Jeffery J. Sheldon and Andras Konya MD, PhD v. Pinto Technology Ventures, L.P., Pinto Tv Annex Fund, L.P., Ptv Sciences II, L.P., Rivervest Venture Fund I, L.P., Rivervest Venture Fund II, L.P., Rivervest Venture II (Ohio), L.P., Bay City Capital Fund IV, L.P., Bay City Capital Fund IV Co-Investment ( 2015 )


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  • Reversed and Remanded and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed
    September 10, 2015.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-13-01066-CV
    JEFFERY J. SHELDON AND ANDRAS KONYA, MD, PH.D., Appellants
    V.
    PINTO TECHNOLOGY VENTURES, L.P., PINTO TV ANNEX FUND, L.P.,
    PTV SCIENCES II, L.P., RIVERVEST VENTURE FUND I, L.P.,
    RIVERVEST VENTURE FUND II, L.P., RIVERVEST VENTURE II
    (OHIO), L.P., BAY CITY CAPITAL FUND IV, L.P., BAY CITY CAPITAL
    FUND IV CO-INVESTMENT FUND, L.P., CHRIS OWENS, BILL BURKE,
    REESE TERRY, AND CRAIG WALKER, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 125th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2013-41145
    DISSENTING OPINION
    When deciding whether claims fall within the scope of a forum-selection
    clause, a reviewing court should engage in a “common-sense examination of the
    substance of the claims.” See In re Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc., 
    274 S.W.3d 672
    , 677
    (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). The majority misapplies this standard
    by looking primarily at the label of the claims, rather than their substance. I would
    hold that the Shareholders’ claims—all of which pertain to the dilution of equity
    interests—arise out of their Shareholders Agreement (the “Agreement”), and thus,
    fall within the scope of the Agreement’s forum-selection clause.
    The clause at issue provides that certain courts in Delaware “shall have
    exclusive jurisdiction and venue over any dispute arising out of this Agreement.”
    Whether a claim “arises out of” an agreement turns on the substance of the claim,
    not artful pleading. 
    Id. A claim
    may arise out of an agreement if the claimant seeks
    a direct benefit from the agreement, or if liability is derived from the agreement as
    opposed to some other general obligation imposed by law. 
    Id. A claim
    may also
    arise out of an agreement if, but for the agreement, the claimant would have no
    basis to complain. See In re Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 
    310 S.W.3d 880
    , 886 (Tex.
    2010) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
    The majority holds that the Shareholders’ claims fail the “but for” test from
    Lisa Laser because the claims are “an assortment of non-contractual claims.” The
    majority explains that the claims are non-contractual for two reasons: (1) the
    Shareholders did not sue for a breach of the Agreement, and (2) “all of the
    purported obligations that the IDev Parties allegedly breached arise either under
    statute or common law.”
    In effect, the majority concludes that only claims for breach of contract and
    tortious interference with contract can satisfy the “but for” test. The majority’s
    reasoning is erroneous because it considers just the labels of the claims, which
    conflicts with binding supreme court authority that we must focus on the substance
    of the claims instead. See In re Fisher, 
    433 S.W.3d 523
    , 529 (Tex. 2014) (orig.
    proceeding) (stating that a court should consider the substance of the claims,
    2
    without regard to the claimant’s characterizations or artful pleadings). The majority
    is also wrong in taking such a limited view of the “but for” test. The supreme court
    has noted that a “but for” requirement has in itself “no limiting principle; it literally
    embraces every event that hindsight can logically identify in the causative chain.”
    See Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors Inc., No. 13-0597,
    — S.W.3d —, 
    2015 WL 3653330
    , at *10 (Tex. June 12, 2015). In addition, no
    other court of appeals has used Lisa Laser to limit the scope of a forum-selection
    clause.
    The substance of the Shareholders’ claims is that the IDev Parties diluted the
    Shareholders’ equity interests by engaging in various forms of tortious conduct. If
    the Shareholders’ equity interests had not been diluted, they would have no basis
    for their lawsuit.
    The Shareholders’ pleadings demonstrate that the dilution of their equity
    interests was closely connected with the 2010 amendments to the Agreement,
    which retained the Delaware forum-selection clause. Importantly, the 2006 and
    2008 Agreements had the same Delaware forum-selection clause. The
    Shareholders alleged as follows:
     The Shareholders had a previous agreement (with a Delaware forum-
    selection clause) that named one of them, Jeffery Sheldon, as a “Significant
    Shareholder,” a term which gave him preemptive rights and other rights
    relating to the sale of company shares. The other Shareholder, Andras
    Konya, was identified as a “Key Shareholder,” and he did not have the same
    set of rights.
     In 2010, the IDev Parties decided “to dilute the holdings of the company’s
    common shareholders to the point that the common stock holders were
    almost wiped out altogether.” The reason for this dilution was “to permit the
    3
    venture capital stockholders and their select related parties to acquire newly
    issued preferred stock.”
