Harriman, Timothy Scott ( 2015 )


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  •                        6S3-fS
    Cause No.
    ORIGINAL
    IN THE
    CRIMINAL COURT OF APPEALS
    TIMOTHY HARRIMAN,
    Appellant,
    „ RECEIVED SW
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    Vs.                                 MAY 29 2015
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee.
    FILED IN
    On Petition for Discretionary Review       COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    from the Court ofAppealsfor the
    NAY 29 2015
    Fifth District Court No. 5
    At Dallas County, Texas                   Abel Acosta, Clerk
    In Cause No. 05-13-01547-CR;
    Trial Cause No. F94-015553-L
    PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    Counsel of Record:
    Timothy Scott Harriman
    TDCJ# 00677187
    Pro Se Petitioner
    2 Jester Rd, Vance Unit
    Richmond, Texas 77406
    Attorneyfor Appellant
    LIST OF PARTIES
    APPELLANT/PETITIONER
    Timothy Harriman
    APPELLEE
    The State of Texas
    DEFENSE COUNSEL AT TRIAL
    Original Trial:
    Amy Abboud
    7161 Bishop Road, Suite 200
    Piano. Texas 75024
    Post-Conviction DNA Motion:
    Julie Doucet
    Dallas County Public Defender's Office
    Frank Crowley Courts Building
    133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-2
    Dallas, Texas 75207-4399
    STATE'S ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL
    John Vance, Linda Bayless, and Scott Bryant
    Dallas County District Attorney's Office
    Frank Crowley Courts Building
    133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-19
    Dallas, Texas 75207-4399
    APPELLANT'S ATTORNYS ON APPEAL
    Post-Conviction DNA Motion:
    Julie Woods
    Dallas County Public Defender's Office
    Frank Crowley Courts Building
    133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-2
    Dallas, Texas 75207-4399
    STATE'S ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL
    Original Trial:      Patricia PoppoffNoble
    Post-Conviction DNA Motion:         Shara Saget
    Dallas County District Attorney's Office
    Frank Crowley Courts Building
    133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-19
    Dallas, Texas 75207-4399
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    LIST OF PARTIES                                                    ii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                 iii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES                                              iv
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE...                                           1
    HISTORY OF THE CASE                                                2
    GROUND ONE FOR REVIEW                                                 4
    GROUND TWO FOR REVIEW                                                 6
    ARGUMENT                                                               7
    Point of Error 1, Restated                                             7
    The intermediate courts abused their discretion in denying
    Appellant's motion for post-conviction DNA testing because
    Appellant met his burden of establishing that identity was or
    is an issue in this case and demonstrating by a preponderance
    ofthe evidence that he would not have been convicted had the
    results ofthe DNA test been available at trial.
    Point of Error 2, Restated                                         10
    The intermediate courts have misconstrued Chapter 64 to
    mandate a foreclosure on indigent defendants' rights when an
    important question of factual Identity arises from state and
    federal concerns as to actual innocence that falls within
    contours ofscientific certainty.
    PRAYER                                                             14
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE                                                 14
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE                                              15
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases                                                                        Page
    Harriman v. State,
    No. 05-94-00905-CR, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 2556 (Tex. App.- Dallas Oct. 12,
    1995, no pet.)                                                                   1
    Bell v. State, 
    90 S.W.3d 301
    , 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)                    passim
    Ex Parte Gutierrez, 
    337 S.W.3d 883
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)                   passim
    Blacklockv. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 231
    , 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)                    5
    Esparza v. State, 
    282 S.W.3d 913
    , 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)                     5
    Peyravi v. State,
    S.W.3d         (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2013, no pet.)
    (NO.14-13-00118-CR; 11-7-3.)                                                     5
    Skinner v.Switzer, 
    131 S. Ct. 1289
    ,1296, 
    179 L. Ed. 2d 233
    (2011)                   6
    State v. Swearingen, 
    424 S.W.3d 32
    , 37-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)                 6
    Routier v. State, 
    89 S.W.3d 55
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)                            7
    Jacksonv. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    (1979)                     10
    Ex Parte Robbins, 360 S.W3d 446,457 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)                      11
    In Re Franklin, 
    337 S.W.3d 890
    , 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)                      12
    Gonzales v. State, 4 S.W.3d406, 412 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999)                       12
    Statutes
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 64.03(a)                                              .2
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 64.03(a)(2)(A)                                            2
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 64.03(a)(1)(B)                                            4
    Miscellaneous
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 11.073                                6
    HOW DNA Evidence Works, http://science.howitorks.com/life/genetic/dna-
    evidence.htm (last visited September 26, 2014)                     12
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
    COMES NOW; Appellant/Petitioner, Timothy Harriman, and submits
    this Petition for Discretionary Review from the denial of a motion for post
    conviction DNA testing in Criminal District Court No. 5 of Dallas County,
    Texas, the Honorable Carter Thompson, Judge presiding.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    A jury convicted Petitioner of murder and sentenced him to thirty-four
    years' imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (CR: 5-
    8). Petitioner appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed his
    conviction on October 12, 1995. See Harriman v. State, No. 05-94-00905-
    CR, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 2556 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 12, 1995, no pet.).
