Lancaster, Charles Christopher ( 2015 )

59,0)7@'0?
June 81 2015
The District Clerk of Williamson County
Lisa David
P.O. Box 24
Georgetown, Texas 78627
RE: Ex parte Charles Christopher Lancaster
cause no . 9§5\1~»~.1@;¢'1\®:-»1<§2&7315'?1& m R__ 561 gaj(d_©"]
_ J
Dear Clerk,
Please find enclosed for filing in the above styled and
numbered cause, the Applicant's Objections to: Trial Court
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Please bring this to the
attention of the Honorable Stacey Mathews, the Presiding Judge in
the 277th Judicial District Court of Williams County, Texas.
Please include the enclosed documents with the Record in the
habeas record forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals. If the
record has already been forwarded in the instant case, please
'forward a supplemental record for consideration in said Honorable
Court. The enclosed objections demonstrate continuing
incarceration on the instant sentence until June 28, 2015. I
though it prudent to alert the Court as to it‘s erroneous
judgements in the instant case.
Further, would you please bring this to the attention of the
Honorable John C. Prezas, A.D.A. .
By copy of this letter I serve a copy to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals at Austin, Texas. This to ensure the facts of
the case are heard.
RECE|VED lN
Charles Christopher Lancaster COURTOFCR'M'NALAF’PEALS
TDCJ-ID # 1256143
Eastham State Farm - JUN 2220%
2665 Prison Road # l
Lovelady, Texas 75851
Abe!Acosta,Clerk
cc/ filed»``~l______``_``_``_
@he;$eras Court of Crimfn§l:&pp§§f§
P.S. Please file mark date stamp the enclosed copy of this letter
and return to me in the S.A.S.E. provided for your convenience.
kANL=SESUWQrfiB
Couse No. 95-0&0-K277A
Ex parte v § IN THE 277th JunchAL
mmmmmmmmmm§ nmmmMmF
“Ppl‘°““t § wlLLIAMsoN couNTv, TExAs
APPLICANT'S OBJECTION§ TO:
TRIAL COURT_FLHQING OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS'OF LAW
10 THE H0N0RABLE JUDGE oF sAIn couRT:
COMES NCW, Charles Christopher Lancaster, “Applicant" and
objects to the Trial Court's erroneous finding of fact and
conclusions of law entered on May 22, 2015, in the above-styled
and numbered cause, and would respectfully show this Honorable
Court the following:
I.
This Honorable Court after reviewing the pleadings of the
Applicant, and the State, entered several erroneous Findings of
Fact, and Factual Findings within the Conclusions of Law. These
Findings are not supported by the record in this case, and are
based upon the State's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law' which do not properly reflect the factual and legal
precepts of the instant case.
The Applicant at this time notifies this Honorable Court of
these erroneous Findings contained within it‘s Order issued on
May 22, 2015, and respectfully request this Honorable Court
reevaluate his pleadings, and reform the Order to speak the truth
in all instances.
II.
§RRON§OUS FINDlNGS OF FACT
This Honorable Court entered Nine (9) Findings of Fact under
page l
'\
paragraph ”III. FINDINGS OF FACT". The Applicant demonstrates the
following findings of fact are factually incorrect.
At Finding of Fact 4. the Court found:
4. This Court observes that Applicant's sentence in this
case has since expired.
The Finding of Fact at "4.“ is factually incorrect, as the
following factual events occurred to prevent the sentence from
expiring on December 31, 2014:
On July 5, 2001, the Applicant made parole and was released
from the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice -
Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID). At this point the earning of
time on the instant sentence ceased to accrue. The sentence did
not begin to accrue time again until January 7, 2002, when the
Texas Board of Pardons and Parole issued a "Blue warrant" to
revoke said parole. Therefore, the Applicant’s sentence was
extended approximately Eive (5) months and twenty three (23)
days.
The Applicant has made a request to the TDCJ-ID‘s Official
responsible for said information, and discovered that the Maximum
expiration date in the instant case is in actuality June 23,
2015. Thus, the Court's finding on May 22, 2015, is incorrect.
Less there be any doubt as to this factual issue, the Applicant
has attached an Original Inmate Request Form (1-60) to the
Application at Exhibit - Al,_ demonstrating the official
expiration date as of record with TDCJ-ID.
