Entravision Communications Corporation and Marianele Aguirre v. Jesus Everardo Villarreal Salinas ( 2015 )

NUMBER 13-13-00702-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
ENTRAVISION COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
AND MARIANELE AGUIRRE, Appellants,
v.
JESUS EVERARDO VILLARREAL SALINAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 398th District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez1 and Justices Rodriguez and Longoria
Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
This is an interlocutory appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to
the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA or the Act), also known as the Anti-SLAPP
1 Chief Justice Valdez, while hearing the case when it was submitted at oral argument, did not
participate in this opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.1(a).
statute.2 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011 (West, Westlaw through
2015 R.S.). By five issues, which we have reorganized, appellants Entravision
Communications Corporation and Marianele Aguirre3 (collectively Entravision) contend
that the trial court erred: (1–4) in denying their motion to dismiss brought pursuant to the
TCPA; and (5) in not awarding attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses to Entravision when
appellee Jesus Everardo Villarreal Salinas non-suited defendants Entravision-Texas G.P.
LLC (ETGP) and Entravision Holdings, LLC (EH) after the motion to dismiss was filed.4
We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Everardo, the Mayor of Reynosa, Mexico during all relevant times, and Arturo
Villarreal Tijerina, Everardo’s father, 5 filed suit against Entravision, ETGP, and EH,
alleging defamation per se and defamation per quod.6 The basis for the suit arises out
2 “SLAPP” is an acronym for “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.” See In re Estate of
Check, 438 S.W.3d 829, 830 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). This Anti-SLAPP statute permits
defendants targeted by SLAPP suits to move for dismissal if the action relates to the defendant’s exercise
of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 27.003 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.); see also Kinney v. BCG Attorney Search, Inc., No. 03-12-
00579-CV, 2014 WL 1432012, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 11, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g).
3
Jesus Everardo Villarreal Salinas sued Marianele Aguirre as the News Director and Anchor at
KNVO-TV Channel 48.
4 Entravision-Texas G.P. LLC and Entravision Holdings, LLC are not parties to this appeal.
5 Arturo Villarreal Tijerina is not a party to this appeal.
6 Everardo and Arturo amended their petition to include Univision Radio Corporation, Viva
Communications, Inc., Raul Brindis, Univision Radio Houston License Corporation (the Univision
defendants), and Antonio Gallegos Gonzalez as defendants. They asserted that these defendants
published a defaming news story about them. The Univision defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
lawsuit pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). Before the trial court heard this motion to
dismiss, Arturo and Everardo reached a settlement with the Univision defendants, and consistent with the
settlement agreement, the trial court issued an order dismissing the Univision defendants from the lawsuit
with prejudice. Defendant Gonzalez did not file a motion to dismiss and is not a party to this appeal.
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of a statement posted on May 17, 2013 by Entravision on the Facebook page of Noticias
48, a television media outlet.7 The Facebook post, translated from Spanish to English
by a Texas Master Court Interpreter, reads as follows:
Architect Arturo Villarreal, father of the Mayor of Reynosa, Tamps.
Everardo Villarreal Salinas,—according to Unofficial sources—Was
Arrested with a Very Important Sum of Money, here [in] the Rio Grande
Valley, More details at 5:00 o’clock pm. We’ll be waiting for you.[8]
A picture of Arturo and Everardo appeared below the subject post.
Entravision answered, generally denying the claims against it. Entravision also
asserted affirmative and other defenses, including the following: (1) “[t]he statement(s)
at issue are privileged as a reasonable and fair comment on a matter of public concern
published for general information”; (2) the “claims are barred because Plaintiffs are public
7 Everardo complains only of the first May 17th Facebook post that he refers to as the “subject
statement.” We note that the same day Entravision posted a second statement on Facebook, which when
translated from Spanish to English reads as follows:
Strong rumors are going around in the social media about the alleged arrest of Architect
Arturo Villarreal, Father of the Mayor of Reynosa Tamaulipas, Everardo Villarreal Salinas.
The rumors indicate that he was arrested with a Very Important Sum of Money here [in]
the Rio Grande Valley. Noticias 48 is investigating and trying to contact a spokesperson
for the family or the Mayor’s Office in Reynosa, to clarify the facts or deny them, if such is
the case.
The subject post and this second post were deleted from the Facebook page approximately five days later.