    On August 15, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction
    forensic DNA testing pursuant to Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal
    Procedure. (CR: 17-26). On September 25, 2013, the State filed a response
    to Petitioner's motion. (CR: 47-67). In its response, the State identified two
    pieces of evidence that have been retained in this case: (1) head hair standard
    and (2) hairs from hands. (CR: 47-67). The State argued in its response that
    "Appellant's motion should be denied because identity 'was not and is not
    an issue' in this case and Petitioner failed to show that he 'would have' not
    been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA
    testing." (CR: 51-52).
    On October 12, 2013, and without a hearing, the trial court entered an
    order denying Petitioner's motion for post-conviction DNA testing. (CR: 68-
    69). The court found that identity was not and is not an issue in this case and
    that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he
    would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained
    through DNA testing as required by Article 64.03(a)(2)(A) of the Texas
    Code of Criminal Procedure. (CR; 68-69); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art.
    64.03(a)(2)(A). Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal. (CR: 72-75).
    HISTORY OF THE CASE
    Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder based upon an
    uncorroborated statement and/or confession, and sentenced to thirty-four
    years' confinement. The trial court entered a deadly weapon finding on the
    same, absent any factual findings of harm or injury required. The Fifth
    District Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction On grounds of "mere
    probable cause" alone. See Harriman v. State, No. 05-94-00905-CR, 1995
    Tex. App. LEXIS 2556 (Tex. App.- Dallas Oct. 12,1995, no pet.).
    On or about February, 2012, applicant filed an original motion for
    post-conviction forensic DNA testing pursuant to Chapter 64 of the Texas
    Code of Criminal Procedure. The convicting court ignored the motion. On
    August 15, 2012, Appellant filed his "second" motion for post-conviction
    forensic DNA testing pursuant to Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal
    Procedure.1 (CR: 17-26). Again, the court ignored the request in violation of
    due process.
    Notwithstanding, on February 12, 013, defendant was compelled to
    file his Pro Se motion pursuant to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
    rule 52.1 under mandamus relief. On February 22, 2013, the intermediate
    court of appeals ordered the State to respond. On March 7, 2013, the State
    argued and attached (1) the trial court's order directing the state to bring
    forth the DNA evidence, if any, signed on March 1, 2013, and (2) a motion
    annexed for extension of time.
    On May 4, 2015, the court of appeals handed down an opinion
    affirming the trial court's order denying the request for DNA Testing on the
    sole basis that the record shows that Petitioner admitted to conduct that is
    unsupported by [any] evidence outside of the rule of Corpus Delicti.(citing
    Bell v. State, 
    90 S.W.3d 301
    , 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ( SeeAppx. 2).
    1See Appx. 1.
    GROUND ONE
    The intermediate courts abused their discretion in
    denying Appellant's motion for post-conviction DNA testing
    because Appellant met his burden ofestablishing that identity
    was or is an issue in this case and demonstrating by a
    preponderance of the evidence that he would not have been
    convicted had the results of the DNA test been available at
    trial.
    The intermediate courts abused their discretion in denying Petitioner's
    motion for post-conviction DNA testing because Petitioner has met his
    burden under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure by
    establishing that identity was or is an issue in this case and that he would not
    have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA
    testing at the time of his trial. The trial court's explicit finding that identity
    was not and is not an issue in this case is not supported by the trial record
    which contains evidence that (1) a third person may have been responsible
    for the victim's death, (2) a probability of causing death is not sufficient
    absent harm and/or injury not shown outside of the defendant's statement,
    and (3) newer testing techniques would show such probabilities are
    unreliable and exculpatory results can be obtained. TEX. CODE CRIM.
    PROC. Art. 64.03 (a)(1)(B).
    In light of the trial testimony and that the only medical examiner
    could not determine the cause and manner of the victim's death, evidence of
    a third person's DNA on the victim or the fact that the alleged victim could
    have died from other means, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
    that Petitioner would not have been convicted had the DNA test results been
    available at trial. Admitted conduct, without more, cannot stand as sufficient
    to constitute affirmative evidence of appellant's guilt as to the underlying
    offense of murder. Ex Parte Gutierrez, 
    337 S.W.3d 883
    , 893-94 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2011).
    The statutes language and legislative history is very clear that a
    defendant can make identity an issue whether or not there is an accuser, or
    whether the defendant pled guilty. See Blacklock v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 231
    ,
    233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Esparza v. State, 
    282 S.W.3d 913
    , 922 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2009). It should follow that when a defendant makes an extra
    judicial statement that is uncorroborated, the question of identity will always
    be open for inquiry thereto. 
    Blacklock, 235 S.W.3d at 233
    , (indicating that
    under "some" circumstances, a witnesses statement maybe irrelevant to
    constitute Identity issues).
    2
    The purpose of such DNA testing is to provide an avenue by which a defendant may seek to establish
    innocence and exclude himself as the perpetrator of the alleged offense. Peyravi v. State, S.W.3d
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2013, nopet.)(No. 14-13-00118-CR; 11-7-13).
    GROUND TWO
    The intermediate courts have misconstrued Chapter 64
    to mandate a foreclosure on indigent defendants' rights
    when an important question of factual Identity arises
    from state and federal concerns as to actual innocence
    thatfalls within contours ofscientific certainty.
