Alinea Family Hospice Care LLC D/B/A Alinea Family Hospice Care, Donna Junkersfeld and Karla Gamble v. Peggy Goldsmith, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Ruth N. Massey ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                           ACCEPTED
    12-15-00061-CV
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER, TEXAS
    5/11/2015 1:29:25 PM
    CATHY LUSK
    CLERK
    No. 12-15-00061-CV
    RECEIVED IN
    12th COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER, TEXAS
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS      5/11/2015 1:29:25 PM
    CATHY S. LUSK
    FOR THE TWELFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS          Clerk
    IN TYLER, TEXAS
    ALINEA FAMILY HOSPICE CARE LLC D/B/A ALINEA FAMILY HOSPICE CARE,
    DONNA JUNKERSFELD, R.N., AND KARLA GAMBLE, LVN,
    Appellants,                                                    5/11/2015
    v.
    PEGGY GOLDSMITH, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF RUTH N.
    MASSEY,
    Appellee.
    On Appeal from the 294th District Court
    Van Zandt County, Texas, Cause No. 13-00276
    BRIEF OF APPELLEE
    Patrick Powers                                    Counsel for Appellee
    State Bar No. 24013351
    Meredith Mathews
    State Bar No. 24055180
    POWERS TAYLOR LLP
    Campbell Centre II
    8150 North Central Expressway
    Suite 1575
    Dallas, Texas 75206
    Phone: 214.239.8900
    Facsimile: 214.239.8901
    LIST OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
    Parties to the Trial Court’s Order:
    Peggy Goldsmith, Individually and on         Plaintiff/Appellee
    Behalf of the Estate of Ruth N. Massey
    Alinea Family Hospice Care LLC d/b/a         Defendant/Appellant
    Alinea Family Hospice Care
    Donna Junkersfeld, RN                        Defendant/ Appellant
    Karla Gamble, LVN                            Defendant/Appellant
    Appellants                                   Trial and Appellate Counsel
    Alinea Family Hospice Care LLC d/b/a         Jason D. Mazingo
    Alinea Family Hospice Care                   The Mazingo Firm, P.C.
    Donna Junkersfeld, RN                        305 S. Broadway Ave., Ste.
    404
    Karla Gamble, LVN                            Tyler, Texas 75702
    903.630.7123
    800.771.3589 (facsimile)
    Appellee                                     Trial and Appellate Counsel
    Peggy Goldsmith, Individually and on         Patrick Powers
    Behalf of the Estate of Ruth N. Massey       Meredith Mathews
    POWERS TAYLOR, LLP
    Campbell Centre II
    8150 N. Central Expressway,
    Suite 1575
    Dallas, Texas 75206
    214.239.8900
    214.239.8901 (facsimile)
    i
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    PAGE
    List of Parties and Counsel ........................................................................................ i
    Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... ii
    Index of Authorities ................................................................................................. iii
    Statement of the Case ............................................................................................... 1
    Statement Regarding Oral Argument ....................................................................... 2
    Statement of Jurisdiction .......................................................................................... 2
    Issues Presented on Appeal ...................................................................................... 2
    Statement of Facts..................................................................................................... 2
    Summary of the Argument ....................................................................................... 5
    Standard of Review................................................................................................... 5
    Argument and Authorities ........................................................................................ 6
    A. Appellee complied with the Court’s June 23, 2014 Order, which superseded
    and/or amended the Court’s May 27th. 2014 Order......................................... 6
    B. Section 74.351(c) and the cases cited by Appellants are inapplicable because
    the Court entered a subsequent order setting the statutory amendment
    period .............................................................................................................. 8
    C. The Trial Court has the Power to Toll the Time Period for Goldsmith to file
    her Amended Expert Report ......................................................................... 11
    Conclusion and Prayer ............................................................................................ 12
    Certificate of Service .............................................................................................. 13
    ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    PAGE
    Cases
    Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. Of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 
    46 S.W.3d 873
    (Tex. 2001) ............................................................................................................... 5
