in the Matter of the Marriage of Carrie Lanell Price and Nathan Doyle Price and in the Interest of A.D.P. and J.L.P., Children ( 2015 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14-00260-CV
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF
CARRIE LANELL PRICE AND NATHAN DOYLE PRICE
AND IN THE INTEREST OF A.D.P. AND J.L.P., CHILDREN
From the 249th District Court
Johnson County, Texas
Trial Court No. D201205445
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Nathan Price, appearing pro se as he did at trial, appeals the trial court’s final
decree of divorce for his marriage to Carrie Price.1 We will affirm.
Nathan’s pro se brief fails to comply with most of the requirements of Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38.1. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. Because we, like Carrie, have been
able to discern several issues raised by Nathan, we invoke Rule 2 to suspend Rule 38.1’s
1The background of the case and the evidence are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them
here in detail. Because all the dispositive legal issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum
opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4.
appellant’s brief requirements to expedite this matter.2 See id. R. 2; see also In re Marriage
of Jordan, 264 S.W.3d 850, 852 n.1 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.) (stating that we review
and evaluate pro se briefs with patience and liberality).
Jurisdiction. Nathan generally argues that we and the trial court have no
jurisdiction over his marriage and that he has the freedom to exercise religion; instead,
God’s law (the Bible) and the church should judge this matter.3 At least one court has
rejected similar arguments, holding that a Texas court does have subject-matter
jurisdiction in a suit for divorce over constitutional objections (the Establishment and
Free-Exercise Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the “rights of conscience” guarantee
under the Texas Constitution) and that Texas’ no-fault divorce law is constitutional and
does not violate those same constitutional rights. See Waite v. Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797, 800-
801 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); Waite v. Waite, 64 S.W.3d 217,
220-22 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). We likewise reject and thus
overrule Nathan’s challenge to jurisdiction.
Evidentiary and extraneous matters. Nathan’s complaints about matters that
occurred in a criminal proceeding that was pending against him at the time of the divorce
trial are not properly before us and are also outside the record of this case. Also not
properly before us are Nathan’s complaints about the agreed temporary orders and the
2
We will, however, disregard Nathan’s factual statements that are outside the record. See In re Marriage of
Hernandez, No. 10-09-00136-CV, 2011 WL 3821995 at *3, n.3 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 10, 2011, no pet.).
3
Subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised for first time on appeal. Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control
Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993).
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 2
contempt order and his incarceration for failure to pay child support.4 See Beard v. Beard,
49 S.W.3d 40, 69 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. denied) (final decree supplants temporary
orders); Hernandez v. Hernandez, 318 S.W.3d 464, 466 n.1 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no
pet.) (courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review contempt order on direct appeal).
Nathan’s complaints about documents that allegedly were not produced by Carrie in
discovery are not properly before us because he did not seek relief in the trial court. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.1. Finally, in his brief Nathan requests a venue change, but that request
is plainly untimely.
Any complaint about the admission of a police report pertaining to a separate
incident is not preserved for appellate review because no objection was made at trial.
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). And Nathan’s complaint (that there is a two-year limitations
period on the use of letters) about the admission of letters that he wrote to Carrie is also
not preserved for appellate review because no objection was made at trial. Id. Moreover,
no such “limitations” exists in Texas law.
Conservatorship. Nathan and Carrie each sought to be appointed sole managing
conservator, and a jury trial was held on conservatorship. The jury found that Carrie
should be appointed sole managing conservator of the two children. The trial court then
appointed Carrie as sole managing conservator and Nathan as possessory conservator.
Nathan complains about the appointment of Carrie as sole managing conservator. He
discusses some of the evidence, along with matters outside the record (which we
4
While the case was pending, Nathan became arrears in child support in the amount of approximately
$34,000. He was found in contempt and was sentenced to 180 days in jail. He served a couple of months
in jail before he agreed to pay and did pay the child-support arrearage.
