidge
wellsite. Id. At the time of the incident, Burchett was doing that —taking the
Amerimex crew back to the bunkhouse.
The whereabouts of the bunkhouse is irrelevant. Whether the crewmembers
could take their own vehicles or not is irrelevant. Whether the crewmembers could
stop for a meal en route is irrelevant. The clear, unambiguous language of the
contract controlled Amerimex’s actions. See R. at 99, § 27.9(B). The contract
specifically required Amerimex’s Driller to transport the Amerimex Crew to and
from the drilling site. Id. Therefore, when Mr. Burchett was driving the Amerimex
Crew at the time of the incident, he was performing Amerimex’s contractual
obligation; he was furthering Amerimex’s business interests.
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling—Mot. Rehearing Page 5
2. The reason for the “car-pooling arrangement” is unconnected to
vicarious liability.
This Court (wrongly) concluded that it is Appellants’ contention that “the car-
pooling arrangement was in furtherance of Amerimex’s business as it ensured that
a complete crew came [sic] to the drilling rig each day.” Op., p. 6 (emphasis added).
Not so. The reason the so-called “car-pooling arrangement” was in furtherance of
Amerimex’s business interests was because it was the execution of Amerimex’s
contractual obligation under the Amerimex-SandRidge contract. See R. at 99,
§ 27.9(B).
C. The “most frequently offered reason” means it is not the only reason to
impose vicarious liability.
Relying on Baptist Memorial Hospital System v. Sampson, 969 S.W. 2d 945,
947 (Tex. 1998), this Court correctly noted an employer is vicariously liable for the
negligence of an employee when the employee acts within the course and scope of
their employment. See Op., p. 8. This Court also admitted that “[t]here are a number
of possible justifications for this rule.” Id. But, it then stated that the “most
frequently offered reason for imposing vicarious liability” arises out of control of
the employee by the employer. Id. This Court relied on Comment D to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 to support that contention. Id. However,
Comment D states:
…. [T]he control or right to control needed to establish the relation of
master and servant may be very attenuated. In some types of cases
which involve persons customarily considered as servants, there may
even be an understanding that the employer shall not exercise
control. Thus, the full-time cook is regarded as a servant although it is
understood that the employer will exercise no control over the cooking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220, cmt. D (1958) (emphasis added). So,
when this Court then applied overt control as the only possible reason to impose
vicarious liability, the Court overstepped both reason and evidence. See Op., p. 8.
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling—Mot. Rehearing Page 6
“To impose vicarious liability on the principal, the proper inquiry for agency
is whether the agent was acting within the scope of the agency relationship at the
time of the wrongful act” Bell v. VPSI, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 706, 714 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2006, no pet.) (citing Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Coats, 885 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Tex.
1994)). The requirements to prove course and scope of employment are enumerated
by the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY which provides that torts are within the scope of
an agent’s employment if the conduct is:
1) The kind [the employee] is employed to perform;
2) Occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; and
3) Is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 543 (1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) at 504). Applying those requirements to the present
case:
1) Mr. Burchett, as Driller, was employed as driver for his crew and paid a
separate amount from his regular Driller’s pay just to drive the
Amerimex Crew to and from the well site;
2) The incident occurred substantially within a short period of the
Amerimex’s Crew regular tour shift and en route from the well site; and
3) Mr. Burchett driving the Amerimex Crew was actuated in its entirety to
serve and execute Amerimex’s agreement with SandRidge.
Clearly, Mr. Burchett was furthering Amerimex’s business interests.
D. Burchett is does not understand the legal term “control.”
The Court relied on testimony by Mr. Burchett, Amerimex’s Driller and driver
for his testimony that his, Painter, Wright, and Carillo’s (the “Amerimex Crew”)
“shift ended at 6 a.m. [sic],” he “was not working at the time” of the incident, and
that “Amerimex has no control over … [their] time off.” Op., p. 20. Burchett is not
qualified to make those statements such that they should be interpreted in a legal
manner.
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling—Mot. Rehearing Page 7
Mr. Burchett was the Driller for the Amerimex Crew. See R. at 140–41, J.C.