Next, at Finding of Fact 5. the Court found:
5. Applicant does not plead nor prove any confinement
resulting from his conviction. .
Page 2
The Finding of Fact at "5.,“ is incorrect as, it is not
necessary for the Applicant to plead or prove confinement on an
active case. As demonstrated above concerning finding "4." the
maximum expiration date of the instant sentence is June 23, 2015.
At the time of signing of the instant Finding of Fact and
Conclusions of Law by the Court on May 22, 2015, there was an
entire month remaining on the sentence and five months remaining
upon the filing of the Application for writ of Habeas Corpus on
February 25, 2015. Therefore, factually the Applicant on February
25, 2015, was still under judgement and the instant case are
subject to jurisdiction under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
art. 11.07 § 3.
But, less there be any doubt, on or about May 23, 2003, the
Applicant received an order in cause no. 02-275-K277, to run the
case "CONSECUTIVELY [stacked] to cause no. 95-039-K277 and
95-040-K277, the defendant's parole revocation cases." (See,
Exhibit - Bl) As such, cause no. 02-275-K277 has not earned a
single day credit since May 23, 2003, and had only accrued 509
days prior to the judgement. Thereby, directly demonstrating
continuing confinement as a result of the instant conviction. As
minus the instant case, the Applicant would have all but
completed cause no. 02-275-K277. However, the stacked sentence
has prevented the Applicant from earning time in cause no.
02-275-K277, as a direct result of the instant cases.
Next, the Finding of Fact at 8. the Court found:
8. There is no evidence before this Court that the State in
this case at any point failed to disclose any evidence to
Applicant, or that the State was previously aware of the
claims only now presented by Applicant.
Page 3
The Finding of Fact at "8." is in direct contention with the
affidavits filed by the victim in the instant case. The Applicant
directs the Court to the multiple affidavit‘s -- four in each
case -- demonstrating the knowledge of the prosecution in the
instant cases concerning the actual innocence of the Applicant.
Therefore, there can be no doubt that this Finding of Facts is
erroneous, as the Court has sufficient evidence in the instant
case demonstrating Applicant's actual innocence of the crime
alleged in the indictments.
Next, at Finding of Fact 9. the Court found:
9. Applicant is currently incarcerated in TDCJ under a life
sentence, as a result of one of his five felony
convictions subsequent to his plea in this case.
The Finding of Fact at "9." is incorrect in it‘s factual
recitation concerning the alleged "five felony convictions
subsequent to his plea in this case." It is true, the Applicant
is currently incarcerated in TDCJ under a life sentence, however,
this is not as a result of this felony conviction, nor is the
life sentence challenged within this claim. Further, one of the
five subsequent convictions, is in actuality prior to the instant
cases.
In cause no. 7730, from the let Judicial District Court of
Bastrop County, Texas, the Applicant was sentenced to nine (9)
years in TDCJ-ID. Although the judgement in cause no. 7730 was
signed on May 30, 1995, -_ a mere 81 days after the plea in the
instant cases -- the Applicant was given credit for 334 days
served in the case, and only 103 days in the instant case. cf.
Finding of Fact at 3. As a result, cause No. 7730 -- committed on
or about January 30, 1992 -- is in actuality a prior conviction
Page 4
to the instant case, not a subsequent conviction as it predates
the instant cases by 231 days. (cf. Finding of fact at 3.;
Exhibit - Cl) This issue will be further discussed below at
Conclusions of Law no. 26. incorporated by reference herein.
III.
§RRON§GUS FINDING OF FACT CONTAL§§D WlTHIN
``CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court has made several Findings of Fact within the
Conclusions of Law portion of the Order in the instant cases-
Beginning at, Conclusions of Law 14. the Court found:
14. While Applicant claims that he could not have filed this
Application previously because the victim resided in
Arizona until just recently, it is clear from the face
of the submitted affidavits that the notary public which
witnessed them was from Maricopa County, Arizona.
Clearly, Applicant could have contacted the victims and
obtained the affidavits at any time in the last two
decades.