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 3
disregard) and events in the case, and requests that we grant him “sole custody” of the
children. We construe this complaint and request as a challenge to the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence and that we should appoint Nathan as sole managing
conservator.
To raise a factual-sufficiency complaint on appeal, it must be preserved by
including it in a motion for new trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2), (3); Cecil v. Smith, 804
S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex. 1991). Because Nathan did not file a motion for new trial, he has
not preserved for appellate review a complaint that the evidence is factually insufficient
to support the jury finding that Carrie should be appointed sole managing conservator
or a complaint that the jury’s failure to find that he should be appointed sole managing
conservator is against the great weight of the evidence.
To raise a legal-sufficiency complaint on appeal, it must be preserved in a motion
for directed verdict, an objection to the submission of the jury question in the charge, a
motion for JNOV or to disregard the jury finding, or a motion for new trial. Because
Nathan did not do any of these items, he has not preserved for appellate review a
complaint that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury finding that Carrie
should be appointed sole managing conservator or a complaint that he established as a
matter of law he should have been appointed sole managing conservator.5
Property Division. A separate bench trial was held on property division. At trial
5
If we were to address Nathan’s complaint, we would hold that the jury’s finding was legally and factually
sufficient because of the ample evidence of Nathan’s abusive behavior (much of which he admitted at trial
to committing) toward Carrie and the children, including toward their now-adult oldest son when he was
a minor.
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 4
Carrie presented the trial court with her proposed property division, and the trial court
adopted it as the division of property between the parties.6 Because Carrie was appointed
sole managing conservator, Nathan requested a disproportionate share (90%) of the
marital estate. Carrie’s division and valuations resulted in $371,571.00 in assets to Nathan
and $379,726.79 in assets to Carrie, but those figures do not include Nathan’s retirement
pension, which was divided equally between the parties. Nathan testified that he
believed that Carrie’s testimony about the assets was “accurate,” but he makes several
complaints on appeal about the trial court’s property division.
Nathan filed an initial request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, but
because he did not file a notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law, he has
waived any complaint that the trial court did not file findings and conclusions. Sonnier
v. Sonnier, 331 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, no pet.). He has further
waived any complaints about the trial court’s failure to make valuation findings. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.711 (West 2006) (applying rules of civil procedure to request for
findings on valuation). In a bench trial where no findings of fact or conclusions of law
are requested or filed, the judgment of the trial court implies all necessary findings of fact
in support of it. See Pharo v. Chambers County, 922 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1996); Sonnier,
331 S.W.3d at 214.
We review a trial court’s division of property under an abuse of
discretion standard. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981). A trial
court has wide latitude in the exercise of its discretion in dividing the
marital property in a divorce proceeding, and that division will not be
6
Gold and silver coins that were in a safe-deposit box were omitted from Carrie’s proposal; the trial court
awarded one-half of their value to each party in the decree.
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 5
overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion. Id.; see
Zieba v. Martin, 928 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996,
no writ); Dankowski v. Dankowski, 922 S.W.2d 298, 304 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1996, no writ). The mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter
within his discretionary authority differently than an appellate judge is not
an abuse of discretion. Jones v. Jones, 804 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1991, no writ) (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701
S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985)). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the
trial court’s division of the property must be manifestly unfair. Mann v.
Mann, 607 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1980); see Vandiver v. Vandiver, 4 S.W.3d
300, 303-04 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied).
Section 7.001 of the family code provides that the trial court shall, in
its divorce decree, order a division of the marital estate in a manner that it
deems just and right. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon 2006). The trial
court is not required to divide the marital estate equally; however, its
division must be equitable. Zieba, 928 S.W.2d at 790. “The trial court’s
discretion is not unlimited, and there must be some reasonable basis for an
unequal division of the property.” O’Carolan v. Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529, 532
(Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). In deciding whether a reasonable basis
exists for an unequal division of the marital estate, the trial court may
consider “such factors as the spouses’ capacities and abilities, benefits
which the party not at fault would have derived from continuation of the
marriage, business opportunities, education, relative physical conditions,
relative financial condition and obligations, disparity of ages, size of
separate estates, and the nature of the property.” Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699.