Burchett Dep. v. 1, 6:24–7:1; 8:1–5; 11:23–25; 12:7–22 (Oct. 7, 2008) (Amerimex
Mot. Sum. J., Ex. F (Jun. 25, 2012)); see also R. at 239, J.C. Burchett Dep. v. 2, 6:2–
4, 7:2–5 (Apr. 1, 2009) (Pl.’s Resp. to Amerimex Mot. Sum. J., Ex. A-2 (July 19,
2012)). He never graduated high school. He has only the simplest understanding of
how he is paid, what that pay represents, and the legal implications that go with those
things.
Giving Mr. Burchett credit for making a legal representation that his “shift
ended at 6 A.M.,” he “was not working at the time” of the incident, and that
“Amerimex has no control over … [their] time off,” is pure conjecture and
conclusory. It is more likely, given Mr. Burchett’s very limited education, that in
his mind “working” meant actually working on the rig as a driller. It is more likely
that in Mr. Burchett’s mind “control” by Amerimex means Amerimex telling him
what job to do.
The Opinion and Record are clear on the fact that Mr. Burchett was getting
paid a separate stipend to ferry the Amerimex Crew to and from the drilling site.
This Court recognized that Amerimex paid Mr. Burchett a separate payment
specifically for driving the Amerimex Crew to the jobsite before their schedule tour
start time and from the jobsite after their scheduled tour ended. Op., pp. 3, 21.
Yes, the Amerimex Crew’s tour shift was over and Mr. Burchett had,
analogously, removed his Driller’s hat, just as the rest of his crew had removed their
hats when they clocked off the jobsite. But, at the time of the incident, Mr. Burchett
was wearing his Chauffer’s hat. Mr. Burchett was on the clock, performing a
different and distinct job for Amerimex. Mr. Burchett was getting paid to shuttle the
Amerimex Crew. It is un-American to think that a for-profit entity would pay an
employee for doing something that did not further the business’s interests.
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling—Mot. Rehearing Page 8
Mr. Burchett might be an exceptional Driller. For all Appellants know, he
might be the most adept Driller in history. But, he has no legal training. He never
finished the 12th grade. It is inconceivable that he used the word “control” in any
legal sense. It is inequitable for this Court assigned the legal definition to Mr.
Burchett’s use of the word “control.”
E. Glen Murphree is not qualified to make a statement whether Amerimex
had legal control over the Amerimex Crew.
Mr. Murphree is Amerimex’s CFO. R. at 108, Contested Case Hr’g, G.
Murphree Testimony, 3:6–9 (Feb. 29, 2009) (Amerimex Mot. Sum. J., Ex. D (Jun.
25, 2012)) (“Murphree Testimony”). He is not an attorney and the record does not
indicate he has had any legal training. Before he became CFO for Amerimex’s
general partner in 1997, he worked twenty-two years for a bank in Sweetwater,
Texas. R. at 284–85, G. Murphree Dep., 41:17–25, 42:3–7 (Oct. 7, 2008)
(Amerimex Mot. Sum. J., Ex. D (Jun. 25, 2012)) (“Murphree Dep.”). He spent
eighteen of his twenty-two years working in the bank’s trust department. Id.
In its Opinion, this Court accepted Mr. Murphree’s contention that Amerimex
had “no control” over its employees once “they leave the rig.” Op., pp. 20–21. In
doing that, this Court ordained Mr. Murphree as having the knowledge, skill, and
training to understand the legal definition of “control.” However, reading all of Mr.
Murphree’s deposition, even reading the snippets quoted in the Opinion, it is clear
he used the term “control” in its common, ordinary usage and not in the legal-sense.
Mr. Murphree said things like “I have no control over those people when they
leave the rig” or “They start work when the get to the rig, and that’s when work
begins … Outside that, you know, we have no control over them,” he is using
“control” in a generalized and common-usage manner. See Op., pp. 20–21. Well,
obviously, Amerimex controls its employees under a common usage definition. The
employees have to “get to the rig” sober with no alcohol or drugs in their “bodily
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling—Mot. Rehearing Page 9
systems”—that’s controlling their actions outside of the workplace. The employees
have to submit to “searches or inspections” of their persons, property, or vehicles for
alcohol or drugs—that’s controlling their actions outside of the workplace and in
their personal vehicle. The employees must wear proper clothing and personal
protective equipment—that’s controlling their actions outside of the workplace and
not letting them dress as they please.