    Under Texas law, the Legislature's amendments towards Chapter 64's
    advancements in reviewing such cases, as lies here, are not fully explained
    when considering "other methods" for determining the existence of DNA
    related biological evidence. Hence, the appellate court has decided an
    important question of state and/or federal law in a way that directly conflicts
    with legislative intent, applicable decisions, and should be settled by this
    Honorable Criminal Court of Appeals. It remains unconstitutional to
    continue to deprive an innocent person, whether indigent or not, the
    opportunity to resolve prior conflicts. See Skinner v. Switzer, 
    131 S. Ct. 1289
    ,
    1296, 
    179 L. Ed. 2d 233
    (2011)(noting that, as unconstitutional, Texas courts
    have construed the statute under DNA testing, to completely foreclose any
    prisoner who could have sought DNA testing...); e.g. State v. Swearingen,
    
    424 S.W.3d 32
    , 37-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
    Art. 64.03(a)(1)(B) See also S.B. 344, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
    article 11.073.
    ARGUMENT(S)
    Point of Error 1, Restated:
    The intermediate courts abused their discretion in denying
    Appellant's motion for post-conviction DNA testing because
    Appellant met his burden of establishing that identity was or
    is an issue in this case and demonstrating by a preponderance
    ofthe evidence that he would not have been convicted had the
    results ofthe DNA test been available at trial.
    Standard of Review
    Courts review a trial court's ruling on a post-conviction motion for
    DNA testing under a bifurcated standard of review. Rivera v. State, 
    89 S.W.3d 55
    , 59 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). The appellate court will give almost
    total deference to the trial court's determination of issues of historical fact
    and application-of-law-to-fact issues that turn on credibility and demeanor
    and will review other application-of-law-to-fact issues de novo. Routier v.
    State, 
    273 S.W.3d 241
    , 246 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). When the trial court
    rules on a motion for DNA testing without a hearing, courts review the
    ruling de novo. Smith v. State, 
    165 S.W.3d 361
    , 363 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005);
    see also Martinez v. State, No. 05-11-00329-CR, Tex. App. LEXIS 1970, *6
    (Tex. App.-Dallas march 13, 2012, pet. refd) (not designated for
    publication). For purposes of review, the appellate court must assume that
    the results of the DNA testing to which Appellant is entitled under Chapter
    64 would be favorable to Petitioner. 
    Routier, 273 S.W.3d at 257
    .
    The trial court and appellate court's conclusion that identity was not
    and is not an issue in this case is not supported by evidence in the trial
    court record.
    This Court has noted that, "The presence of another person's DNA at
    the crime scene will not, 'without more,' constitute affirmative evidence
    of...   innocence."    (citing   Bell   v.   State,   
    90 S.W.3d 301
    ,   306
    (Tex.Crim.App.2002). In this Court's decision, the evidence of guilt was
    over-whelming of the defendant's guilt. 
    Id. However, unlike
    this Court's
    decision found in the above, and in Dinkins v. State, 
    84 S.W.3d 639
    , 642
    Tex.Crim.App.2002), the intermediate court(s) cannot say with reasonable
    certainty that the trial court found evidence of guilt that bears out
    constitutional concerns towards innocence. The bone of contention in the
    instant case is that a criminal agent [necessary] is wholly absent outside of
    the defendant's statement. 
    Blacklock, 235 S.W.3d at 233
    (Indicating that
    under "some" circumstances, a witnesses statement maybe irrelevant to
    constitute Identity issues).
    Detective Carollo conceded during trial, that Petitioner's statement to
    police did not specifically admit that he killed the victim. (RR3: 235).
    Detective Carollo testified that when he spoke with Petitioner about the
    offense, Petitioner told him that Vanlandingham (the decedent) routinely
    purchased cocaine from a drug dealer named Carlos who lived in the same
    apartment complex. (RR3: 231). When the detective asked Petitioner if he
    knew of anyone who wanted to kill the victim, Petitioner said that the victim
    owed Carlos a lot of money for the cocaine and that Carlos could be
    involved in the murder. (RR3: 231-32). Additionally, neighbors, including
    Carlos, partied with the victim inside Petitioner's apartment on the date of
    the offense. (RR4: 15-17). Trial testimony also established that the victim
    had been in a relationship with Carlos's cousin Marvin. (RR3: 227; State's
    Exhibit 24). On the date of the offense, Petitioner walked into his apartment
    and saw the victim and Marvin in a physically intimate scenario. (RR4: 18-
    19). The evidence at trial established that many other people had access to
    the apartment and the victim on the day of his death. Nothing in the record,
    outside of the principle of corpus delicti points or brings forth the upshot of
    identity of the defendant. Moreover, this Court is to believe that the
    defendant somehow has stealthily overcame the demand for cause and
    result.3
    3      Cause: n. 13(c) Something that produces an effect or resultIt has been said that an act in which no way contributed to the result in
    question cannot be the cause of it; but this, of course, does not mean that an event
    which ,xmight" have happened in the same way though the defendant's act or omission had
    not occurred is not the result of it. The question is not what would have happened,
    but rather what did happen, (citing) Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequencer of an
    Act, 33 Harv.L.Rev. 633, 638(1920).
    Here, the appellate court's ruling under the term "probability," leaves
    room for an appealable decision. The question of [without more] cannot be
    answered absent precise scientific certainty within the realm of newer testing
    techniques now available. Therefore, it would be, but for an abuse of
    discretion, for the trial court and the appellate court to deprive, prohibit, or
    foreclose on a defendant's entitlement to reach or engage the (more) explicit
    standard of exculpatory evidence otherwise necessary under an independent
    collateral inquiry into the validity of murder. Ex Parte 
    Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d at 893-94
    .