And on July 2, 2013, Noticias 48 issued a follow-up statement setting out that “[t]he information contained
in [the May Facebook posts] may not be accurate or valid” and that “[a]lthough Noticias 48 deems that the
Facebook publication of May 17, precisely indicates that there were rumors, Noticias 48 believes now that
no arrest of Arturo Villarreal Tijerina has occurred. Arturo Villarreal Tijerina has also denied that he had
been arrested.”
8 In its appellate reply brief, Entravision set out the following translation for this Facebook post:
Arturo Villarreal, Architect, father of Reynosa Tamaulipas Mayor Everardo Villarreal
Salinas, according to unofficial sources, was detained here in the Rio Grande Valley with
a very large amount of money. More details at 5:00 p.m. sharp. We expect you.
(Emphasis added.) Entravision offers no record cites for this translation or for its accuracy, and we find
none.
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officials or public figures”; and (3) the “claims are barred and subject to dismissal by the
[TCPA] . . . . The purpose of the [TCPA] is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional
rights of persons to speak freely to the maximum extent permitted by law.”
Entravision, ETGP, and EH subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that
(1) the lawsuit fell within the protection of the Anti-SLAPP statute; and (2) Everardo could
not establish a prima facie case for defamation as required by the TCPA. See id. §
27.003. The motion argued that Everardo was not entitled to bring a defamation suit
because the allegedly defamatory statement concerned Everardo’s father and not
Everardo. The motion did not seek to dismiss Arturo’s claim.
After the filing of the motion to dismiss, Everardo and Arturo filed a motion to non-
suit ETGP and EH. The trial court granted that motion and dismissed ETGP and EH with
prejudice.
Everardo then responded to Entravision’s motion to dismiss arguing, in part, the
following:
[t]he obvious reality is that the only sensational and scintillating aspect of
this story is that the person arrested with all that unexplained money is the
father of Reynosa's Mayor, who must have had some illicit role in obtaining
the money. The gist of the story is clear and was clear to its readers. The
gist of the story is false. It is about the Mayor. It is defamatory.
The trial court held a hearing on the merits of the remaining portion of the motion
to dismiss—the portion that concerned Everardo’s claims against Entravision. The trial
court effectively denied the motion to dismiss by operation of law, and Entravision filed
this expedited appeal. See id. § 27.008(a–b).
4
II. THE TCPA
The purpose of the TCPA is “to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights
of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in
government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the
rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” Id. § 27.002. The
TCPA is to “be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose and intent fully,” but it “does
not abrogate or lessen any other defense, remedy, immunity, or privilege available under
other constitutional, statutory, case, or common law or rule provisions.” Id. § 27.011.
The TCPA provides a procedure for the expedited dismissal of “retaliatory lawsuits
that seek to intimidate or silence them on matters of public concern.” In re Lipsky, 460
S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). The Act provides that
[a] two-step process is initiated by motion of a defendant who believes that
the lawsuit responds to the defendant's valid exercise of First Amendment
rights. Under the first step, the burden is initially on the defendant-movant
to show “by a preponderance of the evidence” that the plaintiff's claim “is
based on, relates to, or is in response to the [movant's] exercise of: (1) the
right of free speech; (2) the right to petition; or (3) the right of association.”
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(b). If the movant is able to
demonstrate that the plaintiff's claim implicates one of these rights, the
second step shifts the burden to the plaintiff to “establish[ ] by clear and
specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim
in question.” Id. § 27.005(c).
Id. And even if the nonmovant makes this showing, the trial court must dismiss the case
if the movant “establishes by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element of
a valid defense to the nonmovant’s claim.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 27.005(d). When determining whether to dismiss the legal action, the court must
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consider “the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which
the liability or defense is based.”9 Id. § 27.006(a).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We consider de novo the legal question of whether the movant has established
by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged legal action is covered under the
Act.” Serafine v. Blunt, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, No. 03-12-00726-CV, 2015 WL 3941219,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 26, 2015, no. pet. h.) (op. on reh’g) (citing Rehak Creative
Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716, 725 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet.
denied), disapproved on other grounds by In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 587–88)). “We
also review de novo a trial court's determination of whether a nonmovant has presented
clear and specific evidence establishing a prima facie case for each essential element of
the challenged claims.” Id. (citing Rehak Creative Servs., 404 S.W.3d at 726).