Moreover, because the trial court is in a better position to determine
the candor, demeanor, and credibility of the witnesses, we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. See Garner v. Garner, 200
S.W.3d 303, 308 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.), overruled on other grounds
by Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011); see also In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424,
427 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (noting that trial court
is best able to observe and assess witnesses’ demeanor and credibility and
to sense “forces, powers, and influences” that may not be apparent merely
from reading the record on appeal). Instead, we defer to the trial court’s
resolution of underlying facts and to the credibility determinations that
may have affected its decision. In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d at 427. Thus, an
abuse of discretion will generally not occur when a trial court bases its
discretion on conflicting evidence. In re De La Pena, 999 S.W.2d 521, 526
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.).
In re Marriage of Hernandez, 2011 WL 3821995, at *2-3.
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 6
In a divorce case based solely on the ground of insupportability, the trial court can
consider fault in the break-up of the marriage when making a just and right division of
the community estate. In re Marriage of Brown, 187 S.W.3d 143, 144-46 (Tex. App.—Waco
2006, no pet.).
When an appellant challenges the trial court’s order on legal or
factual sufficiency grounds, we do not treat these as independent grounds
of reversible error but, instead, consider them as factors relevant to our
assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Wells v. Wells,
251 S.W.3d at 838; Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2004, no pet.). To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion
because the evidence is legally or factually insufficient, we consider
whether the court (1) had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its
discretion and (2) erred in the application of that discretion. Wells v. Wells,
251 S.W.3d at 838.
In re Marriage of Grisham, No. 10-09-00429-CV, 2010 WL 4570266, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco
Oct. 20, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
The applicable sufficiency review comes into play with regard to the first
question. We then proceed to determine whether, based on the elicited
evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Stated inversely, we
must conclude that the trial court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable.
Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (citations
omitted).
Carrie testified that she and Nathan were married in 1988 when she was age 19.
She did not go to college and was a homemaker and stay-at-home mom. She home-
schooled the two younger children. Nathan was ten years older and had a college
education. He had been employed in “IT” and earned an annual salary in the range of
$70,000 to $80,000, though he lost his job while the divorce was pending. Nathan was
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 7
eligible for retirement and had inherited over $200,000. Carrie had no separate property.
In 2010, Carrie left with the children because of Nathan’s emotional and physical
abuse of her and the children. They were separated for four months and reconciled with
the help of church members and Nathan’s agreement to counseling. After Nathan
returned to his abusive conduct, Carrie left with the children again in 2012 and filed for
divorce on insupportability grounds. She did not want the two younger children to
experience what their oldest son had experienced. She got a job as a high-school
paraprofessional with take-home monthly pay of around $700. Because Nathan was not
paying child support, Carrie enrolled in Medicaid and went on food stamps. Carrie went
to counseling for three years and was diagnosed with PTSD.
For the marital property, we begin with two retirement accounts. “A spouse has
a community property interest in the other spouse’s retirement benefits that accrued
during marriage.” In re Marriage of Smith, 115 S.W.3d 126, 132 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2003, pet. denied) (citing Valdez v. Ramirez, 574 S.W.2d 748, 749 (Tex. 1978)). Further, it is
not disputed by Nathan that the two retirement accounts are community property. The
trial court awarded Carrie one-half of Nathan’s retirement pension from his employment.
The other account, a 457(b) retirement plan, had a balance of $305,312 as of March 31,
2011. The trial court awarded Carrie $200,000 of that account, plus one-half of the account
exceeding $305,312 and awarded Nathan $105,312 plus one-half of the account exceeding
$305,312.
The parties owned mineral interests as community property and received monthly
oil-and-gas royalty checks. Carrie valued the mineral interests at $24,000, and the trial
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 8
court awarded the mineral interests to her. Nathan complains that Carrie should not
have received all of the mineral interests.