    Point of Error 2, Restated:
    The intermediate courts have misconstrued Chapter 64 to
    mandate a foreclosure on indigent defendants' rights when an
    important question offactual Identity arises from state and
    federal concerns as to actual innocence that falls within
    contours ofscientific certainty.
    Under Texas Law, as well as federal law, the courts must consider
    whether the jury could rely on facts that turn on sound and reasonable
    scientific evidence in analyzing whether the credibility of a witness may be
    regarded    as   fact.   Ex   Parte      Brooks,   
    219 S.W.3d 396
    ,    401
    (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    10
    (1979) (discussing the standards of review under reasonable credibility of
    witness(s)).   See   also   Ex   Parte Robbins,       
    360 S.W.3d 446
    ,   457
    (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (involving due course and due process violations that
    rendered his trial unfair and unconstitutional...).
    The trial court failed to consider evidence in the trial record indicating
    that favorable results from DNA testing of the hairs and additional
    fingerprint DNA related evidence would corroborate a defense theory
    and could have tipped the jury's verdict in Defendant's favor.
    The appellate court's assertion that biological evidence of a third
    person in Vanlandingham's hand would "only muddy the waters" is not
    supported by the record. (CR: 51). The state courts cannot know if there was
    DNA evidence from a third person on the victim's hand, or whether
    Petitioner could be excluded as a donor because the hairs collected and/or
    the fingerprint analysis submitted to SWIFS were never fully tested or
    identified for DNA. Indeed, this is the purpose of post-conviction DNA
    testing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 64.01(b)(2)(A).
    Under Texas law, the trial court must consider reliable facts and sound
    medical evidence in lieu of statements that were (or should have been)
    inadmissible at trial. Ex Parte 
    Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d at 893-94
    ; Dansby v.
    State, 960 S.W.2d 668(Tex.App.-Tyler 997)(Harm was shown from
    improper admission of the defendant's unrecorded oral confession where the
    n
    statement contradicted his position at trial, the State emphasized the
    improper evidence, ...). It is apparent from the record that the appellate
    court would otherwise suggest that, "even if exculpatory evidence could be
    identified, this fact would not prove innocence or guilt.4 Again, the court
    rests its decision on the defendant's uncorroborated confession. This clearly
    conflicts with prior applicable decisions of appellate courts and this Court's
    precedent, i.e. Gonzales v. State, 
    4 S.W.3d 406
    , 412 (Tex.App.-Waco
    1999)(A defendant's extra-judicial confession standing alone, is not
    sufficient to support a conviction; there must be other evidence independent
    of the confession that tends to prove the corpus delicti)(citmg Williams v.
    State, 
    958 S.W.2d 186
    , 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
    Therefore, the intermediate courts have misconstrued Chapter 64 to
    essentially foreclose on a defendant's entitlement to have the testing done
    when he is seeking out the validity of the instant conviction. InReFranklin,
    2008, LEXIS 4545, 
    2008 WL 2468712
    (
    337 S.W.3d 890
    , 892 Tex. Crim.
    App. 2008)(reasonable grounds exist for a testing motion are present when
    the facts stated in the request for counsel or otherwise knownto the convict-
    4Appx. 2 at Pp 4.
    5How DNA Evidence Works, http://science.howitworks.com/life/genetic/dna-evidence.htm (last
    visited September 26, 2014).
    12
    ing court reasonably suggests a plausible argument for testing can be made.
    Conversely, reasonable grounds for testing are not present if the record
    before the court shows that DNA testing is impossible or that no viable
    argument for testing can be made).
    The fact that Petitioner suggested to choking the victim does not mean
    he killed the victim, especially in light of the evidence of the victim's drug
    and alcohol use, and absence of harm or injury done. Consequently, the trial
    record did not establish that Petitioner was the person who caused the
    victim's death. Tangible probative evidence collected from the crime scene
    includes, but not limited to, fingerprints from a tray in the apartment's
    bathroom. (RR3: 208-12). These fingerprints did not belong to Petitioner or
    the victim. (RR3: 211-12). The Physical Evidence Detective did not collect
    any evidence from [any of] the areas where the victim's deceased body had
    been inside the apartment. (RR3: 208-12). Consequently, the biological
    material retrieved from the victim's hand, scientific information, and
    additional biological evidence collected during the autopsy would be vital in
    establishing who was near the victim and/or caused his death.
    If a third person's DNA were found on Vanlandingham, this
    information would certainly be exculpatory. It supports Petitioner's defense
    that another person could be responsible for the victim's death. Evidence
    13
    that a third person's biological material was on the victim at the time of his
    death would most certainly establish that a third person, not Petitioner, was
    near the victim at the time of his death. Vanlandingham had a criminal
    record, was a drug user, and owed money to his drug dealer. (RR3: 136-37;
    RR4: 15-17). If testing shows that the DNA is from a third person and not
    Petitioner, this information would constitute objective corroboration of
    Appellant's defensive theory that the victim could have been killed by
    another person with a motive. Whether DNA of a third person was on the
    victim would be significant in the jury's evaluation of the defensive theory
    presented at trial.