    Baylor College of Medicine v. Pokluda, 
    283 S.W.3d 110
    (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2009) ....................................................................................................... 6
    Comet Aluminum Company v. Dibrell, 
    450 S.W.2d 56
    (Tex. 1970) ........................ 7
    Constancio v. Bray, 
    266 S.W.3d 149
    (Tex. App. – Austin 2008, no pet) .............. 10
    Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 
    636 F.3d 708
    (5th Cir. 2011) ......................................... 11
    Knox v. Long, 
    257 S.W.2d 289
    (1953) ..................................................................... 7
    Lewis v. Funderburk, 
    253 S.W.3d 204
    (Tex. 2008) ............................................... 10
    Nexion Health at Beechnut, Inc. v. Paul, 
    335 S.W.3d 716
    (Tex. App. – Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet) ......................................................................................... 10
    Oak Creek Homes, Inc. v. Jones, 
    758 S.W.2d 288
    (Tex. App.—Waco, 1988) .... 7, 8
    SSC Robstown Operating Co. LP v. Perez, 
    2013 WL 1838597
    , at *2 (Tex. App. –
    Corpus Christi, Feb. 28, 2013) ............................................................................... 10
    Smith v. J-Hite, Inc., 
    127 S.W.3d 837
    (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, no pet.) ......... 11
    Utils. Pipeline Co. v. Am. Petrofina Mktg., 
    760 S.W.2d 719
    (Tex. App.—Dallas,
    1988, no writ)............................................................................................................ 7
    Statutes and Codes
    TEX. R. CIV. P. 74.351(c) ...................................................................... 5, 8, 9, 10, 11
    iii
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    This underlying case arises out of a medical negligence claim field by Peggy
    Goldsmith on behalf of herself and her mother, Ruth Massey (hereinafter
    “Goldsmith” or “Appellee”). Appellee filed her Original Petition on November 1,
    2013 alleging that Appellants Alinea Family Hospice Care, LLC d/b/a Alinea
    Family Hospice Care, Donna Junkersfeld, R.N., and Karla Gamble, LVN
    (hereinafter “Alinea” or “Apellants”) were negligent in their care and treatment of
    Ruth Massey, ultimately leading to death due to a fecal impaction.1         Alinea
    answered the lawsuit and filed an objection to the expert report served by
    Appellee.2 On May 27, 2014, the trial court issued an order giving Goldsmith 30
    days to cur the deficient reports, however Appellee was never served with a copy
    of the report. On June 23, 2014, the trial court issued an order on Alinea’s
    Objections and Motion to Dismiss Goldsmith’s expert report, finding good cause
    to change Appellee’s deadline to amend Appellee’s Expert Report and providing
    Goldsmith until July 24, 2014 to serve an amended expert report. Goldsmith
    timely served her amended expert report on July 22, 2014. However, Alinea
    sought dismissal of Goldsmith’s suit, claiming the amended report was untimely.
    The trial court denied Alinea’s motion to dismiss on February 5, 2015, and on
    1
    C.R.
    at 6.
    2
    C.R. at 24, 29.
    APPELLEE’S BRIEF                                                         PAGE     1
    February 20, 2015, Alinea filed its Notice of Appeal.
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    Appellees believe oral argument would aid the Court in reaching a decision
    on this case. Oral argument will allow the Parties to explain the application of
    facts to law, and allow the Parties to answer any questions the Court may have
    regarding the matter.
    STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
    Appellees do not contest the Court’s jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
    ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
    Whether or not the trial court properly denied Appellant’s Motion to
    Dismiss.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Appellee filed this lawsuit on November 1, 2013 and Appellants timely
    answered.3 On February 5, 2014, Appellee served Appellants with Goldsmith’s
    Chapter 74 Expert Report, prepared by Steven C. Fox, D.O. (“Expert Report”). On
    February 25, 2014, Appellants file objections to Appellee’s Expert Report, and on
    May 14, 2014 the trial court held a hearing on this motion and took the matter
    under advisement.
    On May 27, 2014, the trial court entered an order sustaining Appellants’
    3
    C.R.   at 6, 24.
    APPELLEE’S BRIEF                                                                 PAGE   2
    objections to Appellee’s Expert Report and provided Appellee thirty days to serve
    Appellants with an amended expert report.4 This order was intended to be served
    on all counsel of record by facsimile. Unfortunately, Appellee’s counsel did not
    receive a copy of the Court’s order because of a typographical error in the
    facsimile number – Appellee’s counsel’s facsimile number is (214) 239-8901, but
    the order mistakenly listed the facsimile number as (214) 239-8401.5 As such,
    Appellee did not receive the order.
