London, Joshua ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                  PD-0480-15
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    Transmitted 8/26/2015 2:23:33 PM
    Accepted 8/26/2015 2:37:22 PM
    August 26, 2015           No. PD-0480-15                                         ABEL ACOSTA
    CLERK
    In the
    Court of Criminal Appeals
    
    No. 01-13-00441-CR
    In the Court of Appeals for the
    Fourteenth District of Texas at Houston
    
    No. 1367861
    In the 260th District Court of
    Harris County, Texas
    
    JOSHUA LONDON
    Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    Appellee
    
    STATE’S BRIEF ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    
    DEVON ANDERSON
    District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    ERIC KUGLER
    Assistant District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    TBC No. 796910
    kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net
    1201 Franklin, Suite 600
    Houston, Texas 77002
    Tel.: 713-755-5826
    FAX: 713-755-5809
    Counsel for Appellee
    ORAL ARGUMENT PERMITTED
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    This Court has permitted oral argument in this case.
    IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
    Counsel for the State:
    Devon Anderson  District Attorney of Harris County
    Eric Kugler  Assistant District Attorney on appeal
    Chris Morton  Assistant District Attorney at trial
    Appellant or criminal defendant:
    Joshua London
    Counsel for Appellant:
    Jani Wood  Assistant Public Defender on appeal
    Charles Brown  Counsel at trial
    Trial Judge:
    Hon. Jim Anderson  Presiding Judge (visiting)
    Hon. Brad Hart  Presiding Judge (elected)
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................. 1
    IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES .................................................................... 1
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................... 3
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................... 5
    ISSUE PRESENTED ................................................................................................. 5
    The Court of Appeals determined that the constitutional challenge to the
    Sheriff’s fees could not be raised for the first time on appeal. The basis for the
    challenge was not available to Mr. London until 19 days after the judgment was
    signed. Did the Court of Appeals err in refusing to consider a challenge that was
    only available post-trial, in derogation of Landers v. State? ..................................5
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................................................................... 5
    ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 6
    The appellant did not preserve the issue he raised on appeal because he failed to
    object in the trial court on the same basis and failed to develop a record on how
    the court costs were applied to him. .......................................................................6
    PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 13
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE............................................. 14
    2
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASES
    Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals,
    
    795 S.W.2d 712
    (Tex. 1990) ................................................................................. 11
    Cardenas v. State,
    
    423 S.W.3d 396
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ................................................................8
    Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.,
    
    826 S.W.2d 489
    (Tex. 1992) ................................................................................. 11
    Clark v. State,
    
    305 S.W.3d 351
    (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2010).....................................................................................7
    Curry v. State,
    
    910 S.W.2d 490
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ............................................................7, 8
    Johnson v. State,
    14-14-00475-CR (Tex. App.
    – Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 25, 2015, no pet. h.) .................................................9
    Johnson v. State,
    
    423 S.W.3d 385
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ................................................................8
    Landers v. State,
    10-11-00408-CR, 
    2012 WL 3799212
    (Tex. App.—
    Waco Aug. 30, 2012) ..............................................................................................9
    Landers v. State,
    
    402 S.W.3d 252
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ....................................................9, 11, 12
    London v. State,
    01-13-00441-CR, 
    2015 WL 1778583
    (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 16, 2015, pet. granted) ....................................................5
    Mayer v. State,
    
    309 S.W.3d 552
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ..............................................................10
    3
    Moff v. State,
    
    131 S.W.3d 485
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ................................................................8
    Rylander v. Caldwell,
    
    23 S.W.3d 132
    (Tex. App.—
    Austin 2000, no pet.) ............................................................................................ 11
    State v. Rosseau,
    
    398 S.W.3d 769
    (Tex. App.—
    San Antonio 2011), aff’d,
    
    396 S.W.3d 550
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) .............................................................. 11
    Sturdivant v. State,
    
    445 S.W.3d 435
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) ....................10
    STATUTES
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.011(a)(3) (West 2010) ...........................................7
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.011(b) (West 2010) ................................................8
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 103.008 (West 2010) ..................................................12
    RULES
    TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) ................................................................................................6
    TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A) .....................................................................................7
    TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a) ..............................................................................................12
    4
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS:
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    The appellant was charged with possession of cocaine (CR – 14). He pled
    “guilty” to the charge, and the court sentenced him to 25 years in prison (CR – 77).
    The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. London v. State, 01-13-00441-CR,
    