This is a bare assertion unsupported by the factual record,
and a mere bare assertion of the Court. The Applicant plainly
stated within his Application:
“It is further noted that the Applicant was unable to obtain
the Sworn Affidavit in this case until January 201 2015, as
the alleged victim was in Arizona. However, the alleged
victim is residing in Texas, in Williamson County, and is
available for any evidentiary hearing required in this
case, should it be deemed necessary." Id. at Ground One
(emphasis added)
The denotative substance of the Applicant's statements are
clear: the alleged victim was in Arizona, hence the Maricopa
County, Arizona, notary public witness. The Applicant never
stated that the alleged victim ever lived in Arizona, nor that
she in some way had moved back to ‘Iexas. The victim in the
instant case has since executed two sworn affidavits in Texas, at
Page 5
the Williamson County Courthouse itself, thereby, excluding any
doubts as to the authenticity of the Sworn Affidavits.
However, there is one glaringly clear problem with the
Conclusion of Law Finding of Fact at 14., that is the statement:
"Clearly, Applicant could have contacted the victims and obtained
the affidavits at any time in the last two decades." Id. This is
a violation of TDCJ-ID Administrative Directive- 04.82, which
prohibits contact with a ‘victim or a victim's family without
consent of TDCJ's Victim Services Division. Further, as proposed
by the Court such contact by the Applicant would be a Felony of
the Third Degree. Tex.Pen. Code § 38.lll(d); Furthermore, this
would include "either directly or through a third party, a victim
of the offense or a member of the victim's family...” Id. See
also, Tex.Gov‘t Code § 498.0042. Had the Applicant contacted the
victim in the instant case any time within the past two decades,
he would have been subject to a Third Degree Felony with a two to
ten (2 - lO) year penalty, however, this would have been subject
to enhancement rules under Tex.Pen. Code § 12.42, and as the
indictment already contained a single enhancement paragraph,
would have accrued a second paragraph, placing the Applicant at
jeopardy of another life sentence.
No Court should require an Applicant to provide evidence
fron\ a source which requires him to face significant further
penalties to obtain. Therefore, the reasoning of the Court is
flawed, and clearly the Applicant could not have contacted the
victims and obtained the affidavits at any time in the last two
Page 6
decades, without facing possible punitive measures, including
loss of all good time accrued, and enhanced felony charges in the
instant case.
Next, at Conclusions of Law 15. & 16. the Court found:
15. Specifically Applicant has proved no reason why he only
now has filed an affidavit from his own mother alleging
that he was, at the time, living at the home which was
burglarized.
16. This Court concludes that the Applicant has not provided
any real reasons for the significant delay in presenting
this application.
For the reasons outlined supra, at 14. the Applicant
demonstrated plainly the reasons for the delay. As the Applicant
cannot force a victim to contact him, nor execute an affidavit.
The affidvaits of the victim demonstrates two things. l) The the
Applicant was a resident of the home at the time of the alleged
burglary,, the value of the property taken was only equilizant to
a misdeameanor, and 2) the victim has recanted the original
report to reflect a true statement as to value. Either of these
reasons standing alone or together are adequate to warrant
relief. The laws of the State of Texas, and implemented Rules of
TDCJ-ID, shown above provide adequate preventative measures
implemented by' the State itself to discourage contact by the
Applicant of his victims. (See, 14. supra, cincorporated by
reference herein.) The Court's Finding of Fact under Conclusions
of Law 15. & 16. are in direct conflict with the facts of the
case, and the laws of the State of Texas, and rules and
regulations of TDCJ-ID at AD-O4.82.
Page 7
Next, at Conclusion of Law 17., 18., & 19. the Court found:
17. Applicant's twenty year delay in filing this application
significantly prejudiced the State to meaningfully
respond to the factual basis claimed.
18. Even though the State need not show a particularized
prejudice, it is prejudiced by faded memories of law
enforcement and the victims, by the diminished
availability of witnesses, and by the lack of physical
evidence from twenty years ago.
19. Therefore, this application for writ of habeas corpus is
barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.
These three Factual Findings contained within the
Conclusions of Law portion of the Order in the instant case all
revolve around a single precept: That the State claims prejudice
as a result of the delay in filing. However, this is far from the
truth.