    On June 18, 2014, the trial court heard objections to Goldsmith’s Expert
    Report filed by another defendant in the case, Dr. Richard Ingrim.6 The trial court
    sustained these objections as well, and entered an order requiring that Appellee
    serve an amended expert report regarding Dr. Ingrim by July 24, 2014.7
    At this hearing, Appellee’s counsel also informed the trial court that
    Appellee’s counsel had not received the Court’s May 27, 2014 order.8 The trial
    court requested additional documentary proof to establish lack of service, and
    counsel agreed to provide this information to the Court. That same day, on June
    18, 2014, Appellee’s counsel wrote to the trial court explaining that because of the
    error in the facsimile number on the order cover sheet, Appellee’s counsel did not
    4
    C.R.
    at 35
    5
    C.R. at 38.
    6
    C.R. at 69.
    7
    C.R. at 43.
    8
    C.R. at 69.
    APPELLEE’S BRIEF                                                          PAGE     3
    receive a copy of the order from May 27, 2014. 9
    On June 23, 2014, the Court issued a second order on Alinea’s Objections
    and Motion to Dismiss Goldsmith’s Expert Report, finding good cause change
    Appellee’s deadline to amend Appellee’s Expert Report and providing Appellee
    10
    until July 24, 2014 to serve an amended expert report.          The Court’s June 23,
    2014 order altered Appellee’s deadline to serve an amended expert report related to
    Appellants Alinea Health, Junkersfeld, and Gamble to the same deadline to amend
    Appellee’s Expert Report as to Dr. Ingrim, which was July 24, 2014.
    On July 22, 2014, Appellee timely served Amended Expert Reports on all
    Appellants in this case. 11 On August 12, 2014, Appellants Alinea, Junkersfeld,
    and Gamble filed a motion to dismiss Goldsmith’s claims, asserting that Appellee
    did not timely serve an amended expert report as to these Appellants. Goldsmith
    filed her response to Alinea’s motion to dismiss on January 27, 2015.12 A hearing
    was held on the motion on January 28, 2015.13 The trial court denied Appellant’s
    motion to dismiss, finding that Goldsmith acted in reliance of a court order, and
    timely served the amended report.14
    9
    C.R.
    at 37.
    10
    C.R. at 3.
    11
    C.R. at 102.
    12
    C.R. at 57.
    13
    C.R. at 146.
    14
    
    Id. APPELLEE’S BRIEF
                                                             PAGE     4
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    The appeal should be denied for three primary reasons. First, Appellee was
    never properly served with a copy of the trial court’s May 27, 2014 order. The
    trial court’s May 27, 2014 order was amended and superseded by the trial court’s
    June 23, 2014 order, which is the only order regarding the deadline to serve
    amended expert reports that the trial court served on Appellee. The deadline set
    forth in the trial court’s June 23, 2014 order is the operative deadline, which
    Appellee met.
    Second, Appellants’ reliance on Section 74.351(c) is misplaced – this
    section does not speak to instances in which an order is not served on a party and is
    subsequently amended or superseded by a court. In this case, the Court amended
    the order to change the beginning date of the 30-day period. Appellee met this
    deadline and timely served amended expert reports.
    Third, Goldsmith was acting in reasonable reliance of an order of the trial
    court, and should not be punished as a result of that reliance.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    A trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed by this Court for an
    abuse of discretion. Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. Of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 
    46 S.W.3d 873
    , 875 (Tex. 2001).          In order to prove the trial court abused its
    discretions, Appellants must show the trial court acted in an unreasonable and
    APPELLEE’S BRIEF                                                          PAGE     5
    arbitrary manner or without reference to any rules or guiding principles. Baylor
    College of Medicine v. Pokluda, 
    283 S.W.3d 110
    , 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2009). In other words, Appellants must show the trial court with complete
    disregard to the law.
    ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
    Appellants claim that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
    dismiss Goldsmith’s claims against them because Appellee did not timely serve
    Appellants with an amended expert report. As support for its position, Alinea
    asserts that because Appellee was made aware of the Court’s May 27, 2014 at the
    June 18, 2014 hearing, Appellee had until 30 days after June 18, 2014 (until July
    18, 2014) to serve Appellee’s amended expert reports, and serving the amended
    report on July 22, 2015 was untimely, and dismissal was required.
    A.    Appellee complied with the Court’s June 23, 2014 Order, which
    superseded the Court’s May 27, 2014 Order.
    On June 23, 2014, the trial court entered an order in this case setting the
    deadline for Appellee to serve amended reports by July 24, 2014. Although the
    trial court had previously entered an order on May 27, 2014, Appellee’s counsel
    did not have notice of that order, and the trial court never served Appellee’s
    counsel with a copy of the Order. On June 23, 2014, the Court entered a second
    order, superseding the trial court’s prior May 27, 2014 Order, setting that
    beginning of the 30-day amendment period to June 23, 2014. This order was
    APPELLEE’S BRIEF                                                      PAGE     6
    properly served on Appellee’s counsel on June 23, 2014.