    Furthermore, because this case involves an absence of injury and/or
    harm done within the essential meaning of [caus]ation, and does more than
    clearly diminish the credibility of either an uncorroborated statement or
    extra-judicial confession, nor will it support a hypothetical conclusion under
    any Texas Rules or Law applied, the intermediate courts have erred in
    concludingthat exculpatory evidence would "only muddy the waters." 
    Bell, 90 S.W.3d at 306
    .
    14
    PRAYER
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSD3ERED, Petitioner prays that
    this Court reverse the appellate and trial court's order denying Petitioner's
    motion for post-conviction DNA testing.
    Respectfully submitted
    /s/ Timothy Scott Harriman
    ( Signature of Pro Se Petitioner        )
    Timothy Scott Harriman
    TDCJ# 677187
    2 Jester Road, Carol Vance Unit
    Richmond, Texas 77406
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing petition was served on the
    Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Supreme Court Bldg., P.O.
    Box 12308, Austin, Texas 78711, and the Dallas County Criminal District
    Attorney's Office (Appellate Division), 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., 10th Floor,
    Dallas, Texas 75207, by placing this document in the United States Postal
    Service on May 23, 2015.
    /s/ Timothy Scott Harriman
    Timothy Scott Harriman
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I hereby certify that this petition for discretionary review, exclusive of
    appendices, is 3,713 words in length, according to Microsoft Office, which
    was used to prepare this petition and complies with the word-count limit and
    typeface conventions required by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    /s/ Timothy Scott Harriman
    Timothy Scott Harriman
    15
    APPENDIX
    16
    TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN,                           §                IN THE TEXAS COURT
    Applicant,                        §
    §                             OF
    §
    §                                                      an1
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                  CRIMINAL APPEALS
    §
    MOTION FOR FORENSIC D.N.A. TESTING: ART. 64.01
    101
    Applicant, Timothy Scott Harriman appearing Pro Se in the above styled and numbered
    cause of action, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to consider the requested material,
    specifically, D.N.A. subject matter consisting of, but not limited to, DNA FINGERPRrNTING;
    DNA analysis, i.e. skin, blood, hair, fingerprinting on skin, and subsequent testing as to inquiry of
    facts consistent with Penal Code §6.04 and TRE 702.
    For the purposes listed herein, and pursuant to Vernon's Ann. Texas C.C.P. art.
    64.03(a)(2)(A), the applicant would respectfully show, "but for " causation must be clearly
    established, other than a hypothetical capability of causing death or serious bodily injury,
    between the accused' conduct and the [Resulting harm, Wooten v. State, 
    267 S.W.3d 289
    (
    2010) thus, herein, constituting a reasonable probability clearly exists that had this information
    and forensic testing been made available to the trier-of-fact, if proven true, would be clear and
    convincing so as to undermine confidence in the outcome of the defendant'strial. SeeRay v.
    State. 897 S.W.2d333rrex.Crim.App. 1995): Johnston v. State. 115SS.W.3d
    761.764CTex.Crim.Avv. -Austin 2003).
    Because the courts require morethan mere probability or omission of factual evidence to
    sustain a conviction; i.e. superficial bruising to the skinonly, this finding cannotdivorce the
    "cardinal findings" as alleged in the defendant's indictment, (to wit: strangulation of the neck
    with hands being a deadly weapon). Such allegations must be supported by evidence directly
    related to the allegation(s) made.
    This standard is brightlined in the Supreme Court's precedents spelled out in Jackson v.
    Virginia, 443 U.S 307,318-319(1979) (Under this test, we permit juries to draw multiple
    reasonable inferences, as long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial.
    However, juries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on "mere speculation or factually
    unsupported inferences or presumptions." To correctly apply ... this standard, it is vital that the
    courts of appeals understand the difference between a reasonable inference supported by the
    evidence at trial, speculation, and a presumption...).
    Likewise, because the State and the Court of Appeals solely relied upon an improper
    result, due to no fault ofthe defendant's, based on speculation unsupported by facts ("bruising
    could have been obscured by the discoloration of the skin") when forensic testing factually relies
    upon other evidence necessary to prove an ultimate fact in existence, i.e. petechial hemorrhaging
    in the eyes; bruising to neck strap muscles; contusions to nose and mouth; congestion in
    respiratory system; 70%blockage of coronary artery, ect...) all of which would indeed constitute
    such allegations set out in the indictment.
    However, because counsel never exercised or demonstrated a tactical or strategic decision
    towards adversarial testing of the facts consistent with such a caseas this, when such basicand
    essential elementsof the allegedcrime must be supported by facts found under TRE Rule 702.
    To the contrary, this requirement is so basic to the principle of the defendant's due
    process soasto preclude prejudice. With respect to effective counsel and under these precise
    circumstances, iheAke v. Oklahoma, 
    470 U.S. 68
    , 76, 
    105 S. Ct. 1087
    , 1092(1985) Court spoke in
    terms of the "basic tools of an adequatedefense" in concluding that in certain circumstances
    (such asthis) a defense expert is such theelement necessarily required. Rey, at345; Ake, 
    at83, 105 S. Ct. at 1096
    .
    Therefore, because the defendant was prejudiced to a vital and critical defense function,
    being fundamental in nature and the State has suppressed such information and vital evidence
    herein requested, and the result was adverse to the defendant's due process, the Applicant now
    presents facts sufficient by a preponderance of the evidence, that this evidence was either
    suppressed by the State and/or his counsel never investigated the essential facts as to the scientific
    evidence necessary to corroborate an alleged confession nonetheless. See State's Findings of
    Fact, at 27-29, W94—01553-L(A); Affidavit, at 6, ("I do not recall consulting [any] experts
    regarding the cause of death and autopsy findings.").