First, the State offers no legitimate reason for any alleged
prejudice. The State claimed within the State's Reply in the
instant case -at p. 4, that: "However, the State anticipates
affidavits or other evidence will show that when law enforcement
responded..." (95-039-K277A, State's Reply at p. 4, concerning
availability of detectives in the instant case.)- Thus, the
State has the police reports, and officers in the instant case
available, and no prejudice is shown. Next, the victim in the
instant case is quite adamant about the innocence of the
Applicant, and executed four (4) sworn affidavits, and displayed
an increasing willingness to testify on his behalf. Thus, there
can be no prejudice as to memories, or availability in either
case. As far as lack of physical evidence, the State has all the
police reports, witness statements, and pawn receipts available
Page 8
to demonstrate it‘s case. However, quite simply, the State after
review was unable to prove up it‘s points of contentionl and made
no attempt to do so once it realized the Applicant's grounds were
valid.
Thus, as the Order of the Court on these three contentions
centers around the State's contentions, which are unproven and
unfounded, the issues concerning laches is moot.
Therefore, in the instant case, the application for writ of
habeas corpus is not barred by the equitable doctrine of laches,
as all the evidence available in 1995, is readily available.
Next, under (confinement) Conclusions of Law 20., 24., 25./
26. & 27. the Court found:
20. Even if not barred by Laches, Applicant has failed to
prove ‘that he is suffering any confinement resulting
from this conviction, a fact necessary to establish
jurisdiction.
24. In this case, Applicant's 20 year sentence in this
matter has expired, and Applicant has not alleged any
further confinement resulting from his conviction.
Therefore, this Court concludes that Applicant is not
being physically confined as a result of this
conviction.
25. Further, Applicant has not alleged that he is suffering
fron\ any collateral consequences as a result of his
conviction.
26. Even beyond what is alleged, this Court observes that
Applicant is currently serving a life sentence in TDCJ
on one of his felony conviction which arose after his
conviction in this case. However, even if this instant
conviction were used to enhance of habitualize Applicant
in any of his subsequent cases, it would not be the only
case capable of doing so, as Applicant has been
convicted of five other felonies, and any one or two of
those would have been sufficient regardless of his
instant conviction in this case.
27. Lacking a showing of either actual confinement or
continuing collateral consequences, this Court concludes
that this application in its entirety should be
dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.
Page 9
As stated above in reference to the Finding of Fact nos. 4.
& 5., the Applicant as of date is currently serving time on the
instant cases until the maximum expiration date of J§ne 23, 2015.
Thus, establishing jurisdiction under statute, "Confinement means
confinement for any offense or any collateral consequences
resulting from the conviction that is the basis of the instant
habeas corpus.“ Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. ll.07 § 3(c). Thus,
the Applicant need not have plead any additional jurisdiction in
the instant case as the sentence as of May 22, 2015, had not
expired as alleged in the Court's Finding of Fact, and
Conclusions of Law.
Furthermore, there is a collateral consequence in the
instant case, as demonstrated above, cause no. 02-275-K277, was
"stacked" on top of the instant cases, thereby, demonstrating
that there is indeed 4a collateral consequence to the instant
cases. The Applicant has not earned a single day in cause no.
02-275-K277 as a result of the instant convictions. (See, Exhibit
_ Bl) Therefore, the Applicant, though not required to,
demonstrates both continued jurisdiction though his active ¢- not
fully served ~- cases, and the collateral consequences of the
stacked fifteen year sentence in cause no. 02-275-K277.
Thus, Sections 24., 25., 26. & 27., are unfounded and
clearly erroneous in their factual analysis compared to the law.
The Applicant was as of May 22, 2015, currently confined in the
instant cases, and continues to suffer collateral consequences
for the next thirteen and a half (13%) years as a result of the
stacking order in cause no. 02-275-K277.
Page 10
The Court observed in No. 24. that "any one or two of those
would have been sufficient..." Id. regarding enhancement
purposes. However, minus benefit of cause no. 94-039-K277, and
95-040-K277, no prior or subsequent enhancement and/or
habitualization as a result of Applicant's prior convictions,
would have resulted in the life sentence in cause No. 10,208,
from the 21st Judicial District Court of Bastrop Conty, Texas, as
the enhancement would have been only a single paragraph, not two
paragraphs for enhancement purposes.
IV.
FAI|=URE TO ADDRESS THE MERITS OF CLAIMS
In the instant case, the District Court wholly failed to
make any decision as to the effectiveness of counsel. Therefore,
the Applicant reasserts his claims at this time, and respectfully
request a further finding on this matter.