IV. APPLICABILITY OF TCPA—ENTRAVISION’S BURDEN
By its first issue, Entravision contends, as it did in the trial court, that it has satisfied
the first step of the process by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that
Everardo’s claim is “based on, relates to, or is in response to” Entravision’s exercise of
“the right of free speech.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(b). Entravision
asserts that it exercised the right of free speech through the communication—the
Facebook post—it “made in connection with a public concern,” which included, in this
9 A “pleading” is “a document containing the written allegations of fact that each party is required
to communicate to the opponent before trial, so that each will know what contentions must be met by the
evidence.” Garner, Bryan, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 667 (2nd ed. 1995). “Examples of
pleadings are complaints, petitions, counter-claims, and answers.” Id.
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case, issues related to “community well-being; . . . the government; . . . [or] a public
official or public figure.” Id. § 27.001(3), (7); see id. § 27.001(1). In response, Everardo
argues that the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss because Entravision did
not show that the suit related to a matter of public concern. See id. § 27.005(c).
A. Applicable Law
The statute broadly defines “the exercise of the right of free speech” as “a
communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.” Id. § 27.001(3).
The statute defines “communication” as “the making or submitting of a statement or
document in any form or medium, including oral, visual, written, audiovisual, or
electronic.” Id. § 27.001(1). Everardo does not dispute that the subject Facebook post
was a “communication” under the statute. See id. The statute further defines a “matter
of public concern” to include, among other things, issues related to the “environment,
economic, or community well-being” and issues related to “a public official or public
figure.” Id. § 27.001(7)(B & D). Our determination of whether the communication was
about a matter of public concern is dispositive of Entravision’s first issue.
B. Discussion
Entravision’s motion to dismiss alleged that Arturo was a public figure as well as
the father of Everardo and that Everardo was the Mayor of Reynosa, Mexico, at the time.
Entravision also alleged in its motion that
[t]he possibility that authorities had detained someone (in this case, [Arturo],
a former secretary of urban development and public works for Reynosa who
has also been involved in the chamber of commerce and other
organizations in the city) with a large sum of money is certainly a matter of
public concern.
7
To determine whether Everardo’s lawsuit is related to the exercise of free speech
under the broad language of the TCPA, we begin our de novo review by looking at the
pleadings. See id. § 27.006(a), Serafine, 2015 WL 3941219, at *4. In his second
amended original petition, Everardo set out the following background:
Beginning on or after May 17, 2013, Defendants recklessly and
maliciously published false and defamatory statements about Plaintiffs.
Specifically, Defendants published news stories saying that Arturo Villarreal
Tijerina had been detained with a large sum of money by law enforcement
officials in the Rio Grande Valley. . . . Defendants knew that any
reasonable person hearing or seeing these stories would conclude that
Arturo Villarreal Tijerina was a criminal, a drug trafficker, and probably
involved in corrupt and illegal political activity or connected to the Mexican
drug trade. The Defendants’ false and defamatory stories also pointed out
gratuitously and specifically that Arturo Villarreal Tijerina was the father of
The Honorable Jesus Everardo Villarreal Salinas, Mayor of Reynosa,
Mexico. The stories included a photograph of the Mayor and his father
taken in the past. The obvious and intended result was that The Honorable
Jesus Everardo Villarreal Salinas would be defamed and branded by
association as a corrupt and criminal politician or a criminal drug
trafficker. . . . The Mayor was not involved in any criminal activity or corrupt
political conduct.
Through his pleading, Everardo alleged that Entravision’s suggestions of corruption and
criminal drug trafficking, among other things, impacted his position of Mayor, specifically
through the allegedly false statement that his father had a large amount of money in his
possession when he was detained in the Rio Grande Valley. Everardo’s pleading set
out that the communication also pointed out that Arturo was the father of Everardo, the
Mayor of Reynosa; included a photograph of Everardo and his father “taken in the past”;
and asserted that the communication obviously intended to defame Everardo and brand
him as a corrupt politician or a criminal by association. Entravision’s answer also set out,
among other things, that the statement at issue involved public officials or public figures.
8
It described the statement as a comment on a matter of public concern.
Considering the petition and the answer in this case, we conclude that Entravision
made the communication at issue, as set out in the pleadings, in connection with a matter
of public concern—specifically that it implicated concerns of community well-being or that
it involved issues related to a public official or public figure. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 27.001(3), 27.001(7)(B & D). Entravision met its initial burden of showing
that Everardo’s defamation claims were based on, related to, or were in response to
Entravision’s exercise of the right of free speech, such that the TCPA applied to those
claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001(3), 27.001(7)(B & D),
27.005(b)(1); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 586. We sustain Entravision’s first issue to the
extent the trial court denied Entravision’s motion to dismiss on the basis that it failed to
satisfy its burden.