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    This case arises from an unlawful interrogation in violation of Texas Code 38.22 §3,
    Vernon's Ann. C.C.P.penal code §37.09, when the defendant is to agree with an unreasonable
    "what if or "how do you think it could have happened" hypothesis not reasoned upon the facts
    while constructing a "fraudulent misrepresentation" of evidence against the accused. See State's
    Findings ofFact, at 12, W94-01553-L(A)(The Court finds [no] evidence that an audio or visual
    recording was made of applicant's statement."). Nonetheless, this alleged statement was admitted
    into evidence, but for an abuse of the Court's discretion, was wholly misleading to the jury and
    the defendant. This statutory violation prejudiced the defendant under his due process entitlement
    altogether. See Dansby v. State. 960 S.W. 2d 668(Tex.App.-Tyler 1997) (harm was shown from
    the improperadmission of the defendant's unrecorded oral confession where the statement
    contradicted his position at trial,the State emphasized the improper evidence, anda finding of
    harmless error would [en]courage repetition).
    Additionally, the State knowingly suppressedvital information and facts that would
    exculpate thedefendant, specifically, body hair, (that were notsuitable butmay now be reached)
    air and/orskin undernails; lungweightconsistent with drug and/oralcohol induced cardiac
    arrest; toxicology of alcohol-blood related findings that are not consistent with sole
    decomposition; and petechial hemorrhages specifically associated with strangulation and/or
    asphyxia.
    Accordingly, when the cause of death and manner of death is found to be undetermined,
    and no trauma or injury is found true only three days after death has occurred, in these cases the
    death certificate may be signed off as "undetermined," though the cause may be equally attributed
    to "lethal cardiac arrhythmia," as this condition cannot be detected after death on postmortem.
    However, where this option is taken, the manner of death [must] be declared as natural, e.g. Smith
    v. State. Tex.App.- 10th Dist.2008/20008 WL 553558 unreported).
    Perhaps, under similar circumstances as lies here, an accused is to agree to believing, by
    giving a statement contrary to evidence already known, leaving an insufficientprobability that he
    shot someone, police find deceased without injury or cause of death, yet the law may promote
    prosecution of the accused nevertheless,would precisely violate his due process entitlement
    altogether. See Lvnum v. Illinois. 
    372 U.S. 528
    . 
    83 S. Ct. 917
    . 9 L.Ed2d 92 (1963).
    The thresholdquestion here is, was the factual cause of death reachedunder FRE 702, is
    easilyanswered when the defendant was precluded, by no fault of his own,to an adversarial
    testing of the facts sufficient to overcome the unconstitutional burden of proofwhen the
    defendant is required to prove otherwise. InRe Winship. 
    397 U.S. 358
    (1970). In the practice of
    law applicable here, theapplicant invokes his actual innocence joined with the constitutional
    violation(s) therein, meaning that he is factually innocent ofthe underlying offense of murder in
    the first degree, specifically here, the facts have not changed. Under the reasonableness standard,
    a person ofreason would conclude that ifa finding adverse toone's interest may promote harm,
    he could seek a second or even a third opinion. However, within this case, it has not been yet
    reasoned within the interests ofjustice.
    WHEREFORE PREMESIS CONSIDERED, this provision of Chapter 64, is to give
    applicant "full access" to the courts, and to provide a check ofthe integrity on the prior individual
    decision(s) ofthe trial court and the court ofappeals. House Research Org, Bill Analysis
    Tex.S.B.3 at8, 77thLeg., RS (March21, 2001); Kutznerv. State. 75.W.3d427. 433.
    435(Tex. Crim.Avv.2002).
    Accordingly, there exists a reasonable probability that ifthe evidence to be tested results
    adversely towards a substantial showing of causation, it would indeed constitute a factual
    innocence finding. Although a finding being inconclusive may render neither a finding for or
    against the defendant, he may rely upon other facts to be tested and relied upon for
    conclusiveness under DNA fingerprinting material to be essential element ofthe alleged offense.
    Therefore, the precise evidence, being DNA in nature, to be tested is as follows:
    (1) Hair sample subject matter;
    (2) Blood samples, including toxicology samples within the context of alcohol-
    blood concentration and symptoms being lethal levels at the time of death, as
    opposed to time of examination;
    (3) Toxicology as to a probability to existent drug concentration, specifically,
    cocaine;
    (4) Forensic inquiry underDNAfingerprinting in context to abnormalities that
    affect activity of the cardiac muscles;
    (5) DNA fingerprinting as to precise toxicology results indicating the specific
    probability of blood-alcohol levelat time of death, as opposed to present
    level of 0.17% to 0.20%;
    (6) DNA fingerprinting asto evidence of facts consistent with harm or injury to
    alleged victim, including finger-nail clippings signifying struggle;
    (7) DNA fingerprinting showing cardinal findings ofeither asphyxia or
    strangulation, within the context of, but not limited to, blockage of coronary
    arteries, contusion of mouthand nose, petechial hemorrhaging of eyes;
    (8) Factual conclusions of DNA fingerprinting and injury results listed; and
    (9) Death certificate showing all indications andlegal basis.