Furthermore, the Applicant properly filed an amended
Application on or about May 18, 2015, which contained the Ground
Four: Actual Innocence, and Newly Discovered Evidence in the
instant cases. This Honorable Court has failed to properly
address these claims as well. The operative substance of these
claims were contained within the original application, and
responded to by the State. Further, additional evidence was
brought to light after the filing of the original application
which necessitated the filing of the amended application. These
additional facts, demonstrated the State's complicity and
egregious conduct in the original cases, and filing in this case,
both in 1995, and 2015.
Page ll
Therefore, the Applicant respectfully request further
findings of fact and conclusions of law to properly address the
merits of all the Applicant's claims.
V.
QQNQL!§lQN
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Applicant, Objects most
ardently to the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
instant cases as clearly erroneous, as demonstrated by the
record, and Applicant moves for this Honorable Court to adopt the
Applicant's Proposed Finding of fact and Conclusions of Law.
Therefore, the Applicant respectfully request either the
Court of Criminal Appeals, remand the case back to the trial
court for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, hold
an evidentiary hearing, or GRANT the Application for Writ of
Habeas Corpus as a result thereof, as the Applicant has
significantly prevailed in the instant cases.
Respectfully submitted,
%%
arlés’Christopher Lancaster
TDCJ-ID # 1256143
Eastham State Farm
2665 Prison Road # l
Lovelady, Texas
Executed on this the Sth day of June, 2015.
Poge 12
UNSWORN DECLARAT ION
I, Charles Christopher Lancaster, declare (or certify, verify, or
state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct.
28 U.S.C. § 1746
Executed on this the 8th day of June, 2015.
%NarlesLCEristopher Lancaster
TDCJ-ID # 1256143
Eastham State Farm
2665 Prison Road # l
Lovelady, Texas 75851
Page 13
BXBIBIT - Al
TDCJ-ID OFFICIAL RESPONSB AS TQ MAXIHUH DATB
JUNE 230 2015
SUBJECT:_. State briefly the problem on which you desire assistance
I have two habeas corpus' pending in the Court cf Criminal Appaals, and need to
verify whether or not the following cases have ceased to operata?"
1: Cauee No. 95- 039- K277, williamson County, Texas 20 years TDCJ- ID;
fr cause No§ 95- UAU- K277, williamson County, Texas 20 years TDBJ- I_D;
l need to know whether these cases are still active, and if so when do they
cease to operate? ;" `` ' ' » ' /
Thank you for your aaaistance;
Name; charles Christopher Lancaster NO; 12561&3 `` n dohm Eastham
megcwanms 3 norm °~59!Bunk l -W@m/D¢@nmem:Garment'Factory
DISP'OSIT|ON: (|nmate Wil| not Write in this:space)
Yes, as of date both cases are active.
vIn both cases the max date is 6- 23- 201
K:‘ (¢%rb/‘
i§I-SO (Rev. 11-90)
{,l
BXBIBIT - Bl
CAUSB NO~ 02-275-K277
277th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 0F WILLIAHSOH COUNTY¢ TBXAS
ORDER STACKING SBNTBHCB ON;
95-039-¢277 & 95-040-£277
AND INDICTHENT IN SAID CAUSB
ll
_"`` 44``.\``;_\ ``
.r';.~
,~5 Counts l '~I'heft v n Penal Y§§
Count 2: Unauthorlzed Use of a Penal c desec 31
' Yehlcle
<'\t
r'g
l",
- L- _-\»\B
CountsJ: Theft v ' . Penal code sec. w
Indictrnent in the 277th Judicial District
Court of Williamson County, Texas . STATE_, _OF T.EXA_S_ .. 1
No.€``H " 375 1137/7 V.