Having determined that Entravision carried its initial burden and established that
its claims are covered by the TCPA, the burden shifted to Everardo to present clear and
specific evidence of a prima facie case for each element of his defamation claims. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(c); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 584.
V. PRIMA FACIE CASE—EVERARDO’S BURDEN
By its second and third issues, Entravision contends that Everardo failed to
establish a prima facie case by clear and specific evidence that the alleged statement
was defamatory per se or per quod, as required by the TCPA. Elements of a defamation
claim include (1) the publication of a false statement, (2) that defamed the plaintiff, (3)
“with the requisite degree of fault[, actual malice if the plaintiff was a public official or
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public figure or negligence if the plaintiff was a private individual], and (4) damages, in
some cases [i.e., defamation per quod].” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (Tex. 2015);
see Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 61 (Tex. 2013).
Among other things, Entravision attacks the second element of Everardo’s
defamation claims by asserting that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss
because the allegedly false statement was not capable of a defamatory meaning as to
Everardo. Entravision claims that the statement was not defamatory in Everardo’s case
because it was not about Everardo. In response, Everardo argues that “an ordinary
person’s perception of the subject statement entailed an inference that [Everardo] was
involved in criminal wrongdoing” and “that this inference arose from a false allegation.”
In other words, Everardo asserts that the Facebook post was defamatory because it
falsely implied that he was involved in a “criminal wrongdoing.”
By this argument, the parties focus on the “gist” of the Facebook post as a whole—
its “‘main point or material part,’” its “‘essence.’” D MagazinePartners v. Rosenthal, ___
S.W.3d ___, ___, No. 05-14-00951-CV, 2015 WL 5156908, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug.
28, 2015, no. pet. h.) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 805 (10th ed. 2014); W EBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 959
(1981)). And while Everardo must establish that the article's “gist” is false and is
defamatory concerning him by clear and specific evidence under the Anti-SLAPP statute,
whether an article is capable of a defamatory meaning is initially a question for the court.
Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 114–15 (Tex. 2000); see Hancock v.
Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Tex. 2013) (“If the statement is not reasonably capable of
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a defamatory meaning, the statement is not defamatory as a matter of law and the claim
fails.”); D MagazinePartners, 2015 WL 5156908, at *5. So we determine this threshold
matter-of-law question before we reach any clear-and-specific evidentiary review. See
Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 114–15; D MagazinePartners, 2015 WL 5156908, at *5.
In construing the Facebook post to determine whether it is capable of a defamatory
meaning, we must construe it as a whole in light of the surrounding circumstances based
upon how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive it. Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 114;
Wheeler v. New Times, Inc., 49 S.W.3d 471, 474 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.); see
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 811 (Tex. 2005) (“[P]ublications alleged to be
defamatory must be viewed as a whole—including accompanying statements, headlines,
pictures, and the general tenor and reputation of the source itself.”). Such a person
exercises care and prudence, but not omniscience, when evaluating allegedly defamatory
communications. New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 157 (Tex. 2004).
B. Discussion
Everardo argues that the “gist” of the post was that he was a corrupt and criminal
politician or a criminal drug trafficker by association with Arturo. Entravision contends
that the Facebook post does not have the defamatory meaning Everardo ascribes to it.
We agree with Entravision.
The subject post only identified Arturo as Everardo’s father, which is undisputedly
a true statement. It then stated that Arturo, not Everardo, “was arrested with a [v]ery
[i]mportant [s]um of [m]oney” in “the Rio Grande Valley.”
Assuming for the purpose of this analysis that the statement about Arturo being
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arrested with a “[v]ery [i]mportant [s]um of [m]oney” was false, we would only conclude
that a person of ordinary intelligence, exercising care and prudence, might perceive it as
a statement concerning Arturo and his activities. 10 The Facebook post directed the
statement to Arturo. It did not expressly comment that Everardo was arrested or that he
had a large sum of money. We cannot conclude that the “gist” of the same post that
contained this allegedly false statement implied that Everardo, as Arturo’s son, personally
engaged in any criminal conduct.