    Because applicant has demonstrated that, but for a reasonable probability, he would not
    havebeen convicted of murderundereitheran cumulative error doctrine, and/ora structural error
    all the same, ifproven true, the exculpatory results had been obtained through discovery or
    further inquiry and additional testing necessary to the essential element tothe crime, the Court
    should find that pursuant to Art. 64.04, the Movant "isentitled" todiscovery when considered
    with the record in this case that would promote an imperative fundamental principle in comity,
    and finality in the interests ofjustice required, e.g. Smith v. State, 
    165 S.W.3d 36HTex
    .Crim.App.2005).
    Accordingly, Movant need not prove his actual innocence (a principle under habeas law)
    in order to meet his burden to have the testing done. He need only show that the evidence
    requested may be re-evaluated and/or tested with [new]er testing techniques. Vernon's
    Ann.Tex.CCP. art 64.01(b)(1)(A),(B).
    With premises considered, this Court has jurisdiction under Senate Bill 3, and may make
    the appropriate rendering in favor of such request when applicant, Timothy Scott Harriman, is in
    fact indigent and unable to compensate such expenses, with respect to his present conviction of
    murder in the first degree. In Re Rosers. 
    53 S.W.3d 778
    (Tex.App. - 2 Dist. 2001).
    Respectfully submitted,
    (Signatureof Applicant/Pro Se)
    Timothy Scott Harriman, 677187
    1391 FM 338, Beto Unit
    Tennessee Colony, Texas 75880
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify hat a true and correct copy of the aforegoing motion has been served
    upon the DistrictClerk: Gary Fitzsimmons, 133 N. RiverfrontBlvd., LB-12, Dallas,Texas
    75297; to be processed and transmitted to all parry's of interest, by placing this document, with
    affidavit annexed, in the United States mail, via prison mail system effective: August 10,2012.
    cott Harriman, 677187
    tfL K):39
    ,^'s*
    AFFIDAVIT
    TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN                   §
    V.                                       §
    STATE OF TEXAS
    County of Dallas
    I, TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN, being of sound mind and being over the age of
    eighteen, herein, make the following statementof facts that are true and correct, and are based
    upon personal knowledge of the same, am competent to make the following affidavit:
    On the night of September 16, 1993,1 was already under the influence of alcohol and
    drugs due to the stateof depression, during the past here years, I had been experiencing what is
    called black-outs, however, at the time, I didn't even know the symptomsor terminology. On this
    particular night in question, I had experienced this precise symptom, which resulted in poor
    decision making nonetheless.
    When I woke the following morning, I discovered George (the alleged victim) lying on
    the floor covered in his sheet,as he had done prior during sleep. I called his name because it was
    time to go towork. However, he did not respond; although, I noticed his toes moving as ifhe
    were jut ignoring me. After several attempts to get his attention, I arose toheck on him. When I
    touched his shoulder, I noticed thecoldness of his skin, which coincidently, brought a rush of
    shock and fear, mainly due towhat the circumstances entailed, (several people being with him
    doing drugs that I was not aware of...) and my past paranoia and negativity.
    Nonetheless, I failed to make the appropriate decision and call police altering what I
    discovered, which brings forth unreasonable decisions forthwith. Admittedly, upon being arrested
    and placed in custodial interrogation(s), Ireasonably still desired to help or aide police in their
    investigations, possibly finding out what truly happened to George. However, applying hindsight,
    I have discovered this as clearly not the case here.
    Although, the record will indicate that I gave an affidavit in my on hand-writing, that
    wasn't sufficient for a conviction, mainly because of how George was found. Thus, I was
    subjected to agree to "what if or "how do you think it might have happened" hypothesis, which
    has resulted in incredible and uncorroborated events that cannot be reasoned under scientific
    explanation(s). Since I could not recall specific events of the night in question, police took a
    vindictive turn, and reasoned that I was holding something back. Nevertheless, this statement was
    taken in violation of State statute code being without the administrative protection of the very
    letter of Art. 38.22.
    Further, my counsel solely relied upon the prosecutions file and brief discussions with
    myself, indicating only a formality, knowing the circumstances after the fact are not, and cannot
    constitute murder as alleged. Consequently, only hours before trial ended in guilt phase, my
    counsel asked me if I "would like for her to compel an expert to attest to the fact that if someone
    strangled or asphyxiated, they would know this beyond a reasonable doubt, and to bring in court
    documents establishing such," to which I agreed, yet I wondered why she had not already
    prepared for this essential information in which to aide the jury in their determinations.
    Nonetheless, counsel came back with absolutely nothing, nor an explanation as to why
    she came back empty handed and then insisted for me to take the stand when it was contrary to
    my position during trial.
    To the contrary, prosecution did not aide the jury nor did my counsel. Specifically,the
    probate force and essential element to the crime was withheld from the jury along with myself not
    made known of the facts to which I now request. The forensic testing is imperative to all in the
    interests ofjustice so required.
    I, TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN, being presently incarcerated at Beto Unit, TDCJ-ID,
    declare under penalty of perjury thatthe facts stated herein, aretrueandcorrect and are based
    upon personal knowledge of the same.
    jjj**,'^-        ,         _
    TimothjssSeott Harriman, 677187
    APPENDIX
    17
    AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed May 4, 2015.