    Under the Court’s June 23, 2014 Order, Appellee had until July 24, 2014 to
    serve amended expert reports. Appellee complied with the Court’s deadline by
    serving amended expert reports on July 22, 2014. Based on this alone, the Court
    should uphold the trial court’s order.
    Appellants argue that an entry in the docket sheet cannot take the place of an
    order of the court. However, Appellants mischaracterize the trial court’s June 23,
    2014 order as a docket sheet entry. Appellants’ brief indicates that an order must
    reduced to writing, signed by the trial court, and entered in the record. Utils.
    Pipeline Co. v. Am. Petrofina Mktg., 
    760 S.W.2d 719
    , 723 (Tex. App.—Dallas,
    1988, no writ). The June 23, 2014 is labeled as an order of the court, it is written,
    and it was signed by the judge, giving it all of the hallmarks of an order.
    Rendition of a judgment occurs when the trial court’s decision upon a matter
    submitted to it is officially announced either in open court or by a memorandum
    filed with the clerk. Knox v. Long, 
    257 S.W.2d 289
    , 292 (1953); Oak Creek
    Homes, Inc. v. Jones, 
    758 S.W.2d 288
    (Tex. App.—Waco, 1988). Rendition is
    defined as “the judicial act by which the court settles and declares the decision of
    the law upon the matters at issue.” Comet Aluminum Company v. Dibrell, 
    450 S.W.2d 56
    , 58 (Tex. 1970). A subsequent writing of the order and signing by the
    court is merely a ministerial act by the trial court, but does not change the
    APPELLEE’S BRIEF                                                              PAGE   7
    rendering of the order. Oak Creek 
    Homes, 758 S.W.2d at 290
    .                In the action
    below, the trial court filed a memorandum with the clerk when the court entered its
    order on the docket sheet. As a result, the notation on the docket sheet does
    function as an order of the court on which Goldsmith could rely.
    In addition, the matter required the rendition of a second order because the
    trial court did not make the determination at the June 18, 2014 hearing that
    Goldsmith would be permitted to amend her report.15 In fact, the record is clear
    that the trial court required counsel to essentially offer proof to the trial court that
    Goldsmith’s counsel never received notice of the motion. The trial court did not
    make a decision on Goldsmith’s request until June 23, 2014, at which time the
    second order, superseding the May 27, 2014 order, was rendered.16
    B.           Section 74.351(c) and the cases cited by Appellants are inapplicable
    because the Court entered a subsequent order setting the statutory
    amendment period.
    Appellants argue that the Court has no discretion to allow Appellee longer
    than 30 days to amend Appellee’s expert reports. Appellants rely upon Section
    74.351(c) in support of their claim.             However, this section and the cases
    interpreting this section are not applicable to this issue presented in this case.
    Here, the trial court never actually served the original order on Appellee, but
    entered a superseding order that changed the beginning of the 30-day amendment
    15
    C.R.
    at 82 – 84.
    16
    C.R. at 3.
    APPELLEE’S BRIEF                                                              PAGE     8
    period. Appellee has not been granted more than 30 days to amend.
    Section 74.351(c) relates to instances in which a court finds that an expert
    report has not been served (including a timely served but “deficient” report) within
    the 120-day period. In such a case, a trial court has the discretion to enter an order
    granting a 30-day extension to serve an amended expert report.        If the 120-day
    period has not yet run at the time of the extension, the amending party’s deadline
    to amend is 30 days plus the remaining time under the 120-day deadline. If the
    120-day period has run at the time that the request for the amendment is granted,
    the 30-day period does not start to run until the amending party actually receives
    notice of the order granting the extension. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 74.351(c). The
    rationale for this rule is clear – if a court sustains a party’s objections to expert
    reports before the 120-day period runs, the amending party’s remaining time under
    the 120-day deadline should not be cut short. Conversely, if a court grants a 30-
    day extension after the 120-day deadline has run, but the amending party does not
    get a copy of the order granting the extension until after the order date, it would be
    unfair to require a party to amend with less than the statutorily-prescribed 30 day
    period. However, this is not the case here.
    Here, Appellee was never served a copy of the Court’s May 27, 2014 order
    by the trial court. It was not until June 18, 2014, that counsel for Defendant Dr.