An analysis of the structure of the Facebook post provides the same result. The
article opened with Arturo’s name, not Everardo’s. The first sentence described Arturo
as an architect and then as Everardo’s father. A reference to his son’s political position
perhaps enhanced Arturo’s importance, but the sentence defined Arturo. The article
next described the alleged activities of Arturo, not Everardo. An unlabeled picture of two
unnamed men, an older man—Arturo—and a younger man—Everardo, appeared under
the post. The placement of the photograph below the article arguably emphasized the
father-son relationship, but when viewed with the language of the post we cannot
conclude that it created the impression to a person of ordinary intelligence that Everardo
was involved in criminal wrongdoings. Further, the tone of the article was that of a news
bulletin, focusing on details about Arturo that would draw the reader’s attention to an
upcoming news broadcast.
Construing the article as a whole in light of the surrounding circumstances, we
conclude that a person of ordinary intelligence, exercising care and prudence, but not
10 We offer no opinion as to whether the statement or the “gist” of the Facebook post was
defamatory as to Arturo, who is not a party in this appeal. That matter is not before us.
12
omniscience, would perceive the “gist” of the article as concerning Arturo and his
activities. See Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 114; New Times, 146 S.W.3d at 157; Wheeler, 49
S.W.3d at 474. We do not agree that an ordinary person’s perception of the subject
statement would entail any inference that Everardo was involved in any criminal
wrongdoing with Arturo or that he was a corrupt and criminal politician or a criminal drug
trafficker by association, as Everardo argues.
Based on this analysis, we conclude, as a matter of law, that the “gist” of the
Facebook post is not defamatory because it is not reasonably capable of a defamatory
meaning concerning Everardo. See Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 114–15; see also Hancock,
400 S.W.3d at 66; D MagazinePartners, 2015 WL 5156908, at *5. Because we have
determined that the statement is not defamatory as a matter of law, Everardo cannot
establish a prima facie case for each essential element of his defamation claims. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(c); see also Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 66;
D MagazinePartners, 2015 WL 5156908, at *5. And the trial court erred in denying
Entravision’s motion to dismiss Everardo’s defamation claims. We sustain Entravision’s
second and third issues on this basis.11
C. Fee Shifting Provision
By its fifth issue, Entravision contends that Everardo invoked the mandatory fee
shifting provision of the statute when he dismissed ETGP and EH after the motion to
dismiss was filed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.009(a) (providing that
11 Having sustained Entravision’s second and third issues, we do not reach Entravision’s fourth
issue that challenges portions of all affidavits filed in support of Everardo’s response because it is not
necessary to the disposition of this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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when a court orders dismissal of a legal action under the TCPA, the court shall award to
the moving party (1) court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other expenses incurred
in defending against the legal action as justice and equity may require and (2) sanctions
against the party who brought the legal action as the court determines sufficient to deter
the party who brought the legal action from bringing similar actions). Entravision asserts
that although it
advised [a]ppellee and Tijerina prior to filing [its] motion (and prior to their
filing suit) that the claims against ETGP and EH could not be sustained
because ETGP and EH had no employees and had no operating activities,
they still brought claims against ETGP and EH and refused to dismiss them
from this lawsuit. Appellee’s actions necessitated the filing of the Anti-
SLAPP Motion for these defendants. Only after [a]ppellant[ ] filed [its] Anti-
SLAPP Motion did [a]ppellee and Tijerina finally dismiss ETGP and EH
from this lawsuit. The last minute withdrawal of such claims does not
insulate [a]ppellee from being liable for [its attorneys’ fees, costs, and
expenses] incurred in preparing the motion.
Although the law is well settled that a defendant's motion to dismiss that may afford
more relief than a nonsuit affords constitutes a claim for affirmative relief that survives a
nonsuit, Entravision did not make this argument to the trial court. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV.
P. 162; CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 390 S.W.3d 299,
300–01 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam); Villafani v. Trejo, 251 S.W.3d 466, 468–69 (Tex. 2008);
Klein v. Dooley, 949 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). Moreover, ETGP and
EH are not parties to this appeal, and Entravision does not claim that it has standing to
complain about this matter on their behalf. We decline to afford Entravision the relief it
seeks based on its non-suit argument. We overrule Entravision’s fifth issue.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court's order and remand for entry of judgment dismissing
Jesus Everardo Villarreal Salinas's claims against Entravision Communications
Corporation and Marianele Aguirre and for a determination of court costs, reasonable
attorney's fees, other expenses, and sanctions, if any, as authorized by statute. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.009(a).
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice
Delivered and filed the 30th
day of September, 2015.
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