t sm; Txo3972529 CHARi_Es CHRlsToPHER
LANcAsTER
ii\l "l``HE NAME AND BY AUTHOR|TY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
The Grand Jury for the January 2002 tenn of the 277th Judicial District Court of
Williamson County, Texas, having been duly selected, empaneled, sworn, charged and
organized, presents that before the presentment of this indictment
qunt Og_e_
on or about the 29th day of December, 2001, in the County of Williamson and St``ate of Texas,
Charles Christopher Lancaster, hereinafter "defendant",
acquired cr otherwise exercised control over property, namely; a truck, which had a value of
$1,500 or more, without the eH``ective consent of Tainara Ful]er, the owner, and with intent to
deprive the owner of the property,
un Two 4
The Grand Jury further presents that on or about the 29th day of December, 2001, in the County
of Williamson and State ofTexas, Charles Christopher Lancaster, hereinafter “defendant”,
intentionally or knowingly operated a motor-propelled vehicle, namely, a truck, owned by
Tamara Fuller, without the effective consent of the owner,
§Qunt_'l.lir_ee
. The Grand Jury further presents that on or about the lst day of December; 2001, in the County of
Williarnson and State of Texas, Charles Christopher Lancaster, hereinafter “defendant”,
acquired or otherwise exercised control over property, namely, tools and a television, which had
a value of $l,500 or more, without,the effective consent of Carl Deike, the owner, and with
intent to deprive the owner of the _property~. w ll_ED
. SYM' 'r|nr‘lr__ _(2_$
MAR 42 8 2002 _
' , ' w ``
omaha C!cik, llllamson Cn.. Tx - \
E)rri;n erLiAMSON cormr\~', rr-:xAs
LANCASTER
MOTlON TO CUMULATE SENTENCE '
To THE HoNoRABLE JUDGE or sAir) Couar; '
COMES NOW THE STATE OF TEXAS, by and through her Assistant District
Attorney. lane Starnes, and moves the Court to cumulate the sentence assessed in the
above cause number with the sentences in cause numbers 95-039-K277 and 95-040-l<277
and as grounds therefore shows the following
l.
The defendant was sentenced to 20 years 'I'DCJ-ID in cause numbers 95-039-K277
(Burglary of a l-labitation) and 95-040-K277 (Thet``t) on or about April 10, l995. Those
two sentences ran concurrently l-le was paroled on those cases in July. 200\. Det``endant
was on parole in those cases when cause number 02-275-K277 was committed, and a
vmotion to-revolunn ``eruAMsoN cou:\‘rY, texas
LANcAstisR »
oRnER
l
After hearing evidence on the State’s Motion to Cumulate Sentence. the Court hereby
orders that the sentence in cause number 02-275-K277 run
\/ coNsEcUri\/ELY
coNcuRRENTLY .
to cause number 95~039-K277 and 95-040-1(277._ the defendant’s parole revocation cases
s/_ § xeu A~oeazsou
Presiding Judge, 277th Judicial District Court
Williamson County, Texas
§}¢}/\MA 5/13/03
'A
EXHIBIT - Cl
CAUSB NQ~ 7730
218t JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BASTROF COUNTY¢ TEXAS
JUDGEHENT¢ PRCBATICN RBVOCATION¢ INDICTMENT
(b
NO.UQ
THE STATE OF TEXAS `` " lN THE 21$T JUD|C|AL D|STRICT
VS " ' COURT OF
CHARLES LANCASTER " BASTROP COUNTY. TEXAS
JUDGEMENT- REVOK|NG PROBATlON
JUDGE PRESID|NG S\§ §§ C\§ § \§L§ é(fDATE OF JUDGEMENT §S§g`` §§ §§ )_ \O\C\S
ATTORNEY FOR STATE. CHARLES D PEN|CK
ArtoRNEY FoR oeFENDANT: ilth Y\G;\\L\CN\X\(\
OFFENSE CONV|CTED OF: Burglary of a Habitation
DEGREE; DATE oFFeNsE coMMirTeD; ~JCL'\\GGS\\ 39 )\C"f``t``l
-DATE OF PROBAT|ON ORDER: June 19, 1992
PARAGRAPH VIOLATED AND GROUNDS FOR REVOCATION: y 21) Defe'i\d__ant failed to remain
incarcerated in Bastrop County Law Enforcement Center until transponed‘tb._$astrop County Restitution
Centef. l "j';! "l.t‘!i' '-.
AS SET OUT lN STATE'S ORlGlNAt PETlTlON TO REVOKE PROBAT|ON
)§_
oRlGlNAL PuNisHMENr Ass``esSED; ‘ ~ ,Ej-``-*"
Ten (10) years Texas Department of C_r_iminal``J,ustiEe/_|nstitutional Division, probated ten (10) years
FiNDiNGS oN use oF neruY;_\_/veAPoN'§ - ``{\@\r\@
T£.\``e_\t\_c\QA.-'\Xq \’_: Z£\\\€\\L€£§
PUN|SHMENT||V|POSED AND PLACE OF CONF|NEMENT __,YO \,\w\€.