    Ingrim e-mailed counsel a copy of the order. Further, the trial court actually
    APPELLEE’S BRIEF                                                           PAGE     9
    entered an entirely separate order that superseded the previous order. Section
    74.351(c) does not address either of these issues – (i) when a Court does not serve
    an amending party with the order granting the 30-day extension or (ii) when an
    entirely separate order is entered that alters the beginning date of the amendment
    period. Nor do any of the cases cited by Appellants that have interpreted this
    section. Further, the cases cited by Appellants also do not address this issue, but
    concern instances in which a court improperly gave a party 30 days from the date
    of the hearing on the objections and when a court improperly cut off an amending
    party’s time to amend prior to the running of the 120-day deadline or a party
    simply missed the deadline. See, e.g., Lewis v. Funderburk, 
    253 S.W.3d 204
    , 207-
    08 (Tex. 2008) (holding that a Appellee can change experts within the extension
    period, but not addressing the notice issue); SSC Robstown Operating Co. LP v.
    Perez, 
    2013 WL 1838597
    , at *2 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi, Feb. 28, 2013)
    (upholding dismissal because the amending party served amended reports a day
    late, but not addressing the notice issue); Nexion Health at Beechnut, Inc. v. Paul,
    
    335 S.W.3d 716
    , 718-19 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet)
    (upholding dismissal because the amending party served amended reports a day
    late, but not addressing the notice issue); and Constancio v. Bray, 
    266 S.W.3d 149
    ,
    162 (Tex. App. – Austin 2008, no pet) (holding that time remaining under the 120-
    day deadline must be in additional to the 30-day extension, but not addressing the
    APPELLEE’S BRIEF                                                         PAGE    10
    notice issue).
    Thus, application of Section 74.351(c) does not mandate that the Court
    dismiss Appellee’s claims because the amended reports were served untimely. Nor
    do any of the cases interpreting this statutory provision.
    C.    The Trial Court has the Power to Toll the Time Period for Goldsmith to
    file her Amended Expert Report.
    Goldsmith served her Amended Expert Report on Appellants in the time
    prescribed by the trial court’s June 23, 2014 order. In doing so, she relied on the
    issuance of an order of the trial court. The trial court had the power to toll the time
    period for Goldsmith to serve her amended expert report. Courts have the inherent
    power to toll a specific time period when there are extenuating circumstances.
    Smith v. J-Hite, Inc., 
    127 S.W.3d 837
    , 843 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, no pet.).
    The application of equitable tolling is a fact-specific, discretionary matter.
    Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 
    636 F.3d 708
    , 712 (5th Cir. 2011). In the instant case, it
    was within in the discretion of the trial court to give Goldsmith additional time to
    file her amended expert report based on the principle of equitable tolling, as there
    were extenuating circumstances due to Goldsmith not receiving the original order
    because of a mistake made by the trial court. Because the trial court has the power
    to equitably toll a time period, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving
    Goldsmith the additional time, and the Court should affirm the trial court’s order.
    APPELLEE’S BRIEF                                                            PAGE      11
    CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
    For these reasons, Appellees respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
    trial court’s order denying Appellants’ Motion to Dismiss.        Goldsmith also
    requests any such general relief to which she may be entitled.
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/ Meredith Mathews
    Patrick W. Powers
    State Bar No. 24013351
    patrick@powerstaylor.com
    Meredith Mathews
    State Bar No. 24055180
    meredith@powerstaylor.com
    POWERS TAYLOR LLP
    8150 North Central Expressway
    Suite 1575
    Dallas, Texas 75206
    Phone: 214.239.8900
    Fax: 214.239.8901
    Attorneys for Appellee Peggy Goldsmith
    APPELLEE’S BRIEF                                                        PAGE    12
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    1.    This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of TEX. R. APP. P.
    9.4(i)(2)(B) because it contains 2,337 words, excluding the parts of the brief
    exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).
    2.    This brief complies with the typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P.
    9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using
    Microsoft Word 2010 in 14 point Times New Roman font (and 12 point for
    footnotes).
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
    document was served upon all counsel of record on this 8th day of May 2015 via:
    VIA ELECTRONIC FILING SERVICE
    Jason D. Mazingo
    305 South Broadway Ave., Ste. 404
    Tyler, Texas 75702
    /s/ Meredith Mathews
    Meredith Mathews
    APPELLEE’S BRIEF                                                         PAGE    13