For the royalty checks received while the divorce was pending, the trial court’s
agreed temporary orders had ordered that each party was to receive one-half of each
check. Carrie testified that Nathan never gave her half of the royalty checks and that
many of them were not negotiated by Nathan and had expired. As a result, the trial court
ordered that the checks be negotiated and that the funds be placed in Carrie’s attorney’s
escrow account. In the decree’s property division, the trial court awarded Carrie
$8,664.79 in royalty funds, and Nathan was awarded the checks (estimated by Carrie to
total $6,000) received since May 13, 2013. The decree’s division of the royalty checks
supplanted the temporary orders. See Beard, 49 S.W.3d at 69.
Nathan was awarded a car (a 2002 Volkswagen) valued by Carrie at $4,4607 and a
backhoe valued by Carrie at $4,000. Nathan’s complaint on appeal appears to be that the
value of each of those items is only $1,500, but as we stated above, he waived his right to
complain about the trial court’s failure to make valuation findings.8 In any event, Carrie
testified that the Kelly Blue Book value of the car was $4,460, and Nathan testified that its
value was $1,500 because it needed transmission repair. Carrie testified that Nathan
7
Nathan complains that Carrie has not relinquished the title to this car. The decree provides that Nathan
was awarded that car, “together with … title documents.” This complaint is a matter for which Nathan
must seek enforcement in the trial court.
8
He also complains about the valuation of the motor home that he was awarded because Carrie’s valuation
did not include the motor home’s depreciation.
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 9
valued the backhoe at $4,000, and Nathan testified that its value “would be closer to
3,000.”
The trial court awarded each party the personal property “currently” in their
possession. Nathan states that, while the case was pending and he was incarcerated for
failure to pay child support, Carrie “broke into” his storage units, vehicle, and residence
“to steal” his personal property so that she could sell it. Carrie testified that because
Nathan had not been paying child support and was in jail for contempt, she sought to sell
some of their community property to have money for her and the children’s support; she
also took personal belongings and furnishings for a home that she bought. Carrie said
that she also took some community property out of storage while Nathan was in jail so
that it would not be seized by the storage owner in the event that the rental was not paid.9
Nathan complains that the decree’s award to each party of the personal property
“currently” in their possession does not reflect Carrie’s disposition of this community
property. This complaint is unclear and does not request relief, but in any event, this
community property that may have been Nathan’s personal property was not “currently”
in his possession when Carrie may have disposed of it. This complaint thus lacks merit
in this appeal.
Carrie also testified that she took some of Nathan’s separate property from a
storage shed to protect it from being ruined while he was in jail and that she “would be
9
Nathan and Carrie had three storage units. Nathan said that a storage unit was in his name and had his
lock on it, but it is unclear if that unit was one of the three units or a fourth unit that he had acquired
individually.
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 10
glad to give them back.”10 Nathan complains that Carrie has her lock on a storage unit
where his “tools” are stored and that Carrie has denied him access to the contents of that
unit. It is unclear if Nathan is complaining about the separate property that Carrie said
she would give back or some other personal property or separate personal property. In
any case, neither this separate property nor Carrie’s apparent agreement to give back this
separate property to Nathan was set forth in the decree, and it is a matter for which
Nathan must seek relief in the trial court.
Finally, we address Nathan’s complaint that two items that were awarded to him
were mischaracterized as community property; he argues that they were his separate
property because he had inherited the funds used to purchase those items. Carrie
proposed and the trial court awarded Nathan (1) the investment account with Life
Partners, Inc., which was valued by Carrie at $200,000; and (2) a 2006 Winnebago motor
home, which was valued by Carrie at $50,000.
All property on hand at the dissolution of marriage is presumed to
be community property. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a) (Vernon 2006). It
is a rebuttable presumption requiring a spouse claiming assets as separate
property to establish its separate character by clear and convincing
evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(b) (Vernon 2006).