    2015 WL 1778583
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 16, 2015, pet. granted).
    But this Court granted review.
    ISSUE PRESENTED
    The Court of Appeals determined that the constitutional challenge
    to the Sheriff’s fees could not be raised for the first time on
    appeal. The basis for the challenge was not available to Mr.
    London until 19 days after the judgment was signed. Did
    the Court of Appeals err in refusing to consider a challenge
    that was only available post-trial, in derogation of Landers
    v. State?
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    The appellant challenged on appeal the constitutionality of the court cost
    statutes as applied to him. But he failed to object in the trial court, to file a formal
    bill of exception, or to otherwise take any steps to develop the record on how the
    court cost statutes were actually applied to him. Therefore, he failed to preserve
    the constitutional as-applied claim for appellate review, and the court of appeals
    properly dismissed that claim on that basis.
    5
    ARGUMENT
    The appellant claims that the assessment of court costs for summoning
    witnesses is unconstitutional as applied to him. (App’nt PDR Brf. 7). Specifically,
    he complains that the assessment violated his rights to confrontation and
    compulsory process. This argument lacks merit because he failed to object to that
    specific court cost at trial, did not develop a record on how the court costs were
    applied to him, and did not preserve the constitutional issues for appellate review.
    A notation on the appellant’s written judgment states “Court Costs,” and the
    sum of “$294.00” is typed below that heading (CR – 35). That “$294.00” figure
    was then crossed out, and the number “329” was written in its place along with
    someone’s apparent initials (CR – 77). On the second page of the judgment, the
    “Court ORDERS Defendant to pay all fines, court costs, and restitution as
    indicated above.” (CR – 78) (emphasis in original). Finally, the district clerk
    prepared and filed a bill of costs that breaks down the $329 in assessed court costs,
    including $35 for “Summoning Witness/Mileage.” (CR – 80).
    The appellant did not preserve the issue he raised on appeal
    because he failed to object in the trial court on the same
    basis and failed to develop a record on how the court costs
    were applied to him.
    The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require a party to preserve error for
    appellate review by demonstrating the error on the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a);
    6
    Clark v. State, 
    305 S.W.3d 351
    , 354 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010), aff’d,
    
    365 S.W.3d 333
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The party must make the complaint in a
    timely manner and state the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party seeks
    from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the
    complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context. TEX. R.
    APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).
    In raising the complaint on appeal, the party must ensure the point of error is
    the same as the complaint or objection made during trial. 
    Clark, 305 S.W.3d at 354
    . Even constitutional errors can be waived if a party fails to properly object to
    the errors at trial. 
    Id. at 355.
    A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute as
    applied to a defendant may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Curry v. State,
    
    910 S.W.2d 490
    , 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Therefore, if a party’s objection at
    trial does not correspond with its issue on appeal, the party has waived that issue.
    