By Amerimex’s own attorney’s statement, Mr. Murphree had no
understanding of the legal definition of control, except what he was told after-the-
fact by the Amerimex attorney. R. at 290, Murphree Dep. at 62:3–24. Therefore,
any legal-definition amounts to testimony by Amerimex’s attorney.
Mr. Murphree used the word “control” in a common, everyday manner. In
consecrating his trust-officer, layman’s usage of the word “control” with the full
ramification of the legal definition of “control,” this Court rendered an inequity upon
Appellants.
F. Court misapplied Pilgrim v. Fortune Drilling Co.
This Court relied on Pilgrim v. Fortune Drilling Co., Inc., 653 F.2d 982, 986–
87 (5th Cir., Unit A, 1981) for the principle that an “employer [is] not vicariously
liable under respondeat superior … despite per diem paid” for transporting drilling
crew. Op., p. 21. However, the facts in Pilgrim are readily distinguishable.
Pilgrim Present Case
The employees were being transported The employees were being transported
to/from their personal homes. (at 983). to/from Amerimex-provided housing.
The payment was a “travel allowance.” The payment was a “Driver bonus”
(at 983). under the Amerimex-SandRidge
contract.
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling—Mot. Rehearing Page 10
Pilgrim Present Case
Per diem travel allowance available to “Driver bonus” was only available to
any rig member. (at 983). Rig crew driller on that job under the Contract.
decided from day to day which
crewmember would receive that day’s
travel allowance. (at 983).
Most of the crew drove to a location in Evidence in the record indicates the
Iraan, met there, and then carpooled in entire crew stayed at the Amerimex
one vehicle to the rig (at 983 n.3). housing and the rig every day.
Some employees drive their own Evidence in the record indicates
vehicles, some employees camped near Burchett drove all of his crew to and
the rig, some carpooled daily (at 987). from the Amerimex housing and the rig
every day.
Purpose: None stated. Purpose: to make Amerimex
competitive so crew did not quit mid-
drilling.
Normally, Amerimex would set a mobile bunkhouse at the drilling location
for its crews. R. at 109, Murphree CCH Testimony 7:4–20. However, at this drill
site, the bunkhouse was not permitted. Id. Therefore, Amerimex moved the
bunkhouse to a location near Fort Stockton. Id. Usually, the Amerimex crew could
walk to the bunkhouse after their shift was over. But, at this site, Amerimex paid
Burchett to drive the crew.
Burchett was not paid for his personal travel time—he was paid to transport
the Amerimex crew. In Murphree’s own words, the driving of the crew was not
routine. R. at 109, Murphree CCH Testimony 8:15–9:16.
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling—Mot. Rehearing Page 11
III. PRAYER
The Court should grant rehearing, request additional briefing and argument.
In the alternative, Appellants pray the Court will reconsider and reverse its previous
decision.
Respectfully submitted,
COTTON, BLEDSOE, TIGHE & DAWSON, PC
P.O. Box 2776
Midland, Texas 797002-2776
P: 432.685.5782 | F: 432.682.3672
By: /s/ David Lauritzen___
David W. Lauritzen
State Bar No. 00796934
DLauritzen@CBTD.com
THE MALHOTRA LAW FIRM
319 North Grant Avenue
Odessa, Texas 79761
P: 432.580.4878 | F: 432.337.7283
By:
Rahul Malhotra
State Bar No. 00797781
Rahul@TheMalhotraLawFirm.com
HANNA LAW FIRM, PC
302 Chestnut Street
Abilene, Texas 79704
P: 325.673.6952 | F: 325.673.4496
Jon Hanna
State Bar No. 08919200
JHanna7534@aol.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling—Mot. Rehearing Page 12
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify this document, excluding caption, signature, proof of service,
certification, and this certificate, contains 2,426 words, according to the word count
of the computer program used to prepare this document.
Rachel Ambler, State Bar No. 24081954
THE MALHOTRA LAW FIRM
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true copy of the above was served on each attorney of record
or party in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on the 18th day of
December, 2015.
VIA EMAIL and efiling, which will automatically
serve a Notice of Electronic Filing.:
Karen C. Burgess, kburgess@richardsonburgess.com
RICHARDSON + BURGESS, LLP
221 West 6th Street, Suite 900
Austin, Texas 78701-3445
Attorneys for Amerimex, Appellee
RACHEL AMBLER
THE MALHOTRA LAW FIRM
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling—Mot. Rehearing Page 13