Crissy Nicole Guerra v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                            NUMBER 13-15-00068-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
    CRISSY NICOLE GUERRA,                                                     Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                        Appellee.
    On appeal from the 404th District Court
    of Cameron County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Garza, Benavides and Longoria
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
    In August of 2013, appellant Crissy Nicole Guerra pled no contest to one count of
    intoxication manslaughter, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08
    (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The trial court assessed sentence at ten years’
    imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In November of 2013, the
    trial court granted appellant’s motion for shock probation and placed her on community
    supervision for a period of ten years. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(f)(2)
    (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).
    In November of 2014, the State filed a motion to revoke alleging nine violations of
    the terms and conditions of her supervision. The trial court held a hearing on the State’s
    motion at which appellant admitted to consuming alcohol and not remaining away from
    bars or nightclubs, violations of the conditions of her supervision. At the end of the
    hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion and imposed the original term of ten
    years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. As discussed below,
    appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw accompanied by an
    Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967). We affirm.
    I. ANDERS BRIEF
    Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel
    has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the
    record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See 
    id. Counsel’s brief
    meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation
    demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re
    Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief
    need not specifically advance 'arguable' points of error if counsel finds none, but it must
    provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal
    authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 
    112 S.W.3d 340
    , 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus
    Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
    2
    In compliance with High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    , 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
    Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 
    436 S.W.3d 313
    , 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), appellant’s
    counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error
    in the trial court's judgment.1 Counsel has informed this Court, in writing, that counsel
    has: (1) notified the appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to
    withdraw; (2) informed the appellant of her rights to file a pro se response,2 review the
    record preparatory to filing that response, and seek discretionary review if the Court
    concludes that the appeal is frivolous; and (3) provided appellant with a form motion for
    pro se access to the appellate record, lacking only the appellant’s signature and the date
    and including the mailing address for the court of appeals, with instructions to file the
    motion within ten days. See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; 
    Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319
    ; 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510
    n.3; see also In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409
    n.23. More than an
    adequate time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se motion for access to the
    appellate record or a motion for extension of time to do so. No pro se response was filed,
    and the State has also not filed a brief.
    1 Counsel informed us that he specifically considered whether: (1) sufficient evidence supported
    the court’s decision to revoke appellant’s supervision; (2) the court’s rulings on any motions could form the
    basis of an arguable issue; (3) the record revealed fundamental error; (4) appellant could mount a viable
    claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984); (5) the
    sentence was within the applicable punishment range; and (6) appellant received credit for all the time she
    previously spent imprisoned. Counsel concluded that none of these issues were meritorious.
    2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with
    the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the
    court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the
    case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
    (quoting Wilson v. State, 
    955 S.W.2d 693
    , 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
    3
    II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
    Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
    proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have
    found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in
    the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for
    reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule
    of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509
    . We have found no reversible
    error in the record. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
    In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for
    permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; see also
    In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408
    n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 
    903 S.W.2d 776
    , 779–80
    (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he
    must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the
    appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the
    appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s
    motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered
    to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise her of
    her right to file a petition for discretionary review. 3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In
    3 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case
    by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, she must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
    review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
    within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
    4
    re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412
    n.35; Ex parte Owens, 
    206 S.W.3d 670
    , 673 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2006).
    NORA L. LONGORIA,
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Delivered and filed the
    19th day of November, 2015.
    for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for
    discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals and should comply with
    the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3, 68.4.
    5