    Clark, 305 S.W.3d at 354
    .
    In the present case, the appellant claimed on appeal that Article
    102.011(a)(3) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure was unconstitutional as
    applied to him. (App’nt Brf. 8). Article 102.011(a)(3) provides that a “defendant
    convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor shall pay the following fees for services
    performed in the case by a peace officer…$5 for summoning a witness.” TEX.
    CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.011(a)(3) (West 2010). Article 102.011(b) further
    7
    provides that a defendant is also required to pay “29 cents per mile for mileage
    required of an officer to perform a service listed in this subsection and to return
    from performing that service,” and “all necessary and reasonable expenses for
    meals and lodging incurred by the officer in the performance of services under this
    subsection.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.011(b) (West 2010). There was no
    indication in the bill of costs how much of the $35 “Summoning Witness/Mileage”
    fee was for summoning witnesses and how much was for mileage and expenses.
    Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the appellant ever objected to the
    assessment of such court costs on any basis. Therefore, his constitutional claims
    were not preserved for appellate review, and the court of appeals properly
    dismissed his claim.
    The appellant cites Cardenas v. State, 
    423 S.W.3d 396
    , 398–99 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2014), and Johnson v. State, 
    423 S.W.3d 385
    , 391–92 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2014), in support of his argument that an objection was not required. (App’nt PDR
    Brf. 9). But those cases dealt with the sufficiency of the evidence to support court
    costs, not the constitutionality of the court-cost statutes themselves. It is well-
    settled that no trial objection is required to challenge the sufficiency of the
    evidence on appeal. See Moff v. State, 
    131 S.W.3d 485
    , 488–89 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2004). But it is equally well-settled that a trial objection is required to challenge
    the constitutionality of a statute as applied to a particular litigant. See Curry, 
    910 8 S.W.2d at 496
    ; see also Johnson v. State, 14-14-00475-CR, slip. op. at 6 (Tex.
    App. – Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 25, 2015, no pet. h.) (“Because neither Johnson
    nor Cardenas provides appellant with an exception to the requirement that he
    preserve his facial constitutional challenge in the trial court, we conclude that
    appellant failed to preserve error for appellate review.”).     Therefore, a trial
    objection was required in the present case, and the appellant waived his complaint
    on appeal by failing to make such a trial objection.
    The appellant also cites Landers v. State, 
    402 S.W.3d 252
    (Tex. Crim. App.
    2013), in support of his argument. (App’nt PDR Brf. 10). In Landers, court costs
    and included fees of $3,718.50 for an attorney pro tem and $440.00 for
    investigative costs of the prosecutor were assessed against Landers without notice.
    On appeal, the appellant challenged the statutory authority and sufficiency of the
    evidence to sustain the assessment. Landers v. State, 10-11-00408-CR, 
    2012 WL 3799212
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 30, 2012). This Court held that Landers
    was not required to file a motion for new trial to challenge the assessment of such
    costs on appeal because his “complaint was one of law and not facts.” 
    Landers, 402 S.W.3d at 255
    . As in all sufficiency challenges, there could be no further
    factual development of the record because sufficiency challenges are based on the
    existing record.
    9
    In the present case and unlike Landers, whether the appellant’s rights to
    confrontation and compulsory process were violated required further factual
    development. Specifically, as highlighted by the appellant, additional fact-finding
    was required on “whether this fee is for the State’s subpoenas or the defense
    subpoenas.” (App’nt Brf. 8). Additional fact-finding was also required on whether
    the appellant truly “cannot bear the costs associated with the defense of his
    constitutional rights,” as he claimed. (App’nt Brf. 10). Thus, because additional
    fact-finding was required in order to support the appellant’s as-applied
    constitutional challenge to the statutory court costs, the appellant should have filed
    a motion for new trial, or, in the alternative, a formal bill of exception. See 
    id., 402 S.W.3d
    at 256 (Keller, P.J., concurring). It simply defies logic to allow an as-
    applied challenge to proceed without an opportunity to develop the record on how
    the statute was applied to the facts of the particular case.
    The appellant cites Sturdivant v. State, 
    445 S.W.3d 435
    (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d), in support of his claim that a formal bill of
    exception was not required to develop the record. But like Landers, Sturdivant was
    challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the assessed fees under
    Mayer v. State, 
    309 S.W.3d 552
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), rather than the
    constitutionality of the court cost statute as applied to him. Thus, there could be no
    further factual development of the record. As-applied constitutional challenges, on
    10
    the other hand, require a factual development. See State v. Rosseau, 
    398 S.W.3d 769
    , 774 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011), aff’d, 
    396 S.W.3d 550
    (Tex. Crim. App.
    2013) (“Rosseau’s motion to quash only raised an ‘as-applied’ challenge to the
    constitutionality of section 22.011(f), which could not be determined pre-trial
    because it depends on the facts developed at trial.”); see also Carrollton-Farmers
    Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    826 S.W.2d 489
    , 551
    (Tex. 1992) (“determination of whether statute as applied violates Constitution
    ‘requires a fully-developed factual record.’”) (citing Brady v. Fourteenth Court of
    Appeals, 
    795 S.W.2d 712
    (Tex. 1990)). Because the appellant’s claim required full
    factual development, he should have filed a formal bill of exception to develop the
    record. His failure to do so waived the issue for appellate review. See 
    Landers, 402 S.W.3d at 255
    (“A motion for new trial is required to preserve error only when
    it is necessary to adduce facts not in the record.”).
    Finally, the appellant cites a civil case, Rylander v. Caldwell, 
    23 S.W.3d 132
    (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.), in support of his claim that he could not have
    challenged the constitutionality of Article 102.011(a)(3) under the procedure
    established by Article 103.008. (App’nt PDR Brf. 11). Article 103.008 provides:
    “On the filing of a motion by a defendant not later than one year after the date of
    the final disposition of a case in which costs were imposed, the court in which the
    case is pending or was last pending shall correct any error in the costs.” TEX. CODE
    11
    CRIM. PROC. art. 103.008 (West 2010). The Rylander court held that “seeking a
    declaration that the statute imposing the costs is unconstitutional” did not
    constitute “error” under Article 103.008. 
    Rylander, 23 S.W.3d at 137
    . But the
    term “error” has traditionally included both constitutional and non-constitutional
    errors. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). And if a court cost should not have been assessed
    because it was unconstitutional, then surely there would be an error in the assessed
    costs, which could be challenged and corrected under Article 103.008. Thus,
    Rylander is incorrect and should be repudiated by this Court.          Nevertheless,
    Rylander is ultimately irrelevant to this case because the appellant was required to
    develop the record in order to support his as-applied challenge to the statute and to
    preserve the issue for appellate review.       
    Landers, 402 S.W.3d at 255
    .       The
    appellant failed to develop such a record. Therefore, his claim was not preserved
    for appellate review, and the court of appeals properly rejected it.
    12
    PRAYER
    It is respectfully submitted that the court of appeals properly affirmed the
    judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court should affirm the ruling of the lower
    court of appeals for the reasons stated.
    DEVON ANDERSON
    District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    /s/ Eric Kugler
    ERIC KUGLER
    Assistant District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    1201 Franklin, Suite 600
    Houston, Texas 77002
    (713) 755-5826
    kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net
    TBC No. 796910
    13
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE
    This is to certify that: (a) the word count function of the computer program
    used to prepare this document reports that there are 2,611 words in it; and (b) a
    copy of the foregoing instrument will be served by efile.txcourts.gov to:
    Jani Wood                          Lisa McMinn
    Assistant Public Defender          State Prosecuting Attorney
    Harris County, Texas               P.O. Box 13046
    1201 Franklin, 13th Floor          Austin, Texas 78711
    Houston, Texas 77002               Lisa.McMinn@SPA.texas.gov
    Jani.Maselli@pdo.hctx.net
    /s/ Eric Kugler
    ERIC KUGLER
    Assistant District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    1201 Franklin, Suite 600
    Houston, Texas 77002
    (713) 755-5826
    TBC No. 796910
    Date: August 26, 2015
    14