In re Grisham, 2010 WL 4570266, at *1.
When the burden of proof at trial is by clear and convincing
evidence, we apply a higher standard of legal and factual sufficiency
review. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265-66 (Tex. 2002); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 26 (Tex. 2002). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as that measure
or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (Vernon 2002); Transp. Ins. Co.
10
These items include “workshop items,” an antique stove, an antique desk, a piano, and an RCA Victrola.
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 11
v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 31 (Tex. 1994). This intermediate standard falls
between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the
reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d
846, 847 (Tex. 1980); State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979); In re
D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied) (op. on
reh’g). While the proof must weigh heavier than merely the greater weight
of the credible evidence, there is no requirement that the evidence be
unequivocal or undisputed. Addington, 588 S.W.2d at 570. Therefore, in
reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we must give due
consideration to evidence that the fact finder could reasonably have found
to be clear and convincing and then determine whether, based on the entire
record, a fact finder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that
the allegations in the petition were proven. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25.
Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 611.
The characterization of property as either community or separate is
determined by the inception of title to the property. Smith v. Smith, 22
S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (op. on
reh’g). Inception of title occurs when a party first has a right of claim to the
property by virtue of which title is finally vested. Id. The major
consideration in determining the characterization of property as
community or separate is the intention of spouses shown by the
circumstances surrounding the inception of title. Scott v. Estate of Scott, 973
S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.).
In order to overcome the community presumption, the burden is on
the spouse claiming certain property as separate to trace and clearly
identify the property claimed to be separate. See Estate of Hanau v. Hanau,
730 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex. 1987) (citing Tarver v. Tarver, 394 S.W.2d 780, 783
(Tex. 1965)). The burden of tracing is a difficult, but not impossible, burden
to sustain. Latham v. Allison, 560 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort
Worth 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Tracing involves establishing the separate
origin of the property through evidence showing the time and means by
which the spouse originally obtained possession of the property. Ganesan
v. Vallabhaneni, 96 S.W.3d 345, 354 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied).
The issue of whether the property is separate or community property
is determined by the facts that, according to rules of law, give character to
the property. Robles v. Robles, 965 S.W.2d 605, 615 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). Separate property will retain its
character through a series of exchanges so long as the party asserting
separate ownership can overcome the presumption of community property
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 12
by tracing the assets on hand during the marriage back to property that,
because of its time and manner of acquisition, is separate in character.
Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. 1975). However, if the
evidence shows that separate and community property have been so
commingled as to defy resegregation and identification, the community
presumption prevails. Hanau, 730 S.W.2d at 667.
When tracing separate property, it is not enough to show that
separate funds could have been the source of a subsequent deposit of funds.
Latham, 560 S.W.2d at 485. Moreover, as a general rule, mere testimony that
property was purchased with separate funds, without any tracing of the
funds, is insufficient to rebut the community presumption. Zagorski v.
Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
denied) (op. on reh’g); Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723, 728 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1998, no pet.); McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). Any doubt as to the character
of property should be resolved in favor of the community estate. Akin v.
Akin, 649 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Id. at 612; see also Bush v. Bush, 336 S.W.3d 722, 743 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010,
no pet.).
We begin with Carrie’s testimony. She testified that Nathan had inherited over
$200,000 from his parents’ estate, as evidenced by two checks that were in Nathan’s
sister’s possession, according to what Nathan had told her. Carrie said that these funds
were Nathan’s separate property and that she was not asking the trial court for division
or access to those funds. In the decree, the trial court ordered that two estate checks made
payable to Nathan (in the amounts of $150,000 and $80,000) were Nathan’s separate
property.
Next, Carrie testified that she and Nathan purchased a life settlement agreement
by investing $200,000 in Life Partners, Inc. in November 2010 with a check from their joint
account. According to Life Partners account documents that Carrie offered and the trial
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 13
court admitted, the account was set up as a “joint tenant with right of survivorship
account” in both of their names.