°‘\\@ \QY\Q§\®< §§ Qt\\w\\t\tt\ "\\3%‘< \< e; ax\s\;\<\\\m:n§\\im‘
DATEOFSENTENCE'(\{\(_"R\)1 3© \C\C\§C_OSTS; $%"\ §§
TlME CRED``TED Qte(\``\§c Q®t`` 33“-\ C\Ot\t§ SG:t\iQQ\
TOTAL ANlOUNT OF RESTlTUTlON/REPARAT|ON;
CONCURRENT UNLESS OTHERW|SE SPEC|F|ED.
(r) \
_. __ll_\,/_, . 31 Fi_, . ""°‘ _.
1 . 00
No. 725@ _ eoND s_/_Q‘_aaa§___
’THE state or TexAs vs. cHARLns LANCASTER zist nrsretct count
CHARGE: Burglary of Habitation
witness :' cii_Rr s wALKER
IN THE NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF j
"~.’>
THE GRAND JURY, for the county of Bas@°’§;p, of Texas, duly
selected, empaneled, sworn, charged, an_m rga@'ze'- such at the
JANUARY Term A.D. 1992 of the let Jud.-*~ E§§trict Court for said
County, upon their oaths present=,ia.n¢ ~was'id court at said term
that CHARLES LANCASTER hereinafte styla§ De endant, on or about the
30th day of January A,D. 1991¢ ind def»re the presentment of this
indictment, in the County 1 ’ * esaid, did then and there
intentionally, without e consent of THOMAS YOUNG , the
owner thereof, enter a- osi ~th intent to commit THEFT
of the State.
E‘o"REMAN oF THE GRA``ND JURY
cHARLEs L'ANcAs_r_Eg 1 7730 . ’ pAGE TWO
ORDER REVOK|NG PROBAT|ON (FELONY) ~ '
On the 2nd day of September. 1994, the District Attorney of Bastrop County, Texasl nled with the Judge of said
Court a written report. setting out the respects in which the defendant had violated the conditions of probationl to wit:
Defendant violated condition number tuenry- one (21) which was defendant uill remain incarcerated in Bastrop County Law
Enforcement Center until transported to Eastrop County Restitution Center, to- wit: defendant has failed to remain incarcerated
in the Bastrop County Lau Enforcement Center as required.
On the 3£;__§\-`` day of §\( § §§ , WP the defendant appeared in open Court in personl his attorney,
R\``X \\§€»\\``C)c\``;i\\ also being present, and the
State appeared by her District Altorney and the Probation Off\cer of said Court, and after examining said written report and
hearing the evidence offered by both the State and the defendantl the Court is of the opinion that the defendant, Charles
Lancaster violated the terms and conditions of this probation in this respect
Defendant violated condition number tuenty- one (21) which uas defendant will remain incarcerated in Bastrop County Law
Enforcement Center until transported to Bastrop County Restitutior\ Center', to uit: defendant 'has failed to remain incarcerated
in the Bastrop County Lau Enforcement Center as required. '
lt is therefore ORDERED ADJUDGED, and DECREED by the Court that the order suspending the imposition of the
sentence and placing the defendant on probation heretofore entered in this said cause b``e and the same is hereby
revoked and the defendant sentenced to serve §§ §X§§ LQ\\ years in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice/|nstitutional Division and ordered to pay to the Clerk of the District Court ofB §§§tr_og County: $ 5§\(``\ B_L'
restitution; $ " tine; $<_§“"\ “"\.Y court costs; $D\ CC Court appointed attorney fees; asacondition of
parole and the said defendant Charles Lancaster who has been adjudged guilty of the offense of Burglary of a
, Habitation and h_e be taken by the authorized agent of the__ State of T:exas or by the Sheriff of Bastrop County Texas
and by him safely conveyed and delivered to the Director of'said I_e'_xas Department of Criminal Justice/lnstitutional Division
there to be confined in the manner and for the period aforesaid
lt is further the ORDER of this Court that the Defen``dant be given credit for time served in custody as follows:
%\uei\ chr\``\¥ heir 3%\\ done