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    ifftftfj district of utexas at Dallas
    No. 05-13-01547-CR
    TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. F94-01553-ML
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Francis, Evans, and Stoddart
    Opinion by Justice Evans
    Timothy Scott Harriman appeals from the trial court's denial of his post-conviction
    motion for DNA testing. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his
    motion because he met his burden to show the statutory prerequisites for testing. We affirm the
    trial court's order.
    Factual Background
    Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty-four years' confinement. We
    affirmed the conviction in Harriman v. State, No. 05-94-00905-CR, 
    1995 WL 635032
    (Tex.
    App.—Dallas Oct. 12, 1995, no pet.).        The evidence presented at trial included a signed
    voluntary statement by appellant.     According to appellant's statement, on the evening of
    September 16, 1993, he and his roommate, George Vanlandingham, were in their apartment
    along with several neighbors. Vanlandingham purchased cocaine from a neighbor named Carlos
    as well as beer for the group. Appellant stated he became angry with Vanlandingham for
    spending money on beer and cocaine because he owed appellant $100 in rent. Appellant left the
    apartment and, when he returned, Vanlandingham was alone.                 Appellant said he and
    Vanlandingham began to argue about the rent money and appellant grabbed him by the throat
    and squeezed until Vanlandingham "went limp and fell to the ground." Appellant stated he
    thought Vanlandingham was only unconscious because he felt a pulse, so he moved
    Vanlandingham to the area of the apartment where he slept and covered him with a sheet.
    The following morning, appellant realized Vanlandingham was dead. Appellant did not
    call the police because he was afraid they would think he intended to kill Vanlandingham.
    Instead, he wrapped the body in a sheet and put him in a closet. The next day, appellant left to
    stay at a friend's. Vanlandingham's body was discovered two days later by an apartment
    complex maintenance worker.            Appellant was indicted and convicted for causing
    Vanlandingham's death by strangling him.
    On August 15, 2012, appellant filed a motion for post-conviction DNA testing pursuant
    to chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The State responded that it had retained
    two pieces of biological evidence in the case but argued the request for testing should be denied
    because the identity of the person who committed the offense was not at issue in the case and the
    results could not prove appellant's innocence. The trial court denied appellant's motion without
    a hearing finding that identity was not an issue and there was no showing that appellant would
    not have been convicted even if DNA testing had shown the biological material did not belong to
    him. Appellant now brings this appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion.
    -2-
    Analysis
    Chapter 64 of the code of criminal procedure governs a convicted person's request for
    post-conviction forensic DNA testing and contains multiple threshold requirements that must be
    met before a movant is entitled to such testing. Appellant bears the burden of meeting all
    statutory predicates. See Routier v. State, 
    273 S.W.3d 241
    , 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). When a
    trial court rules on a motion for DNA testing without conducting a hearing, we review the court's
    ruling de novo. See Smith v. State, 
    165 S.W.3d 361
    , 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We must
    assume for purposes of our review that the results of the DNA testing would be favorable to
    appellant. See 
    Routier, 273 S.W.3d at 257
    .
    Among the requirements for testing under Chapter 64, a movant must show that identity
    was an issue in the case. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2014)
    Appellant contends identity was an issue here because he testified at trial that Vanlandingham
    still had a pulse after he choked him and many other people had access to the apartment and the
    victim on the date of the offense. Appellant was indicted and convicted, however, on the basis
    that his admitted strangling of Vanlandingham was the cause of death. Although appellant
    disputed that his actions killed Vanlandingham, there was no evidence presented at trial of any
    other potential cause of death. Because appellant admitted to the conduct the jury concluded
    caused Vanlandingham's death, identity was not an issue in the case.
    A second requirement for testing is that the movant must show by a preponderance of the
    evidence that he would not have been convicted if the DNA testing had revealed exculpatory
    results. 
    Id. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A).
    This showing is not made if the exculpatory test results would
    "merely muddy the waters." Rivera v. State, 
    89 S.W.3d 55
    , 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
    Appellant argues that, if a third person's DNA were found on Vanlandingham, this would
    support his defensive theory that another person, such as Carlos, was responsible for the murder.
    The biological evidence available for testing in this case was a "head hair" and "hairs from
    hands." The evidence was undisputed that numerous people, including Carlos, were with
    Vanlandingham shortly before he was killed.          Accordingly, even if the hairs found on
    Vanlandingham belonged to someone else, this fact would neither prove that person's guilt nor
    disprove appellant's. See Bell v. State, 
    90 S.W.3d 301
    , 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc)
    (presence of another person's DNA at crime scene will not, without more, constitute affirmative
    evidence of movant's innocence). Again, appellant admitted to the conduct the jury concluded
    caused Vanlandingham's death. At best, the requested DNA evidence would only "muddy the
    waters." The trial court did not err in concluding that DNA testing was not required.
    We overrule appellant's sole issue and affirm the trial court's order.
    DAVID EVANS
    Do Not Publish                                     JUSTICE
    Tex. R. App. P. 47
    131547F.U05
    (Eourt of Appeals
    ifltftl? Wxstvxtt of utexas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN,                            On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
    Appellant                                          No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. F94-01553-ML.
    No. 05-13-01547-CR        V.                       Opinion delivered by Justice Evans. Justices
    Francis and Stoddart participating.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the order of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered this 4th day of May, 2015.