On cross-examination, in response to Nathan’s question about how “inheritance
monies” were used, Carrie said, “Everything we bought was out of our community bank
account when we were together.” She then said that she remembered that $200,000 went
to Life Partners and she stated that Nathan was getting that property under her proposal.
Carrie never testified that the $200,000 that was invested in Life Partners was Nathan’s
inherited money or his separate property.
Regarding the Winnebago, Carrie testified that it was purchased during the
marriage in 2010 or 2011 for approximately $50,000. The Winnebago’s title was admitted,
and it is in Carrie’s name. After questioning Carrie about Life Partners, Nathan then
asked her:
Q. And then another 50,000 would be life insurance properties that would
be my property that would have been the motor home, correct?
A. I am sorry, what?
Q. There was another $50,000, basically $50,000 - -
A. The motor home is listed under yours.
Carrie did not state that the Winnebago was purchased with Nathan’s separate
property. The only testimony by Nathan on the Life Partners account and the Winnebago
was: “The Exhibit H [the Life Partners account documents], I think, we’ve determined
was not community property. Also Exhibit J [the Winnebago].”
At the conclusion of the bench trial and during the trial court’s ruling on property
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 14
division, the trial court stated: “The Court has nothing before it, evidence, that anything
of this that’s listed on Petitioner’s [Exhibit] 19 [Carrie’s proposed property division] is
separate property.” In accordance with Carrie’s proposed property division, the trial
court awarded the Life Partners account and the Winnebago to Nathan.
Nathan did not present clear and convincing evidence that the Life Partners
account and the Winnebago awarded to Nathan were his separate property. Carrie’s
testimony indicated that those two items were community property. She said that the
check used for the Life Partners account was from their joint account, and the account
was set up as “joint tenant with right of survivorship account” in both of their names. See
Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612 (“However, if the evidence shows that separate and community
property have been so commingled as to defy resegregation and identification, the
community presumption prevails.”) (citing Hanau, 730 S.W.2d at 667.). For the
Winnebago, Carrie said that “we” purchased it, and the title was in her name.
Nathan’s testimony was minimal and conclusory. Furthermore, his testimony
does not trace the items, and it is not corroborated by any documentary tracing. See Bush,
336 S.W.3d at 743 (“It is well established that, in order to show that property purchased
during the marriage is separate property, it is not enough to simply state that the funds
used to purchase the property were separate property funds; instead there typically must
be some sort of documentary tracing to show that the funds used were separate
property.”); Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612 (“Moreover, as a general rule, mere testimony that
property was purchased with separate funds, without any tracing of the funds, is
insufficient to rebut the community presumption.”). The trial court did not abuse its
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 15
discretion in characterizing these two items as community property and then awarding
them to Nathan.
In conclusion, we overrule all of Nathan’s complaints about the trial court’s
property division. The trial court’s division of the marital estate—awarding Carrie
approximately 51% and Nathan approximately 49%—was just and right and was not an
abuse of discretion.11
Having overruled all of Nathan’s complaints, we affirm the trial court’s final
decree of divorce.
REX D. DAVIS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed October 15, 2015
[CV06]
11
Nathan asserts in his brief that if the Life Partners account and the Winnebago are excluded as
community property, the marital estate division would be $379,726 to Carrie (75%) and $120,571 to Nathan
(25%). If Nathan had proved that the Life Partners account and the Winnebago were his separate property,
we would still hold that the trial court’s division was just and right and not an abuse of discretion, based
on Carrie’s and Nathan’s capacities and abilities, the benefits that Carrie would have derived from
continuation of the marriage, Nathan’s fault in the break-up of the marriage, their relative educations, the
disparity of ages, the size of Nathan’s separate estate, and Nathan’s history of refusing to pay child support.
And it is notable that, in recent correspondence inquiring about the status of this appeal, Nathan reported
that he is currently in jail again after being held in contempt again for failure to pay child support.
In the Matter of the Marriage of Price Page 16