Daniel Medrano v. State ( 2015 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-13-00292-CR
DANIEL MEDRANO, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 140th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2012-436,049; Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, Presiding
August 20, 2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
After a bench trial, the court convicted appellant Daniel Medrano of possession
with intent to deliver a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in an amount of four
grams or more but less than 200 grams.1 Appellant plead true to an enhancement
paragraph and was punished by imposition of a sentence of sixty-five years’
1
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (d) (West 2010). An
offense under this section is a first-degree felony.
confinement in prison.2 On appeal, appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to
identify him as the person who possessed the contraband. Disagreeing, we will affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
Background
Shortly after 1:00 a.m. on August 14, 2012, a Lubbock police officer saw a small
Suzuki SUV with a defective tail lamp operating on a public road. He activated the
lights of his patrol car and the Suzuki pulled to the side of the road. Shining a spotlight
on the vehicle, the officer saw only one occupant, the driver. The officer noted the
driver was “nervously looking back and forth” and the vehicle’s brake lights remained
on. The officer’s view of the driver was limited to the driver’s reflection in the side rear-
view mirror. He described the driver to dispatch as a light-complected black or Hispanic
male, possibly wearing a black hat or a black “do-rag.” As the officer watched, the
vehicle moved forward a few feet. A black object flew out the passenger-side window
into an adjoining vacant lot. The officer requested backup. Then the Suzuki sped
away.
The officer testified he turned on his siren and gave chase. He said he obeyed
stop signs but the Suzuki’s driver did not, so he fell behind by about five to ten seconds.
At one point, the officer briefly lost sight of the vehicle. He continued following its path
and found it parked in a neighborhood.
2
Based on appellant’s prior felony conviction, the punishment range was
enhanced to imprisonment for life or any term not more than 99 years or less than 15
years. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(1) (West Supp. 2014).
2
The Suzuki was unoccupied but the keys were in the ignition. Other officers
arrived and established a perimeter. In the vehicle, the officer found $133 in cash, a
yellow sword, a glass smoking pipe with white burned residue, a small black air soft
pistol, and two cell phones.
The officer requested that another officer retrieve the object tossed from the
Suzuki. When he reached the scene of the initial stop, some residents from across the
street were outside their homes. They pointed the second officer to an area some eight
feet from the street. There the second officer found a black zipper pouch. The second
officer was in the vicinity when he received the call and needed, according to his
estimate, less than two minutes to reach the scene of the initial stop.
Meanwhile police contacted the registered owner of the Suzuki. He indicated his
daughter Natalie Lemon drove the vehicle. When officers contacted Lemon she
explained she allowed appellant to borrow the vehicle. Lemon denied placing the
sword, air soft gun, pipe or the currency in the vehicle. She gave officers an address
where appellant “was staying.”
The address was a residence which, according to the officer, was some seventy-
five to a hundred feet from the parked Suzuki. Angelica Gutierrez and her children lived
there. Officers gained entrance to the residence. The officer testified Gutierrez told him
appellant had arrived at the house shortly before police arrived. In a bedroom, officers
found appellant in bed. He was removed from the residence and arrested on an
outstanding parole-violation warrant.
3
At trial, Gutierrez testified she and appellant had a long-standing relationship
which had been romantic. Contrary to the officer’s testimony of her statements, she
testified that on the night of appellant’s arrest, he had been at her house for some time.
He loaned the Suzuki to someone she knew only as “homeboy,” and went to bed, telling
Gutierrez to wake him when the borrower returned the Suzuki.
The pouch contained a substance that later proved to be methamphetamine with
a net weight of 10.64 grams. It also held measuring spoons, cotton swabs, and a digital
scale with residue. Officers also found in the pouch a cellphone payment receipt
containing appellant’s name and an address and telephone number, as well as the
operator’s manual for an iPhone 4.
At trial, appellant testified and agreed the black pouch was his. He used it, he
said, to carry a razor and blades. He further agreed the iPhone manual belonged to him
and the receipt “probably” was his. Appellant testified that although he was married, he
lived with Gutierrez at the time of his arrest. Like Gutierrez, he told the court he loaned
the Suzuki to another person, whom he identified as his neighbor “Josh.” Despite
knowing Josh for “about four or five years” and knowing his phone number by memory,
appellant did not know Josh’s last name.
Several of appellant’s recorded jail telephone conversations were played for the
court. In one, appellant told a female, “They found the black thing, and inside had a
receipt that had my phone bill on it.” Appellant stated in another call, “They found that
thing and charged me with everything that was in it.”
4
According to a testifying narcotics detective, the quantity of methamphetamine
found in the pouch was consistent with that of a street dealer. He further explained that
“in the world of methamphetamines” knives are more common than guns and air soft
pistols are used “for show.”