     The IDev Parties took many steps towards achieving this dilution of the
    equity interests. These steps included (1) causing the conversion of all
    preferred stock to common stock; (2) causing the reverse stock split of all
    common stock to reduce the number of common stock shares by a 100 to 1
    factor; and (3) causing “the board of directors to join with them to amend the
    Shareholder’s Agreement, eliminating Sheldon and other similarly situated
    shareholders as ‘Significant Shareholders’ with preemptive rights.”
     “Immediately along with the transactions noted above, the [IDev Parties] set
    about to offer new preferred stock primarily to the venture capital
    defendants. In doing so, they offered—on a pro rata basis, but based only
    upon preferred stock holdings and not considering prior common stock
    holdings—preferred stock to other prior preferred stock holders. This offer
    served to significantly dilute the holdings of prior common stock holders and
    to enhance the percentage holdings of prior preferred stock holders.”
     The IDev Parties caused the Agreement “to be amended in hopes of
    avoiding Sheldon’s (and others’) preemptive rights in respect of his common
    and preferred stock holdings.”
    The Shareholders’ damages are based on the value of their shares prior to the
    dilution. The number and value of the shares will be determined by comparing
    their holdings under the 2008 Agreement and the 2010 Agreement. The
    Shareholders allege that:
     Sheldon’s more than 5% holdings (before dilution) should result in several
    millions of dollars rather than approximately $20,000 after dilution.
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     Konya’s 2.4% holdings (before dilution) should result in over one million
    dollars rather than approximately $10,000 after dilution.
     Under their claim for damages, the 2010 Agreement is unenforceable.
    This court has previously recognized that a claim may fall within the scope
    of an arbitration clause if the factual allegations “touch matters,” have a
    “significant relationship” to, are “inextricably enmeshed” with, or are “factually
    intertwined” with the contract that is the subject of the arbitration agreement.1 See
    AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 
    105 S.W.3d 190
    , 195 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding). In AutoNation, a consumer sued for a violation of
    the Texas Finance Code in connection with a financing agreement that did not
    contain an arbitration clause. 
    Id. at 194.
    However, the consumer had a purchase
    agreement that did contain an arbitration clause. 
    Id. Although the
    arbitration
    provision in the purchase agreement was not limited to the words “arising out of,”
    the court applied a “but for” test, concluding: “But for [the consumer’s] purchase,
    there would have been no relationship between the parties and no financing
    transaction that is the basis of [the consumer’s] claims.” 
    Id. at 197.
    Similarly, but
    for the Agreement in this case, there would be no relationship between the parties
    and no claims.
    The Shareholders have clearly pleaded that the dilution of their equity
    interests was part of the same tortious conduct as the amendment to their
    Agreement. Therefore, the Shareholders’ claims are, to borrow language from our
    arbitration jurisprudence, “enmeshed” and “intertwined” with the Agreement. Cf.
    In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 
    180 S.W.3d 127
    , 135 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)
    1
    Arbitration cases are germane to an analysis of a forum-selection clause because
    arbitration clauses are “another type of forum-selection clause.” See Smith v. Kenda Capital,
    LLC, 
    451 S.W.3d 453
    , 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (quoting In re AIU
    Ins. Co., 
    148 S.W.3d 109
    , 115 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)).
    5
    (holding that a personal injury claimant who was not a signatory to a contract to
    build a house was bound by the contract’s arbitration agreement because her claim
    arose from the construction and repair of the house).
    A plain reading of the Agreement confirms that the Shareholders’ claims and
    damages arise out of that Agreement. One of the many amendments to the
    Agreement was a redefining of the term “Significant Shareholder,” under which
    Sheldon was previously classified. Now, under the amended Agreement, that term
    is reserved for investors who acquired the stock that resulted in the dilution of the
    Shareholders’ equity interests. The Agreement was amended to enable that dilution
    and to protect the investors who acquired the newly issued stock. The Shareholders
    would have no basis for their suit but for the Agreement. Cf. In re H&R Block Fin.
    Advisors, Inc., 
    235 S.W.3d 177
    , 178 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
    (investors would have no suit but for their investor account agreement).
    The majority asserts that the purported obligations that the IDev Parties
    breached arise under either statute or common law, rather than the Agreement. The
    majority explains that the Shareholders could have asserted all of their claims
    without the Agreement. I disagree. The Agreement exists and the rights and
    obligations of the parties are set out in the Agreement. The IDev Parties’ liability
    “must be determined by reference to it,” rather than general obligations imposed by
    law. See Weekley 
    Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 132
    . The lawsuit will focus on the parties’
    shares in the 2008 Agreement versus what they ended up with in the 2010
    Agreement. All of their damages will be based on the amount of shares that they
    previously owned. The “but for” test has been met. See In re H&R Block Fin.
    Advisors, 
    Inc., 235 S.W.3d at 178
    .
    6
    I would hold that the Shareholders’ claims arise out of the Agreement and
    are subject to the Agreement’s forum-selection clause. Because the majority holds
    otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
    /s/ Tracy Christopher
    Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Christopher and Busby. (Frost,
    C.J., majority).
    7