The court found appellant guilty and imposed the noted sentence after a
punishment hearing.
Analysis
Through two issues, which we discuss jointly, appellant contends the evidence
was insufficient to prove he possessed the contraband. Appellant divides his argument
between contentions the proof he was the Suzuki’s driver was insufficient, and that
proof linking him to the contraband found in the black pouch also was insufficient. The
key to the sufficiency argument, however, is the evidence appellant was the driver,
because he does not contest that the Suzuki’s driver was linked to the contraband.
We apply the same standard of review in bench trials as in jury trials. Grant v.
State, 989 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). “In
determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, a
reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom, a rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d
560 (1979)). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
5
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard
gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to
ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original). A reviewing court
“determine[s] whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the
combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
In the face of conflicting inferences, a reviewing court presumes the factfinder resolved
the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defers to that determination.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. We “defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations
because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given
their testimony.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326). As such, the factfinder is free to believe all, some, or
none of the testimony presented by the parties. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459,
461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Williams v. State, 290 S.W.3d 407, 412 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2009, no pet.). “It is not necessary that the evidence directly proves the
defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in
establishing the guilt of the actor, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to
establish guilt.” Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). It is the State’s burden to prove each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, not to exclude every conceivable alternative to a
defendant’s guilt. Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (explaining
6
that “the evidence is not rendered insufficient simply because appellant presented a
different version of the events”).
A person commits an offense if he knowingly possesses with intent to deliver a
controlled substance in an amount four grams or more but less than 200 grams. TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (d) (West 2010). Possession means “actual
care, custody, control, or management.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
481.002(38) (West Supp. 2014); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp.
2014).
Appellant points to pieces of evidence that, he contends, preclude a finding of
guilt on the identity issue. The officer agreed that at the traffic stop he “never really got
a good look at who was driving” the Suzuki. The best description the officer could give
of the vehicle’s driver was “a light-complected black or light-complected Hispanic male,
possibly wearing a black hat or a black do-rag.”
According to Lemon, when police contacted her, they said they sought a
heavyset Hispanic male. Appellant testified his neighbor Josh is a “light-complected,
bigger guy.” He is Hispanic and sometimes wears do-rags. Appellant was not heavy
set and never wore do-rags. Gutierrez testified appellant loaned the Suzuki to someone
she knew as “homeboy.” Appellant denied possession of the methamphetamine,
spoons, scale, the sword, the air soft pistol, and the money. He denied being in the
vehicle during the chase. Appellant further contends evidence of guilt is weakened
because police did not find a hat or do-rag in his possession, his fingerprints did not
appear on the pouch or its contents, the drug dog police brought to the scene showed
7
no interest in appellant, and the evidence shows no connection between appellant and
the two cellphones found in the Suzuki.
Appellant cites cases addressing the sufficiency of evidence showing possession
of contraband.3 All the cases he cites are distinguishable on their facts from this case.
And none are helpful to our analysis because the determinative question in this case is
whether appellant was the driver of the Suzuki.
Under the Jackson standard, the evidence was sufficient to permit the trial court
as finder of fact reasonably to find appellant was the driver of the Suzuki. Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319. Appellant, Gutierrez and Lemon all testified he borrowed the vehicle from
Lemon. Appellant acknowledged he owned the black pouch thrown from the vehicle
during the attempted traffic stop and found minutes later at that location. Although the
pursuing officer briefly lost sight of the Suzuki, he shortly located it near Gutierrez’s
house. This was the address where Lemon said appellant “was staying,” where
appellant testified he was living, and where appellant was found shortly after the chase
ended. The trial court was free to believe the officer’s version of the conversation with
Gutierrez rather than the version of events to which Gutierrez testified. By the officer’s
testimony, Gutierrez that night indicated appellant had just arrived at the house. The
court also was free to reject appellant’s and Gutierrez’s testimony that he loaned
Lemon’s Suzuki to the mysterious “Josh” or “homeboy.” Likewise, the State was not
obligated to negate the other hypothesis to which appellant refers on appeal, which
3
Appellant relies on Nguyen v. State, 54 S.W.3d 49, 51 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2001, pet. refused), overruled on other grounds by Fagan v. State, 362 S.W.3d 796
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. refused); Kyte v. State, 944 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 1997, no pet.); and Collins v. State, 901 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex.
App.—Waco 1994, pet. refused).
8
effectively would have required the court to believe that a bystander found appellant’s
pouch lying near the street and, for reasons unclear, put into it a large quantity of
methamphetamine, spoons, and a scale with residue.
Finding the evidence sufficient to establish appellant drove the Suzuki and
possessed the methamphetamine and other contraband, we overrule appellant’s two
issues on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
James T. Campbell
Justice
Do not publish.
9